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Chapter 1
Introduction

In an argument claiming that Plato’s early dialogues present the historical
Socrates, Gregory Vlastos says:

Xenophon’s Socrates, pious reciter of moral commonplaces, would have elicited
nothing but a sneer from Critias and a yawn from Alcibiades, while Plato’s
Socrates is just the man who could have gotten under their skin (Vlastos 1971, 23).1
Vlastos intends to justify a claim to Socratic authenticity.2 But he also tells us
something about the ways in which we read Plato. He shows that when we read a
dialogue, we import external knowledge into it in order to supplement our understanding
of the arguments and the characters. This external knowledge opens temporal dimensions
that the dialogue form cannot include, but must necessarily imply. No dialogue lasts
longer than a single day. But, in order to understand the role a particular character plays
in a dialogue, we must take into account what we know about their lives from other
sources. I argue that we not only do this, but that Plato intends us to, and constructs the
dialogues so that they force the reader to take a diachronic view of the characters.
1

Elsewhere in the same essay Vlastos characterizes Critias as “that nasty intellectual.” (1971, 9).
Brickhouse and Smith offer a good description of Vlastos’ influence. “The entire field of Socratic studies
has been a busy one lately, stimulated to a large degree by the attention called to it in the work and teaching
of Gregory Vlastos. Although we rarely agree with Vlastos’ specific positions, our debt to him and our
recognition of the great significance of his work will be obvious from our many references to his work …
No doubt, our very selection of topics reflects Vlastos’s influence” ( 1994 vii-viii). For another similar
account cf. Beversluis 2000.
2
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This diachronic dimension helps us judge or weigh the arguments that characters
put forth. Ruby Blondell calls this diachronic dimension “historical irony.” She describes
it as follows:
Plato can exploit his audience’s knowledge of subsequent events in a way that
parallels the dramatic irony of the tragedians. Just as the playwright’s audience
knew how the main events of a myth would turn out … so Plato’s readers knew
the prominent events and ideas of late fifth-century and early fourth-century
Greek history and read the dialogues in their light. Plato uses this technique,
which I call ‘historical irony,’ in various ways (Blondell 2002, 32).
I argue that the main purpose of Plato’s use of historical irony is to enable the reader to
see the relationship between the lives that people lead and the accounts that they give.
One can only see this relationship over the course of time. Plato doesn’t show us
Alcibiades and Critias when they are coming to ruin. Rather, he presents them in their
youths in order to highlight the importance of arguments and accounts on the outcome of
their lives. That is to say, that by the use of historical irony, Plato is able to turn historical
individuals into paradigmatic characters.
In a recent book, Frances Pownall shows the ways in which fourth century
historians created what she calls a “paradigmatic history” which views the past as a way
to illustrate moral points (2004).3 Thus, I build on Pownall’s concept of “paradigmatic
history” in my investigation of Alcibiades and Critias as “paradigmatic characters.” I
agree with Pownall that Plato, like the historians who followed him, saw the figures of
the past as models of different kinds of living and as potential moral examples. I show,
however, that Plato’s use of historical characters is far more complex than what we see in
3

She points out that the “influence of Socrates and Isocrates in particular results in a greater emphasis upon
the instruction of political virtue in the interpretation of the past by fourth century prose writers. As a result,
the moral and didactic elements implicit in Herodotus and Thucydides become overt and the primary focus
of the historical works of Xenophon, Ephorus, and Theopompus” (2004, 29).
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Pownall’s account. Plato uses historical figures in order to show us something about the
human experience of time itself and to enable us to evaluate synchronic arguments in a
diachronic way. Paradigmatic characters show the relationships between accounts and
lives. Plato does this through a complex use of intertextual relations with the historians.
Intertextuality is a term coined by Julia Kristeva and associated with post-modern
literary theory.4 Intertextuality refers to one text’s use of and reliance on the resonance of
other texts and other genres. Andrea Nightingale uses this concept to show how Plato
incorporates the echoes of other genres in order to create the genre of philosophy.
Nightingale focuses on Plato’s use of tragedy, encomia and comedy. Of these comedy is
the most useful for our discussion for it, like the Socraticoi logoi,5 is a genre which uses
historical characters paradigmatically. Nightingale does not use the treatment of
historical characters to investigate Plato’s relation to the historians.6 Indeed, very little
work has been done to show Plato’s connections with the tradition of classical
historiography. My dissertation shows the relation between the genres of historiography
and philosophy by focusing on the figures of Alcibiades and Critias. Plato relies on the
knowledge that his reader has of the historical tradition, but he also uses some of the
same literary devices and sees history in the same way as many fourth century historians.

4

Cf. Barthes “Any text is a new tissue of past citations. Bits of code, formulae, rhythmic models, fragments
of social languages, etc., pass into the text and are redistributed within it, for there is always language
before and around the text. Intertextuality, the condition of any text whatsoever, cannot, of course, be
reduced to a problem of sources or influences; the intertext is a general field of anonymous formulae whose
origin can scarcely ever be located; of unconscious or automatic quotations, given without quotation
marks” (1981, 39).
5
See also Kahn 1996, 1-36.
6
The historical awareness of Plato’s early readers would be much more complex: a combination of
remembered experience (in some cases) and both oral and written sources. It would more greatly resemble
the knowledge that a twenty-first century reader possesses of twentieth century figures such as Richard
Nixon or Winston Churchill.
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Thus, by combining the key concepts of Nightingale, Blondell and Pownall, I am
able to arrive at a philosophically rigorous and historically adequate description of Plato’s
use of historical characters.
Then I turn to the philosophical purpose behind Plato’s portrayal of these
characters in particular. It is not as immediately obvious as it is in the case of Xenophon
who explicitly defends Socrates against the charges that link him to the corruption of
Alcibiades and Critias. Xenophon begins by claiming that “those two men were by nature
the most honor-loving of all the Athenians. They wished that all affairs might be
conducted through themselves and that they might become the most renowned of all.”
(I.2.14).7 Xenophon tells us how bad Alcibiades and Critias were, but Plato shows them
exclusively when they were young and promising. Xenophon’s employment of
Alcibiades and Critias is historical, while Plato’s is philosophical.
Plato makes a philosophical use of Critias and Alcibiades in order to show
something about the way in which human beings live in relation to time. Most
fundamentally, through these characters, he shows that temporal relativism—or the
tendency to identify with a particular mode of time as one experiences it—causes one to
forget one’s true self, or soul. This explains how it is that we think we know things that
we don’t (Apology 29a) and how we always err unintentionally (Protagoras 358d). When
we are lost in the moment, we forget that it is simply a moment and thus we forget the
totality of our lives. When I identify with a particular temporal perspective, I take it as
the truth, as in the Protagorean claim that “as each thing appears to me so it is for me”

7

Then he says: “If the two of them struck false notes in some way, then, the accuser blames Socrates for
this; but does Socrates deserve no praise in the accuser’s opinion for the fact that when they were young
and likely to be most lacking in judgment and continence he rendered them moderate” (I. 2.26).
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(Theaetetus 152a).8 The struggle to overcome this temporal relativism is the attempt to
achieve objectivity or to account for the effects of my own perspective.
Plato shows Socrates using argument as a way to remember his true self, and to
avoid escaping his own notice. The word lanyãnoµai, which means to forget, or to
escape the notice of, comes up repeatedly in the discussions of these characters. We
escape our notice when we forget that our perspective is a perspective, when we are not
aware of our limits and when we think that we know what we don’t know. Thus the
ability to remember one’s self (with all its limitations) is the “human wisdom” of the
Apology (20e). But, since it is time and change that cause one to forget oneself, we
cannot assume that once one comes to know that one knows nothing that one has
achieved this state once and for all. Instead one must continually remind oneself of
oneself by means of questioning and investigation, as Socrates does. This shows what
Socrates gains from his endless questioning. His elenchus is an attempt to account for
and eliminate his own perspective.9 Of course, he hopes to remind others of their souls,
but as we see from the examples of Alcibiades and Critias, often he does not.
Nevertheless, his questioning enables him to see his life as a whole—i.e.
rationally—rather than forgetting himself and the forgetting through the identification
with one of the temporal modes of his life.
This means that Plato uses historical characters to show the ways that arguments
affect character over the course time. In order to make a strong case for philosophy,10 it is
8

All translations of Plato shall be those in Cooper’s edition of the Complete Works (Cooper, 1997) unless
otherwise noted.
9
Cf. Scott (ed.), 2002, for a variety of views on the elenchus.
10
See Nightingale for a thorough discussion of Plato’s claims for philosophy. In her introduction she says
“In order to create the specialized discipline of philosophy, Plato had to distinguish what he was doing
from all other discursive practices that laid claim to wisdom. It is for this reason that, in dialogue after
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imperative for Plato not only to present Socrates as a positive example but also to show
the ways that bad accounts and misunderstandings adversely affect our lives in the long
run and explain why the “unexamined life is not worth living” (Apology 38a). Thus, Plato
presents us not only with Socrates as an example of constancy and the proper relation to
time, but he also uses other characters in a paradigmatic way so that we can gauge the
effects of different accounts on different lives.
This dissertation analyzes these problems in four parts. The first part consists of
four chapters treating various aspects of the Protagoras. This dialogue provides the
framework for the analysis of the other dialogues in which Alcibiades and Critias appear.
The second part consists of separate chapters analyzing the Alcibiades I and Alcibiades’
speech in the Symposium. The third part similarly consists of a discussion of the TimaeusCritias and the Charmides in both of which Critias appears. Finally, in the fourth part, I
look at the larger social context of the decline of these two paradigmatic lives in a
discussion of Republic I, and VIII.
In Chapter 2, I present Plato’s use of paradigmatic lives in the Protagoras.
Alcibiades and Critias arrive at the house of Callias together in the Protagoras (316a).
Though subsequent history may associate the two this is the only time they appear
together in Plato.11 Plato uses paradigmatic characters in the Protagoras so that we may
use them as a way to measure our own lives.

dialogue, Plato deliberately set out to define and defend a new and quite peculiar mode of living and
thinking” (1995,10-11). I would add that Plato must not only show that his ‘specialized discipline’ was
different from other discursive practices, but he must show the danger of not adopting his “quite peculiar
mode of living and thinking.” One particularly effective way to get this point across is through the use of
emblematically disgraced figures.
11
Lampert and Planeux (1998) argue that Alcibiades is the missing fourth in the Timaeus. Their case,
however, is largely speculative.

10

The Protagoras begins with a discussion of Alcibiades just after the conversation
with Protagoras ended. That is, it begins as retold, where Socrates knows what happens
and his friend does not. When we reach the end of the dialogue, this makes sense for
there Socrates says that they should “return to inquire about whether it [virtue] can or
cannot be taught, so that Epimetheus might not frustrate us a second time” (361d).
Socrates is referring to Protagoras’ creation story at 320d. He continues saying that he
liked the Prometheus character better. “Since I take promethean forethought over my life
as a whole, I pay attention to these things” (361d4-6). I argue that the dialogue is
constructed in such a way that the reader is forced to think of it as a whole. Within the
whole, Plato presents us with a variety of historical characters in this dialogue, because it
is easier for us to see the effects of the arguments on their lives than on ours. In this
chapter, I offer an extremely close reading of the opening passages of the dialogue, while
elucidating the dialogue with a discussion of Thucydides and Xenophon. This discussion
sets up the next three chapters, each of which concern the effects of time on virtue as
presented in the Protagoras.
In Chapter 3, I turn to the first of several very detailed discussions of the
arguments concerning time and the human experience of it. In this chapter, I look
specifically at the larger temporal issues of progress and decline as they appear in
Protagoras 311b-328e. I focus on Protagoras’ views of time, progress and education.
Early in the Protagoras, Socrates asks what Hippocrates can expect to gain if he
becomes a student of the sophist. Protagoras claims that “the very day you start, you will
go home a better man and the same thing will happen the day after. Every day, day after
day, you will get better” (318a). Protagoras’ educational claims set up the tension of the
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dialogue and the difficulty of virtue in the context of change. Protagoras here spells out a
progressive view that is continued in, and justified by, his so-called Great Speech.
The first word to appear in the Great Speech is xrÒnow, or time, and I show that
the speech is obsessed with time (320d). The myth presents a story in which Prometheus
and Epimetheus are given the task of assigning powers to the different kinds of creatures.
Epimetheus takes the task from his brother. During the distribution Epimetheus forgot
(¶layen)12 himself (aÍtÒn) and he in so doing also forgot humanity. That is, in
forgetting himself, Epimetheus forgot us. This is the basis for our kinship with the gods.
Humanity becomes an aporia for Epimetheus and we experience ourselves as an aporia
(321c). Humanity is the result of a titanic afterthought.
The fact that Epimetheus does not provide for humans helps Protagoras offer an
account of progress, but Epimetheus also becomes the model for the ways in which we
forget ourselves in the course of time. These two positions are necessary correlates of
one another. As E.R. Dodds notes, any idea of forms makes real progress impossible
(1973, 4). Thus Protagoras needs divine error, and no real natures, in order to have his
kind of progress. Thus, Martha Nussbaum (1986, 101) is wrong to make Protagoras a
conservative essentialist. I show that his view of progress strips the world of forms and he
ends up as a proto-existentialist, for whom existence precedes essence.
Both the initial discussion and the Great Speech serve to show the progressive
views of Protagoras. Because Epimetheus forgets humanity, humanity is able to improve
and thus virtue is teachable. That Protagoras intends the speech as a justification of his art
becomes clear in the discussion that immediately follows (324a-327). Here Protagoras
12

Recall the opening of the dialogue where Socrates claims to have forgotten Alcibiades most of the time
(309b).
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claims that everyone teaches virtue in an argument similar to that made by Meletus in the
Apology 24d-25c. Yet, the presence of Alcibiades and Critias undermine this argument in
433 at Callias’ house and again in 399 at Socrates’ trail. Protagoras did not see the events
that were to befall Athens just a year after dramatic date of the dialogue. Protagoras both
helped form and was formed by the great Periclean Age of Athens. Alcibiades and Critias
represent different and less golden times thus showing the difficulty—if not
impossibility—of progress. The next chapter makes these claims explicit.
Chapter 4 is divided into two parts. The first treats the arguments for the unity of
the virtues (329d-333c and 358c-360e). In this part I show that, though it may be
difficult to say precisely how knowledge unifies the virtues, we can clearly see the
conceit of wisdom as the ignorance that unifies the vices since “anyone who does
anything wrong or bad does so involuntarily (êkontew)” (345e). Thus the first difficulty
to virtue is the overcoming of ignorance of ignorance. That is, we must first become
aware that we are not aware. It seems extremely difficult to do this in solitary meditation
and thus we need conversation with another in order to awake.
In the second part, I deal with Socrates’ interpretation of Simonides’ poem. I
show that—despite the interruption from 334d-339a—Socrates continues to press the
same concerns that motivated the initial discussion of unity of the virtues. Here, Socrates
shows that the passage of time makes the overcoming of ignorance so difficult.
I show that one must become and not be virtuous, precisely because virtue is a
kind of knowledge that is never fully attained, but is instead a constant struggle. One
cannot ‘be’ virtuous without succumbing to the conceit of wisdom that thinks it knows
what it does not. Becoming virtuous, I argue, is the “human wisdom” of the Apology, a
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wisdom that constantly guards against this conceit by means of the elenchus. In the next
chapter I discuss Socrates’ solution to this problem.
Chapter 5 treats the section of the Protagoras falling between 351b-358d. This
section has been discussed more than any other part of the dialogue in recent years.13 In
this chapter I address the problems of hedonism, akrasia and measurement. In each of
these the element of time is central to the argument. By focusing on this common aspect,
I am able to show that Socrates may in fact offer the ‘hedonistic’ argument on an ad
hominem basis, or from the positions of Protagoras, but that he also takes it quite
seriously. That is, he is using pleasure to argue from the position of Protagoras toward his
own position. So in the first stage, Socrates forces Protagoras to acknowledge the role
temporal perspective plays in any professed hedonism. Socrates is showing that even the
ordinary hedonist is in reality a Protagorean relativist and so, even Protagoras is, in some
respect, an ordinary hedonist. He does this by removing temporal perspective and
showing the role it played. Socrates has the many argue that pleasure now is very much
different than later pleasure and answers:
[t]hey are not different in any other way than by pleasure and pain, for there is no
other way they could differ. Weighing is a good analogy; you put the pleasures
together and the pains together, both the near and the remote, on the balance scale
and then say which of the two is more (356b1-5).
This shows that in cases of akrasia it is the presence, not the pleasure that is the deciding
factor. Indeed, it is predominantly perspective that causes one to choose as one does.
Protagorean relativism is consistently presented in Plato as declaring the truth of
perspective (cf. Theaetetus 152a and Sophist 236b). The present is the de facto
13

Gregory Vlastos claims that “more was to be contributed to this topic by English speaking scholars in the
following nine years [after his 1956 Introduction to the Protagoras] than had appeared in the previous
forty” (1995, 43).
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perspective and so it is favored by relativism because pleasures appear larger in the
present due to the power of appearance. Socrates explains this phenomenon, which
Walsh calls a “systematic illusion” (Walsh 1971, 269) by means of a spatial analogy.
The Protagorean relativism, which turns out to be the position of the many, is temporally
myopic and is lost in the things that appear big because they are nearby. Thus,
Protagoras’ claim to make Hippocrates better and better each day cannot be true, for
Protagoras sees the good merely as the pleasant present. In order to make Hippocrates
better each day, Protagoras would have to have a view of the whole that he does not have.
Socrates then shows that the way that pleasure appears is not the way that
pleasure is (and to do this he does not have to reject pleasure, but only reject the
immediate temporal perspective). Only one perspective of pleasure is correct, precisely
not the one that appears, but the one that we arrive at when perspective is accounted for,
or corrected (refuted) by questioning. Socrates is committed to hedonism, but only as he
redefines it. He succeeds in radically redefining pleasure not as something to be assessed
from moment to moment, but rather, over the course of an entire life (351b). This is the
elimination of perspective altogether and it succeeds in equating the pleasant and the
good. Socrates shows that if one looks at pleasure over the course of a lifetime everyone
will see the same things as pleasant. When this has been done, akrasia and the relativism
of Protagoras and the many have all been reduced to absurdity.14
Chapter 6 brings us to the second major section of the dissertation. In this chapter,
I turn to the Alcibiades I, where we see that Socrates makes Alcibiades realize that he
14

I agree with scholars Martha Nussbaum and Brickhouse and Smith, who argue in different ways that
Socrates accepts pleasure as a unit of measurement for goodness and in the chapter I offer a comparison
with the Republic and I show that Plato presents us with historical characters so that we can measure their
lives. I believe that we find that even only in terms of pleasure, once a life has been completed, Socrates
lived a far more pleasant life than any of the other interlocutors in the dialogue.
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does not know himself and that he is fit to be ruled rather than to rule. Socrates begins by
telling Alcibiades that he has been watching him for years (103a-b) but that his
daimonion has kept him from speaking or acting until now. Ultimately, Alcibiades will
admit that he is planning on going into politics, even though Socrates has shown him that
he has no knowledge. Thus, in the opening lines, Socrates is setting an example of the
proper relationship to time.
Socrates continues, pointing out to Alcibiades that he does not know his real
ambition in life (105a). This is another form of not knowing oneself. Alcibiades is
dominated by his ambition and yet he is not aware of it in so far as he doesn’t prepare for
the responsibility that accompanies his ambition. Socrates says, “Suppose one of the gods
asked you, ‘Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you now have or would you
rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire anything greater (µe€zv)’ I
think you’d choose to die’” (105a5-b1). Alcibiades of course, does not know what
“greater” means. After some time, Alcibiades concedes that the “better turns out to be
the same as more just” (109c12-13). Socrates asks him “who taught you how to tell the
difference between the more just and the less just” (109d4). He is again asking Alcibiades
to remember his own ignorance.
At the end of the discussion on justice and advantage Alcibiades has reached the
point of recognizing this. “I swear by the gods, Socrates, I have no idea what I mean—I
must be in some absolutely bizarre condition (étexn«w ¶oika étÒpvw ¶xonti)! When
you ask me questions, first I think one thing (ßtera), and then I think something else
(êlla)” (116e). Alcibiades is without art (étexn«w) and ground (étÒpvw), but he has
never noticed it before. Thus the seeming surprise in Socrates’ response. “And are you

16

unaware (égnoe›w), my dear fellow, of what this feeling (tÚ pãyhµa) is?” (116e). Of
course, the feeling is one of ignorance. This shows that Alcibiades is ignorant of his
ignorance. He is unaware of the feeling of wavering until it is pointed out and even then
he slips quickly back into it. Socrates tells Alcibiades “not only are you ignorant about
the most important things, but you also think you know what you don’t know” (118b1-2).
Socrates’ description of his previous attitude towards Alcibiades and his
comportment here—having this conversation first, with no small talk or flirting—sets up
an immediate contrast between himself and Alcibiades and lets him serve as a model for
the young man. From here, I go on to show Socrates’ solution to this problem and his
prescription for Alcibiades. I show that Socrates offers this prescription in temporal
terms. I argue that one of the reasons that Socrates separates the soul from the body and
what belongs to the body is to enable Alcibiades to see his life in a rational way. Time
belongs to movement and movement belongs to body and not to the soul.15 Socrates
wants Alcibiades to put his soul first so that time will not be so pressing and he will not
be caught up in the rush of events. That is, he is pushing him to recognize the divine selfmotion of the soul instead of the distracting movement of events.16 In the discussion of
“self knowledge,” Socrates tries to get Alcibiades to see the active part of his soul
actively. Socrates tries to get him to think rationally about the rational part of the soul.
In the third and shortest part of this chapter, I show the way that the author of the
dialogue plays upon the reader’s knowledge of the historical tradition in order to show
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Cf. Aristotle’s definition of time as the “number of motion with respect to before and after” (Physics
219b1). This account largely agrees with Plato’s discussion of time in the Timaeus where time is a
“moving image of eternity” (37d). This moving image of eternity is a number and this “number, of course,
is what we now call time (37d). It is because the cosmos is becoming rather being that it is a moving
image of eternity.
16
Cf. Phaedrus 245c, 245e; Timaeus 88eff.; and Laws 895b.
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another temporal effect and allow us to see Alcibiades’ life as a whole in a way that we
can’t see our own. Again it is through argument and the measurement of other lives that
we can come to think of our own lives as whole.
Chapter 7 treats Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium. I show that Alcibiades
presents two complex psychological portraits, one of Socrates and another of himself.
The portraits are constructed with a temporal care that helps to demonstrate how the souls
are contrasted precisely in their relation to—and experience of—time.
Martha Nussbaum sets the frame-tale of the dialogue in 404 and thus making the
figure of Alcibiades central to the dialogue (Nussbaum 1986, 170). Nussbaum argues
that this date explains the seemingly incongruous interest expressed by a “business man”
in speeches made about Eros at a drinking party (that turned out to be over decade
earlier). Leo Strauss places the dialogue at 407, when Alcibiades returned to Athens, was
granted full powers and lead the procession to Eleusis. Both accounts are possible the
constant uncertainty regarding Alcibiades due to his propensity for change. The dialogue
also shows us that, as often as Alcibiades’ life changed, Socrates was, remarkably, doing
the same thing in 404, 407 and 416 (the date of the dinner party). Alcibiades’ speech
presents us with pictures of memory and forgetting. As Stanley Rosen notes, the dialogue
may be “tentatively described as a series of recollections within a recollection” (1968, 2).
These recollections show us a Socrates who is split from his appearance and an
Alcibiades, split from his reality.
From here I move on to the third part of the dissertation in which I look at the
appearances of Critias in Plato’s dialogues and I diagnose in him a different form of the
same forgetfulness that we saw in Alcibiades. Alcibiades forgets himself due to constant
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change and ambition. Critias also forgets himself in ambition, but his ambition is
fundamentally nostalgic. In Chapter 8, I show that the Prologues of the Timaeus and the
Critias present tales of memory and forgetting and they cast serious doubt on the project
of historical investigation. These dialogues show the ways in which Critias fares poorly
due to his relation to time and change.
The identity of the Critias of the dialogue has been hotly contested within the
scholarly community. In this chapter, I argue, first, that Plato intended the temporal
inconsistencies and resulting confusion about the identity of the character. Then, I show
the way that Plato uses this temporal confusion to characterize the soul of Critias. Critias
is a conservative aristocrat who sees authority in the relation to the past. He knew the
genealogy of his family for six generations. I show that many of the inconsistencies are
lies intended to bolster his authority. This characterizes his discourse as an attempted
coup of the city described by Socrates on the previous day. Critias claims that he will
take Socrates mythological city and make it actual by placing it in history (26d).17 Thus
he shows that he misunderstands Socrates’ and Timaeus’ discussion, partly because he
was remembering the account he heard from his grandfather. In the Critias, he becomes
so wrapped up in remembering that he forgets himself, and the dialogue, an intentional
fragment, goes blank and once again we see that forgetfulness is most forgetful of itself.
This forgetfulness uses memory—and historical inquiry— to forget itself. Critias is full
of memory, but these memories cause him to forget himself. This has the most dismal
consequences for Athens.

17

When he does so he reintroduces the family and the private household.
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Chapter 9 investigates these same concerns in the Charmides. Plato shows the
difference between Socrates and Critias in terms of their arguments and their respective
understanding of their own accounts of sophrosune (svfrosÊnh), or temperance. Plato
sets the dialogue just after Socrates’ return from Potidaea. The setting of the dialogue
asks us how these accounts will fare when tested by war. I show that Socrates thinks of
his life as a whole and thinks about it rationally and in so doing, at the very beginning of
the long war, he minimizes the distinction between the battlefield and the city as far as
his soul is concerned. Critias, however, erases the difference between war and peace
when he turns the city itself into a bloody battleground at the war’s end. Both Critias and
Socrates present conceptions of the knowledge of knowledge and how it may rule a city.
If the accounts are struggling for the soul of Charmides, it is clear who’s account wins
and at what cost.18
Charmides gives an account of sophrosune that was provided to him by Critias
(161c). In it he says that “temperance is minding one’s own business” (161b4). This is
remarkably similar to Cephalus and Polemarchus’ attempt to define justice as “to give
each what is owed to him” (331d). Such a definition is of no use if one does not know
what one’s proper business is, or what is owed to whom.19 Such “knowledge” is only
possible if one knows that one does not know and remains aware of oneself. This is lost
on Critias and in the final part of this dissertation I will deal with the larger social
implications of this account of time and forgetting in two chapters treating the Republic.
18

Charmides died fighting Thrasybulus, with Critias.
In the Memorabilia, Xenophon reports the following story: “For when the Thirty were killing many
citizens—and not the worst of them—and turning many to the commission of injustice, Socrates said
somewhere that it would be a wonder, in his opinion, if someone became a herdsman over a herd of cattle
and made the cattle fewer and worse didn’t agree that he was a bad cattle-tender, and still more a wonder if
someone who presided over a city and made the citizens fewer and worse were not ashamed and didn’t
think himself a bad president over the city” (II.2.32).
19
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In the first of these—Chapter 10—I offer an intertextual reading of Republic I and
Lysias’ Against Eratosthenes. I locate and examine a number of intertextual parallels
between the two works. The Republic takes place at the house of Polemarchus and the
scene at the beginning of the Republic mirrors the arrest of Polemarchus in street in
Lysias. The theme of time, degeneration and violence is everywhere in introductory
discussions of the nocturnal Republic. I move from here to a discussion of the
conversation with Cephalus and finally to Polemarchus’ inheritance, death, and relation
to philosophy. This chapter makes clear the extent to which the ghost of
Polemarchus—and thus the hand of Critias— haunts the Republic and raises the problem
of intergenerational, or political, decline.
In Chapter 11, I follow the proposed analogy between the city and the soul and
move from the discussion of the decline of specific individuals over the course of a
lifetime, to the corruption of populations over the span of generations as described in
Republic VIII. I show how important generational difference and generational conflict are
to Plato’s conception of education and of the ideal city. I argue that the elimination of the
generation gap is one of the fundamental motivations behind the proposals of the ideal
city. Plato is quite clear that the individual household (o‰kow) is the seat of generational
conflict and miseducation. It is the household that disrupts the proper isomorphism
between the city and the soul and its elimination is one of the most important steps in the
establishment of the ideal city. It is important to remember this is one of the aspects of
the ideal city that Critias overthrew when he put the city in history and the same thing
happens here. When decline begins in the Republic (549c-d), the household has already
surreptitiously been reintroduced and the timocratic man is explained in terms of the
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different desires of his mother and father. This initial marital difference creates
generational difference. The existence of generational difference and private households
all but ensures that, if a regime is not just (and static) it will devolve into tyranny, sooner
or later. If it does not, it is only by chance. Thus, in order for a city to remain stable,
generational difference must be eliminated as much as possible. For the city, as well as
the individual, it seems, Plato holds that the unexamined life is not worth living.
The characters of Alcibiades and Critias have shown that even the worst of
characters do not intend to act viciously, but suffer a progressive ethical and cognitive
deterioration due to an original set of false beliefs. This means that in all but the ideal
case (the true account) one will deteriorate. A false opinion cannot be maintained; it must
be eliminated or it will always be compounded. The previous discussions of Critias and
Alcibiades have dramatically shown us that even the most promising people can become
wretched and vicious even if they have regular access the special attention of Socrates. If
one never chooses to do wrong, but so many people do so many bad things then, Plato
seems to say, drastic change is necessary. The Republic offers a model of change in order
to achieve stability.
In Republic VIII, Plato offers a political account of the same diachronic
deterioration he has dramatically shown through the characters of Critias and Alcibiades.
Alcibiades and Critias are not neutral examples. They represent the two competing
political positions. If democracy produces an Alcibiades and oligarchy a Critias, what is
one to do? Plato uses these characters to make the same point as Republic VIII, which
shows that in all but the just polis and the just individual, tyranny is a possible and
eventually ineluctable outcome. Unless justice is obtained, extreme injustice is
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inevitable, given enough time.20 There are exceptions within any city—such as
Socrates—but Alcibiades and Critias make us ask whether this is enough.
In this way the accounts of the effects of temporality in the Protagoras and the
Republic offer an explanation of Plato’s use of Critias and Alcibiades in the other
dialogues and we arrive at a coherent picture of their incoherent relationships to time. We
are blind to such effects unless we read Plato intertextually with the historians. Vlastos
and the scholars who have followed him want to find the historical Socrates in the work
of Plato. I show Plato’s thought on the relation between the human being and time and
history. In a brief conclusion, I present some of the implications of my work and make
some general conclusions outside of the framework of any particular dialogue.
In this dissertation I show that Plato turns historical characters into paradigmatic
characters by means of the historical irony that is produced by the intertextual relations
between the Socratic dialogue and the historical narrative. Plato uses these paradigmatic
characters in order to evaluate the effects of the accounts that they give over the course of
time. This entire process, the measuring of arguments with examples and vice versa, is
designed to help us avoid escaping our own notice; they are designed so that we might
recollect ourselves.

20

This is what Popper refers to as Plato’s ‘historicism’ (1950).
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Chapter 2
Promethean Readings and the Measurement of Paradigmatic Lives

In the introduction, I offered a general theory of Plato’s use of historical
characters in order to add an implicitly diachronic element to the dialogues. In this
chapter, I offer a close analysis of temporal narrative strategies of the Protagoras. In the
following chapters, I will show that the philosophical theme of the dialogue is the
relationship between time and virtue and that we can understand the unity of virtue only
when we understand the unity of life. Here I prepare this study with a careful reading of
Plato’s presentation of the historical characters included in the dialogue and the narrative
structure that contains them. I will focus particularly on the young Athenians,
Alcibiades, Critias, and Callias. These characters are in a situation similar to that of the
reader in so far as they are forced to choose sides. And yet, the lives of all of the
interlocutors are “closed” whereas the life of the reader is still open. Thus the reader can
use the fates of these characters in order to help evaluate his or her own life.
Ruby Blondell says that the “reader of Plato’s dialogues is seduced by a dazzling
interplay of unity and multiplicity” (2002, 1). She attributes this “dazzling interplay” to
“a tension between ‘philosophical’ content and ‘literary’ form” (2002, 1). One could
interpret this as a tension between narrative and argument. Narrative consists in the
presentation of consecutive events, but argument—though it moves in stages— deals
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primarily with the synchronic relations.21 This tension in many ways models that between
being and becoming that is central to Plato’s philosophy. Plato uses historical characters
because it enables him to suggest temporal possibilities that argument cannot, but the
arguments allow us to contemplate stasis and totality.
Though there are many scholars interested in a “literary” reading of Plato, such
readings have not often been rigorous enough in their analysis of Plato’s narrative
strategies, particularly as they relate to time. In the early twentieth century scholars (such
as Zielinski 190122 ) began to question whether or not Homer was able to represent
simultaneous events. Scholars of Plato have not been equally rigorous regarding his
narrative strategy, and as a consequence, very few commentators have asked how Plato
represents the passage of time or consecutive events within a single dialogue.23 This
chapter will offer a careful reading of the narrative techniques of the Protagoras. It is
particularly important to show how Plato treats the time and character from a literary
perspective in a dialogue that is philosophically so concerned with precisely these issues
of time and character.
Plato does not use just any characters, but often makes specific use of characters
of historical significance. In doing this, he incorporates the works of the historians into
his dialogues. Thus, the characters are paradigmatic. That is, he can use the knowledge
the reader has obtained from many sources in order to make his own philosophical point.
By his paradigmatic use of characters, Plato uses the art of measurement so that we can
assess what constitutes a well-lived life. Though the dialogue begins with Alcibiades,
21

This seems to be one of the points of Sophist 252a-263e. Relations can exist in a way that involves
neither time nor change.
22
I am grateful to Lorenzo F. Garcia for pointing out this reference.
23
I will avoid the more difficult issue of temporal relations between dialogues.
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many of the other Athenian characters offer us alternative fates to contemplate.24 In this
chapter I will offer the lives of these characters in outline, while setting up the apparatus
we will need to understand the dialogue as a whole. I will pay particular attention to the
frame within which the entire dialogue occurs and to those points at which discussion
breaks down in order to allow an interplay between characters. In doing this I will show
the complex ways in which Plato represents and makes philosophical use of the passage
of time on human life.
Writing on Apuleius’ Golden Ass, John Winkler makes a distinction between a
first and second reader.25 The second reader knows what will happen and is therefore
aware of the structure of the whole. “No reader can really be expected to see what is
coming the first time through. There were, one later recalls, or rereads, premonitions”
(Winkler 1985, 10). Winkler continues, saying that it “is only a second-time reader, a
rereader, who will be fully alert to the ambiguities and traps” that point towards the
conclusion (1985, 10). In his own discussion of the Golden Ass, Winkler champions an
artificial, or hermeneutic, first reader, who remains open to such ambiguities.
When discussing the Protagoras, however, it may be wise to begin at the end, as
second readers. In the final lines of the dialogue Socrates suggests that they continue to
seek virtue and “then to return to inquire about whether it can or cannot be taught, so that
Epimetheus might not frustrate us a second time in this inquiry (µØ pollãkiw ≤µçw ı
ÉepiµhyeÁw §ke›now ka‹ §n tª sk°cei sfÆl˙)” (361d). Socrates is referring back to
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I agree with Friedlander 1964 ii, 10, that there is a political element involved in the discussion. It is
partly for this reason that I focus on the lives of the Athenian youths present, rather than those of the
sophists. This is true of Socrates himself, who conducts his discussions with the sophists for the sake of the
youths who listen. Patrick Coby 1997 reads the dialogue in terms of the character of Protagoras. See his
introduction, 13-17.
25
Cf. Winkler 1985, 1-22.
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320d and suggesting that, as first readers we had been tripped up by Epimetheus, who
had somehow caused us to fail. Socrates says that he liked the Prometheus character
better. He says, “It’s because I have forethought for my life as a whole that I go into all
these questions” (⁄ xr≈µenow §g∆ ka‹ proµhyoÊµenow Íp¢r toË b€ou toË
§µautoË pantÚw pãnta taËta pragµateÊoµai) (361d4-6). Protagoras
misunderstands entirely. He tells Socrates, “We will examine these things later, whenever
you wish; now it is time to turn our attention elsewhere (ka‹ per‹ toÊtvn d¢ eﬁw aÔyiw,
˘tan boÊl˙, di°jiµen: nËn d’Õra ¥dh ka‹ §p’ êllo ti tr°psyai)” (361e). His
words reflect the concern with time that dominates the dialogue, while mirroring the
attitude of Epimetheus, who waits until later to address the rational (321c); in the
meantime, he turns his attention elsewhere. Socrates responds that he will leave; he
should have gone some time ago.
After speaking these words and leaving the house of Callias, Socrates meets his
associate to whom he will narrate the dialogue. Plato has set up the Protagoras so that the
whole dialogue begins as retold (or reread). Thus, from the first words, Plato offers us
models of both first and second readers. As we read the dialogue, we are becoming more
like Socrates and less like the ‘associate’ to whom the dialogue is recounted, unless, like
Protagoras and the others, our attention takes us elsewhere and we forget ourselves.
Ultimately, Plato encourages us to think of the dialogue as a whole so that we can think
of our lives as a whole.
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Time and Appearance: 309a-c
The discussion of Alcibiades that begins the dialogue circles around the theme of
perspective. The dialogue opens with Socrates’ anonymous associate asking “Where have
you just come from, Socrates? (PÒyen, Œ S≈krtatew, fa€n˙;)” (309a1). A more
literal translation is “From where, Socrates, have you appeared?” These opening words
establish the theme of appearance. An appearance is always from ‘somewhere;’ i.e.
appearance is by definition perspectival.26 This is one of the reasons that appearances
are so unreliable. The danger of appearance is that we take the characteristics of our
limited perspective as part of the thing itself. If it appears from somewhere, it appears
“to us” and not “by nature,” but we take the way that it appears to us as its nature.27 This
is the essence of Protagorean relativism. Socrates puts it in the Theaetetus, “that as each
thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you” (…w oÂa
µ¢n ßskata §µo‹ fa€netai toiaËta µ¢n ®stin §µo€, oÂa d¢ so€, toiaËta d¢ aÓ
so€)(152a6-8). Perspectives may either be spatial or temporal (cf. Sophist 235d-236a).
In the Protagoras, when the associate says that it is clear (d∞la) to see that
Socrates has been hunting Alcibiades, it is, in fact, far from clear. This does not mean,
however, that it is not true. In a sense, Socrates has been hunting Alcibiades, as he hunts
the souls of all the Athenian youths at Callias’ house. The associate does not know this
and continues, “Well I saw him the other day and he certainly still is a beautiful man (ka€
µÆn µoi ka‹ pr–hn ﬁdÒnti kalÚw µ¢n §fa€neto énØr ¶ti)” (309a). Again the Greek
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Coby’s claim that “He greets Socrates as an appearance (pothen phaine), as an apparition that has
suddenly materialized before him” (1987, 19) seems either exaggerated, or pointless. He is not treating
Socrates as an apparition, but Plato is pointing out an essential feature of appearance.
27
Cf. Aristotle Physics 184a17-20.
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says more literally: “To me seeing (µoi ﬁdÒnti) him in the recent past (pr–hn) he still
(¶ti) appeared (§fa€neto) to be a beautiful (kalÚw) man.” Here we have another form
of fa€nv and two temporal markers.
The ‘¶ti’ is of special importance. It signals that Alcibiades was beautiful in the
past and has remained so, but that he may not always remain so. Like the English ‘still’ it
holds the relation between the three temporal modes of past, present and future. The only
reason that we would remark that something is ‘still’ a certain way—it is still sunny
outside, for instance—is because of the expectation of change. Appearance is temporal,
it is formed by what may be called the structural difference between the past present and
the future. This structural difference is analogous to the spatial difference between “here”
and “there.” The closer something is to here or now, the larger and more important it
seems.
The associate remarks to Socrates upon the social impropriety of his relationship
with the “man” Alcibiades, whose “beard is already (≥dh) filling out” (309a). This
phrase tells us a great deal. It is a comment on the erastes/eromenos relationship that is
essential to Athenian intergenerational relations. Such relations are essential to the
experience of time and history. In Athens such relationships were subject to relatively
strictly enforced codes.28 When the associate comments on Alcibiades’ age, he implicitly
scolds Socrates on the impropriety of the relation. 29 Socrates asks, “Well, what of it? I
thought you were an admirer of Homer, who says that youth is most charming when the
28

See Dover 1978 and Davidson 1998 for two different views on this institution. We will have occasion to
return to this subject more explicitly when we discuss the Symposium.
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Taylor thinks that it is a question of desirability rather than propriety. “Sexual attractiveness was
considered to fade with maturity; cf. Alc. I 131d. Hence Alcibiades, who is now a man, is (from the erotic
point of view) ‘past his best,’ though still handsome (1976, 65). It is interesting that he is ‘past his best’
however when from our point of view he has not achieved or failed in the ways that we know him for.
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beard is first blooming—which is just the stage Alcibiades is at” (309b). More literally,
the Greek says “which Alcibiades now (nËn) holds.” If we remember that Socrates has
just finished his conversation with Protagoras about temporal distance, the nËn takes on a
heightened significance. Wisdom is superior to beauty (309c) because the kind of beauty
that Alcibiades has is determined entirely by perspective, either spatial or temporal.
There are two passages in Homer to which Socrates could be referring, one in the
Iliad, the other in the Odyssey. Both of them refer to Hermes. Zeus sends Hermes who is
described as appearing “ for all the world like a young prince, sporting his first beard just
in the prime and fresh warm pride of youth” (Iliad XXIV 346-349)30 to lead old Priam,
unseen, past the Achaean ships. The passage in the Odyssey is also referring to Hermes.
Here, he is protecting Odysseus from Kirke. Both cases specifically concern appearance.
We may wonder whether Socrates is comparing Alcibiades to Hermes in some way. Or
is he (like his friend) commenting on the transitory nature of what is called beauty? In
either case, it is likely that Plato uses these references to bring the mutilation of the
Hermae to the reader’s mind. If an ancient reader were aware of the passages, he would
most likely not fail to recognize the connection that remains between Alcibiades and
Hermes.
The “mutilation” is in the ‘future’ of the dialogue, which is set “shortly before the
outbreak of the first Peloponnesian War, probably about 433” (Taylor 1976, 64).31
Socrates would have been about 37 and Alcibiades 17. I want to argue that Plato would
not stress Alcibiades’ youth if he were not using the historical characters included in the
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Unless otherwise noted, all translations of Homer are Fitzgerald’s.
A rough consensus has developed on the issue of the dramatic date of the dialogue. Cf. Guthrie 1969 iv,
214 and Nussbaum 1986, 443.
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dialogues to open up a diachronic temporal dimension in the dialogues. Whatever the
dramatic date, it is prior to Alcibiades’ political and military career. It is also prior to the
mutilation of the Hermae, which is the turning point, or crisis, in that career.

The Mutilation of the Hermae
Alcibiades
In the summer of 415, Athens voted to give the generals Alcibiades and Nicias the
power to recruit the forces necessary for the invasion of Sicily. Thucydides says, “In the
midst of these preparations [for the invasion] all the stone Hermae in the city of Athens,
that is to say the customary square figures so common in the doorways of private houses
and temples, had in one night most of them their faces mutilated” (6.27). 32 The
population thought that this was a bad sign for the expedition “and a part of a conspiracy
to bring about a revolution and upset the democracy” (6.27). To these charges were
added those of profaning the mysteries in private houses (6.28). Those who were
opponents of Alcibiades “magnified the matter and loudly proclaimed that the affair of
the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae were part and parcel of a scheme to
overthrow the democracy and that nothing of all this had been done without Alcibiades”
(6.28). Alcibiades asked to be tried before he left on the expedition, in order to prove his
innocence, but this request was refused. His enemies wanted “to have him sent for and
brought home for trial upon some graver charge which they would easily trump up in his
absence (6. 29). 33 Here we see the themes of presence and absence, now and later, that
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All translations of Thucydides are Crawley’s unless otherwise noted. Gomme, Andrews and Dover point
out that “whether early in the period or very shortly before the expedition was due to sail, neither
Thucydides nor any other ancient source tells us” (1970 iv, 271).
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For a comparison between Thucydides and Andocides, see Gomme, Andrews, and Dover (1970 iv, 273).
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come to dominate the later half of the Protagoras. Alcibiades displays a certain degree
of forethought in his attempt to settle the matter before the expedition. It seems as if
Alcibiades was acting wisely, but was overcome by his enemies. 34
Thucydides explains that once the ships had sailed “the Athenian people grew
uneasy and suspicious of those involved in the affair of the Mysteries, and became
convinced that all that had taken place was part of an oligarchic and monarchical
conspiracy” (6.60). The suspicions were wide-ranging,35 but they fell most harshly onto
Alcibiades. Thucydides writes:
Now that the Athenians fancied that they had got at the truth of the matter of the
Hermae, they believed more firmly than ever that the affair of the Mysteries also,
in which he was implicated, had been contrived by him in the same intention and
was connected with the plot against the democracy…in short, everywhere
something was found to create suspicion against Alcibiades (Thucydides 6.61).
Alcibiades was recalled and left Sicily, though he never returned to Athens (6.61).
Instead, “Alcibiades, now an outlaw, crossed in a boat…to the Peloponnesus; and the
Athenians passed sentence of death by default upon him and those in his company”
(6.61). He would, however, continue to play a major role in Athenian politics (and the
self-conception of the Athenians) long after this sentence was passed. These incidents
seared the image of Alcibiades into the minds of the Athenian public. Ten years later
Aristophanes was able to produce the Frogs, in which the deciding factor in a contest (in
the underworld) between Euripides and Aeschylus was the opinion of the poets on the
recall of the fallen general (1422ff).
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Cf. Chapter 4 for a discussion of the role of external events in our misfortunes.
Murray (1990, 149-161).
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Plato’s reference to the Homeric passages at the beginning of the Protagoras
alerts the careful reader to the importance of this future on the discussion. The reference
not only links the life of Alcibiades to that of Socrates, but also to a whole cast of
historical characters, who were both “present” at the house of Callias for the discussion
with Protagoras and involved either in the mutilation of the Hermae or the profanation of
the mysteries.
References to these events will reappear throughout the dialogue. For instance,
when Socrates and Hippocrates arrive at Callias’ house, they are greeted by a eunuch
(314c). It is reported that the faces and the genitals of the Hermae, which also guarded
doorways, were mutilated that night in 415. Socrates refers to the house as the
underworld (315c-316a), setting the true drama of the dialogue into the dark future.36
The underworld is the future of each interlocutor, but it is a distant future. We are
interested in what these characters did in the interval between birth and death. We can
learn from the ways in which they lived and died. Though the setting is compared to
Hades, on a more mundane level the dialogue takes place at the house of Callias (311a).

Callias
To readers of Plato, Callias, is most often thought of as a very rich man who
lavishes money on sophists (Apology 20a-b) and he is portrayed that way here. He was
known for his lavish spending, but he was also known as a priest. Regarding this
spending and the priesthood it has been said,
He was famous also for dissipating his personal wealth, at one time among the
greatest in Greece, so that by 387 he had only two talents (while his grandfather’s
36
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wealth amounted at one time to two hundred talents), and near the end of his life
he could be called the ‘beggar priest’ (µhtragÊpthw) (Clinton 1974, 49).37

Callias was also known for his relation with Alcibiades and the mysteries, over which he
was perhaps daduch, or torch bearer, during the affair of 415. Clinton describes the
relation thus:
The office of the daduch was involved in the accusation of Alcibiades for impiety
in this year. The charge was that Alcibiades called himself hierophant, Polytion
daduch, and Theodorus of Phegaia herald. The daduch was certainly among the
priests and priestesses of Eleusis who cursed Alcibiades in 415 and who had to
rescind their curse in 408…Callias may well have been the daduch at this time
(Clinton 1974, 48).
Not only was Callias one of the officials at Eleusis, but he was also Alcibiades’ brotherin-law. Alcibiades treated his wife Hipparete horribly and yet he and Callias argued over
the size of his dowry, when Alcibiades argued that he was owed ten additional talents
(Clinton 1974, 48-49).

Finally, as Clinton reports, “Alcibiades was also said to have

planned the assassination of Callias in order to acquire his wealth” (Clinton 1974, 49).
Thus emerges a web of political, familial and religious connections that explode in the
mutilation. In addition to this we know that Callias was proxenos to Sparta, a position
which Alcibiades’ “paternal grandfather, Alcibiades II is known for having
renounced…in 462” (Nails 2003, 13). This is an office which Thucydides (5.43.2 and
8.891) shows that Alcibiades would try to reclaim.38

Charmides and Critias
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The phrase ‘beggar priest’ (µhtragÊpthw) comes from Aristotle citing Iphicrates Rhetoric 140519-24.
cf. Nails 2003, 73.
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Cf. Nails on Callias. “Thus he is a prominent example of Plato putting well-known living persons into
the dialogues; since Callias III remained active in Athenian politics well after the establishment of the
Academy, members would have known the man and his character” (2002, 69).
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It is well known that one of the main charges against Alcibiades is that he
profaned the mysteries by performing them in a private house. What is less widely
discussed is the fact that it was not at any private residence but that of Charmides (Nails
2002, 18).39 Charmides is also among the guests in the Protagoras. Charmides is
generally known to readers of Plato as the ward of Critias and one of the Eleven who
‘policed’ the Piraeus under the Thirty. Like Critias he died fighting the forces of
Thrasybulus and the democracy.
Alcibiades arrives at the house of Callias with Critias, who was also involved in
the profanation and is generally believed to have been instrumental in one of Alcibiades’
recalls (under the condition that the democracy was deposed)40 and, ultimately, in his
assassination (Nails 2002, 15). He was exiled at some point by the Democracy at the time
of the recall in 407. Xenophon provides an interesting detail of this exile. He has
Theremenes say that Critias “was establishing a democracy in Thessaly along with
Prometheus and arming the serfs against their masters (Hellenica 2.3.36).41 In the
Memorabilia he claims that Critias lost control of himself in Thessaly (I.2).
It is difficult not to think of Socrates’ claim in the Crito that in Thessaly “you will
find the greatest license and disorder” (53c). It is not clear whether an ancient reader
would have seen a connection between his time in Thessaly with a “Prometheus” and the
story presented by Protagoras, but it is worth pointing out.
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Eryximachus is also present and was implicated in the mutilation of the herms.
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We readers know what happens to Critias, Callias, Alcibiades and Socrates. Their
lives are closed in a way that ours are not. For Plato the difficulty is pushed back onto
each of us. We know how they turn out, but what is important is how we turn out. It is
this implied future that allows Plato to present us with the consequences of living “an
unexamined life” (Apology 38a).
The presentation of paradigmatic characters lets Plato suggest the major events in
the infamous career of Alcibiades to good philosophical effect. It also allows him to place
numerous histories side by side. As we have just seen, the future of Alcibiades intersects
with that of Callias, Critias, Charmides and Socrates.42 If we “weigh” the lives of these
paradigmatic characters we may see that Socrates’ support of hedonism is not as
scandalous as many commentators believe. Socrates need not actually be a hedonist or
be committed to hedonist principles, but Plato can be asking us to evaluate the
philosophical life in comparison with a variety of other lives.43 Even if pleasure is the
only standard, Socrates lived the best life.44
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were; but this a chance arrangement designed by he poet, for, as we know, together with Charmides, both
men later are of the greatest importance in politics. That ‘Socrates the Sophist’ was executed ‘because he
educated Kritias’ was a popular view for decades after the event (Aischines I 173). It is common knowledge
also that, after the death of Socrates, there was an agitated literary debate about his relationship with the
politically subversive Alkibiades. Thus, the reader who understands these implications realizes that, as far
as Socrates is concerned, more is at stake than academic philosophy: the search for arête involves the
nature of the state” (Friedlander 1964, 9-10. Cf. also. 22). Friedlander is certainly correct when he says that
the presence of Alcibiades and Critias shows the political nature of the search for virtue. But there is more
to their presence than that. For both met ignoble ends and Plato wants to show us the philosophical reasons
behind this decline.
43
Pleasure acts as a (somewhat) quantifiable standard of measurement. It would be difficult to believe that
Socrates lived less pleasantly than Alcibiades, Critias or any of the other characters, including Protagoras.
Pleasure is certainly not the only criteria, but as both the Republic (580a-588a) and the Nicomachean Ethics
(1099a5-20) argue, the philosophical life is the most pleasant life as well as the best. In fact, in the
Republic, Socrates shows by exactly how much the pleasure of a king—who must, of course, be a
philosopher— exceeds that of the tyrant. He tells Glaucon that “a king lives seven hundred and twenty-nine
times more pleasantly than a tyrant and that a tyrant is the same number of times more wretched” (587e). I
will return to this discussion in the following chapters.
44
I mention this here, but treat the problem of hedonism thoroughly in Chapter 5.
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Interruptions of Memory 334d-336e4 and 347b-348c
As first readers, we are like Socrates’ associate and we do not know what is to
come. Socrates admits that he had seen Alcibiades. His associate asks Socrates how he
appeared to Alcibiades (∑ par’ §ke€nou fa€n˙) (309b). Socrates responds, saying:
“Pretty well, I think, especially today (oÈx ¥kista d¢ ka‹ tª nËn ≤µ°r&), since he
rallied to my side and said a great many things to support me” (309b). Socrates’
associate cannot know what this means, since he does not even know that Protagoras is in
town, much less that Socrates has just finished a conversation with him. But, as
Friedlander points out, after “the introductory frame of the dialogue we look forward with
excitement to Alkibiades” (1964, 10). The associate and the first reader share in this
excitement, and a second reader can evaluate the role that Alcibiades’ comments at 336b
and 347b have on the discussion.
Socrates says something surprising to his associate. He says that he “forgot all
about” Alcibiades “most of the time” (§pelanyanÒµhn te aÈtoË yaµã) (309b).
Alcibiades, it turns out, forgets about himself most of the time as well. The wording of
this passage gives us a clue as to how Socrates forgot Alcibiades and how we forget
ourselves. The word ‘yaµã’ is a form of ‘ëµa.’ It can refer to either space or time.
Spatially it means “together in crowds, close, thick” (Liddell and Scott 1897, ad loc).
Temporally, Liddell and Scott say that the word means “often, oft-times, frequent” (1897,
ad loc). Here Lombardo and Bell translate it as “most of the time.” Any of these
translations works if we think carefully about the entire sentence. The temporal concept
of ‘often’ is a discontinuous one, one of temporal change. It is occasional, or episodic. It
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presents us with moments coming thick and fast as if in a crowd. It is a plurality of
discontinuous moments. It is due to this discontinuity that constitutes much of the human
experience of time, that we forget our lives in the moment. In the next chapter, I will
show that this forgetfulness, in the Protagoras, is the true enemy of virtue. No wonder
we find it so easy to see a plurality of virtues, when we experience our lives in a
fragmented, momentary manner. Self-knowledge is opposed to forgetfulness and this
self-knowledge unifies the virtues. Here, however, it is necessary to show how it is
precisely this forgetfulness, which reappears throughout the dialogue, that both
establishes and destroys the art of Protagoras. Socrates claims to forget Alcibiades, but
Plato will not let the reader forget him.45 The very fact that Plato has already made the
reader expect a defense of Socrates precludes this possibility.
At 334d Socrates claims that he can no longer engage in the discussion as it has
been going, due to his forgetfulness. “Protagoras, I tend to be a forgetful sort of person
(§gv tugxãnv §pilÆsµvn), and if someone speaks to me at length I tend to forget
(§pilanyãnoµai) the subject of the speech” (334d). Socrates asks that the conversation
be tailored to his forgetfulness.
Now, if I happened to be hard of hearing and you were going to converse with
me, you would think you had better speak louder to me than to others. In the same
way now that you have fallen in with a forgetful person (§peidØ §pilÆsµoni
§n°tuxew), you will have to cut your answers short if I am to follow you (334d).
The claim to be forgetful is, of course, a classic example of Socrates’ seemingly selfdeprecating irony, but Socrates is making a serious point about people in general and the
ability to follow long discourse carefully. After Callias defends the length of Protagoras’
45

He is pointed out as an example at 320, “jumps in” to the conversation at 336c (where he is once again
followed by Critias), and does so again at 347b, 348b-c (where he is followed by Callias).
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answers (336b), Alcibiades points this out, showing he has understood the purpose of
Socrates’ remarks. “At this point (oÔn) Alcibiades jumped in (Ípolab≈n)” (336b) to
defend Socrates. He says of Protagoras,
let him engage in a question-and-answer dialogue and not spin out spin out a long
speech every time he answers, fending off the issues because he doesn’t want to
be accountable, and going on and on until most of the listeners have forgotten
(§pilãyvntai) what the question was about (336c-d).

Alcibiades recognizes that most people are dazzled by such long speeches and forget the
issue at hand. Alcibiades may recognize his own tendency to forget (Cf. Symposium
216b) but, he knows that “Socrates won’t forget (µØ §pilÆsesyai), no matter how much
he jokes about his memory (oÈx ¯ti pa€zei ka€ fhsin §pilÆsµvn e‰nai)” (336d).
Alcibiades claims that Socrates is not forgetful, as he claims to be, but Alcibiades is, like
Socrates, acutely aware of the power of forgetfulness that long speeches induce. Thus, it
seems as if question and answer discussions are the remedy to forgetfulness (334d-e).46
In this passage Plato weaves the characters together, forcing us to consider them
together, to compare them, just as they (the audience have to decide between Socrates
and Protagoras). Critias, once again, follows closely behind Alcibiades.
After (µetã) Alcibiades it was Critias, I think who spoke next ‘Well, Prodicus
and Hippias, it seems to be that Callias is very much on Protagoras’ side, while
Alcibiades as usual wants to be on the winning side of a good fight. But there’s no
need for any of us to lend partisan support to either Socrates or Protagoras (336de).
In narrative, events always fall one after (µetã) another. Argument allows us to present
sequential options simultaneously. If we think in sequential terms about the outcomes of
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Of course, any reader trying to keep the entire discussion of even a short Platonic dialogue in mind at
once, knows that it is easy to forget the topic of a short answer discussion as well.
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our actions, assuming perhaps that we will become better each day, then we will simply
want to be on the winning side and the tide will always change. We shall all be forced to
choose a life, there is no non-partisan position to take. If we leave this up to chance, then
it is only by chance that we do not end up a short-lived tyrant like Critias.
In the next interruption of dialogue, after the discussion of the poem, it is Hippias
who has forgotten the purpose of the conversation when he plans to offer his
interpretation of the poem. Now, it is Alcibiades who remembers the purpose. Instead of
deferring the conversation at hand until later, as Protagoras will do (361e), Alcibiades
holds Hippias back saying, “some other time (aÔyiw), though. What should be done now
(nËn) is what Socrates and Protagoras agreed upon” (347b). Alcibiades then succeeds in
embarrassing Protagoras (348c). The reader must remember that this is not yet
Alcibiades the general, but a young man of seventeen years who defers the demonstration
of one older sophist and embarrasses another in order to keep him engaged in the contest.
Here, Plato is showing some of the spirit that must have later motivated the confidence of
the Athenians in Alcibiades. But, the impulsiveness also shows us something about his
ruin.
In this chapter I have shown the ways in which Plato uses historical characters in
the Protagoras in order to open a diachronic dimension to the dialogue. This diachronic
dimension allows us to measure or assess the lives of the interlocutors and their
arguments. In the process of evaluating the interlocutors’ lives, we are forced to think of
our own lives as a whole and thus we evaluate our own lives in the same way. In the next
chapter, I continue to explore the theme of the effects of the passage of time on human
virtue. I will show that the Great Speech, the discussion of Simonides, and controversial
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claims about hedonism, akrasia and measurement, all make more sense in this temporal
context.
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Chapter 3
Progress and Decline in the Protagoras

In this chapter I will look at the issues of temporal change—progress and
decline—as it occurs in the Protagoras from 311b-328e. I show that the theme of
education—with which this section begins and ends—is given its foundation in the Great
Speech and that both express an explicitly progressivist point of view. In this chapter I
focus primarily on Protagoras’ view and will turn to Socrates’ treatment of this problem
in the next chapter, which details the Simonides poem and the discussion of the unity of
virtues. It will, however, be necessary to touch on views expressed by Socrates in order to
make those of Protagoras clear within the larger context of the dialogue.

Progress and Education
When Socrates and Protagoras meet, Socrates asks Protagoras what Hippocrates
can expect to gain if he becomes a student of the sophist. Protagoras’ response makes
explicit one of the central themes of the dialogue: progress. “Young man, this is what you
will get if you study with me: the very day you start, you will go home a better man, and
the same thing will happen the day after. Every day, day after day you will get better (ka‹
•kãsthw ≤µ°raw éei §p‹ tÚ belt€on §pididÒnai)” (318a). The formulation of this last
sentence is worth noticing. We have •kãsthw ≤µ°raw juxtaposed with ée€. The first
terms represent time’s division. Each (•kãsthw) differentiates those of a kind as
individuals and ‘day’ (≤µ°raw) is perhaps the most fundamental division of time, and
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certainly the most obvious.47 In contrast, always (ée€) is a word that describes the unity
of time, its unchanging quality.48 This is the tension of the dialogue and the difficulty of
virtue in the context of change. If Protagoras is right and one may become better each day
then change predominates. Change, however, may as well be for the worse. If people
may change every day they may also become worse every day. We shall see this in the
character of Critias, both in this dialogue and the Timaeus and the Critias.
For Socrates, this is not an issue yet. The question remains in what respect will
the pupil become better (318c-d). Socrates certainly thinks that humans can and do learn.
He points out that even with his age and wisdom, Protagoras could become better if
someone taught him something he “didn’t happen to know already (µØ tugxãnoiw
§pistãµenow)” (318b). Socrates’ wording hints that Protagoras’ wisdom may have been
acquired by chance (Cf. 319e-320a). What sort of things do we pick up by chance and
how valuable are they? We do not pick up skills like playing the flute or painting—which
take a concerted effort towards a pre-established set of ends—haphazardly (318b-d).
Socrates points to both painting and flute-playing as clearly defined areas in which it is
clear in what ways one may get better. This clarity seems to come from the object of
each of these arts. If these subjects were actually the point of the inquiry, their teachers
could probably be far more specific, telling the pupil precisely how much time will be
spent on the scales of each mode, or learning to mix colors. But in areas like those in
which the sophists specialize, the object itself is unclear. Socrates asks “exactly how will
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Cf. Republic 588a where Socrates speaks of the calculation of pleasant and just lives. “Yet it’s a true one,
and one appropriate to human lives, if indeed days, nights, months, and years are appropriate to them.”
48
Though ée€ can mean ‘ever,’ ‘always,’ or ‘forever,’ (Liddell and Scott 1897, ad loc) these definitions are
joined in their stress on temporal unity.
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he go away a better man and in what will he make progress each and every day he spends
with you?” (318d).
After a jab at Hippias (318e), Protagoras answers:
What I teach is sound deliberation (eÈboul€a), both in domestic matters (t«n
oﬁk°vn)—how best to manage one’s household (oﬁk€an), and in public affairs
(pÒlevw)—how to realize one’s maximum potential for success and political
debate in action (ka‹ prãttein ka‹ l°gein) (318e-319a).
This is the “art of citizenship” or—to translate it differently—the “political art”
(politikÆ t°xnh). It is a kind of council regarding economic (in the Greek sense) and
political affairs.49
The reader knows that Socrates has already rehearsed this conversation with
Hippocrates. The line of questioning there focused on “what you expect to become”
(311b-312a) by going to an expert. Socrates terms his questioning in a way that one is
tempted to call more “existential.” He is asking the student what he wants to become by
studying with the sophist (…w t€w genhsÒµenow). If he goes to a doctor as a student50 he
expects to become a doctor (311c), if he goes to a sculptor, he expects to become a
sculptor. When Socrates asks Hippocrates what he expects to become by going to
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Coby says, “Under the direction of Socrates’ guiding hand, the subject that Protagoras professes to teach
(euboulia)—but that Socrates disallows as teachable—has been transformed into a virtue that at once
partakes of the knowledge of techne but that transcends techne” (1987, 48). Coby thinks of this part of the
dialogue as “one continuing ascent: (1) from betterment to learning; (2) from good counsel to political art;
(3) from private gain to good citizenship; and (4) from good citizenship to virtue, understood as art with
moral component” (1987, 48). A continuous ascent may easily transfer to a continuous descent.
50
John Beversluis questions the analogy as a whole. He says ,” The professional expertise of the doctor,
which is ordinarily valued as a means to the desired end of health is, from the point of view of the
prospective practitioner of medicine, valued as an end in itself and the very thing he wants to learn. The
point is well taken but the analogy is not thereby rehabilitated. Although it is plausible to say that medical
students consult doctors to become doctors, it is implausible in the extreme to say that people consult
sophists to become sophists” (2000, 249-250). Puzzlingly, the reasons Beversluis cites for the disanalogy
are precisely those brought up by Socrates himself. “The doctor’s [expertise] consists in a specific, clearly
defined and comparatively narrow range of skills” (2000, 250).
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Protagoras, Hippocrates is embarrassed to say that he would become a sophist (312a).51
When pushed, however, Hippocrates says that a sophist is one “who has an understanding
of wise things” (312c). Socrates uses painters and carpenters to make his point this time.
“But if someone asked us ‘wise in what respect?’ we would probably answer for painters,
‘wise as far as making images is concerned” (312d). Hippocrates answers that the
sophist will make him a clever speaker. Socrates, still not satisfied, saying that the answer
is “true but not sufficient” (312d). Socrates says that a lyre-player is an expert at speaking
about the lyre (312e). This may be a dubious example. The lyre player cannot
necessarily speak well about the lyre. But it seems as if Socrates’ better point could be
expressed by saying “if a lyre-player can speak well about something, it is about the
lyre.” Hippocrates doesn’t notice either way and when Socrates asks him about what the
sophist will make him a clever speaker (312e), Hippocrates is unable to answer.
Socrates takes a slightly different track of questioning with Protagoras. The elder
sophist has already defended the name “sophist” against the embarrassment of a
prospective student (316d-317d). Protagoras has also begun to answer Socrates’ final
question to Hippocrates, i.e. about what he enables his student to speak well: “domestic
matters (t«n oﬁk°vn)—how best to manage one’s household (oﬁk€an),” and “public
affairs (pÒlevw)—how to realize one’s maximum potential for success and political
debate in action (ka‹ prãttein ka‹ l°gein)” (318e-319a). Hippocrates has already
heard Socrates warn him that “those who take their teachings from town to town and sell
them wholesale or retail to anybody who wants them” most likely have no idea “which of
their products are beneficial and which detrimental to the soul” (313d).

51

In the Gorgias, Polus feels no such shame (cf. 461b).
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Instead of asking for the meaning of eÈboul€a, Socrates cuts Protagoras off and
says instead that he believes that such virtue cannot be taught, that it is “not something
that can be imparted from one human being to another” (319b). The following example
about Pericles’ sons show that they did not gain it by birth, nor by teaching. If the
“political art” cannot be passed on from one human to another, one must ask how might
someone be, or become, virtuous.52
Socrates begins his account with endoxa. He says that the Athenians seek experts
when they are deliberating about matters where training and teaching (and thus expertise)
are possible. But, he says, because the political art may not be taught, the Athenians think
everyone capable of offering political advice (319c-e).53 Some, however, such as Pericles
are listened to more than others. Yet, even these figures cannot manage “to hand on the
others the excellence which they possess” (319e). This is true of both domestic and
political expertise and Pericles stands as Socrates’ example.
Socrates says, “Look at Pericles,” and points out that Pericles educated his sons
very well in those subjects for which there were teachers, but he doesn’t—and by
implication is unable to— teach them, or have any one else teach them, the things about
which he is wise. Thus “his sons have to browse like stray sacred cattle and pick up
virtue on their own wherever they might find it (aÈtÒµatoi peritÊxvsin)” (319e320a).54 In Plato, Pericles often appears as a model of this inability to teach virtue.55

52

I will take up the difference between being and becoming virtuous in the next chapter.
Cf. C.C.W. Taylor for a useful summary of the argument (1976, 72).
54
Cf. Alcibiades I 118c-119b and Meno 93a-94d.
55
“The sons of Perikles, half brothers Kallias, follow on the scene. They are always (as they are here)
witnesses to the thesis that ‘arête cannot be taught’” (319e) (Friedlander 1964 ii, 9).
53
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Indeed, this recurring example helps us establish that Plato uses historical characters in a
paradigmatic way.
The claim that Pericles cannot instill virtue is not an attack on Pericles, whatever
Plato or Socrates thought about him. If so, it would be nothing more than an ad hominem
argument against a dead man and would not be of any philosophical importance. Rather,
it is an example employed to make the larger point. The argument seems to go: if virtue
could be taught, then certainly Pericles would have either instructed his children himself
or had them instructed by someone else.56
This claim puts Protagoras in a peculiar position. In order to claim that he can
teach virtue, Protagoras must first show that it is teachable (instead of, as often, what it is;
Cf. 361d). Since Socrates appealed to the democratic Athenians as his “witnesses” that
virtue is not teachable, Protagoras must claim that everyone teaches virtue,57 before he
can claim that is “uniquely qualified” (328b) to do so. He seems to agree with Socrates
that it is not inherited. He defends the idea that a father such as Pericles may educate his
sons well, while also claiming that a sophist educates them better than others (presumably
including Pericles). Socrates, however, claims that the youth wander around like cattle
hoping to achieve virtue by chance. If one is lucky and achieves virtue by chance, then
56

The “someone else” may be Protagoras himself. Pericles was also associated with Protagoras. Plutarch
reports a discussion that says something about the perceived relation between Protagoras and Pericles.
Schiappa summarizes thus, “A young man, Epitimus of Pharsalus, was killed accidentally with a javelin.
Pericles and Protagoras supposedly spent an entire day trying to decide whether one should regard the
cause of death as the javelin, the man who threw it, or the supervisor in charge of the grounds. According to
Giuseppe Rensi, ‘In fact the answer to the problem could be any one of those three and be always right
according to the point of view—and so according to the person to whom the problem had been submitted.’
To a doctor the best answer (orthos logos) would be the javelin; to a judge in a law court the best answer
would be the person who threw it; and to an administrator the best answer would be the supervisor”
(Schiappa 1991,126).
57
Coby correctly calls this an “entrapment” of Protagoras. He describes it as follows: “If Protagoras claims
to select students on the basis of native ability (and assuming that he is master of an art that can be taught),
he threatens democratic Athens with an aristocracy of the wise; and if he welcomes students who are able
to pay…he threatens democratic Athens with an oligarchy of the rich” (1987, 51).
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one may just as well have achieved vice.58 If Protagoras can clearly define neither his art
nor its ‘field’ then a student will have no choice but to wander to him like a cow.
The next example (320a) plays on the presence of Alcibiades. The demonstrative
toutou€ indicates that Socrates points at him when he mentions Clinias. We know very
little about Clinias. In the Alcibiades I, he is called a maniac (118e), in precisely this
same context. There Socrates asks whom, if anyone, Pericles has improved.59 In the
Protagoras, Socrates tells those present to “take a good look at Clinias” (320a) in order to
illustrate how the young “browse like stray cattle” (320a).
When Pericles became his guardian he was afraid that he would be corrupted
(diafyarª), no less, by Alcibiades. So he separated them and placed Clinias in
Ariphron’s house and tried to educate him there. Six months later he gave him
back to Alcibiades60 because he could not do anything with him (320a-b).
The point here seems to be that Pericles had no real educational strategy. He was afraid
that Alcibiades would corrupt Clinias, but he “haphazardly” sent him to someone who
could not improve him. Pericles was wrong that Ariphon could educate Clinias, but that
does not mean that he was wrong about Alcibiades corrupting him. Nevertheless, he
haphazardly takes him back. Pericles, it should be noted, did not send Clinias or
Alcibiades to be a student of Protagoras, despite friendly relations with the sophist.61

58

The predicament is that if Pericles can teach virtue, why are his sons with Protagoras? If he cannot, how
does he know that Protagoras is competent?
59
In the Alcibiades I, Socrates asks who “Pericles has made into an expert?” (118d). When Alcibiades calls
the sons of Pericles idiots, Socrates asks “What about Clinias, your brother?” Alcibiades replies “There is
no point talking about him, he’s a madman” (318e). Cf. Nails 2003 ad loc.
60
Both C.C.W. Taylor and Lombardo and Bell make it read that “he” presumably Pericles gives Clinias
back to Alcibiades. There is no compelling textual or logical reason for this. The text simply says “ he
gave him back to him, not being able to do anything with him” (ép°dvke toÊtƒ oÈk ¶xvn ˜ti
xrÆsaito). Ariphon, Pericles’ brother gives Clinias back to Pericles because Ariphon could do nothing
with him. He does not give him “back” to Alcibiades, who never had custody of him in the first place. He is
sent back into the possibly corrupting sphere of Alcibiades, but the charge of Pericles.
61
Cf. Coby 1987, 52.
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Alcibiades was as ambitious as Pericles, but less self-controlled and less
successful. This was, of course, not entirely his fault.62 This is, however, precisely the
point. If one gets one’s teaching regarding virtue by chance, then one will not be prepared
for the difficulties that fortune may present. The world in which Alcibiades pursued his
political career was a much different one than that in which Pericles flourished. We do
not know how Pericles would have weathered the long war; he died during the first year
of the event that would soon dominate and in many cases break the next generation.
Martha Nussbaum puts it well, saying:
Plato chooses to set this dialogue right on the ‘razor’s edge.’ It is a time of pride
and prosperity—about two years before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War,
three years before the great plague that devastated Athens, both physically and
morally. Diseases of the body, diseases of character, the disease of war—all, we
know, will shortly strike, unforeseen, this intelligent city that prides itself so much
on artfulness and foresight. Since the reader, by hindsight, is aware that a
vulnerable moral consensus is soon to be unhinged by external pressures, by the
pull of conflicting obligations, by the strength of the appetitive desires, since he
knows that among the dialogue’s characters some will soon be dead and others
will soon be killing, he will feel impatience with the lack of foresight that says
that things in Athens are all right as they are (Nussbaum 1986, 91).
Nussbaum sees Protagoras’ philosophical position as a product of the age in which he
lives. She continues,
One reason for the conservatism is satisfaction. Protagoras has lived the prime of
his life in the greatest age of Athenian political culture. He still seems to us to be a
part of this glorious, relatively happy past…He is not gripped by the sense of
urgency about moral problems that will soon characterize the writing of younger
thinkers, for example Euripides, Thucydides, Aristophanes… It is no surprise that
the dialogue compares Socrates’ interview with these sophists to a living hero’s
visit to the shades of dead heroes in the underworld. It is a dead generation,
lacking understanding of the moral crisis of its own time (105-106).
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Cf. Memorabilia I.2 for a discussion between Alcibiades and Pericles. Xenophon’s account makes the
haphazard nature of Pericles’ education of Alcibiades clear. The “punchline” makes it clear that Alcibiades
was also aware of this. Cf, also Ellis (1989) 9-16.

49

Here, however, Nussbaum seems to miss what may be the point. Protagoras may be
satisfied, but he is not a conservative. He may not have been “gripped by the sense of
urgency” but he holds a progressive view of history. He is not a radical utopian, or a
social pessimist, but he is far from being conservative. He is a moderate progressive.63
Nussbaum is wrong when she faults him for not sensing the change that was to come. He
only missed the nature of the change. He thought that every day people would “get better
and better” (318b).
C.C.W. Taylor describes the available positions as follows “(a) that represented
here, the naturalistic tradition, developed in the fifth century from traditional antecedents,
of progress from primitive beginnings; (b) the older Hesiodic tradition of progressive
decline from an original state of innocence.” (1976, 78).64 By this standard, only position
(b) could be considered conservative, whereas Protagoras clearly holds (a).65 It is
precisely position (a) that Socrates is attacking. The “naturalistic position” assumes
change, but it assumes that this change is progressive. Very often, however, people
become worse from generation to generation. Socrates seems to be asking whether this
would be possible if virtue were transmittable.
The presence of Alcibiades and Critias together demonstrate the possibility of
decline. It is not only that the intellectuals have been “gripped” by the urgency of moral
problems, but that moral and political problems forced this view upon them. They in turn
63

Nussbaum’s confusion between a moderate progressive and a revolutionary, shows something of the
logic whereby radicals work.
64
He claims that “Plato’s own theory combines elements of both traditions” He cites Statesman. 273-4
Timeaus 72-73, Crito 110-12, Laws III, 676-82.
65
McCoy points out the differences between Protagoras’ Prometheus myth and those found in Hesiod and
Aeschylus. She is correct to see that it is in the Protagorean account that “the natural world and human
nature—not woman—is the cause of human suffering” (1998 24) but she leaves out the fundamental
difference between progress and decline. It is in Protagoras’ myth that human life gets better, rather than
worse.
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compound the problem and create new ones. If Pericles was the paradigm of a fifth
century politician, and Alcibiades was the next step, after him would come Critias, the
final political paradigm of the fifth century, a tyrant ruling briefly but brutally, perhaps as
a puppet, over a defeated Athens.
Certainly, Plato might just as well have had Socrates use Solon or some other
member of Plato’s own family as an example of decline. As Guthrie says of Critias,
We are left with the picture of a man of brilliant intellectual and artistic gifts,
plunging eagerly into the philosophical discussions of his time, all the more so as
many of them had direct bearing on political life. But some of the headier theories
conspired with his own ambitious, headstrong and unstable character, the product
of generations of politicians and poets, to lead him away from the wisdom of
Socrates to violence, cruelty and death in civil strife (1969 iii, 304).
This state of affairs must have presented some difficulty for Plato (cf. Letter VII
324c-d). Critias becomes an example of human decline, although he was known for his
espousal of progress. Guthrie says that
he shared with Protagoras, Democritus and others a belief in the progressive
evolution of mankind by their own efforts, that he thought of laws as neither
inherent in human nature from the beginning nor a gift of any gods…Religion
was for the subject, to ensure his obedience, not for the enlightened ruler (1969
iii, 301).
The philosophical position described above sounds remarkably like that espoused by
Protagoras in the dialogue.66 While explicating the myth of the origin of humanity in
what follows, I will show that Plato is using the historical character and the reader’s
knowledge of his fate and his ideas in order to show the effect that irresponsible
intellectuals had on the young Athenian nobles. I am not saying that Plato is trying to
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blame the fate of Critias on Protagoras, but rather that he wants to show that the progress
espoused by both takes on quite a different appearance depending upon the historical
circumstances. Plato uses the presence of Critias to give the lie to the easy progressivism
of Protagoras in order to show all of the potential students of sophists, that the accounts
we give (or hear) affect the soul over the course of time. I will show that error is
essentially built in to any account of progress. This is particularly clear in the Great
Speech of Protagoras.

The Great Speech
The first noun to occur in Protagoras’ myth is ‘xrÒnow,’ or time. This is telling,
for the speech is obsessed with time. It tells us that “there was a time when the gods
existed but the mortal races did not. When the time came for their appointed genesis the
gods molded them inside the earth” (320d). In this account there is time before there is
death and before there is genesis. The time here is closer to the cosmic time of the
Timaeus than the span of an individual’s life. One is tempted to say that there are no
individuals, but only kinds,67 and yet under closer inspection the opposite will turn out to
be the case: there will not really be kinds except for those that are improvised.
There are a number of strange points early on in Protagoras’ story. Martha
Nussbaum describes the opening scene thus,
At this point, Titans Prometheus and Epimetheus are charged with the task of
distributing ‘to each kind’ powers or capabilities that will enable its members to
survive and reproduce. Distinctions among the kinds appear, then, to pre-exist the
67
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distribution of arts and capabilities. The gods talk of kinds, even of allotting
suitable powers to each kind; but the species, mere lumps of material stuff, are not
yet in possession of any of the distinctive capabilities and ways of acting that
currently constitute them as the species we know” (Nussbaum 1986, 100).
Nussbaum rightly points out the “incoherence” (101) of this account, asking, how would
a horse be a horse without any of the characteristics of a horse. Nussbaum continues,
the oddness is blatant and sounds like a deliberate pointer. What can it mean, we
wonder, to speak of using powers upon the non-rational, so there is nothing left
for the human being, when we know (and will be told again) that the human
being (or whatever it currently is) is not yet a rational being? The distinction
between the rational is presupposed in the very story of the gift of rationality.
Protagoras lets us see that there is no coherent way of talking about the human
being, and contrasting him with the rest of nature, without mentioning the
distinctive capabilities and ways of acting that make him the creature he is.
Rationality is not just an instrument given to a creature already constituted with a
nature and natural ends; it is an essential element in this creature’s nature (1986,
101).
Nussbaum is correct to see the “oddness” as a “deliberate pointer,” but her explanation of
that to which the oddness is points is lacking. Indeed, Protagoras may see the difficulty of
contrasting the human with the rest of nature, but it seems more fruitful to think of
Protagoras as an early existentialist. Protagoras could easily say with Jean-Paul Sartre
that “Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself” (Cahoone, ed. 1996, 259).
Nussbaum sees Protagoras as an essentialist, but it seems that his story is intent on
undermining the very notion of fixed natural kinds. As a result of seeing Protagoras in an
essentialist light, Nussbaums’s account also neglects the importance of the ‘mistake’ or
‘error’ inherent in Protagoras’ account.
Marina Berzins McCoy, to the contrary, claims that “It is only because
Epimetheus failed to give humans claws, speed, or other means of protection before he
exhausted his resources on the other animals that we possess uniquely human abilities at
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all: they are a huge mistake” (1998, 24). McCoy is correct in this assessment, for an
initial error (or lack of perfection) is necessary for any idea of human progress.
Protagoras has already made his progressive beliefs clear (318e-319a) and now offers this
myth as an account of these beliefs. This is the only way that a story of progress can
occur. Error, or imperfection, is essential to the concept of progress. Something that is
perfect, does not progress.
E.R. Dodds points out that any conception of forms or essences impose “a more
fundamental limitation on the idea of progress” (Dodds 1973, 14). He explains that
for Plato all progress consists in approximation to a pre-existing model; the model
has existed and will exist to all eternity in the unchanging world of transcendent
Forms. There is, strictly speaking, no open future, no such thing as invention
(Dodds 1973, 14-15).
The other side of this equation is that, if one holds what here appears as Protagorean
progress then one must hold that things were not good in the beginning and that there are
no really fixed natures. If one believes in gods, then the gods must have made some
mistake and humans must be able to correct that mistake, however gradually. According
to this view, humans can make things better, but they can also make them worse. When
you have an open future both progress and decline are possible.68
Epimetheus errs due to his absorption in the present. He is engaged in the
moment, distributing this to that animal and that to that, without looking at the whole. In
fact, he goes through several rounds of distribution without ever thinking of the “human.”
He begins by first giving means of preservation (¶sƒzen) (321a). Then he adjusts these
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“taking precautions against the possible extinction (éistvye€h) of any of the races”
(321a). Next he “devised for them protection against the weather” (321b). After this he
“shod them” and “provided them with various forms of nourishment” (321b). Each of
these has concerned the salvation of the individual, or of the kind through the individual.
Finally he assigns them either few or many births to allow for the salvation of the
individual by means of the kind. For, before any thing else, these creatures are mortal
(ynhtã).
Epimetheus has gone through four distributions without attending to the ‘human.’
The text acknowledges, in Lombardo’s and Bell’s translation, that “Epimetheus was not
very wise, and he absentmindedly used up all the powers and abilities on the nonreasoning animals” (321c). The Greek is more direct. He forgot (¶layen)69 himself
(aÍtÒn) and he lavishly spent (katanal≈siw) the powers on the irrational animals. He
was so enrapt lavishing preservation, protection from the weather, sturdy feet and
reproduction on the irrational animals, that he also forgot humanity. That is, in forgetting
himself, Epimetheus forgot us. This is the basis for our kinship with the gods. Humanity
becomes an aporia for Epimetheus (321c). Humanity is the result of a titanic afterthought.
The fact that Epimetheus does not provide for humans helps Protagoras offer an
account of progress. Prometheus “stole from Hephaestus and Athena wisdom in the
practical arts together with fire (without which this kind of wisdom is effectively useless)
and gave them outright to the human race” (321d). If Protagoras does not believe in the
gods and thinks they are a human invention, as many scholars believe (cf. Guthrie
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above), we must ask what the purpose of this part of the myth may be. It is because of
this stolen fire and the arts that accompany it that humans
alone among animals worshipped the gods, with whom they had a kind of kinship,
and erected alters and sacred images. It wasn’t long before they started articulated
speech and words and had invented houses, clothes, shoes, and blankets and were
nourished from food from the earth (322a-b).
This account places the worship of gods prior to the advent of speech. This seems
unlikely and strange. Instead of attributing crafts and fire to the gods, it is possible that
Protagoras is attributing the worship of the gods to the “discovery” of fire and crafts.
Patrick Coby makes this case. He says: “This kinship is man’s inventive intelligence, by
which early man invented all the tools and crafts requisite to his survival” (1987, 55).70
He continues saying that “Man invented the tale of Prometheus and the Olympians in
order to explain his otherwise inexplicable inheritance of wisdom” (1987, 56).71
According to this account, we may ask with Nietzsche: “Is humanity God’s mistake? Or
God just a mistake of humanity” (Nietzsche 1997, 6). Gods look bad when we use them
to explain the difficulty of life prior to technology and invention.
It is worth comparing this interpretation of Protagoras’ myth with Sextus’
comments on Critias and his account of the origin of religion.72 “And Critias…says that
the ancient lawgivers fabricated the deity as an overseer of men’s successes and failures
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in the interest of no man secretly injuring his neighbor, guarding against retribution on
the part of the gods” (Sprague 1972, 259).
Critias’ account is more extreme than that offered by Protagoras in the dialogue.
Protagoras does not say that the gods are pragmatic fictions, but it is easy to see how a
bright and ambitious young man may read this into the myth that Plato gives to
Protagoras, especially in light of the worsening political situation and its attendant
intellectual climate. Nevertheless, there are important similarities. Immediately after
Protagoras says that Prometheus was punished, that he reports on the worship of the gods
“with whom they had a kind of kinship (322a). In the account of Critias, we invent gods
in order to justify punishment and to create a “panopticon”73 whereby people police
themselves out of fear of an ever-watchful eye. Punishment is also central to Protagoras’
account, as will become increasingly clear.
In the next stage of the myth it is precisely some kind of punishment, or justice
that is needed. The arts—human inventiveness—kept humans alive, but they lived in a
sort of Hobbesian state of nature where their lives would have been “solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short” (Hobbes 1994, 76). At this stage we had houses, clothing, shoes and
blankets but “lived in scattered isolation; there were no cities” (322b). Humans were
“being destroyed by wild beasts because they were weaker in every way” (322b).
Human art was not enough to make us superior to the beasts, it only accounted for those
things that Epimetheus had supplied them. Despite our “kinship” with the gods, the
beasts are stronger than us in every way. People were in danger due to the beasts and the
beastliness of humanity. “The wisdom it [the human kind] acquired was for staying alive;
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wisdom for living together in political wisdom, it did not acquire” (321d). When people
did band together in cities “they wronged each other because they did not possess the art
of politics” (322c-e). Thus we find humanity in a position where its arts cannot fend off
the beasts, but are sufficient to enable them to wrong one another, that is to steal one
another’s “houses, clothing, shoes and blankets” so that there would really be “no place
for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain” (Hobbes 1994, 76).
Protagoras makes a clever move at this point. He does not say that Zeus instructs
Hermes to distribute the “political art” in order to save humanity, but rather to distribute
“justice and a sense of shame to humans” (322c). From what we saw earlier “justice”
(d€kh) and “a sense of shame” (aﬁd≈w) should equivalent with “sound deliberation both
in domestic matters—how to best manage one’s household, and in public affairs—how to
realize one’s maximum potential for success in political debate and action” (319a). If
they are not Protagoras equivocates between “justice and shame” and “the political art.”
Both d€kh and aﬁd≈w are used in the context of political goods. They are given
by Zeus so that we may live together. McCoy argues in the case of aﬁd≈w that it is
significant that “the motivation for self-restraint is concern for the opinion of others”
(1998, 23 n. 23).74 Being concerned with the opinions of others is necessary for everyone
is the city. It is necessary that everyone have justice and shame “for cities would never
come to be if only a few possessed these” (322d). It may be that, despite appearances,
Protagoras’ justice and shame are simply the “advantage of the stronger” (Republic
339a). Bartlett argues that “Protagoras is a teacher of injustice” (2004, 74). If this is the
case then Protagoras is actually practicing a certain esotericism here in the dialogue. He
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presents his case as if no one could be denied justice and shame by the gods. But, he does
not say that a human cannot secretly reject these.
It seems that for Protagoras, this is the difference between the political art and
justice and shame. The politikÆ t°xnh is a t°xnh something that aﬁd≈w, at the very
least, is not. For Protagoras the eÈboul€a that constitutes this politikÆ t°xnh consists
of knowledge of “how best to manage one’s household (oﬁk€an)” and “how to realize
one’s maximum potential for success and political debate in action (ka‹ prãttein ka‹
l°gein)” (318e-319a). These are both “self-oriented” or beneficial to the agent rather
than the community. In Protagoras’ account justice and shame are community oriented,
or beneficial to the collective. It is necessary for everyone to have shame and justice, and
for a few to have the political art which enables its possessor to reject these.
Protagoras establishes the difference between the political art or eÈboul€a and
justice later when Socrates gets him to say that “some people are being sensible
(svfrone›n) when they act unjustly” (333d). When Socrates supplies the word
svfrone›n he is referring to the svfrosÊnh discussed between 329c-333c. But,
Socrates immediately defines svfrone›n as eÔ frone›n. Socrates then, pointedly
defines eÔ frone›n as eÔ bouleÊesyai a virtual cognate of the eÈboul€a that defines
Protagoras’ political craft. People who have “good judgment (eÔ bouleÊesyai) in acting
unjustly” (333d), have the good judgment “Only if they get good results” (333d) out of
their injustice. Here Protagoras admits the nature of his teaching. It may be by acting
with injustice that one can “realize one’s maximum potential for success and political
debate in action (ka‹ prãttein ka‹ l°gein)” (318e-319a).
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That one is seeking what is advantageous to oneself, rather than the polis, is clear
in what follows. When Socrates asks if good is what is “advantageous to people” (333e),
Protagoras balks. “And even if they are not advantageous (»f°liµa) to people (to›w
ényr≈poiw ), I (®gvge) can still call it good” (333e). Socrates lets Protagoras off the
hook because he “could see that Protagoras was really worked up and struggling by now
and he was dead set against answering anymore. Accordingly, I carefully modified
(eÈlaboÊµenow)75 the tone of my question” (333e). Socrates asks whether Protagoras
means that things are “advantageous to no human being, Protagoras, or of no advantage
whatsoever” (334a). Socrates allows Protagoras to save face and make a well-received
relativistic point (334a-c). But, Protagoras did not intend his remarks in the way that
Socrates generously interpreted them. When Protagoras calls things good even if they are
not good for people (to›w ényr≈poiw) he is not thinking of the “human” as opposed to
the beasts or the trees (as Socrates allows him to reinterpret his statement), but rather his
statement focuses on the plural aspect of people. He is contrasting to›w ényr≈poiw
with a very emphatic ¶gvge.
In this passage Protagoras makes it clear that the political craft that he teaches is
not justice or shame, but is something for the good of the agent. It is precisely this
difference between the political art and justice and shame that allows Protagoras to teach
his art as one “uniquely qualified to assist others in becoming noble and good” (328b)
without denying that the Athenians are able to teach their children the “one thing which
all citizens must have for there to be a city” (324e). Protagoras declares this openly for
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he has just shown that he does not highly value shame, except in others. Socrates cannot
hope to make Protagoras blush, as he did Hippocrates (cf. 312a and 316c-317c).
Thus, Protagoras claims to give “good judgment (eÔ bouleÊesyai) in acting
unjustly” (333d), while Zeus gives the d€kh and aﬁd≈w that make cities possible by
keeping everyone from acting like Protagoras’ potential students. The art of Protagoras is
possible if only a few possess it. It is truly an art of ¶gvge and neither politikÆ nor for
the good of to›w ényr≈poiw.
Protagoras claims that people act as if everyone has a share of justice and that
“everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not… since one must have some
trace of it or not be human” (323b-c) and that they do not regard it as “natural or selfgenerated, but as something taught and carefully developed” (323c). Here Protagoras is
saying that if we do not have a share of justice, we are not human, but we were human
(presumably) when we had fire and the arts. But, it is also developed. Again it seems as
if Protagoras is pushing a proto-existentialist line that “existence precedes essence”
(Cahoone 1996, 260). This tension between what we might call nature and nurture runs
throughout Protagoras’ account. The tension informs his discussion of punishment and
child-rearing, or education.76 Protagoras follows the myth with a discussion of education
that reinforces the idea of justice as punishment. I show that for Protagoras punishment
and education are inextricably bound.
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Education
Punishment corrects injustice and allows for progress. Protagoras claims that the
“the true significance of punishment” lies in the future. But, Protagoras does not
think—as Socrates does—that just punishment is good for the one who is punished. He
does not see punishment as primarily “corrective,” i.e. its purpose is not so that those who
have become bad, can be made good again (though it may be good to punish children in
order to educate them (cf. 325c). He claims that
reasonable punishment is not a vengeance for a past wrong—for one cannot undo
what is done—but is undertaken with a view to the future (toË µ°llontow
xãrin), to deter the wrong-doer and whoever sees him being punished from
repeating the crime (324a-c).
People are punished pedagogically and pragmatically. One person is punished in order to
deter others. This view of punishment ignores retribution as a rationale for punishment
and takes a utilitarian view, i.e. the punishment causes one member of the community
pain in order to serve as a model for the entire community and thus increases its overall
pleasure. Socrates will refer to this definition when he discusses painful things that result
in pleasure (354e). If, as many commentators suggest,77 Socrates uses hedonism as an ad
hominem attack, it may be at this point that he sees the hedonism inherent in Protagoras’
position.78 Protagoras wants what is good for the agent (if the agent is a student of
Protagoras or Protagoras himself) and what is good for the community. The good, in
either case, is a minimum of pain.
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Protagorean punishment relies on people’s ability to see themselves in one
another’s shoes.79 His educational ideas rest on this same associative, and essentially
mimetic, ability. He returns to the question of how the political art is taught (324d).
Then, he says:
Starting when they are little children and continuing as long as they live, they
teach and correct them. As soon as a child understands what is said to him, the
nurse, mother, tutor, and the father himself fight for him to be as good as he
possibly can, seizing on every action and word to teach him and show him that
this is just, that is unjust, this is noble, that is ugly, this is pious, that is impious,
he should do this, he should not do that (325c-d).
Here education and correction begin “as soon as a child understands.” In order for this to
be a good thing, all of those who teach the child and those whom the child emulates must
understand what is just and unjust, pious and impious. Protagoras has just said, however,
that “everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and that it is madness
not to pretend justice” (323c).80 We do not need to push the idea that everyone is
pretending to be just when they are not. They are not lying to the child, but to
themselves. They think they know what they do not and pass this error on to their
children. If neither the father, the teacher, the nurse nor the mother truly know what
virtue is, they cannot present a clear conception of virtue to the child.81 The problem is
made worse because of the multiplicity of influences. The child is not only imitating a
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single skewed conception of virtue, but many.82 The mother and the nurse would not, in
Athens, have been educated, thus they would have a much different conception of virtue
from the father or the tutor.83 In many cases the father and the tutor would not have been
extremely concerned with virtue, but rather with honor, wealth, or pleasure.84
Protagoras then recounts how the child will be sent to school (325e-326a) and
learn music (326a-b) and athletic training (326b-c). He concludes by asking, “When so
much care and attention is paid to virtue, Socrates, both in public and private, are you still
puzzled about virtue being teachable?” (326e). Protagoras sees only one difficulty
remaining for his account, the problem of “why, then, do so many sons of good fathers
never amount to anything?” (326e). In order to answer this objection, Protagoras pulls
out Socrates’ analogy with a flute-player.
Suppose, for instance, there could be no city unless we were all flute-players, each
to the best of his ability, and everybody were teaching everybody else this art in
public and private and reprimanding the poor players and doing all this
unstintingly, just as now no one begrudges or conceals his expertise in what is just
and lawful…For it is to our collective advantage that we each possess justice and
virtue, and so we gladly tell and teach each other what is lawful and just. Well if
we all had the same eagerness and generosity in teaching each other flute-playing,
do you think, Socrates that the sons of good flute-players would more likely be
good flute-players than the sons of poor flute players (327b-d).
It is precisely because everyone is concerned with virtue that the sons of the experts in
the political craft do not appear better than others. Protagoras then makes a second
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analogy saying, “You might as well look for a teacher of Greek; you wouldn’t find a
single one of those either” (328a).
The Alcibiades I also addresses this very problem. There, Alcibiades says “I
learned how to speak Greek from them [‘people in general’]; I couldn’t tell you who my
teacher was” (111a). Socrates explains our understanding of language according to
agreement and usage. If we ask what ‘stone’ means, people will give us the same
answer, and also for wood. “I suppose that this is pretty much what you mean by
speaking Greek” (111c). Of course, when we ask what virtue, or justice is no one is able
to tell us. This is the problem in the Protagoras. We are not really taught what words like
virtue mean. Perhaps such meanings cannot be transmitted at all. Thus it seems that no
one knows “what is lawful and just” (327c). Yet, due to the nature of child-birth and
rearing, each becomes a sort of expert to his or her offspring, teaching virtue of which he
or she knows nothing.
This analogy with teaching Greek brings out another element of discord. A family
may teach the child its first words, but once that child makes its way into the city it
comes into contact with polis influences.85 One may require the use of formal grammar
and proper diction within the home, but once the child begins to experience influences
outside the home, he or she will most likely pick up expressions, grammatical habits and
words that the parents do not like. Ever since Protagoras’ initial definition of his craft
(318e-319a), we have seen a division between economic and political affairs. The
point—whether regarding virtue, language, or flute-playing—is that no matter how
strictly one controls the home environment, one cannot control the polis-environment.
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Often, the attempt to provide certain conditions at home will actually create conditions in
the polis that work against one’s actual aim.86 If everyone is a teacher of the flute, then
no one in particular is responsible for a bad flautist. Xenophon uses this same strategy to
defend Socrates
What master of the flute or master of cithara or other teacher who has made his
students competent is blamed if they appear worse after they have gone to others?
And what father, if his son is moderate when he spends time with one person, but
later becomes wicked when he spends time with another? (Memorabilia I.2.27).
Protagoras and the other sophists seem to exploit this claim that everyone teaches virtue.
No teacher can really be blamed for the students’ failures. Ultimately, the student him or
her self must be blamed. Yet, there is something else here. If what we have seen is true
and neither the parents nor the city know what justice is, then the youth will not be able
to become bad, or be corrupted, for he or she will never have become good.
If virtue cannot be taught then Protagorean progress is implausible. Decline is far
more likely. The youth may “haphazardly” find some good teaching, but they may not
have to criteria to distinguish it from everything else they come across by chance. One of
the points that this part of the dialogue struggles to make is that without knowledge both
virtue and vice are no more than a matter of chance. This saves Socrates from historical
determinism. But, if we do not know virtue and we cannot become truly good, then it is
only by chance that we are not truly bad. This is the context within which I will read
Socrates’ interpretation of the Simonides poem. The youth cannot be corrupted when
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Cf. Lear “So, for example, the democratic polis is shaped not only by the degenerate son of the
oligarchy, but also by the rebellious poor (556c-557a). However, the rebellious poor also had their psyches
shaped via internalizations of previous externalizations of oligarchic rulers. And both they and the
democratic man—the metaphorical and literal sons of the oligarchy—help to shape the democratic polis via
externalization of the structures of their psyches” (1992, 207 n. 122).
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they were never made good in the first place.87 Though many commentators have refused
to take his reading seriously, I will show that it is because he is so serious about it that
Socrates is “perverse.”88 He does not care about Simonides’ poem, but about our souls.89
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People, of course, may become worse if they were never good, but this is just a degree of corruption.
One is already corrupt and does not become corrupted.
88
Cf. C.C.W. Taylor 1976, 142.
89
In the refutation that follows Socrates tells us twice about the importance of the discussion for ‘our’
lives. “Don’t do that to me! It’s not this ‘if you want’ or ‘if you agree’ business I want to test. It’s you and
me I want to put on the line” (331c). Socrates and Protagoras are no longer on the line, however. Their
lives and the world they inhabited have already passed. But, our lives are still open and on the line. A few
moments later, just as they begin to discuss the “majority” position, Socrates claims “I am interested in
testing the argument, although it may happen that the questioner, myself, and my respondent wind up being
tested” (333c-d).
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Chapter 4
The Unity and Difficulty of Virtue

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first treats the arguments for the unity
of the virtues (329d-333c and 358c-360e). In this part I show that, though it may be
difficult to say precisely how knowledge unifies the virtues, we can clearly see the
conceit of wisdom as the ignorance that unifies the vices. Thus the first difficulty to
virtue is the overcoming of ignorance.
In the second part, I deal with Socrates’ interpretation of Simonides’ poem. I
show that—despite the interruption from 334d-339a—Socrates continues to press the
same concerns that motivated the initial discussion of unity of the virtues. Here, Socrates
shows that the passage of time makes the overcoming of ignorance (or the conceit of
wisdom) so difficult. If virtue is wisdom and humans are not wise, humans are not truly
virtuous. Rather, we must continually “become” wise and good. Whatever the wisdom
that unites the virtues, the “human wisdom” of the Apology is a prerequisite.

Unity of the Virtues
At Protagoras 329d Socrates asks “Is virtue a single thing, with justice and
temperance and piety its parts, or are the things I have just listed all names for a single
entity?” Though Protagoras claims that the answer is easy, the remainder of the dialogue
and a great deal of critical commentary show that, quite to the contrary, this is one of the
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more difficult problems concerning virtue. Protagoras says that “Virtue is a single entity,
and the things you are asking about are its parts” (329d). Socrates again responds with a
question, asking whether the individual virtues were parts “as in the parts of a face:
mouth, nose, eyes, and ears? Or parts as in the parts of gold, where there is no difference
except for size, between the parts and the whole” (329d-e). Protagoras answers that they
are like the parts of a face and that each has its own power and function (330a-b) but he
acknowledges that wisdom is the greatest part (329e).
Socrates then engages him in an argument to show that “justice is the same kind
of thing as piety, and piety as justice” (331b). He shows that it would be absurd to say
that piety is pious and unjust and so “piety is the sort of thing that is just, and … justice
the sort of thing that is pious” (331a). Then he uses an elenctic argument from opposites
to show that temperance and wisdom are the same thing. He arrives at this by getting
Protagoras to agree that “folly”(éfrosÊnhn) is the opposite of both temperance and
wisdom. Protagoras also agrees that each thing may only have one opposite and thus
Socrates concludes that wisdom and temperance must be one (332a-333b). Later courage
is also identified with wisdom (sof€a) and ignorance (éµay€a) with cowardice (360cd). Thus Socrates has treated each of the virtues in an attempt “to show that everything is
knowledge—justice, temperance, courage” (361b). Yet Socrates also claims that virtue is
not teachable (320a-e and 362b). In this chapter, I show that virtue cannot be taught, but
must continue to become taught—that is, one must be ever diligent against the ignorance
that unifies all vice, which, I argue, is thinking that one knows what one does not.
A great deal has been written on the unity of the virtues as presented in the
Protagoras. Gregory Vlastos has provided one of the most influential and compelling
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treatments of the unity of the virtues. Much of Vlastos’ discussion relies on what have
become known as “Pauline predications.” “Pauline predications” are statements whose
“predicate term is asserted not of their abstract subject, but of the concrete instances of
that abstract” (1973, 252). Thus “justice is pious” 90 need not cause us trouble. “It is the
sort of sentence which could be used, absurdly, to predicate ‘is pious’ of the universal
Justice. But it could also be used, impeccably, to predicate ‘is pious’ of the instances of
the universal” (1973, 252-253). That is, a just person will also be pious, etc. According
to Vlastos, “all five virtues are interpredicable” (1973, 237) if the predications are made
of instances rather than universals. That is, the just person will also be a temperate
person who will also be a wise person and vice versa. I think that Vlastos is correct and
takes us a long way towards understanding this difficult passage, but his view still does
not tell us what virtue is, and more specifically, in what way it is knowledge or of what
this knowledge consists.
Terry Penner offers a similar argument, but Penner’s argument does a better job at
explaining in what way the virtues are interpredicable in their instantiation. Penner’s
interpretation of this tricky passage rests on his general reading of Socrates’ “what is X?”
questions. He claims that Socrates “did not want to know what the meaning of the word
‘bravery’ was, nor what the essence of bravery was, nor what the universal bravery was”
(Penner 1992, 164). Rather, Penner argues that Socrates is asking “the general’s question,
‘What is bravery?’—that is, ‘What is it that makes brave men brave?’” (1992, 164).
According to Penner, Socrates, like the general, “asks this question not out of interest in
mapping our concepts, but out of a desire to learn something substantial about the human
90

Nor should “justice is just” for according to Vlastos Pauline predications eliminate the problem of selfpredication
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psyche. He wants to know what psychological state it is, the imparting of which to his
men will make them brave” (1992 164). Penner accepts the face-value answer that this
psychological state is “the knowledge (science) of good and evil” (1992, 162). He does
not say how this “knowledge (science) of good and evil” would work.91
Charles Kahn points out two difficulties with Penner’s approach. He asks, “(1)
how if at all, the various virtues differ from one another, and (2) how the knowledge of
good and evil can have the required motive-force so as to guarantee virtuous action”
(1996, 222). I will focus here primarily on the first of these. In order for it to be
meaningful to say that virtue is knowledge, we must inquire into the ways in which the
individual virtues are similar and different.92
Kahn argues that Plato “has deliberately left the thesis of unity indeterminate and
open for further discussion” (1996, 222).93 Kahn cites the Stoic interpretation of this
point to show precisely “how much room Plato has left for unity among the virtues”
(223). Kahn points out that:
Ariston of Chios held that courage, temperance, and the rest were strictly identical
as far as their intrinsic nature was concerned; they were distinguished from one
another only by their external relation to circumstance and application. Thus
courage is wisdom applied to circumstances of danger, temperance is wisdom in
circumstances of desire and pleasure and so forth (1996, 222).
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Brickhouse and Smith say “even if one were to somehow know that wisdom is defined as the knowledge
of good and evil, one would not by that knowledge alone be able to steer one’s way through vexing issues”
(1994).
92
Vlastos successfully shows that Socrates cannot mean that “(i) the five virtues are the same virtue and
(ii) that their names are synonyms” (1972, 227). He offers a heloful discussion from the Phaedo about the
way in which the number “three” is also appropriately called “odd.” Both are properly names of the same
number, but that does not mean that “three” and “odd” mean the same thing (1973, 239; Phaedo 103e).
93
Friedlander thinks that “this is a conscious deception on the part of Socrates—or an exercise in logic for
the reader…It is left to the reader to discover the mistake in this logical exercise and to think for himself
about how unity is to be conceived” (1964, 20).
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Brickhouse and Smith provide an example that supports Ariston’s position. They deny
that the relation between the individual virtues and wisdom could be understood on a
“discipline/subdiscipline” model (1994, 69). Instead, like Ariston, they see the
relationship as one “between a general discipline and the specialized applications of that
discipline to different areas” (1994, 70). The example they give is triangulation.
“Navigators in coastal waters use triangulation to fix their position by taking bearings
from …objects along the coastline. Surveyors also use triangulation is measuring land
and setting boundaries” (1994, 70). They point out that surveyors and navigators are
using the same skill but their “use of the skill, however produces different erga” (1994,
70).94 Thus, by analogy, each of the virtues would be like navigating or surveying—they
would use the wisdom that is akin to triangulation in different contexts.95
The analogy is useful to see in what way the same knowledge may be a part of a
variety of widely different practices. Their analogy, however, seems to agree with
Protagoras’ claim that “you will find many people who are extremely unjust, impious,
intemperate, and ignorant, and yet exceptionally courageous” (349d). We could easily
find a surveyor who did not know navigation, and a navigator who does not know
surveying, but we could find neither a navigator nor a surveyor who lacked the
knowledge of triangulation. So, triangulation is necessary, but not sufficient to be a good
navigator and a good surveyor. Thus, the example falls short, for if Vlastos is right, this
wisdom would be such as to make all of the virtues interpredicable, so that in this
analogy, triangulation would necessarily make a navigator also a good surveyor and vice
94

This is not a discipline/subdiscipline model because navigation and surveying are not subdisciplines of
the same discipline, but rather different fields that use the same skill for different results (1994, 70).
95
The analogy seems to make Plato into an intellectualist who sees no place for character in virtue.
Triangulation is as easily performed by a scoundrel as not. I think that Plato is an intellectualist, but one
who, as the Republic shows, realizes the intense interaction between the soul and the intellect.
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versa. This is clearly not the case. Nevertheless, the fact that triangulation is a necessary
prerequisite for both areas of expertise points us in the right direction.
Socrates asks Protagoras how one could know what to fear and what not to fear if
one does not have knowledge. People who are “lacking knowledge in all these
occupations yet confident in each of them” (350a-b), are, according to Socrates “not
courageous but mad (µainÒµenoi)” (350c). That is to say that if one is confident about
things of which one knows nothing, then one is insane, rather than courageous or manly.
If we ask of what this insanity consists we see that it is the conceit of wisdom, or thinking
that one knows what one does not know. In this context, we can see what is particularly
dangerous about this. Whether or not we can say here that the virtues are interpredicable,
Socrates shows that the vices are all dependent on ignorance. Thus, knowing that one
does not know is the first step towards virtue.
If the knowledge that unifies the virtues is a knowledge of good and evil, we can
say: if one lacks the knowledge of good and evil (the necessary and sufficient condition
for all virtue) then one will not know that one does not have wisdom or the other virtues.
The lack of knowledge of good and bad is the conceit of wisdom. If one does not know
what is good, then one often goes towards the bad, thinking that it is good (cf. 358c-d).
Not only will one go towards the bad thinking that it is good, but one will not even know
that one does not have the virtues. This is a convincing description of the states of the
souls of the µainÒµenoi described in the Protagoras. Thus the true difficulty is going to
be the same that we see in the Apology, the problem of thinking that one has this
knowledge when one does not. But, here we can see more explicitly the effect this lack
of knowledge has on virtue.

73

As the Apology also shows, it is a considerable accomplishment to come to know
that one knows nothing of any consequence. I claim that the Protagoras shows that the
knowledge of good and bad that unifies the virtues in each human instantiation of those
universal virtues (Vlastos) is not something that one possesses—or a state that one
attains— once and for all. It is, as Penner argues, a state of the soul, but a state that must
be thought of as a process due to the passage of time and the unexpected events that
befall one in the course of a lifetime. More than just the haphazard event—or the
haphazard nature of events in general—the fear of death in particular makes virtue and
knowledge difficult to maintain.96 We fear death because we think it is bad, and the
conceit of wisdom slips in (Apology 29a-b). If the virtues are unified in wisdom then the
vices are unified in “folly” (éfrosÊnhn). At 332a-333d Socrates argues that wisdom
and self-control must be the same thing because they have a single opposite, folly, for
“there is only one opposite for each thing” (333b) and so, if “folly” is a thing, it can have
only one opposite. Therefore, wisdom and temperance must be one. 97 In what follows
similar arguments are made to show that virtue is wisdom and ignorance is vice. In the
case of courage, “the wisdom about what is and what is not to be feared is courage and
the opposite is ignorance (éµay€a)” (360d).
Thus, in the Protagoras, as in the Apology, we may not have the knowledge that
makes all of the virtues possible, but we know that ignorance makes the vices possible. It
is not just ignorance, but the double order ignorance of the Apology. In the Protagoras
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Crito seems to forget everything he “learned” from years of association with Socrates at the approach of
his friend’s death. In the dialogue that shares his name, Crito is ready to throw a life based on arguments
aside out of such a fear (46a). It is against this fear that Socrates conjures the auloi of the Corybants (54b).
97
Friedlander sees this entire section as a “grave fallacy” (1964, 19). Worse “the inference that Socrates
derives from this artificially constructed nonsense is made worthless” (1964, 19).
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Socrates makes this clear when he says that “ignorance (éµay€an) is to have a false
(ceud∞) belief and to be deceived (§ceËsyai) about matters of great importance’ (358c).
This is not simple ignorance. For I can be ignorant of something without having a false
opinion about it. If I am ignorant of the good in a given situation, but am aware of that
ignorance, I will probably fair all right. But, if I think that I know what the good is, then I
commit a “mistaken act done without knowledge” (357e)
When Socrates says in the Apology, “to fear death, gentleman, is no other than to
think one is wise when one is not, to think one knows what one does not know” (29a), he
is offering a description of the state of mind in which the conceit of wisdom slips in. I am
afraid because I think I know that something is terrible when I do not. This state of
cowardice, by its nature, also means that I will lack each of the other virtues for the same
reason. The introduction of hedonism shows that ignorance prohibits self-control. I will
think that the wrong things are pleasant and I will want to eat, drink and be merry for
tomorrow I will surely die. The speech of the Laws in the Crito shows that without
knowledge I cannot have justice, because I will fear the wrong things and I will escape
from jail or commit other unjust acts (50a ad finem). If I do not have knowledge, I will
also lack piety. I will “abandon” the post at which I was put by the god. In the Apology
Socrates says that had he abandoned his post that it “would have been a dreadful thing,
and then I might truly and justly been brought here for not believing that there are gods,
disobeying the oracle, fearing death, and thinking I was wise when I was not” (29a).
Death is the extreme limit that continually threatens our “human wisdom” that
knows that it does not know (Apology 20d). We slip into the fear of death, as if it were
natural. We slip into ignorance unawares and we think we know what we do not and thus
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we assume we have virtues that we do not have. Virtue is difficult because we have to
keep becoming virtuous in a world that is constantly changing and in which foresight is
quite unpredictable. Humans cannot have true wisdom or true virtue because we live in a
world of change and becoming. Socrates continued to ask questions until he died,
because he had to keep from thinking that he knew what he did not know.98 Socrates’
constant investigations are guards against the passage of time and the tendency to get lost
in the moment—as did Epimetheus— and as such suffer from “the loss of knowledge”
(Protagoras 345b).
Brickhouse and Smith offer a similar interpretation of the elenchus. For them it
ensures that “one will never act upon a carelessly accepted conception of justice” (1994,
129). They go on to point out that the elenchus neither provides wisdom “nor can the
most scrupulously careful employment of the elenchus provide an absolute guarantee that
a false moral conception could never escape one’s notice. Such errors would be a good
deal less likely to occur” (1994, 128). But, this is the case only if one continually
practices it. Thus the elenchus seems to be a kind of diligence against unexamined
beliefs upon which one may act, either under pressure or at the spur of the moment. It is
both a prophylactic incantation and a kind of training whereby one may fight the loss of
knowledge that occurs under duress. In other words, I interpret the elenchus as a
ceaseless attempt to keep from forgetting oneself.99
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Socrates is also interested in helping others to see their lack of wisdom, but it is important to note here
the extent to which he asks questions to work on his own soul..
99
Carpenter and Polanksy argue that “Socrates has no single method of refutation or cross-examination. He
uses a variety of approaches based upon the needs of the particular interlocutor and conversational setting”
(2002, 90). If I am correct and Socrates uses the elenchus to combat the effects of time and change then
such a plurality of methods would be necessary.
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Only with death do the difficulties of becoming virtuous cease. We continually
have to navigate the labyrinth and fight the minotauric fear of death, until the moment we
die. At the end of the Phaedo, Socrates does not say that he and Crito owe a cock to
Aesclepius for the reason that many suggest, that life was an illness.100 Rather, he is
saying that the illness is the fear of death against which his struggle had finally ended.
The battle against thinking that you know what you do not has ended. This is because the
soul is separated from the body and the change that accompanies physical things may
cease.
The discussion of courage at the end of the dialogue shows that “cowardice is
ignorance of what is to be feared” (360c). Part of the power of Plato’s dialogues comes
from the paradigmatic role played by Socrates. It is easy to say that one does not fear
death, but it is a far different matter to maintain one’s convictions in the face of it. Virtue
is difficult because of becoming, because of temporal perspective and constant change.
The elenchus fights against forgetting oneself. In order to see the virtues as one, the first
step, it seems, is to see one’s life as a whole.
In the next section, I show that Socrates continues to explain the difficulty and
apparent disunity of virtue due to the nature of time and death. My reading of Socrates’
exegesis builds upon the argument just offered for the unity of the virtues.101 Like the
preceding analysis, I show that Socrates’ point in his exegesis of the poem is in
agreement with other so-called “early” dialogues and especially the Apology.
100

Nehemas attributes this view to Nietzsche which he rightly points out “has by now become almost
canonical” (1998, 158). Cf. Grube’s note explaining that “Socrates apparently means that death is a cure
for the ills of life” (in Cooper, 1996, 100 n. 19)
101
Few scholars see the connection between the two sections. Neither Nussbaum 1986, Kahn 1996, Penner
1992, nor Vlastos 1973 mention the interpretation of the poem at all. Of the scholars who write about
Socrates’ interpretation of the poem, Robert Bartlett is one of the few commentators to see Socrates’
discussion of the poem as continuation of the discussion of the unity of the virtues (2004, 76).
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Being or Becoming Virtuous?
The discussion of the poem begins as a compromise, but neither Socrates nor
Protagoras do much to compromise. Protagoras wants to turn the conversation into an
eristic display, but Socrates steadfastly continues to work through the themes that
flustered Protagoras at 333e. Socrates wants to discuss the unity of virtue.
Protagoras introduces a poem where “Simonides says to Scopas, the son of Creon
in Thessaly102:
For a man to become good truly is hard,
In hands and feet and mind foursquare,
Blamelessly built… (339a-b).
Protagoras asks Socrates if the poem is well made and Socrates answers that is certainly
is. “And do you think it’s well made if the poet contradicts himself?” (339b-c). When
Socrates answers in the negative Protagoras quotes another passage from the same poem.
Nor is Pittacus’ proverb in tune
however wise a man he was
hard it is to be good, he said (339c).
Protagoras explains his position.
How can anyone who says both these things be consistent. First, he asserts
himself that it is hard for a man truly to become good, and then a little further
along in his poem he forgets and criticizes Pittacus for saying the same thing as he
did, that it is hard for a man to be good, and refuses to accept from him the same
thing that he himself said. And yet, when he criticizes him for saying the same
thing as himself, he obviously criticizes himself as well, so either the earlier or the
later must not be right (339c-d).
Protagoras’ claims amount to a sort of anti-elenchus and Plato might be offering a parody
of the general confusion of elenchus and eristic. Protagoras wants to change the subject
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If Froma Zeitlin is correct and Thebes allows Athens to “play the Other” in tragedy, Thessaly may serve
the same function in Plato. Cf. “Thebes: Theater of Self and Society in Athenian Drama” (Winkler and
Zeitlin 1992, 130-167).
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and show how clever he is while also furthering his own cause by pointing out the
contradiction in the poem. The eristic quality of Protagoras’ speech is made even more
explicit when Socrates says: “At first I felt as if I had been hit by a good boxer.
Everything went black and I was reeling from Protagoras’ oratory and the others’
clamor” (349e). It is important that Socrates is able to “keep his head” and not forget
himself here as his interlocutors so often do. This will be of significance in his
interpretation of the poem, almost as if he is offering his interpretation here, under attack
“as if it were it were an incantation” (Phaedo 114d).
Socrates begins with something of an attack on Simonides.
[T]he characteristic style of ancient philosophy was laconic brevity. It was in this
context that the saying of Pittacus—It is hard to be good—was privately
circulated with approval among the sages. Then Simonides, ambitious for
philosophical fame, saw that if he could score a takedown against this saying, as if
it were a famous wrestler, and get the better of it, he would himself become
famous in his own lifetime (343b-c).
Simonides wants to improve his reputation and so attempts to bring down the older
Pittacus, ranked among the sages. Socrates could be saying the same thing about
Protagoras’ treatment of Simonides. But, while Socrates “rehabilitates” Simonides with
his interpretation, the claim still holds for Protagoras. Socrates has just compared
Protagoras to a pugilist (349e) and here he compares Simonides to a wrestler. Patrick
Coby finds nine points of similarity between Simonides and Protagoras (1987, 111). He
says, “Protagoras has so much in common with Simonides that it may be warranted in the
upcoming poem analysis…to treat Simonides as a surrogate for Protagoras” (111).
While there many similarities between the two figures, these are played up at the
beginning of this section. In the end, as Brickhouse and Smith argue “invariably what
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Simonides ends up meaning is suspiciously Socratic in tone and content” (1984, 83). The
“Socratic” meaning of the poem is, Brickhouse and Smith maintain, due to Socrates’
method of interpretation. Brickhouse and Smith write that, “Socrates attributes only
those beliefs he supposes all of us to hold. The result is that the only views Socrates is
prepared to attribute to Simonides are views he would attribute to anyone at all” (1984,
83). This means, of course, that Protagoras cannot but, in some way, agree with Socrates.
Protagoras was supposed to adapt to Socrates’ short memory and stick to short
answers. Instead, he moves to the interpretation of a poem. In return, Socrates begins his
interpretation—which Taylor calls “generally perverse” (Taylor 1976, 142 ad loc)— by
turning the poem into a dialogue.
We have to approach this maxim of Pittacus by imagining him speaking and
Simonides replying, something like this: Pittacus: ‘Gentlemen, it is hard to be
good (âV ênyrvpoi, xalepÚn §sylÚn ¶µµenai).103 Simonides: ‘What you
say is not true, Pittacus, for it is not being but becoming good (oÈ går e‰nai
éllå gen°syai µ°n §stin índra égayÚn), in hands and feet and mind
foursquare, blamelessly built, that is hard truly (xalepÚn éley°vw) (343e344a).104
Socrates’ interpretation of the poem may well be perverse, but it renders a clear
philosophical point that counters the perversity of Protagoras’ lack of concern with
virtue. Socrates is highlighting the effects of the passage of time on virtue. When we
read the poem with this in mind, it answers the initial question of why virtue cannot be
taught. His interpretation of the poem allows us to see that and why virtue (even if it is
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The use of the epic infinitive ¶µµenai of eﬁµ€ sum brings to mind the diaµ°nein that comes later at
344b9.
104
The translation of Lombardo and Bell works nicely with this interpretation, because they set off the
speakers, as some of the dialogues themselves do. But the Greek does not exactly warrant this. The dialogic
nature of the interpretation, is however, clear.
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knowledge) cannot be taught. At 320b-c, when Socrates says, “I just don’t think that
virtue can be taught,” the Greek reads: “didaktÒn §stin ≤ éretÆ,” virtue is not taught,
or is not teachable. The construction uses the same verb ‘to be’ for which Simonides
(according to Socrates) criticizes Pittacus. Virtue is not taught (for then one knows, or is
virtuous) and this belongs only to the gods. Virtue becomes taught, which is to say that it
is equivalent to the continual process of learning. This interpretation explains why
Socrates continues to practice the elenchus and calls it “service to the god” in the
Apology (30a). As we saw in the previous section, Socrates uses the elenchus continually
to become virtuous. Virtue is a struggle, not an attained state. Socrates may have been
referring to this when he jokingly tried to substitute “bad” for “difficult.” Even if they do
not admit it, people fail in virtue because they flee difficulty. If they flee difficulty, then
they think it is bad or fearful (cf. 358d).
Socrates’ interpretation focuses on the difficulty of virtue, but this is overlooked
by his interlocutors, intent as they are upon verbal agon. He says,
For a little later, as if he were developing his argument, he says that to become a
god man is truly difficult, but possible, for a time at least (oÂÒn te µ°ntoi §p€ ge
xrÒnon); but having become one (genÒµenon ), to remain (diaµ°nein) in that
state (tª ßjei) and be a good man, as you say, Pittacus, is impossible beyond
human power (édÊnaton ka‹ oÈk ényr≈peion), but only a god could have that
gift (344b6-c3).
The distinction is one between being and becoming.105 Only a god can be good
but a human can perhaps become good “for a time at least.” It is not possible, however,
for a mortal to remain in that state, because of time. ‘Remaining’ (diaµ°nein) is here
105

Taylor says, The verb in the opening line…is in fact the past infinitive, which could have the sense
either ‘to have become’ or ‘to become on one occasion’ (as opposed to acquiring a lasting disposition),
while there is some evidence in early Greek of a distinction between becoming F in the sense of
manifesting F-ness for a limited time and being F permanently (e.g. Pind. Pyth. x21-4) (Taylor 1976, 143).
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similar to the epic form of being (¶µµenai) used in the poem. The difficulty of being
good, for a human being in a world of change is that time renders being into remaining,
which is ultimately a kind of becoming rather than of being.
If virtue is indeed knowledge, this claim is remarkably similar to those describing
the difference between human and divine wisdom. “What has caused my reputation is
none other than a certain kind of wisdom. What kind of wisdom? Human wisdom,
perhaps. It may be that I really possess this, while those whom I mentioned just no are
wise with a wisdom more than human” (20d-e). Human wisdom is, of course, simply
“that I do not think I know what I do not know” (21d). He shows later that “To fear
death gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to think one
knows what one does not” (29a). If we see death as misfortune, we fear it and it leads us
astray.106 Thus fear of death takes away one’s knowledge.
In the Protagoras, Socrates cites the poem again in order to make a related point.
But that man inevitably is bad
whom incapacitating misfortune throws down (344c).
This is a surprising claim, for it seems that even the good man will inevitably be made
bad by misfortune. Robert Bartlett takes a somewhat extreme but not entirely inaccurate
reading of this. He says: “All human excellence is doomed to decline as a result of time,
toil and illness, for example (345b2-4), and it is precisely those who have gained the most
knowledge and so act or fare best who have the most to lose—and will lose it eventually”
(2004, 78). I think that Bartlett interprets this too strongly as saying that it is impossible
to “possess” virtue (2004, 79). I argue that according to Simonides it is difficult but
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Cf. Crito 46e-47a.
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possible to become wise, but since it is a becoming wise it is always subject to change
and thus one may (but will not necessarily) also become worse. It is precisely because
the predicates of virtue in the Protagoras are Pauline, that one may not be, but only
become, virtuous. It is a human being who is striving for universal virtue and the human
is partly physical and temporal and subject to change. A particular instantiation of a
universal is not ever that universal itself. The person will not necessarily lose virtue,
however, as Bartlett suggests. Socrates says only that if certain circumstances occur, one
will always be made bad, not that one will always be made bad, for luck may have it that
the circumstances never occur in some lives.
C.C.W. Taylor asks instead what it means that he will become bad.
The poet might be saying that misfortune makes a man poor, hungry, weak in
body, lacking in reputation etc., i.e. kakos (inferior) according to the traditional
success conception of arête, or (alternately or additionally) that the man in that
situation has no choice but to act in shameful ways (Taylor 1976, 145).
Taylor glosses over Socrates’ reading as “an interpretation…in terms of his own thesis
that goodness consists in knowledge is clearly anachronistic and whimsical” (Taylor
1976, 146). Perhaps it is both anachronistic and whimsical as an interpretation of
Simonides, but as a determined effort to keep the discussion on the subject of virtue and
its transmission, the interpretation is serious and does a lot of work. Socrates, does use
the lines to introduce “his own thesis that goodness consists in knowledge” but that is not
all he does. He is also still commenting on the difficulty of virtue. He says,
the good man too could sometimes become bad, either through old age or toil or
disease or some misfortune—for doing badly is nothing other than being deprived
of knowledge—but the bad man could never become bad—for he is bad all the
time—but if he is to become bad he must first become good (345b-c).
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Socrates’ life (as depicted by Plato) is proof that we do not have to, but that due to the
passage of time we cannot assume that we “are” virtuous. If virtue is knowledge and we
think we are knowledgeable, then we think that we know something that we do not. We
become knowledgeable by continuous questioning. This is becoming good, or gaining
some degree of knowledge—if only the knowledge that I don’t know. It keeps us from
acting viciously and thus contributes to the state of being called virtue so that one will
better be able to handle unexpected and adverse situations, should they arise. Thus,
Socrates says that events such as old age and toil can only take away the knowledge (or
goodness) of one who has knowledge.
Whom does incapacitating (éµÆxanow) misfortune (suµforã) overthrow
(kayaire›)? Clearly not the ordinary passenger who is always susceptible (d∞lon
˘ti oÈ tÚn ﬁdi≈thn: ı µ¢n går ﬁdi≈thw ée€ kayπrhtai) (344c).
Misfortune or more literally “events” (suµforã) cannot overthrow someone who has no
knowledge to be overthrown. If we imagine an ordinary person has to take control of a
ship or a plane, a problem does not really throw him down. He is down from the start.
Otherwise, we would have something like the joke about the man who breaks his hand
and says “Doc, will I ever play the piano?” The punch line is that the man has never
played the piano and has no knowledge of the piano to have suffered in the injury. If we
have not thought about virtue and the state of our souls we do not lose knowledge when
we are overcome by the fear of death, for we have never thought about what should be
feared and what should not.
We might say the same thing in other, more temporal terms. If one lives caught up
in the multiplicity of moments, then no particular moment (no matter how particularly
eventful, or unfortunate) can be named as the cause of misfortune. Lack of knowledge is
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the real misfortune. Socrates seems to call something a misfortune only if it takes away
knowledge. If one never has knowledge, that is the misfortune.
Socrates continues along this line of reasoning. He says:
You can’t knock down someone already supine, you can only knock down
someone standing up and render him supine (Àsper oÔn tÚn ke€µenÒn tiw ín
katabãloi, ållå tÚn µ¢n •st«tã katlãboi ín tiw œste ke€µenon
poi∞sai). In the same way, incapacitating misfortune would overthrow only
someone who is capable, not the chronically incapable (tÚn d¢ ke€µenon oÎ,
oÏtv ka‹ tÚn ˆnta pot¢ éµÆxanow ín suµforå kay°loi, tÚn d¢ ée‹
ˆnta oÎ). A hurricane striking a pilot would incapacitate him, a bad season will
do it to a farmer, and the same thing applies to a doctor. For the good is
susceptible to becoming bad…but the bad is not susceptible to becoming; it must
always be (aÈtar énØr égayÚw tot¢ µ¢n kakÒw, êllote dÉ §sylÒw: t“ d¢
kak“ oÈk §gxvre› gen°syai, éllÉ ée‹ e‰nai énãgke. Õste tÚn µ¢n
eÈµÆxanon ka‹ sofÚn ka‹ égayÚn §peidån éµÆxanow suµforå kay°l˙,
oÁk ¶sti µØ oÈ kakÚn ¶µµena) (344c-e).
Socrates is saying that the one who doesn’t know cannot be overtaken by events, because
being overtaken means losing knowledge. Thus events (suµforã) may overtake a good
man but not a bad one. If the bad one does well, it is a form of luck or accident and so he
may as well have done poorly.
All of Socrates’ examples are ‘natural’ phenomena that overtake the human. A
storm hits the ship and no amount of skill or knowledge can save it. The farmer cannot
make it rain, no matter how expert in agriculture. Certain diseases or injuries simply
cannot be cured, no matter how expert the doctor. In such circumstances, a good person
who is eÈµÆxanon ka‹ sofÚn ka‹ égayÒn will lose his or her knowledge (which is
only to say that the knowledge becomes useless) and become éµÆxanow.
In order to illustrate this, Socrates shows the different ways that a good man and a
“scoundrel” deal with adversity (346a-b). Just as knowing how to deal with storms is an
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integral part of being a good pilot (even if some storms will overcome even the best
pilot), knowing how to handle adversity is part it seems of being a virtuous person. In
order to prepare for events we must not trust our virtue to luck. If one trusts luck one
may well turn out like Critias or Alcibiades who “are almost happy to see their parents’
or country’s trouble and viciously point it out and denounce it so that their own
dereliction of duty toward them will not be called into question” (346a-b).
The scoundrel, like Meletus, thinks that he has knowledge that he does not have
and loudly criticizes others. The knowledgeable person, to the contrary, realizes how
difficult knowledge is and he or she never
thinks that any human being willingly (•kÒnta) makes a mistake
(§jaµartãnein) or willingly (•kÒnta) does anything wrong (aﬁsxrã) or bad
(kakã). They know very well that anyone who does anything wrong or bad does
so involuntarily (êkontew)” (345d-e).107

Thus, those who have become good “are angry because their parents or country wronged
them, they calm themselves down and reconcile themselves to it, and force themselves to
love and praise their own people (346b). It is not difficult to see the contrast here
between Socrates, who was wronged by his city, but who died loving it and upholding its
laws, and Alcibiades, who at least partially blamed the city for his misfortune. The point
is that most people think they know things that they do not and if they do not have the
disastrous fortunes of Alcibiades it is either because of a lack of ambition and talent, or a
surplus of luck.
In this chapter I have shown that while we may not be able to say precisely what
wisdom or virtue is, or how they are unified, we can see clearly that the conceit of
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Cf. Crito 49a-b and Apology 25d-26e for two different but related claims.
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wisdom is the ignorance or folly that unites the vices, since “anyone who does anything
wrong or bad does so involuntarily (êkontew)” (345e). In addition I have shown that
Socrates’ interpretation of the poem is a continuation of the discussion of the unity of the
virtues. I have shown that one must become and not be virtuous, precisely because virtue
is a kind of knowledge that is never fully attained, but is instead a constant struggle. One
cannot ‘be’ virtuous without succumbing to the conceit of wisdom that thinks it knows
what it does not. Becoming virtuous, I argue, is the “human wisdom” of the Apology, a
wisdom that constantly guards against this conceit by means of the elenchus. In the next
chapter I will discuss Socrates’ solution to this problem in his discussion of pleasure,
akrasia and measurement.
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Chapter 5
Pleasure, Akrasia and Measure

In the last chapter, I showed that Socrates’ discussion of the Simonides poem
suggests that the wisdom that unites the virtues is the “human wisdom” of the Apology
(20d) so that virtue could not be taught because it was an unceasing process of becoming
virtuous. In this chapter, I show that Socrates continues the discussion by telling us
precisely what kind of wisdom we should attempt in order to overcome this same
becoming and the temporal distortions that it presents. In thinking of one’s life as a
whole, one must think about it rationally. When one does so one will be able to assess
pleasures and pains correctly, seeing that only the unchanging objects of contemplation
are truly pleasant. Thus time—and now how to overcome it and become good—remain
central themes of the dialogue.
In recent years, the section of the Protagoras falling between 351b-358d has been
discussed more than any other part of the dialogue.108 In this chapter I address the
problems of hedonism, akrasia and measurement. In each of these the element of time is
central to the argument. By focusing on this common aspect, I am able to show that
Socrates may in fact offer the ‘hedonistic’ argument on an ad hominem basis, but that he
also takes it quite seriously. So in the first stage, Socrates forces Protagoras to
acknowledge temporal perspective. Protagorean relativism is consistently presented in
Plato as declaring the truth of perspective (cf. Theaetetus 152a and Sophist 236b). The
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Gregory Vlastos claims that “more was to be contributed to this topic by English speaking scholars in
the following nine years [after his 1956 Introduction to the Protagoras] than had appeared in the previous
forty” (1995, 43).
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immediate pleasure—the present—is the de facto perspective and so it is favored by
relativism because pleasures appear larger in the present due to the power of appearance.
Thus, Protagoras’ claim to make Hippocrates better and better each day cannot be true,
for Protagoras sees the good merely as the pleasant present. In order to make
Hippocrates better each day, Protagoras would have to have a view of the whole that he
does not have.
Socrates then shows that the way pleasure appears is not the way that pleasure is.
Only one perspective on pleasure is correct, precisely not the one that appears, but the
one where perspective is eliminated by radically redefining pleasure not as something to
be assessed from moment to moment, but rather, over the course of an entire life. This is
the elimination of perspective altogether. Socrates shows that if one looks at pleasure
over the course of a lifetime everyone will see the same things as pleasant. Socrates
accomplishes this with the discussion of akrasia. He shows that akrasia is an error of
appearance and that it can be corrected with argument. He does not hold a truly hedonist
position that pleasure is the good, but rather he defines pleasure in such a way that only
the good would be truly pleasant. In the course of this argument Socrates has gotten
Protagoras to accept arguments that destroy relativism and hedonism. Socrates has in
addition shown that Protagoras is not an elite like he thinks. Rather, the hedonism of the
many is based upon the same favoring of the present. Thus, Protagorean relativism
becomes equated with the base position of the many. The ad hominem attack is precisely
to call it an ad populum attack.
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Pleasure
Socrates’ avowal of hedonism in the Protagoras has caused a great deal of
controversy in the scholarly community. In this chapter, I evaluate Socrates’ discussion
of pleasure and his avowal of hedonism. I show that most scholarly discussions of the
hedonism of the Protagoras are misguided, because they do not see that Socrates compels
Protagoras to accept a redefinition of pleasure that refutes relativism as well as the belief
in akrasia.
Many scholars have been reluctant to take Socrates’ claims seriously. Charles
Kahn expresses surprise that he, Zeyl (1980) and O’Brien (1967,138) are “honorable
exceptions” to what he claims (without citation) is the dominant tendency not to take
sufficient notice of the “ad populum” argument which suggests that “Socrates is here
arguing tongue in cheek” (Kahn 1996, 240). This position is not the minority position that
Kahn makes it out to be. In fact various forms of this argument are perhaps the most
common. There are some minor differences between an ad hominem and an ad populum
interpretation of this passage. The point, however, is that the ad hominem is the ad
populum. That means that Socrates reduces Protagoras’ position to that of the many.
Though careful not to offend the democracy, Protagoras has said that “the masses,
needless to say, see nothing” (317b). Thus, if Socrates can show that Protagoras’ position
is in many respects the same as (or at least inherent in) the position of the masses, then
Protagoras would have to admit that he too sees nothing. Socrates, will in effect show
this, when he discusses the power of appearance.
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Guthrie offers a typical outline of three possible explanations of Socrates’
professed hedonism. The first option is that “Socrates advocates a vulgar hedonism such
as he fiercely combats in the Gorgias” (1965, 231). A variation of this interpretation
relies on a developmentalist supposition which holds that the doctrine “represents the
genuine Socratic and Platonic position at the time the dialogue was written” (1965, 231),
but that Plato came to reject the position later. This is the position held by Grote and
Hackforth.
The second possible position holds that the
episode, like the whole dialogue, is written ad hominem, in an attack on
Protagoras and more generally on Sophistic standards of morality, which are
entirely conventional: Socrates does not himself believe in the premise on which
he bases the proof of his own view that courage, and virtue generally, is
knowledge (1965, 232).
Guthrie rejects both of these positions, though the option he accepts is a modification of
the second position. He believes that Socrates is arguing from the sophists’ position, or
ad hominem “not (as in the previous explanation) to attack them openly but actually to
show them at their best” (1965 233).
None of these positions are sufficient for the same reason: none of them ask what
Socrates’ definition of pleasure is. Guthrie’s own position seems particularly misguided.
As for the sophists, Plato may be trying “to show them at their best” (1965, 233), but the
point, for Plato, is that their best is not very good. The entire dialogue is constructed
around the question of progress that Protagoras proposes to Hippocrates. The only reason
that Guthrie could possibly say that Plato wants to portray the sophists in the best
possible light is because of the subtle way that he shows them in the worst possible light.
Not only are the sophists ignorant, they are so ignorant of their own ignorance that they
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do not recognize that Socrates has destroyed the positions of Protagoras. The
commentators who want to avoid making Socrates a hedonist at the expense of having
him express opinions he does not hold, are also too squeamish to present him in an eristic
light. They want an ad hominem argument that has no teeth. This is not the way Plato
presents Socrates as seeing it. Socrates says “It’s you and me I want to put on the line”
(331c) and he effectively destroys Protagoras’ position.
Thus, Socrates does offer a strong ad hominem argument that relies on positions
held by Protagoras, but this does not mean that he does not take those claims quite
seriously.109 I agree that he is seriously committed to hedonism, but a radically redefined
hedonism. Scholars, such as Terrence Irwin and Martha Nussbaum and Brickhouse and
Smith take Socrates seriously when he espouses the identity of the good and the pleasant.
Such scholars reject the ad hominem interpretation and argue, in different ways, that
Socrates uses pleasure to create a standard, or a unit of measurement to make
incommensurable ends, commensurate. While such scholars may not be entirely correct
in rejecting the ad hominem approach, the idea of pleasure as a standard of measurement
is important both for the discussion of akrasia and of measurement and the power of
appearance.110 I show that in order to make it such a standard, however, Socrates must
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Cf. Irwin who says that the “first argument rests on the fact that Socrates seeks to show that the many
implicitly accept hedonism. This is a poor reason for supposing that he does not accept it himself” (1995,
86).
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Like Guthrie, Irwin begins by offering three different versions of the ad hominem interpretation. He will
reject all three however. “This ‘ad hominem’ interpretation of hedonism rests on three main arguments. (1)
Socrates tries to show how the many are committed to hedonism; he does not agree that it is true, but only
that they cannot avoid it. And so we cannot infer that he accepts hedonism. (2) The truth of hedonism is
unnecessary for Socrates’ rejection of incontinence and his belief in the unity of the virtues, and Socrates
and Plato must have realized this. (3) None of the other Socratic dialogues affirms hedonism; indeed, it is
incompatible with the ethical doctrine of the other dialogues and Socrates and Plato must have realized
this” (Irwin 1995, 86). Irwin is correct here. Even if he is arguing for Protagoras or the many, it is no
reason to assume that he does not accept the position. It is not much of an argument that he does, either.
Irwin continues his assault on the ad hominem position, saying: “We would have a better argument for an
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radically redefines pleasure. If he did not it could not serve as any kind of standard
whatsoever. This has not been noticed by scholars who bring anachronistic (or at least
mistaken) interpretations of pleasure into the discussion.111 Thus he is committed to
hedonism, but only as he defines it in the text when he says “if he completed his life,
having lived pleasantly, does he not seem to you to have lived well” (351b).
Terrence Irwin comes close to this position when he says that we need “to see
whether hedonism ought to seem plausible in the light of the Socratic dialogues, we
ought to see how this account of happiness fits with Socratic eudaimonism” (1995, 87).
He has claimed that:
Socrates does not offer hedonism as an alternative to eudaimonism, but as an
account of the good that eudaimonism takes to be our ultimate end. Let us say,
then that he affirms epistemological hedonism, taking judgments about pleasure
to be epistemologically prior to judgments about goodness (83).
It seems that Irwin is making two points. First, he is saying that hedonism is a
kind of eudaimonism. He is also saying that pleasure is the criterion for goodness.
According to this hedonism, we identify happiness with the “predominance of pleasure
over pain in our life as a whole” (Irwin 1995, 87; emphasis mine).112 Irwin is correct that
the hedonism endorsed by Socrates is one in which only overall pleasure in the course of

ad hominem interpretation if we found that Socrates is careful to confine the hedonist claim to the many,
and to dissociate himself from it; but this is not at all what we find. In fact, Socrates himself proposes
hedonism, against the initial opposition of Protagoras and the many, as the first step of his argument for the
unity of the virtues” (351b3-c6).
111
Cf. Nussbaum’s comparison of “the role of hedonism in this dialogue with the way it figures in later
fourth-century thought” (1986, 110). She finds that “Eudoxos and Epicurus both argue for the intrinsic
attractiveness of pleasure as the end or good...The Protagoras shows no trace of these concerns; nor,
indeed, do any texts of the fifth and early fourth centuries” (1986, 110).
112
This ‘life as a whole’ criterion for pleasure (thus identifying pleasure and happiness) should be
distinguished from Vlastos’ (1969) claim that the objects of choice must be “good or bad on the whole or
all things considered, since they are generally (invariably, in the examples in this passage) mixed bags of
goods and evils” (in Vlastos 1995, 45). I agree with Vlastos as well. It is, however, the elimination of the
temporal perspective that allows us to decide whether “mixed bags” are good or bad.
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a life counts as pleasure. Momentary pleasure that produces more pain later will be
disqualified by this criterion.113 Disqualifying momentary pleasures is the first step in
transforming pleasure into a standard. Martha Nussbaum says that what we
find prominently expressed, as we have already seen in the Antigone, is the
concern to find a standard or measure that will render values commensurable,
therefore subject to precise scientific control. The need for measurement
motivates the search for an acceptable measure (1986, 110).114
We must understand that Socrates’ “concern” to find a standard of measurement is an
attempt to destroy Protagorean relativism.115 If the relativist prejudice for the ‘nearer’
position is removed, only the good things that truly contribute to happiness will be called
pleasant.116 But pleasure may only be a standard if we count only as pleasure those things
that provide more pleasure than pain in the course of a life as a whole. This will mean
that only “non-transitory” pleasures will count as pleasure.
Plato expresses this same “hedonistic” idea elsewhere, most notably in the
Republic where Socrates says that “of the three pleasures, the most pleasant is the part of
the soul with which we learn, and the one in whom that part rules has the most pleasant
life” (582e-583a). Socrates goes on to show that “a king lives seven hundred and twentynine times more pleasantly than a tyrant and that a tyrant is the same number of times
113

According to Vlastos, even the many realize that “they have been calling actions ‘pleasant’ and
‘painful’ only if they are immediately such” (1995, 49).
114
She points to Aristophanes Frogs. “Weight, as Aristophanes saw, has singleness, externality, and
omnipresence; but it is short on intuitive appeal in ethical appeal. Pleasure is a far more attractive place
holder. It is one of the few things we value that turns up in about everything” (110).
115
Brickhouse and Smith point out that pleasure—which they seem, like Irwin, to associate with
happiness—is used by Socrates to render incommensurables commensurate, but their difficulty with his
position seems to stem from overlooking the crucial move which makes it pleasure, taken over the course
of an entire life (1994, 97).
116
It is odd that the “metaphysics of presence” which amounts to little more than a prejudice, that Jacques
Derrida detects as originating with Plato is instead attacked by Socratic ethics as a sophistic position. Cf.
Derrida 1974 and 1981.
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more wretched” (587e). Though it is presented in a comical light here, this is the same
sort of “calculus” proposed in the Protagoras. It is precisely in this way that we are to
take the hedonism of the Protagoras. As Vlastos puts it:
We are supposed to (a) itemize the good we would gain and the evils we would
suffer both now and in the future by a given action, (b) assign numbers to the
values in each of the two categories, and (c) pronounce the action ‘good’ or ‘evil’
depending on which of the two aggregates is the larger (1995, 46).
In the first stage (a), when we itemize the goods and evils that we suffer now and in the
future, we are eliminating time as a factor. It is not explicit in Vlastos’ summary, but
essential to the argument, that I must assign the numbers in step (b) solely on the basis of
pleasure or pain, without taking the “now” or “in the future” into account.
In the Republic, Plato offers a rather long argument (580d-588a) that classifies
and arranges pleasure in the same way and allows Socrates to calculate—in fashion quite
similar to that described above— by precisely how much the king’s life is more pleasant
than the tyrant’s. In the Protagoras, before Plato allows anyone to offer an argument that
redefines pleasure in a way that makes only the good pleasant, Plato provides us with a
cast of historical characters, whose fates we know and whose lives we can weigh or
measure in the same way that Socrates calculated the pleasure of the lives of kings and
tyrants in the Republic. Plato places these fifth century characters in the dialogue
precisely because we can see their lives in a way that we may not be able see our own.
Like the Republic, the Protagoras invites us to evaluate the lives of these
characters in terms of pleasure alone. It would seem that Callias finds pleasure “in food,
drink, sex and all the things associated with them, but…also…the money-loving part”
(Republic 580d-e). Alcibiades and Critias on the other hand are more “dedicated to the
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pursuit of control, victory and high repute” (Republic 581a).117 But for a “philosopher,
what do you suppose he thinks the other pleasures are worth compared to that of knowing
where the truth lies and always being in some such pleasant condition while learning.
Won’t he think they’re far behind?” (581d-e). In the Republic Socrates goes on to argue
that only the philosopher is qualified to judge because he has “of necessity tasted the
other pleasures” (582a-b) and because we judge with arguments the “philosopher’s
instrument” (582d). Thus, we see that Socrates’ life must have, of necessity, been more
pleasant than that of any of his interlocutors, but Plato provides us with dramatic
representations of those interlocutors so that we can evaluate for ourselves.
It is essential to a proper understanding of the role of pleasure in the Protagoras
to understand that Socrates is using pleasure in the same way. Socrates induces
Protagoras and the many to accept the philosopher’s definition of pleasure though they,
like most commentators, may be unaware of this fact. Protagoras accepts a definition of
pleasure that is incompatible with relativism. He accepts that if someone “completed his
life, having lived pleasantly” he also “lived well” (351b). That is he accepts that pleasure
is the good over the course of a life. Socrates almost immediately asks if “while
knowledge is present in a man, what rules him is not knowledge, but rather anything
else” (352b). This leads to the denial of akrasia, to which I return in the next section, but
it is important to point out here that the entire argument will have the effect of showing
that Protagoras does not have knowledge. If pleasure is the good and he is incapable of
evaluating or defining pleasure, then he does not know the good. If he believes that one
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can be overcome by pleasure, he does not have a true understanding of pleasure, and
therefore has not experienced the pleasure of wisdom and certainly cannot teach it.
When the topic is first introduced Socrates asks if “some people live well and
others badly?” (351b1). Socrates then asks “Now, if he completed his life, having lived
pleasantly (T€ d’eﬁ ≤d°vw bioÁw tÚn b€on teleutÆsien), does he not seem to you to
have lived well? (oÈk eÔ ên soi doke› oÏtvw bebivk°nai;)” (351b4; emphasis mine).
Protagoras underestimates Socrates’ claims. He says that one who has lived
pleasantly if he is pleased by praiseworthy things (E‡per to›w kalo›w gÉ, ¶fh, z–h
≤dÒµenow) (351c). He assumes that shameful things can be pleasant, but this shows
only that Protagoras is missing Socrates’ point entirely. Socrates is attempting to remove
the relativity involved in accounting for pleasure, as his retort suggests, but Protagoras
does not understand this conception of pleasure. Socrates prods Protagoras further. He is
explicit about telling Protagoras what he means. He claims that pleasant things are good
insofar as they are pleasant, leaving their other consequences out (351c5).
Vlastos divides this statement into two propositions. He thinks that the hedonism
expressed here is equivalent to the conjunction of
(A) All pleasure is good and all pain is evil
With
(B) All good is pleasure and all evil is pain (1995, 48).
Vlastos understands (B) as a stronger position that Socrates need not hold. He asks then,
why Socrates did not take the time to distance himself from this position and answers that
“this would open up another big issue, sidetracking him from his immediate goal, which
is to make good to the ‘multitude’ his great claim about ‘the power of knowledge’”
(1995, 50). Vlastos is mistaken in this. The acceptance of both of these positions is part
97

of Socrates “great claim” about the power of knowledge. Socrates is arguing from the
positions of the many and of Protagoras, but he is doing so in order to convince them that
knowledge is the only true pleasure. Socrates is confident that if the temporal distortions
are removed—and they are since time is not inherent in pleasure—the philosophical life
will necessarily be the most pleasant. Protagoras picks up on the importance of the whole
life in his reluctance to answer, but he will still miss the point.118
I don’t know, Socrates, if I should answer as simply as you put the question—that
everything pleasant is good and everything painful is bad. It seems to me to be
safer to respond not merely with my present answer in mind (éllå µoi doke› oÈ
µÒnon prÚw tØn nËn épÒkrisin) but from the point of view of my life overall
(éllå ka‹ prÚw pãnta tÚn êllon b€on tÚn §µÚn) (351d).
Protagoras says that not everything pleasant is good because he means something
different by pleasure than does Socrates. He has the more common subjectivist, or
relativist, view of pleasure. He has already said that “the good is such a multifaceted and
variable thing” (334b). He must also think that pleasure is multifaceted. His inability to
understand the Socratic conception of pleasure becomes clear when Protagoras concludes
with the common sense claim that “that on the one hand, there are pleasurable things
which are not good, and on the other hand, there are painful things which are not bad but
some which are, and a third class which is neutral, neither good or bad” (351d).
Despite his claim, Protagoras fails to look at a human life over all, but even his
attempt to do so undermines his relativism. Socrates’ response has to force the point.
“You call pleasant things those which partake (µet°xonta) of pleasure or produce
(poioËnta) pleasure?’ (351e). poioËnta is the crucial word here. When we equalize
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Walsh interprets this as saying that “even if men pursue pleasure alone, they are still governed by
reason” (1971, 261).
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the effects of time (as Socrates will momentarily suggest) the future pain an immediately
pleasurable action will produce is weighed together with it. Socrates has almost
succeeded in his redefinition of pleasure.119
Plato shows us that it is through arguments that Socrates is able to take his entire
life into account when he assesses pleasure and pain and in doing so destroys the ordinary
notions of pleasure and pain. He is not lost in the present like Epimetheus, but he says
instead that “I take promethean forethought over my life as a whole” (361d). It is on the
grounds of an “entire life” that Socrates offers an account of his radical redefinition of
pleasure. We must be sure we understand what Socrates means here. Certainly one is not
able to predict the future in order to see one’s “life as a whole.” Indeed, even if one
could accurately predict the future, such predictions would be worthless.
And if there had been any honors, praises, or prizes among them for the one
who… best remembered which usually came earlier, and which later, and which
simultaneously, and who could best divine the future, do you think our man
would desire these rewards and envy among prisoners (Republic 516c-d).
The answer, of course is a resounding ‘No’ and Socrates could not mean this by having
“promethean forethought.” Gregory Vlastos says that “his only explicit requirement is
that we aggregate them rationally and thereby measure the value of those actions between
which we choose” (1995, 46). This may not seem like calculating pleasures at all, but
this seems to be part of Socrates’ point: when viewed in a rational way the things that are
ordinarily viewed as pleasant are no longer so. If we can only evaluate pleasures
rationally, then, as the Republic also claims, only rationality will be truly pleasurable for
“what is best for each thing is its own” (586d-e). Thus, by looking at a life as a whole,
119

Vlastos says that even the many recognize that they “have been calling actions ‘pleasant’ and ‘painful’
only if they are immediately such” (1995, 48).
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Socrates means looking at it rationally and using argument to judge pleasures.120 To look
at a life rationally is to look at it non-temporally and non-materially, thus only atemporal
and incorporeal things will produce true pleasure.121
Thus to look at one’s life with promethean forethought is to look at it rationally.
When one looks rationally at one’s life as a whole, only the good is pleasant and thus it
offers us an “objective” standard of the pleasant. Perhaps to think about life as a whole is
to think about its ends, about which we must think about rationally unless we want evil.
Aristotle sets up two options and though he disagrees with Plato here, his comments shed
light on the discussion at hand. Aristotle claims that the end is either laid down by nature
or that it appears, for some other reason, to each person (114b15-20). These positions
could easily be those of Socrates and Protagoras while they both “trace all the other
things back to their ends in doing whatever actions they do” (114b15-17). Aristotle
points out that both are responsible for their mistakes (neither Plato nor Socrates would
disagree), but the point of the Protagoras is that if one holds a relative and changing view
of the ends of a life, then one will think that base things are pleasant and make errors.
Rationality, by focusing on eternal or unchanging things, corrects the skewed perspective
that time produces. Thus, it destroys relativism which privileges the individual
perspective and thus the present moment. Plato consistently presents Protagorean
relativism as a favoring of an individual perspective.
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Seekers of honor also seem to think of their lives as a whole, and so their lives may be better than those
of pleasure lovers, but they are incapable of judging the life of wisdom lovers. In addition, as the presence
of Alcibiades and Critias shows, one may also become worse as a result of this. Callias, by most standards,
had a better—and certainly a longer—life than the others. Cf. Symposium 208c-209c.
121
This does not mean that a stroll or a meal is not pleasant in some sense, and the good person certainly
enjoys these. But such things pale in comparison with rational contemplation of forms. Cf. Symposium
where Alcibiades says that Socrates “was the one man who could really enjoy a feast” (220a).
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In the Theaetetus, Theaetetus claims that knowledge is perception (151e3-4) and
Socrates equates this position with the Protagorean claim that “Man is the measure of all
things, of the things which are that they are of things which are not that they are not”
(pãntvn xrhµãtvn µ°tronÉ ênyrvpon e‰nai, t«n µ¢n ˆntvn …w ¶sti, t«n d¢
µØ ˆntvn …w oÈk ¶stin) (152a). We already see here the term µ°tron, that will appear
as the correction of the power of appearance in the Protagoras. If Protagoras were
indeed known for this position, there is a sort of perverse irony in Socrates’ insistence
upon it as an objective standard. If we look at our lives rationally, as a whole, perspective
is entirely eliminated.
The Theaetetus makes it clear what Protagoras means by his so called “homo
mensura” doctrine when Socrates says “that as each thing appears to me, so it is for me,
and as it appears to you, so it is for you” (…w oÂa µ¢n ßkasta §µo‹ fa€netai toiaËta
µ¢n ¶stin §µo€, oÂa d¢ so€, toiaËta d¢ aÎ so€) (152a). Socrates concludes,
“apparently, that things are for the individual such as he perceives them” (152c1-3).
Later Socrates brings out the temporal discontinuity that results from relativism’s
inherent link to the present (as that perspective from which things always appear).122 He
asks “do you even feel sure that anything appears to another human being like it appears
to you? Wouldn’t you be much more disposed to hold that it doesn’t appear the same
even to yourself because you never remain like yourself” (154a6-8). The temporal
discontinuity of relativism keeps one from agreeing with oneself. This is also the case for
a Protagorean assessment of pleasure. If one has a belief that something is pleasurable
and, as Vlastos says, that belief is not grounded in knowledge then, according to Socrates,
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Socrates uses an argument from the future in order to help refute Protagoras’ relativism (178b-c).
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it would not have the “requisite stability and could shift, at the very next moment, to the
contrary belief” (Vlastos 1995, 45, n. 9).
We have seen that Irwin, Nussbaum and Brickhouse and Smith all treat pleasure
as some form of measurement. For Irwin, it is a means to assess happiness and for
Nussbaum and Brickhouse and Smith a way to make various incommensurable ends in
life commensurate. They have not focused sufficiently on the removal of
“subjectivism”123 from pleasure that this requires. If we accept Socrates’ account and look
at one’s life as a whole, relativism is removed from any explanation of pleasure.
When Socrates asks Protagoras whether he thinks that knowledge is something
powerful or not (352b-c), he is asking two questions. Socrates is asking whether or not
knowledge can be overcome by pleasure or some other criteria for action. When one asks
if knowledge is stronger than pleasure, one is also asking whether or not knowledge can
know pleasure. If we accept the Republic’s discussion of pleasure, we see that the rational
part of the soul is the one that has true pleasure. This is because it is not physical and is
not subject to time. Because the rational is not subject to time it is capable of looking at a
life as a whole, which is to say in a non-perspectival—or objective—fashion. It is also
capable of evaluating the other pleasures that know nothing of reason.
Thus, we have seen that Socrates takes hedonism seriously, but also argues for it
in an ad hominem way that is intended to destroy Protagoras’ relativism by redefining
pleasure in such a way that knowledge is true pleasure. This brings us to the discussion
of akrasia, which continues to investigate the same problems.
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As the Theaetetus puts it, “Whether you apply the term ‘being’ to a thing or the term ‘becoming,’ you
must always use the words ‘for somebody’ or ‘of something’ or ‘relatively to something (tin‹ e‰nai µ
tinÚw µ prow ti =ht°on aÈt“)” (160b-c)
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Akrasia
The denial of akrasia124—or weakness of the will—is one of the most contentious
claims in Platonic literature. Aristotle begins the attack on this position, claiming that
“this argument, then, contradicts things that appear manifestly” (Nicomachean Ethics
1145b27). He thinks that the “claim that ‘no one is willingly bad or unwillingly blessed’
would seem to be partly true but partly false. For while certainly no one is unwillingly
blessed, vice is voluntary” (1145b20). Though some scholars, such as Vlastos and Santas,
wish to argue that this argument can be “‘freed’ from its hedonistic premises” (21; cited
in Vlastos 1995, 57), I will claim, quite to the contrary, that since we now understand
Socrates’ definition of pleasure there is no reason to separate the argument from its
“hedonistic premises” with which it is mutually explanatory.
The same scholars also think that the conclusions from the argument against
akrasia should be limited to pleasure. The question is whether knowledge or something
else “sometimes desire, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, at other times love, often
fear” (352b) rule the human being. Socrates explicitly argues only against the claim that
knowledge can be overcome by pleasure, not the others. Gerasimos Santas agrees with
Vlastos 1965 that Socrates’ “argument, then, even if entirely successful, can refute only
part of the opinion of the many; they still might be right about people being overcome by
fear, love and so forth” (Santas 1971, 269).125 Again this seems like an unnecessary
limitation. I have shown that knowledge looks at unchanging, atemporal principles and
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I follow Vlastos in treating akrasia as an English word (1995, n. 16, 47). Other authors, such as Irwin,
use the English incontinence. It is important that the reader remember that both words stand for the one
Greek term, one by means of transliteration, the other as translation.
125
Walsh sees Euripides’ Hippolytus and Medea as making precisely these claims, that we are overcome
by desire and by rage (1971, 250-257).
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ends in order to determine what is pleasant and what is painful. We have seen that it is
the consistency of knowledge and its objects that it is the only true pleasure. The things
commonly considered more pleasant than knowledge only because of the power of the
present. The wise person—to the extent that there is such a one— enjoys everything, but
only because he or she enjoys wisdom most of all.
When Socrates raises the question he presents two options, either knowledge rules
a person, or a plurality of other psychic phenomena rule that person. It is the shifting
nature of being ruled by “sometimes (tot¢ µ¢n) desires, sometimes (tot¢ d¢) pleasure,
sometimes (tot¢ d¢) pain, at other times (§n€ote d°) love, often (pollãkiw d°) fear”
(352b-c). Socrates’ wording is overwhelmed by markers of temporal discontinuity, so
that it is not difficult to see that it is the inconstancy that is the target here. If one has the
correct conception of pleasure, one is not overcome by pleasure, but constantly chooses
on the basis of it. If one has a mistaken view of pleasure, one is living haphazardly and is
overwhelmed by any old thing. In this section, I offer a careful reading of akrasia to
show that Socrates does not need to refute any of the other things that may “overcome”
someone. This comes as a result of my larger point. I show that Socrates argues that in
the phenomenon of so-called akrasia one is overcome not by pleasure, but by the present.
If this is so, then one is not overcome by fear or desire, either, but by the present. As
Irwin puts it,
Socrates explains the error; since short-term pleasures and pains seem greater
than they really are, we make mistaken judgments about pleasure and pain, and
so we choose the result that will actually be less pleasant because we believe it
will be more pleasant (356c4-e4) (Irwin 1995, 85; emphasis mine).
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Socrates says that people say that they are “overcome by pleasure, because of which they
fail to do the best thing when they know what it is” (353a). Akrasia is to be unwilling or
unable to do what is best, even if one knows what is best.126
Since, however, Socrates has not made this explicit, the many’ ask what is it to be
“overcome by pleasure” (353c). This question is central. In the discussion of the
Simonides poem we saw that only those with knowledge can be overcome by events and
that the “chronically incapable” cannot (344d). Here the discussion is of being overcome
by pleasure, but if we are justified in noticing the similarity127 between the discussion of
being overtaken by events (cf. Chapter 4 above), then we may say that someone without
knowledge cannot be overcome by pleasure or pain or anything else, for this person is
already overcome. If I knew that only good things overall are pleasant then I would know
what is really pleasant and I would choose only it, because it is also good. Since I do not
have any idea what true pleasure is, I am not overcome by anything, it is just chance.
Socrates says:
Do you hold, gentlemen, that this happens to you in circumstances like
these—you are often overcome by pleasant things like food or drink or sex, and
you do these things all the while knowing they are ruinous. They would say yes.
Then I would ask them again: ‘In what sense do you call these things ruinous? Is
it that each of them is pleasant in itself and produces immediate (paraxr∞µa
par°xei) pleasure, or is it that they bring about (poie›) diseases and poverty and
many other things of the sort ? (353d).
Lombardo and Bell imply, but do not translate one of the most important phrases here
Ïsteron xrÒnon so that it should read “they bring about diseases and poverty and many
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For various ways of laying out the argument see Vlastos 1995, 51; Santas 1971, 272; and Irwin 1995,
83-85.
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There are no relevant differences between the two. If one has no knowledge, then one cannot be
overtaken by events, whether good or bad.
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other things of that sort at a later time.” Socrates is explaining how what is called
‘akrasia’ or being overcome by pleasure actually occurs.
We call immediately pleasant things bad, not because they are pleasant, but
because they produce pain at a later time.128 Thus, we call the same thing pleasant at one
time and painful at another. This shows the contradictory nature of appearance and makes
clear why the art of measurement is necessary. We look only at the present time the
things that are paraxr∞µa par°xei and ignore the future (and what we can learn from
the past). According to the Protagorean dictum “as each thing appears to me, so it is for
me, as it appears to you, so it is for you” (Theaetetus 152a). Everything appears from the
present and so it is true as it appears in the present and so I act, and though I think that
pleasure is my criterion for action, it is, in fact simple presence that determines my
decision. Socrates continues,
Or even if it doesn’t bring about these things later ( eﬁw tÚn Ïsteron ), but gives
only enjoyment, would it still be a bad thing, just because it gives enjoyment in
whatever way (353c-d; emphasis mine).
Things that give only pleasure are not called bad. Things are called bad because they are
eventually painful.129 Those who are absorbed in the present do not see this until after
they have made the decision and the once future pain has become present and the once
present pleasure has become past. If one can look at one’s life as a whole, before making
a decision, then one can avoid errors such as those attributed to akrasia.
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Cf. Protagoras’ relativism.
If a homicidal maniac is able to get away with murder and feels nothing but pleasure in his
contemplation of his atrocities, he is already in such a vile state that his ignorance, as always, is its own
punishment. Cf. Chapter 11 on the tyrant in the Republic. Nevertheless, without some serious
consideration of an afterlife, such as that presented in the Myth of Er, such extreme cases add a
considerable difficulty to such a discussion of pleasure.
129
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In order to reinforce this point, Socrates takes the opposite situation next and asks
about things such as exercise and medical treatment. These examples are often
overlooked, as a simple corollary to the examples which have preceded it.130 In reality,
this is the decisive point. Socrates shows that people say that some things are good but
painful. He asks,
Would you call these things [exercise, medical treatment, etc.] good for the reason
that they bring about intense pain and suffering, or because they ultimately
(Ïsteron xrÒnon) bring about health and good condition of bodies and
preservation of cities and power over others and wealth (354b).
In reality Socrates shows that there is a large realm of action in which most people
already take their whole lives into account, rather than the present. Whenever we decide
to take such a course of action as going to the doctor, we must think about our lives as a
whole, or no one would ever go to the doctor. In reality, however, if I am getting
cauterized, I am—in a sense—overcome by pleasure, but by a future pleasure.131 I realize
that the cauterization will hurt, but will ultimately make me better and give me more
pleasure than pain.
Thus, on the one hand, when I choose a distant pleasure over an immediate pain
(which I do in very quotidian situations) I am thinking of pleasure qua pleasant. When,
on the other hand, I choose some immediate pleasure, it is not the pleasure, but the
immediacy that overcomes me. I am choosing pleasure qua present. That is in the cases
of medical treatment and physical training, on the one hand, I make a decision truly based

130

Vlastos (1969) asks “Now why should Socrates pitch his examples so low in the debate? The most
likely explanation is that he wants to meet his adversaries on their own level “ (in Vlastos 1995, 47). This is
another form of the ‘ad hominem’ or ‘ad populum’ interpretation. I will show to the contrary that these are
the most common types of examples of undergoing unpleasant things for the sake of an over-all pleasure.
These “lowly” examples will provide us with our most important models.
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Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of the boxer at Nicomachean Ethics 1117b.
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on pleasure, a calculated decision. When I choose “ruinous things,” thinking that they are
pleasant, I am choosing not on the basis of pleasure, but on the basis of presence, a
temporal relativism that amounts to the prejudice for the present.
Socrates shows that we are capable of determining pleasure in terms of our entire
lives. He asks, “are these things good for any other reason than that they result in
(époteleutò) pleasures and the relief and avoidance of pains?” (354b). Being
overcome by pleasure really means being overcome by the presence of the pleasure,
where presence, not pleasure, is the deciding factor, otherwise we would not chose the
ultimately less, but immediately more pleasant course of action. When we measure, the
pleasure remains, to be counted only in terms of pleasure and pain. It is the temporal
element that is eliminated. Thus, it must be the temporal element—the presence of the
pleasure—that determines the action.
Most commentators have focused on Socrates’ substitution of the ‘good’ for the
‘pleasant’ as decisive in the argument. On this I do not wish to disagree, but rather to
remind the reader that the ‘substitution’ amounts to a removal of the temporal and the
material. A removal of the temporal perspective automatically converts the pleasant into
the good.132 Most commentators, however, have tended to overlook the temporal element
which has already been so prominent and which will become even more important in
what follows. Brickhouse and Smith for instance, complain that “nothing prevents the
possibility of akrasia so long as we can apprehend all costs and benefits correctly, but
allow some other motivation—as, for example, our drive for pleasure qua pleasure to
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This works only on the assumption, seemingly shared by Socrates and Plato, that the cosmos is just and
good.
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motivate action” (1994, 96).133 This is Socrates’ point. If a drive for pleasure qua
pleasure motivates our actions, then we will choose the good because all things that are
truly pleasant are good. It is when a drive for pleasure qua present motivates action that
we miscalculate. People do not know what pleasure really is, but they are unaware of this
ignorance and think that they do know and
therefore, those who have no experience of reason or virtue, but are always
occupied with feasts and the like…and wander in this way throughout their lives,
never reaching beyond this to what is truly higher up…and so they are not filled
with that which really is and never taste any stable or pure pleasure” (Republic
586a).
In the Protagoras, Socrates shows us how to achieve this stable and pure
pleasure. In order to see it the temporal distance (difference) must be eliminated.
Socrates does precisely this when he has the “hubris questioner” say:
What you’re saying is ridiculous—someone does what is bad, knowing that it is
bad, when it is not necessary to do it (oÈ d°on aÈtÚn prãttein), having been
overcome (≤tt≈µenow) by the good (ÍpÚ t«n égay«n)” (355d).134
There is no difference allowed for temporal distance. The equation of the good and the
pleasant eliminates time as a factor in decisions. Vlastos acknowledges this point when
he says that the only “correct substitution…would be ‘because of the goods of the
moment” (1995, 53). By the next page, however, “goods of the moment” has been
replaced by “this particular good” (1995, 54). While it is this particular good that I want,
it is the presence, not the particularity that I am choosing, because if I saw the
particularity of the good appropriately, it would not be good at all. It is the temporal
element that causes me to think that I want something particular about this good. Thus the
133
134

Cf. Sullivan 1961 and Vlastos 1969 n. 24.
It sounds slightly less absurd if we translate it more literally “as by the good things.”
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leveling of the temporal element is what is necessary to make the argument that I was
overcome by pleasure into an absurdity.
Socrates shows clearly in his next statements that other criteria must be stripped
away.
‘So,’ he will say, ‘within yourself does the good outweigh the bad or not? ’ We
will clearly say in reply that it does not; for if it did the person whom we say is
overcome by pleasure would not have made any mistake. ‘In virtue of what’ he
might say, ‘does the good outweigh the bad or the bad the good?’ Only in that one
is greater and one is smaller, or more and less (355d-e).
When Socrates says that they shall not be able to come up with another answer, he allows
the hubristic questioner to say “‘So clearly then’ he will say, ‘by ‘being overcome’ you
mean getting more bad things for the sake of fewer good things” (355e). Socrates has
reduced common hedonism to absurdity. He does so by taking hedonism seriously in a
way that Protagoras and the other sophists did not.
The immediate objection to Socrates’ statement shows the true criterion in what
Protagoras means by hedonism. “But Socrates, the immediate pleasure (parax∞µa
≤dÊ) is very much different from the pleasant and painful at a later time (eﬁw tÚn
Ïsteron xrÒnon ka‹ ≤d°ow ka‹ luperoË)” (356a-b). This is the crucial line. It is the
decisive point in the dialogue, where Socrates makes explicit the theme that has so far
dominated the discussion. Socrates replies “They are not different in any other way than
by pleasure and pain, for there is no other way that they could differ” (356b). The
problem is distance rather than difference. Socrates is as clear as possible in his
statement of what really happens in putative cases of akrasia.135 The many suppose that
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Cf. Santas says that “the pleasure being near in time and the pain remote in the future does indeed make
a difference in the explanation, it is not an irrelevant feature; but the only difference this feature can make
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there is a difference between “immediate pleasure” and “pleasure and pain at a later
time.” If this error is eliminated, the mistakes erroneously attributed to akrasia will be
eliminated. Socrates will show us how to do this in his discussion on measurement.
Before moving on to that discussion, however, we should test the “overcome by
the present” interpretation of akrasia on an example, or what Brickhouse and Smith call
“a test case.” They imagine the situation where a patient is told by his doctor that “he
must not eat sweets or he will make himself very sick. He accepts the physician’s
authority, and what is more, wants very much not to be ill” (1994, 93). Unfortunately, he
also has “a sweet tooth and we now find him eyeing a piece of candy” (1994, 93). They
offer three situations in which the man acts out of ignorance in ways that cannot be
conceived of as akratic. But they offer a fourth instance, which eliminates the three
misapprehensions involved in the previous examples (misapprehensions which prevent
the error from being attributed to akrasia).
He might be aware (a) that it is a piece of candy, (b) that this piece of candy is
precisely the sort of thing the physician prohibited him from eating, and (c) that it
will harm him if he eats it, but might eat it anyhow because of his representing to
himself another—conflicting—aspect of the situation, which he takes in this case
to override the rule eating the candy (Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 94).
Brickhouse and Smith show that the putative akratic would “miscalculate the harm the
act would bring by overvaluing the pleasure at hand because it is closer and hence greater
in appearance than it is in reality” (1994, 94). They go on to say that “one could
represent the pleasure one will get from eating the candy as having greater value than the
value one would obtain from abstaining” (1994, 94). While all of this is possible and to

is a difference in pain and pleasure” (1971, 287). He goes on to say that the person who makes a mistake
here “was acting in accordance with, indeed on the basis of, his hedonistic principle, even though he made
a mistaken application of it” (1971, 287).
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some extent correct, Brickhouse and Smith left out the most important element in
Socrates’ account, that of time. If they had been sensitive to the temporal element of the
decision they would have seen that the pleasure is more important than the pain because
of the systematic privileging of the present of the other modes of temporality. In order to
see this, they would have had to be more specific about the doctor’s statements. For
instance, the man would be much less likely to eat the candy if it would immediately
make him ill, than he would if it would produce illness in the future.
Consider the smoker. Anyone who smokes does so knowing that he or she may
get sick in the future. Though the smoker may be told repeatedly that he or she will
eventually become sick, if he or she smokes long enough, the smoker him or her self sees
the illness as a remote possibility, because he or she can always quit tomorrow, or next
Spring and still be fine. The “if he or she smokes long enough” is the crucial part of the
equation in the mind of the smoker, for not all smokers get lung cancer, or other diseases,
though the odds are increased. But probability concerns the future and the smoker knows
that he or she may be hit by a bus, or become a victim of a violent crime, or die by some
other means long before lung cancer sets in, if it does at all. Thus, the knowledge that the
smoker has about the dangers of smoking is overcome by the remoteness of the possible
negative outcome and the immediacy of the pleasure, which is to say, by the “power of
appearance” (356d).
Since, the illness seems so distant and it takes many cigarettes to cause cancer, the
smoker is able to deceive him or her self by representing only the present and allowing it
to be the decisive, but unacknowledged, point in the decision to smoke. To see that it is
the presence of the pleasure that is chosen one need only look at an actually sick smoker.
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A smoker with the flu, for instance, will be far less likely to smoke while ill because it
produces more immediate results.136 What we call akrasia turns out to be the result of an
Epimethean absorption in the present. It is not being overcome by the pleasant but by the
presence of the pleasure. Otherwise, no one would choose less pleasure over more.

Measure
Socrates attempts to combat the prevalent idea that “immediate pleasure is very
much different from the pleasant and painful at a later time” with an analogy. It is an
analogy that is intended to eliminate the role that temporal difference plays in our
decision-making processes. “You put the pleasures together and the pains together
(sunye‹w tå ±d°a ka‹ sunye‹w tå luphrã), both the near (§ggÊw) and the remote
(pÒrrv), on the balance scale and then say which of the two is more” (356b). The
analogy allows him to counter-act against what Walsh calls a “systematic temporal
illusion.” He says, “There is a systematic temporal illusion in the case of pleasures
comparable to illusions of spatial perspective: imminent pleasures appear greater in
anticipation than do those in the remote future” (Walsh 1971, 259).137
Socrates begins with the analogy of “weighing” in order to eliminate this temporal
perspective, but he must explain what he is talking about with a visual analogy. “Do
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This seems to be the reasoning behind certain treatments for severe alcoholism, where the alcoholic
takes a pill each morning that will cause an immediately negative reaction to alcohol.
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Cf. Gerasimos Santas “This feature of the case, the pleasure being near in time and the pain remote in
the future, does indeed make a difference in the explanation, it is not an irrelevant feature; but the only
difference this feature can make is a difference in pain or pleasure or rather in the quantities of pleasure or
pain. It is not, however, a difference in the actual quantities of pleasure and pain involved in the case (we
are not to suppose that the further the pain is in the future the smaller it will be!), but in the estimated or
believed (by the agent) qualities of pleasure and pain….just as in the case of size and variation of distance,
so here also—because the pleasure is near the agent in time and the pain far, he misestimates the quantities
and supposes that the pleasure outweighs the pain (in Vlastos 1971,)
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things of the same size appear to you larger when you see them near at hand and smaller
when seen from a distance or not?” (356c-d). He continues to argue that this is also the
case with thickness and with sounds. Things appear thicker and louder the closer they are.
If then our well-being depended upon this, doing and choosing large things,
avoiding and not doing small ones, what would be our salvation in life (svter€a
§fãnh toË b€ou)? Would it be the art of measurement (≤ µetrhtikØ t°xnh) or
the power of appearance (toË fainoµ°nou dÊnaµiw)? While the power of
appearance often makes us wander all over the place in confusion, often changing
our minds about the same things and regretting our actions and choices with
respect to things large and small, the art of measurement in contrast, would make
appearances (tÚ fãntasµa) lose their power by showing us the truth, would
give us peace of mind firmly rooted in the truth and save our life (¶svw ìn tÚn
b€on) (356d-e).
The art of measurement very literally saves our lives from the present because it is a
reasoning about human ends and atemporal standards or models. It can do this because it
is a rational art, which is not subject to time or motion. The “power of appearance” is
precisely that which makes us think we know things that we do not, because appearance
does not just appear, but it is perceived and believed,138 so that “things are for the
individual such as he perceives them” (152c1-3). Socrates allows the many to as much at
the end of the argument. “So this is what ‘being overcome by pleasure’ is—ignorance in
the highest degree” (357e). If people take their own perspectives to be true, they will
always be swayed by the present and make decisions in which the temporal perspective
becomes the deciding factor. It is because the art of measurement corrects the perspective
upon which the conceit of wisdom is based, primarily by recognizing that it has been a
criteria and thus accounting for it. This is the “human wisdom” of the Apology (20d) that
knows that it does not know. “Human wisdom” is the rejection of the relativism that says
138

“dÒj˙ µetÉaﬁsyÆsevw“ (Timaeus 52a7). Cf. de Anima (428a19-28).
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“as it appears…so it is” (Theaetetus 152a).139 We see now that this art of measurement is
able to “make appearances lose their power” (356e). It does not say it destroys
appearances or eliminates them, but rather takes away the kicker, the belief that comes
with the appearance and says that it is as it appears. This is what saves our life and unites
the virtues. Once the temporal illusions have been corrected and we calculate about
human ends can we achieve human excellence. This entire discussion occurs as part of
the larger argument about the unity and the transmission of virtue.
If we recall the Great Speech, it was precisely a means of “salvation” which
Epimetheus forgot to provide to human beings (321d).140 Now, Socrates is presenting us
with something, which may indeed save our lives.141 It is the ability to correct the
“systematic temporal illusion” to which humans are subject, both in the fear of death and
in the over-estimation of immediate pleasures (which is, in fact, the mistake of taking
something painful as pleasant and thinking that one knows something one does not).
We have seen that a myopic nearness to pleasures causes us to make incorrect
assessments of value. The implication of the argument is that when we say that we are
overcome by pleasure, what we mean is that we are basing our judgments upon the power
of appearance; we are overcome by the present in the same way as when events overtake
us (345b, Cf. Chapter 4 above). If we had true knowledge, it would not be of changing
things at all. As embodied creatures, we may at best have a worthless human wisdom
that tells us that we do not know (Apology 20d). Then we may attempt to account for our
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The Theaetetus makes it clear that this is a claim to know how things are. Cf. 151eff.
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(322c). This, however, does not seem to be sufficient to keep us from forgetting ourselves.
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lack of knowledge, by asking questions. It seems to be through argument that we are able
to weigh pleasures against pains (CF. Republic 582d). The art of measurement is, as
Nussbaum and Brickhouse and Smith suggest, the result of finding a standard of
measurement that allows incommensurables to become commensurable. Other scholars
want to claim that he is arguing from the position of either Protagoras or the many.
Socrates is arguing from the shared positions of Protagoras and the many, but he is
arguing towards his own position, by getting them to accept pleasure as he slyly presents
it.
Neither of the prominent scholarly interpretations of the Protagoras offers
sufficient attention to the temporal element in Socrates’ argument. It is only by
eliminating the temporal perspective, which is the medium of relativism, that pleasure
can be made in to any kind of standard whatsoever. Further, by means of this same
elimination Socrates moves the many and Protagoras from their own hedonistic positions
towards his own modified “hedonistic” position. In doing so, Socrates is able to refute
both Protagorean and “common” relativism, which are united in the privileging of the
present as the field or arena for all appearance. Both think they know what they do not
know and the refutation of the Protagoras shows that the great sophist holds the same
contradictory beliefs as the many. Thus Socrates might dissuade Hippocrates from
entrusting his soul to Protagoras (313a). Far from attempting to present Protagoras in his
best light, Socrates forces Protagoras into demolishing his own position. Protagoras
espoused progress and the future (cf. Chapter 3 above), but Socrates has shown that a
progressive relativism creates a plurality that ends in confusion and inconstancy and
remains trapped in the present perspective. Yet, Protagoras, like Euthyphro, is so lost in
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the Epimethean present that he is not aware he has been refuted, though Socrates is quite
pointed in his criticism. He says:
A mistaken act, done without knowledge you must know is one done from
ignorance. So this is what ‘being overcome by pleasure’ is—ignorance in the
highest degree, and it is that which Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias claim to
cure. But you, thinking it is something other than ignorance, do not go to sophists
yourselves, nor do you send your children to them (357e).
This passage is the height of Socratic irony. Protagoras has shown that he did not know
this either and shared the position of the many. This raises the question of why the many
should send their children to him.
We have seen that Socrates equates the pleasant and the good and the painful and
the bad, by redefining the terms with reference to their overall effects on a life as a whole
(351a-354d). This allows us to account for what is generally called akrasia. Because, as
Socrates’ argument shows, presence and not pleasure is the real criterion for a decision, it
is a case of being overcome by the present in my assessment of pleasure (352b-356c).
Finally, the art of measurement is an elimination of temporal preference as a criterion for
choosing a course of action in order that a life may be as pleasant and good as possible
(355a-358e). In each of these stages time plays a central role on human conduct in respect
to virtue and vice. It is only by means of the elimination of relativism, which has been
equated with the conceit of wisdom in making decisions based on the illusions created by
temporal presence that one can begin to be virtuous by thinking about the eternal and
unchanging ends of human life.
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Chapter 6
Time and the Soul in the Alcibiades I

Of modern commentators on the Alcibiades, Paul Friedlander is perhaps the most
influential. Unfortunately, this is because those who have been influenced by the other
major figure—Schleiermacher142—do not consider the Alcibiades to be authentic, and as
a result, do not write much on the dialogue Though Friedlander is unable to prove
conclusively that the dialogue was authentically penned by Plato—in this regard we
could abide by the most extreme criteria and say that the only dialogues of whose
authenticity we can be absolutely assured are those mentioned directly by
Aristotle143—he conclusively shows that the dialogue, whoever its author, repays close
study.144 Since, I am investigating the way that Plato’s fourth century audience would
have read the historical figures of Alcibiades and Critias, the question of authenticity
does not greatly affect my project. That Plutarch and so many others have taken this
dialogue as authentic and necessary to the presentation of Platonism certainly reflects the
importance—if not the authenticity— of this dialogue.145
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“And therefore, let us once and for all undertake to say, that this little work, which, with those who are
accustomed to admire in the gross, has been ever a subject of especial commendation, appears to us to be
but very insignificant and poor, and that to such a degree that we cannot ascribe it to Plato” (1973, 329).
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Cf. Scott 2000, 206.
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For his discussion of the authenticity of the dialogue, see Friedlander 1964 ii, 231-232. Cf. Pangle 1987,
15 and Scott 2000, 205-207
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Since Schleiermacher’s objections rest on matters of “quality” this is all Friedlander really needs to
show. Cf. Scott 2000 for a discussion of the stylometric arguments (205-206, n.1).
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Friedlander’s chapter on the Alcibiades has restored the tradition behind the
dialogue and offers and insightful reading of the dialogue (1964 ii, 231-232). He is more
sensitive to the temporal play of the dialogue than most commentators. He says that “the
dialogue begins with a tension between the past and present; it ends with a tension
between present and future” (1964 ii., 233). He claims that the “course of the
conversation moves between these two tensions” (1964 ii., 233). Friedlander also
recognizes the “future” that the reader supplies. He does not clearly delineate the way
that it affects the dialogue when its final lines refer to a future that comes after the end of
the dialogue but long before the composition of the dialogue, so that the reader actively
provides the future of the characters by means of an intertextual incorporation of the
historical (whether written or oral) tradition.
Though Friedlander sees the relation at the beginning as between the past and the
present and at the end between present and future, in reality the temporal tension in the
dialogue is far more complex. In general, Friedlander points out the temporal tension in
the dialogue, but he does not explore it in depth. In this chapter, I offer a detailed reading
of the use of time as both a literary device and a philosophical theme in the Alcibiades.
In the first part of this chapter, I show how Socrates diagnoses what he sees as
Alcibiades’ problem and the threat it poses to his promise. Socrates spends much of the
dialogue trying to point out the temporally fragmented nature of Alcibiades’ life.
Alcibiades, he shows, is “wedded to stupidity” (118b) because of a forgetfulness that
accompanies time. He has ambition that forgets both the present and the past for the sake
of the future.
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I located and parsed in the Protagoras a temporal relativism that systematically
privileged the present. The Alcibiades both confirms and deepens this analysis. For
Alcibiades is still subject to a temporal relativism that privileges his present perspective,
only that present is the experience of ambition that consumes the true presence of that
present. In phenomenological language that ambition is a present phenomenon that
intends towards the future.146 This futural intention presses Alcibiades and makes him
incapable of “biding his time” as Socrates claims to have done at the beginning of the
dialogue. My analysis shows precisely how Socrates’ argument works and how he
diagnoses Alcibiades’ soul in temporal terms.
In the second part, I show Socrates’ solution to this problem and his prescription
for Alcibiades. Though the atemporal nature of the soul is generally acknowledged this
notion is not often brought to bear on readings of the Alcibiades.147 I argue that one of
the reasons that Socrates separates the soul from the body and what belongs to the body is
to enable Alcibiades to see his life as a whole, either atemporally (a stronger case) or at
least synchronically. Time belongs to movement and movement belongs to body and not
to the soul.148 Socrates is not telling Alcibiades to “forget about” time, for forgetting is
the young man’s problem. Rather, Socrates wants Alcibiades to put his soul first so that
time will not be so pressing and he will not be caught up in the rush of events. That is, he
is pushing him to recognize the divine self-motion of the soul instead of the distracting

146

Cf. Husserl 1991, 11, 159.
Vernant cites the Pythagorean and Orphic conception of the soul as one “linked to spiritual exercises
designed to escape from time” (Cited in Scott 2000, 120 n. 23).
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Cf. Aristotle’s definition of time as the “number of motion with respect to before and after” (Physics
219b1). This account largely agrees with Plato’s discussion of time in the Timaeus where time is a
“moving image of eternity” (37d). This moving image of eternity is a number and this “number, of course,
is what we now call time (37d). It is because the cosmos is becoming rather being that it is a moving
image of eternity.
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movement of events.149 In the discussion of “self knowledge,” Socrates tries to get
Alcibiades to see the active part of his soul actively. That is to think rationally about the
soul and with the soul.
In the third and shortest part, I show the way that the author of the dialogue plays
upon the reader’s knowledge of the historical tradition in order to show another temporal
effect and allow us to see Alcibiades’ life as a whole in a way that we can’t see our own.

Diagnosis: Ignorance and Ambition
The dialogue opens abruptly. In contrast to dialogues like the Symposium, there is
no frame-tale, nothing to set up the dialogue. We simply find Socrates saying, “I was the
first (pr«tow) man to fall in love with you, son of Clinias, and now that the others have
stopped pursuing you I suppose you’re wondering why I’m the only one who hasn’t
given up (épallãttoµai)” (103a). Socrates is setting an example for Alcibiades with
these opening remarks. He is pointing out his constancy which is here contrasted with the
fickleness of the other suitors, but will come into an even sharper contrast with
Alcibiades’ own “wavering” (16e-118a). Socrates continues to try to set an example,
pointing out his ability to bide time and wait for the appropriate moment to speak. This
passage sets up an interesting contrast to the picture of a garrulous Socrates who says that
“I never cease to rouse each and every one of you, to persuade and reproach you all day
long and everywhere I find myself in your company” (Apology 31b). He finds himself in
Alcibiades’ company, but does not speak. Nevertheless, he must have still “roused”—if
not aroused—him. When Socrates supposes that Alcibiades was wondering, “why, when
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the others pestered you with conversation, I never spoke to you all these years” (103a),
Alcibiades agrees. Not only does Alcibiades agree that he had been wondering about it,
but that he had reached a decision. He says:
Yes, Socrates, perhaps you don’t realize you’ve taken the words out of my mouth.
I had already decided (§n n“ e‰xon) to come and ask you that very question:
what could you have in mind? What do you hope (§lp€da) to achieve by
bothering me, always making so sure you’re there (§piµ°lestata par≈n)
wherever I am. Yes, I really do wonder (yauµãzv) what you might be up to and
I’d be very glad to find out (104c-d).
Alcibiades’ wording shows that Socrates has roused him and started to awaken him
already, without speaking. Socrates’ most important lesson to Alcibiades may have been
taught before he said a word. Socrates had almost succeeded in inducing Alcibiades to
ask questions. He makes him hold things in mind (§n n“ e‰xon) and marvel (yauµãzv).
The question that he wants to ask Socrates is what he hopes (§lp€da) to achieve by his
actions. Socrates spends the rest of the dialogue trying to get Alcibiades to ask himself
this same question.
Socrates is setting an example the proper relationship to time. We will read the
example differently than Alcibiades receives it, however. Alcibiades’ previous
comments make it clear that he does not yet know the talkative man who spends his days
conversing in the agora. He does not see the significance of Socrates’ observation and
so Socrates explains how he has restrained himself. He says that he is held back by a
divine and not a human cause.150 “But now,” he continues “it no longer prevents me, so
here I am. I’m confident it won’t prevent me in the future either” (103b). Socrates says
to Alcibiades that he has been “observing you all this time” (103b). Socrates’
150

Though it is beyond the scope of the present argument, I would like to suggest that the “divine cause” or
the god who holds Socrates back is precisely the rational part of his soul (133c).
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observation of Alcibiades must somehow coincide with his “listening” to the god. In
fact, as this chapter shows, Socrates is looking at the rational part of Alcibiades and
seeing his own reason reflected and that is how he listens to the god (132e-133c). At
precisely this juncture, near the end of the dialogue, Socrates asks Alcibiades to
“remember when I first spoke to you” (131e). He reminds Alcibiades that he was just
about to ask why Socrates had not given up on him (131e). Thus, at the very least, it is
because he has been observing Alcibiades that Socrates was able to understand the divine
command against speaking to the young man. Socrates is already showing the appropriate
sort of ambition, one full of watching and waiting and preparing. This is precisely what
the Alcibiades of this dialogue and of the historical tradition lacked.151
Socrates says that “if I saw you were content with the advantages I just mentioned
and thought that this was the condition in which you should live out the rest of your life,
I would have given up on you a long time ago (eﬁ µ°n se •≈rvn ì nundØ di∞ylon
égap«nta ka‹ oﬁÒµenon de›n §n toÊtoiw katabi«nai, pãlai ín éphllãgµhn
toË ¶rvtow)” (104e-105a). Socrates here brings out the past in which he has been
watching Alcibiades, the future of Alcibiades’ ambitions, and his present state.
Alcibiades’ present is consumed by ambition—not preparation—for the future.
Alcibiades hopes, but does not plan. In what will be obvious contrast to Socrates, he
lacks constancy. Socrates points out “how constantly I’ve been thinking about you ( ⁄
ka‹ gn≈s˙ ˜ti pros°xvn g° soi tÚn noËn diatet°leka)” (105a). diatet°leka is
the most pertinent word here, and one that again points us in the direction that Socrates
would have us look. It is the perfect form of ‘diatel°v,’ which means “to continue
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doing” (Liddell and Scott 1897, ad loc). It has the sense of carrying through to
completion and the perfect tense gives it a “present resonance,” it is a bringing of the past
in to the future.152 This will be precisely what Alcibiades shows that he is incapable of
doing.
When Socrates lists the qualities that make Alcibiades feel superior, he says that
he starts with this body and ends with his soul. The soul—a topic that occupies much of
the dialogue—is conspicuously absent from the actual list presented at 104a-b. The
catalogue is a catalogue of aspects of Alcibiades’ self-conception.
Socrates begins with an immediate assessment of both Alcibiades’ body and his
“mind,” when he says in “the first place, you fancy (o‡ei) yourself the tallest and best
looking man around” (104a). At first glance, this seems to be a comment solely about
Alcibiades’ body. Indeed, Socrates, the suitor, follows that comment by saying “and it’s
quite plain to see you’re not wrong (ceÊdh)” (104a). Even this is a comment upon
Alcibiades’ soul or rational capacity. He is implying that indeed Alcibiades is tall and
handsome,153 but he does so by way of commenting on his supposition. Indeed, the entire
list is designed to show the ways in which Alcibiades “felt” himself “so superior” (130b104a). Nevertheless, it is repeated that his physical beauty is at the point of fading. At the
very beginning of the dialogue, Socrates says that “the others have stopped pursuing you”
(103a) and much later, after he has in fact discussed the soul, Socrates explains why the
others have left saying, “I’m the one who will stay with you, now that your body has lost

152

Cf. Smyth 1920, 1945-1951.
Nails says that he is also “an ancient equivalent of a record-breaking sports superstar” (2002, 13).
Alcibiades himself mentions his Olympic victories first in his speech at Thucydides VI. 18).
153

124

its bloom and everyone else has gone away” (131d).154 Thus, Socrates knows that the god
won’t prevent him from speaking to Alcibiades any more, partly because of his physical
condition. When he thought himself so superior because of beauty, Alcibiades would not
have received Socrates’ message. Now that his physical present is not as bright, his soul
has become consumed with hope for the future. Socrates recognizes this and knows that it
is time to speak.
The fact that Alcibiades’ physical beauty is fading explains two interlocking
difficulties present at the beginning of the dialogue. It explains why Alcibiades is turning
towards the future. This, in turn, explains why the god has kept Socrates from talking to
Alcibiades until this point. Each of the qualities listed at the beginning of the dialogue,
show not only why Alcibiades thinks himself superior, but also why the Athenians will
listen to him.
Next, Socrates discusses the lineage and connections, another extremely
important aspect in democratic politics (I will discuss this later in the chapter). Finally, he
mentions Alcibiades’ wealth. All of these not only give him a self-conception of
superiority, they are also the things that will make the people think he is superior.
Socrates is simultaneously describing Alcibiades’ self-conception and the way that the
public will think of him. As the dialogue progresses, what this says about Alcibiades’
soul will become clear. But we can see it in outline now. Alcibiades sees himself
reflected not in the best part of the soul of another, but in the praise of the many.
Alcibiades sees himself reflected in the opinions of the many, just as the city
would increasingly identify its fate with that of Alcibiades. We can see one of the most
154
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dangerous elements of Alcibiades’ ambition: he does not know and does not know that he
does not know—and he is one of the more talented people in the city. Looks, birth and
wealth are not of interest to Socrates in themselves (Symposium 216d-e). Socrates
“hunts” Alcibiades (Protagoras 309a) because what Alcibiades has will enable him to go
about getting what he wants, but he only wants more and not what is “better” (107d108b). He suspects that Alcibiades wants to present himself to the Athenians and thereby
become the most influential man in Greece (105b). Socrates divines that Alcibiades’
ambition is limitless.
In order to show the extent of Alcibiades’ ambitions, and his lack of preparation
to fulfill them, Socrates devises a thought experiment in order to get Alcibiades to focus
on the question of his life.155 Socrates asks Alcibiades to “suppose one of the gods asked
you, ‘Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you now have, or would you rather die
on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire anything greater?’ (pÒteron boÊlei z∞n
¶xvn ë nËn ¶xeiw, µ aÈt€ka teynãnei eﬁ µÆ soi §j°stai µe€zv ktÆsasyai)” (105a).
Socrates correctly assumes that Alcibiades would choose to die. Socrates will show that
what Alcibiades really wants is a pleonexic “more.” Socrates presumes to explain to
Alcibiades his true ambition. The phrase that Hutchinson translates as “ambition” is
§lp€di zªw. An ambition is a “living in hope.” Hope concerns the future and allows the
future to press upon the present. This is, of course, not a bad thing, as all teleology is a
determination of the present by the future, but Socrates wants to show that Alcibiades
does not think of his life as a whole, and ignores the true future by privileging the feeling
155
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of hope or ambition in the present. Alcibiades lives in hope, but has not taken sufficient
stock of his life.
Socrates continues, showing the truly global scope of Alcibiades’ ambition,
asking:
if that same god were then to tell you that you should have absolute power in
Europe, but that you weren’t permitted to cross into Asia or get mixed up with
affairs over there, I think you’d rather not live with only that to look forward to;
you want your reputation and your influence to saturate all mankind (105b-c).
This pleonexic desire makes Alcibiades’ looks, lineage and money so dangerous because
people will listen to him.156 Thus Socrates begins to show that Alcibiades has no plan to
achieve these goals and that were he to be able to achieve them, he would do nothing but
harm. Indeed, he will spread this ambition, as he did in the speech where he successfully
gets the Athenians to go to Sicily. He says
We cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have reached a
position in which we must not be content with retaining what we have but must
scheme to extend it for, if we cease to rule others, we shall be in danger of being
ruled ourselves” (Thucydides 6. 18; emphasis mine).157
Socrates has already made it clear that Alcibiades intends to present himself before the
Athenians in a few days (¶sesyai µãla Ùl€gvn ≤µer«n) (105b). Socrates again
contrasts this with his own strategy of confronting Alcibiades, over whom he wants to
wield influence.158 “When you were younger, before you were full of such ambitions, I
think the god didn’t let me talk to you because the conversation would have been
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Cf. Forde for a detailed study of “Thucydides’ understanding of Alcibiades, and of Alcibiades’ place in
Thucydides’ writing and of his relation to the deepest of Thucydidean themes” (1989, 1).
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pointless. But now he’s told me to, because now you will listen to me” (105e-106a).
Socrates has waited until it was the right time to advise Alcibiades, but as what comes
next shows, Alcibiades has no intention of waiting and being prepared before he goes to
advise the Athenians.
From the beginning of the dialogue Socrates has focused on Alcibiades’ hopes. In
the next section of the dialogue, beginning at 106c, Socrates tries to bring Alcibiades’
future hopes in line with his past training and his present knowledge. He tries to get
Alcibiades to imagine the situation in which he will present himself to the Athenians.
You plan, as I say, to come forward and advise the Athenians some time soon
(§ntÚw oÈ polloË xrÒnou). Suppose I stopped you as you were about to take
(eﬁ oÔn µ°llontÒw sou ﬁ°nai) the podium and asked, ‘Alcibiades, what are the
Athenians proposing to discuss. You’re getting up to advise them because it’s
something you know better than they do, aren’t you?’ (106c).
Alcibiades reluctantly agrees that he will offer advise regarding something he knows
better than others. Socrates then gets him to agree that one is only a good advisor about
things that one knows and that one only knows things that “you’ve learned from others or
found out for yourself” (106d). Socrates then gets Alcibiades to agree that he would not
want to figure out things that he thought he already knew (106d). “So there was a time
when you didn’t think you knew what you now understand (ë êra nËn tugxãneiw
§pistãµenow, ∑n xrÒnow ˜te oÈx ≤goË eﬁd°nai)” (106e). This statement is crucial
for the argument that follows, and once again it stresses the importance of time. Socrates
is subtly pointing out (and will proceed to argue) that, like most people, but to a greater
degree, Alcibiades has always thought that he has known better than everyone else and so
he hasn’t bothered to learn. This is also part of his ignorance; he is so exceptionally
ignorant of his own ignorance that not only does he think that he knows but other people
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also think that he knows better than they do and he knows they will listen to him because
he is tall, handsome, well-born, well-connected and wealthy (104b).
Thus, when Socrates says that there must have been a time when Alcibiades did
not know the important things that he now knows, he is trying to get Alcibiades to
remember. In the previous chapters, I argued that the Protagoras discusses the tendency
to lose oneself in the present and fail to see one’s life as a whole. In the Alcibiades, we
find that the eponymous character is full of ambition, or hope §lp€w which is an
expectation of either good or bad. Alcibiades does not see his true self, because he
forgets his true past and true present station in the world and thinks himself grand in the
eyes of the many.
When Alcibiades fails to remember and says that there “must have been” (106e) a
time when he didn’t know, Socrates remembers for Alcibiades. He says:
But I’ve got a pretty good idea what you’ve learned. Tell me if I’ve missed
(l°lhyen) anything as far as I remember (katå µnÆµhn), you learned writing
and lyre-playing and wrestling, but you didn’t want to learn aulos playing.159
These are the subjects that you understand—unless perhaps you’ve been learning
something while I wasn’t looking (l°lhyaw); but I don’t think you’ve been out of
my sight, whenever you left the house, day or night (106e).
In these lines, Socrates is providing a model of constancy in his obsessive pursuit of
Alcibiades. He is also providing a model of conversation and the way that the soul may
see itself reflected in another by asking questions (133a-d). Twice in this short speech he
acknowledges that he may be unaware with the words l°lhyen and l°lhyaw. In doing
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[aulos], holding it to be an illiberal and ignoble thing…let a man go to blowing on a flute, and even his own
kinsmen could scarcely recognize him…the flute closed and barricaded the mouth, robbing its master of
both voice and speech” (II. 4-5). This anecdote shows his early influence, “for word made its way to them
[his age group] that Alcibiades loathed the art of flute playing and scoffed at its disciples…Wherefore the
flute was dropped entirely from the programme of a liberal education and was altogether despised” (II. 5).
Cf. Ellis 1989, 18.
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so, he is asking Alcibiades to remind him, to correct his forgetfulness. It proves very
difficult to get Alcibiades to do this, and though Socrates has thus far watched in silence,
he speaks up now to keep Alcibiades from mistakenly advising the city.
Alcibiades does not correct Socrates and acknowledges that Socrates has made a
fair assessment of his studies and Socrates pointedly asks him if he will advise the
Athenians “when they are discussing how to draw the letters of the alphabet correctly”
(107a).
Socrates begins to offer examples of specific fields of knowledge (cf. Protagoras)
citing building, divining, and health, in which cases the city should consult a builder, a
diviner and a doctor, not Alcibiades (107a-c). Alcibiades agrees and Socrates asks him
“what will they be considering when you stand up to advise them, assuming you are right
to do so?” (107c). Alcibiades says “they’ll be discussing their business” and Socrates
asks “what kind of ‘their own business’ do you think they’ll be discussing?” (107d).
Alcibiades replies that it is war, “or peace, or anything else which is the business
of the city” (307d). Again the author of the dialogue is able to use these words to bring to
mind Thucydides’ discussion of Alcibiades’ advice to the city regarding “who they
should go to war with and how” (307d; Cf. Thucydides 6. 13-18). In order to know who
to go to war with and how, Socrates argues, one must understand what is better (107d109b). Socrates shows that “better” means “more just” (109c) and not more
advantageous, as Alcibiades would have it. When Alcibiades agrees that it does, Socrates
shows an ironic astonishment, but flatly asks Alcibiades “Don’t you realize that this is
something you don’t understand” (109d). Socrates has worked the discussion so that he
may repeat himself and ask again, “when this was, when you didn’t think you knew about
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justice or injustice” (110a). Now, however, we know the object of the knowledge in
which Alcibiades would surpass his compatriots. He has also agreed that he would try to
discover what justice was only if he didn’t think he knew. So Socrates’ question is more
pointed. He wants Alcibiades to tell him when he didn’t know, since this is the
prerequisite for investigating (109e). In other words, Socrates is pushing Alcibiades to
remember his past, to recall not knowing. If he cannot recall not-knowing and recognizes
that he has not learned, then Alcibiades will be retrieving something in his present state
of affairs that has been lost. Socrates is showing Alcibiades the present resonance of past
actions and states of soul. I did not learn and therefore I do not know.160
The discussion that follows shows us something profound about the human
experience of time. Alcibiades’ bewilderment shows on the one hand that in retrospect it
always seems as if we didn’t know in the past, but in the present we think that we do.161
On the other hand, Alcibiades will also demonstrate how difficult it is for him to show
that he was ever wrong.
Socrates asks “was it last year that you were looking into it and didn’t think you
knew? Or did you think you knew (§zÆteiw te ka‹ ’ou eﬁd°nai)?” (110a). The “te ka‹”
shows precisely how closely Socrates considers seeking (§zÆteiw) and not thinking one
knows (’ou eﬁd°nai). When Alcibiades acknowledges that he thought he knew what
justice was last year, Socrates asks “didn’t you think the same thing three years ago and
four years ago, and five?” (110a). Again Alcibiades agrees and Socrates points out that
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o‰da or “I know” is in fact a perfect with present sense of the hypothetical * e‡dv, “I see.” Thus,
literally, the logic of the perfect is “I have seen (and therefore I do know).” Cf. Liddell and Scott 1897, ad
loc.
161
This is the sort of gap between being and knowing that constitutes the stages of consciousness in Hegel.
Cf. Zizek 1993, 145 for a discussion of this movement in erotic terms appropriate to Alcibiades.
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before that Alcibiades had been but a boy and Socrates had observed Alcibiades, as a
boy, acting as if he knew what justice was. This exchange brings out Alcibiades’
character.
Alcibiades is so proud that when Socrates has him recall the past, he is unable to
admit that he did not know what justice was, even as a child. Socrates describes the way
that Alcibiades acted while playing games. Socrates says that he often observed
Alcibiades playing games as a boy and when he would accuse a playmate of cheating and
being unfair “you’d say so to one of your playmates, very loudly and confidently—not at
all like someone who was at a loss about justice and injustice” (110b).
Alcibiades responds in such a way that we can comically see that when he does
remember his experiences, he does so in such a way that he still thinks that he knew
what he did not know. “But I did know, by Zeus! I saw clearly they were cheating me”
(110c). Socrates makes the obvious conclusion that “even as a child you thought you
understood justice and injustice” (110c). To which Alcibiades again emphatically says
“Yes, and I did understand” (110c). This exchange shows that when Alcibiades recalls
the past, he forgets his present agreements, just as when he thinks of the future, he forgets
his past lack of preparation. We see that Alcibiades is subject to an extreme temporal
relativism that privileges his present state of mind. Gary Alan Scott recognizes this,
stating that for “an interlocutor to equate his character with any particular, transitory
viewpoint and assume this is the immutable ‘real’ self augers against further learning and
growth” (Scott 2000, 103). Alcibiades seems to see any particular viewpoint as his “real
self” at an unconscious level. He, like most Socratic interlocutors, is unaware of this
contradiction and this is what Socrates will diagnose later as wavering. It is enough for
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Socrates to conclude that “you won’t find such a time” (110c) as you learned about
justice because there was never such time as you knew you did not know.
Alcibiades’ next set of answers not only shows how Alcibiades sees himself in the
reflection of “the many”, but it also demonstrates the cleverness for which Socrates was
attracted to him. Alcibiades says that he “learned it [what justice is] the same way as
other people” (110d). When Socrates asks from whom he learned it, Alcibiades answers
that he learned it from “people in general” (Parå t«n poll«n) (110e). Socrates
points out that the “many” are not good teachers because they cannot even teach “what
moves to make or not make in knucklebones. And yet that’s a trivial matter, I suppose,
compared with justice” (110e). But Alcibiades responds brilliantly saying that “I learned
Greek from them; I couldn’t tell you who my teacher was but I give the credit to the very
people you say are no good at teaching” (111a).162 This forces Socrates to change his
course. For it seems that the “many” were successful teachers of language. So, Socrates
asks what makes them good teachers of this and enters into an interesting discussion of
language acquisition.
Socrates begins by asking, “Don’t you see that somebody who is going to teach
anything must first know it himself” (111a). Alcibiades agrees. Thus, “the many” can
teach Greek, because they know Greek (though they could not teach Hebrew, or
Sanskrit). Socrates then asks “if people disagree about something, would you say they
know it?” (111b).163 Alcibiades agrees that they would not and thus would not be able to
teach it. The “many” do not disagree about “what wood or stone is” (111b). Socrates
continues: “If you ask them, don’t they give the same answers? Don’t they reach for the
162
163

Cf. Protagoras 328a.
Cf. Euthyphro 8e.
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same things when they want to get some wood or some stone…this is pretty much what
you mean by understanding Greek, isn’t it” (111b-c).
Socrates is pointing out the difficulty of notions like justice and injustice. There is
no ostensible object to which we may point, like wood or stone.164 And no one disagrees
or fights over disagreements about the definition of stone or rock. Socrates
acknowledges then that the many are good teachers of names. Then he asks: “Now if we
wanted to know not just what men or horses are like, but which of them could and
couldn’t run, would people in general be able to teach this as well?” (111d). Socrates
goes through another series of examples in order to show that in areas where there are
experts, it is these that teach and not the “many.” Indeed, when there is an expert in a
clearly defined field of expertise, there is very rarely disagreement about the objects of
this field (112a). “But I know you have seen this sort of dispute over questions of justice
and injustice” (112b). Socrates points out that entire cities disagree about justice and
injustice and that this is what causes wars, such as that in which Alcibiades’ father
perished (112c). But people do fight over the meaning (or perhaps the referent) of justice
and yet everyone thinks they know what these mean and no one takes the time to study
the issues. Socrates concludes that since there are such disagreements, the many clearly
do not know what justice is and if they do not know what justice is, then neither does
Alcibiades. Socrates says “given that your opinion wavers (planò) so much, and given
that you obviously neither found it out yourself nor learned it from anyone else, how
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Cf. Wittgenstein “Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If
you describe the learning of language in this way, you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like
‘table,’ ‘chair,’ ‘bread,’ and of people’s names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and
properties” (1953, 2). Of course, Wittgenstein sees himself as an “anti-Socratic” insofar as he wants to
show that words have uses rather than meanings (1953, 46, 518), but his observation on the present point is
relevant to the discussion in the Alcibiades.
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likely is it that you know about justice and injustice” (112d). Socrates introduces the
topic of wavering or wandering, with the word planò.

Wavering
The elenctic discussion (from 114d-116e) is ostensibly designed to show that the
just is advantageous and good.165 But Socrates really wants Alcibiades to see that he is
ignorant of his own ignorance. Socrates seems to have designed his questions in order to
show Alcibiades the experience of wavering that characterizes him. Alcibiades has
always wavered, but has never noticed it because of the passage of time (as we saw
above). Time creates such a “systematic illusion” (Walsh 1971, 269) that Alcibiades has
never noticed his own inconstancy. Alcibiades, and Socratic interlocutors in general,
tend to forget earlier parts of a discussion in order to meet the demands of the present.
By the end of the discussion on justice and advantage Alcibiades has reached the
point of recognizing this. “I swear by the gods, Socrates, I have no idea what I mean—I
must be in some absolutely bizarre condition (étexn«w ¶oika étÒpvw ¶xonti)! When
you ask me questions, first I think one thing (ßtera), and then I think something else
(êlla)” (116e). Alcibiades is without art (étexn«w) and ground (étÒpvw), but he has
never noticed it before. Thus the seeming surprise in Socrates’ response. “And are you
unaware (égnoe›w), my dear fellow, of what this feeling (tÚ pãyhµa) is?” (116e). Of
course, the feeling is one of ignorance. This shows that Alcibiades is ignorant of his
ignorance. He is unaware of the feeling of wavering until it is pointed out and even then
he slips quickly back into it. Socrates will first show that Alcibiades is ignorant and then
165

Alcibiades, of course, wants to argue that the good is what is advantageous, rather than what is just.
This shows his temporal relativism. What is advantageous is what is immediately expedient.
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that he is ignorant of his ignorance. Even when he has recognized it, the nature of time
propels him into immediate forgetfulness.
Socrates asks Alcibiades whether he would always give the same answer if
someone were to ask him whether he had “two eyes or three eyes, or two hands or four
hands” (116e) and Alcibiades replies that his answers would be consistent. Socrates asks
if Alcibiades would always give the same answer because he has knowledge and
Alcibiades answers yes. Socrates says, “So if you gave conflicting (ténant€a) answers
about something, without meaning to (êkvn), then it would be obvious that you didn’t
know it?” (117a). Alcibiades agrees, but Socrates continues, “you tell me that you’re
wavering (plançsyai) about what is just and what is unjust, admirable and
contemptible, good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous. Isn’t it obvious the
reason you waver (planò) about them is that you don’t know them?” (117a). Again,
Alcibiades agrees, but Socrates can’t let it rest there. He must set out to show that
Alcibiades does not waver simply because he is ignorant about them, but because he is
ignorant of his ignorance. Indeed, Socrates will show that it is part of his wavering, that
he quickly forgets his own ignorance.
Socrates asks if someone’s “soul will necessarily waver about” something it does
not know (117b). When Alcibiades provides an affirmative answer Socrates destroys it
by asking Alcibiades “Do you know any way of flying up to the stars?” (117b).
Alcibiades, of course, admits that he does not. But then Socrates is able to show him that
though he does not know a way to fly to the stars, he does not waver about it. He tells
Alcibiades that this is because “you don’t understand it and you don’t think you
understand it” (117b). Alcibiades is baffled by this statement and—perhaps with
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incredulity—asks Socrates what he means by it. Socrates asks Alcibiades “Do you waver
about what you realize you don’t understand?” (117c). Socrates follows this question
with an example that is less outlandish than that of flying to the stars.166 He presumes
that Alcibiades does not know how “to prepare a fine meal” (117c). Then he asks
Alcibiades: “So do you have your own opinions about how to prepare it, and waver about
it; or do you leave it to someone who knows how?” (117c). Alcibiades confirms that he
has no opinion about how to prepare a fine meal.167 He knows that he does not know how
to cook and so he leaves it to those who do. Likewise, when he is sailing in a ship he does
not wonder “whether to bring the steering oar in or out, and wavering” because he
doesn’t know, but instead decides to “leave it to the skipper and take it easy” (117d).
When Alcibiades has agreed to this Socrates explains the phenomenon of
“wavering.” He concludes, “So you don’t waver about what you don’t know, if in fact
you know you don’t know (oÈk êra per‹ ë µØ o‰sya planò, ênper eﬁdªw ˜ti oÈk
o‰sya)” (117d). This is a very clear statement of the “human wisdom” of the Apology
(20d). It is one of the best descriptions of Socrates’ own goals in Socratic literature. In
fact, in his next lines Socrates claims that “the errors in our conduct (ta èµartÆµata
§n tª prãjei) are caused by this kind of ignorance (diå taÊthn tØn êgnoiãn), of
thinking that we know when we don’t know (tØn toË µØ eﬁdÒta o‡syai eﬁd°nai;)”
(117d). This is a decisive statement of Socratic intellectualism. He clearly says that
errors’ ta èµartÆµata’ in action tª prãjei are a result of ignorance tØn êgnoiãn,
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I would like to suggest that Socrates uses this first example 117b to shock Alcibiades, but Plato may
have chosen such an example to show how few things there are about which people have no opinion.
167
This seems dubious, perhaps not in Alcibiades’ case, but in general. The gourmand has many ideas
about how food should be cooked, without actually knowing how to cook and a fan of comedy may know
how he or she thinks comedy should be done, without actually writing comedy.
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which is appositionally explained with another set of cognitive terms eﬁdÒta o‡syai
eﬁd°nai. Alcibiades has shown himself a bright young man, but he does not understand
what Socrates means.
Socrates provides eight steps to help bolster the argument to explain it to
Alcibiades. First, (1) Socrates gets Alcibiades to agree that “we don’t set out to do
something unless we think we know what we’re doing” (117d). Next, (2) Alcibiades
agrees that “when people don’t think they know how to do something they hand it over to
somebody else” (117e). Then, (3) Socrates gets Alcibiades to agree that “the sort of
people who don’t think they know how to do things make no mistakes in life, because
they leave those things to other people” (117e). Next, (4) Socrates convinces Alcibiades
to agree that the people who make mistakes are neither those who know, nor those who
don’t know but rather “those who don’t know but think they do know” (117e-118a).
Then, (5) Alcibiades agrees that “ignorance causes bad things” and that “this is the most
disgraceful sort of stupidity” (118a). Next, (6) Socrates shows Alcibiades that the
ignorance is “most harmful and contemptible when it is ignorance of the most important
things” (118a). Then, (7) he shows that nothing is more important than “the just and the
admirable” (118a). Finally, (8) Socrates blatantly concludes that since Alcibiades has
been wavering, it shows that he is “not only ignorant of the most important things” but
also that he thinks he knows what he doesn’t know (118b) and is thus “wedded to
stupidity….stupidity to the highest degree” (118b). The unstated but unavoidable
conclusion is that he will make mistakes.168
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Of these (3) may cause trouble. Can Socrates really hold that those who know that they do not know can
make no mistakes in life? For instance, one may say that though Alcibiades leaves the steering of the ship
to the skipper, the skipper dies of an illness and Alcibiades is forced to take control of the ship. Socrates
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On the basis of the argument above Socrates is able to say to Alcibiades that
“This [thinking you know what you don’t] is why you are rushing into politics before
you’ve gotten an education (prÚw tå politikå pr‹n paideuy∞nai)” (118b). If we
recall what a fourth century reader knew about Alcibiades, Plato has brilliantly explained
the psychological state that caused bad things and brought about his ruin. Socrates will
steer the conversation back to this diagnosis, but first Socrates tries to impress upon
Alcibiades—if somewhat facetiously— what kind of education he should get before he
enters politics. The education is one that attempts to account for the effects of time, to
unify the past the present and the future in such a way that one can see the soul, the noncorporeal and thus non-temporal true self. Due to the nature of the tenuous state of
awareness of one’s ignorance, this education takes a lifetime and thus, like Socrates,
Alcibiades never would have entered politics.
In order to steer Alcibiades towards a true education, he must point out to him the
deficiencies of his past by forcing him to compare himself with the Spartan Persian rulers
instead of his fellow Athenians.

discusses a similar case in the Protagoras. The argument there makes it seem as if it is just chance and that
in that case it is circumstance that forces Alcibiades to take control of the rudder. Certainly Socrates is
aware that at times one cannot avoid such circumstances, but since that is the case we should not rush into
them. Indeed, (3) makes perfect sense if we consider that in his own self-appreciation in the Apology,
Socrates seemingly never errs. As in the Protagoras, a picture is emerging which suggests that “human
wisdom” may not be enough for true virtue (which would be divine wisdom), but it is enough to avoid vice.
This would allow for an intermediate state between virtue and vice. But, it is important to note, that this
intermediate state, this knowing that you do not know, is in constant danger of succumbing to the conceit of
wisdom. Socrates’ questioning of Alcibiades has shown that Alcibiades holds many opinions about which
he has never thought. One of the accomplishments of this dialogue is that Socrates awakens Alcibiades
from the familiar everyday world. He makes Alcibiades feel strange about things that he has always
thought he has known, or never thought about at all.
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Education
Socrates tells Alcibiades that he is not alone in his wretched ignorance, but has
the company of “most of our city’s politicians” (118c). There may be a few exceptions,
Socrates admits, “among them, perhaps, your guardian Pericles” (118c). Socrates uses
this as a transitional point to show Alcibiades how little he has actually been educated.
Alcibiades takes the bait, and lists those who have helped Pericles learn. Alcibiades says,
“he kept company with many experts like Pythoclides and Anaxagoras. Even now,
despite his advanced age, he consults with Damon for the same purpose” (118c).
Socrates responds by asking Alcibiades: “Have you ever seen any expert who is
unable to make others expert in what he knows? The person who taught you how to read
and write—he had expertise in his field, and he made you and anybody else he liked
expert as well” (118c). Socrates takes Alcibiades’ previous example of learning Greek
and makes it more technical. That is, though Alcibiades cannot say who taught him to
speak, he can say who taught him to write and to read. Socrates offers several more
examples and concludes, “I think we can be pretty sure that someone understands
something when he can show that he has made someone else understand it” (118d).
Thus, Socrates lays out a criterion for determining expertise. One knows something only
if one can cause someone else to know it. This amounts to little more than saying that if
someone knows something that he or she will be able to explain it.
Now, Socrates is able to ask “who Pericles has made into an expert?”(118d). As
in the Protagoras (319e-320b), Socrates begins with Pericles’ sons, of whom Alcibiades
says both “turned out to be idiots” (118e). Then Socrates turns to Clinias, the brother of
Alcibiades. Alcibiades calls his brother a “madman” (118e), but by doing so has put
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himself on the line. Thus Socrates responds, “Well then, since Clinias is mad and
Pericles’ sons were idiots, what shall we say is the reason he allowed you to be in the
state you’re in?” (118e). Alcibiades answers decisively, exactly as, I suspect, Socrates
would have wanted him to. “I suppose it’s because I didn’t really pay attention (ÉEg∆
o‰µai a‡tiow oÈ pros°xvn tÚn noËn)” (118e). Generally the phrase pros°xvn tÚn
noËn means “to pay attention,” but if we read it more literally we can see, perhaps,
something of what is meant by not paying attention. He does not hold his mind forward,
he lets it slip away and the point of this statement is that not paying attention, is the state
that he’s in, the state that Pericles should be able to correct, were he an expert. Here
Alcibiades admits to the same forgetfulness that characterizes him in both the Protagoras
and the Symposium. In addition, however, Alcibiades is showing loyalty to Pericles by
placing the blame on Pericles’ sons, Clinias and himself and indeed, each person is
responsible for his or her own actions. Nevertheless, Alcibiades has condemned Pericles
by showing that he has been able to turn out no better than idiots, a madman and
Alcibiades. Socrates senses this and asks Alcibiades to name anyone that Pericles has
made more of an expert (119a).
When Alcibiades is unable to name anyone, Socrates turns to the main point and
asks Alcibiades “what do you propose for yourself (t€ oÔn dianoiª per‹ sautoË)? Do
you intend to remain in your present condition (…w nËn ¶xeiw), or practice some selfcultivation (§piµ°leiãn tina poie›syai;)?” (119a). Socrates presents Alcibiades to
himself as a problem, and more specifically as a cognitive problem when he asks what he
thinks about himself t€ oÔn dianoiª per‹ sautoË. Then he completes his thought, by
asking what he thinks to do about himself, whether to remain as he is or to care about
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himself.169 Alcibiades has already told Socrates that he would rather “die on the spot”
than not “be permitted to gain anything greater” (105a-b). Now, Socrates is playing on
this. Socrates has already stated—from the very beginning of the dialogue—that
Alcibiades will not be able to gain what he wants without the help of his older lover, but
now he will set to demonstrating this at great length. This means that Alcibiades’
ambition may force him to care about his soul, and thus, in many ways, ultimately
abandon that ambition. Alcibiades seems to do as Socrates planned for he suggests that
they discuss it together (119b). But when Socrates enquires further Alcibiades will show
that he has very little interest in self-cultivation, even though Socrates has already shown
him that he suffers from the greatest ignorance and that his famous guardian has taught
him nothing, because he too knows nothing. So it is questionable whether Alcibiades is
truly ambitious.170
Rather than seeing the need to take the care of his self seriously, Alcibiades uses
the demonstration of the ignorance of Pericles and other Athenian politicians as a free
license to remain as he is, forgetting his claim at 105a-b. He says that,
if they were educated, then anyone who wanted to compete with them would have
to get some knowledge and go into training like an athlete. But, as it is, since they
entered politics as amateurs, there’s no need for me to train and go to the trouble
of learning. I’m sure my natural abilities will be far superior to theirs (§g∆ går
eÎ o‡dÉ ˜ti toÊtvn tª ge fÊsei pãnu polÁ peri°soµai) (119b-c).
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Michel Foucault claims that “The quite natural starting point for a study focused on the care of the self
is the Alcibiades” (1997, 95). Foucault notes three ways in which the “care of the self” in the Alcibiades is
transformed throughout later Greek literature. He sees the care of the self as the focal point where “politics,
pedagogy, and self-knowledge” come together (1997,85). He makes the important point that “the practice
of the self is conceived as a permanent battle” (1997, 97). Cf. Nehemas 1998 for a detailed discussion of
Foucault’s discussion of this dialogue.
170
One may claim that this may be true only if one supposes that Alcibiades ‘ takes Socrates’ plan
seriously. The point is that he is unable to take the point seriously, because he does not take himself
seriously.
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This claim is an expression of Alcibiades’ arrogance, but it is more than that. It shows
that his self truly is a problem to him, something that he does not know. His ambition
causes him to judge himself in terms of those who surround him, rather than in terms of
the truth. Socrates sets about ridiculing this reflected conception of his self. He says to
Alcibiades: “I’m furious (éganakt«) with you and with my infatuation (¶rvtow) for
you” (119c). When Alcibiades asks for an explanation, Socrates says he is angry because
“you stoop to compete with these people” (119c). When Alcibiades asks who “else have
I got to compete with” (119c), Socrates shows that not only is Alcibiades not ambitious,
but he only “thinks he holds himself in high-esteem (oﬁÒµenon µegalÒfrona e‰nai)”
(119d). If he will not care for his self for its own sake, he certainly does not hold it in
high regard. So, Socrates forces him to compare himself with another class of people
altogether.
This argument shows the imitative nature of human beings and our tendency to
compare ourselves with them and judge ourselves by them. This tendency has many
pitfalls for Plato. Pleonexia (as it is expressed at 105b-c and Republic I) is one problem
associated with this. I always want more than the others. The point here is the converse
danger. When it comes to my internal qualities, I only want “enough” to have more than
my fellows. Socrates recognizes this in Alcibiades and so shows Alcibiades just how
high that bar can be set. He has already shown that Alcibiades’ education has been
haphazard, as has that of his fellow Athenians. Now he will contrast that with the very
well planned education of the Kings of Persia and Sparta, educations that take their entire
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life into consideration from the very first day. They lead planned, rather than haphazard,
lives.171
Socrates begins by reminding Alcibiades that Athens is sometimes at war with
Persia and Sparta and so these are his true competition.172 Socrates’ irony flares up into
sarcasm when he says,
no sir, you’ve got to keep an eye on Midias the cockfighter and such people…So
relax, don’t bother to learn what needs to be learned for the great struggle to
come, don’t train yourself for what needs training—go ahead and go into politics
with your complete and thorough preparation (120a-c).
Socrates is showing an almost unprecedented fierceness in the force he is using against
Alcibiades here. He is playing on Alcibiades’ measuring of himself by others when he
compares him to “Midias the cockfighter” and he mocks his “preparation.” Alcibiades,
again, professes to be swayed, but immediately hedges his bet and says “But I still don’t
think the Spartan generals or the Persian king are any different than anybody else”
(120c). Socrates responds to this by telling Alcibiades the true reason for his comparison.
He asks, “when do you think you’d cultivate yourself: if you feared them and thought
they were formidable or if you didn’t” (120c). Alcibiades answers that he would cultivate
himself if he thought them formidable and Socrates asks whether Alcibiades thinks that
“cultivating yourself will do you any harm” (120d). This is the true reason that he wants
Alcibiades to consider the Spartans and the Persians as his competition. In order to do so,
he needs to make the basis of the comparison stronger.
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Forde 1987 points out the prominence of the word “kosmos” in this section, stressing the order of the
Perisan kingdom (230).
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The reader knows that Alcibiades will become intimately familiar with both the Persians (VIII. 45VIII.47) and the Spartans (Thucydides 6. 88-8. 26).

144

He asks Alcibiades whether “natural talents will be greatest among noble families,
or in other families” (120e). Here he is appealing to Alcibiades’ sense of high birth. Next
he asks if those “who are well born will turn out perfectly virtuous, if they’re well
brought up” (120e). Here Socrates appeals to education. In the next section (120e-124c),
Socrates will show how inferior Alcibiades is to the Persian King and the Spartan
generals. He adds another criterion, that of wealth, but he has already noted that this is
least important to Alcibiades. The effect of this entire speech is to show the ordered
nature of the educations of the Spartans and the Persians, compared with the haphazard
nature of Athenian education. Their educations are ordered because they take the entire
life into account, from the day they are born, both in terms of ambition and separation.
The effect of this is to show Alcibiades that he does not know himself. This means that
Alcibiades is unaware that his past is inadequate to the ambitions that he has for the
future.
Socrates begins by showing Alcibiades that what he thinks of as a high birth is
only relatively high, to the extent that he would be laughed at by both Spartans and
Persians (120e-121b). Socrates continues to point out the haphazard nature of Athenian
birth (implying that either he or Alcibiades could in reality be illegitimate). Everyone
knows that the Spartan and Persian kings are legitimate and everyone celebrates their
birthday but “when we are born, Alcibiades, ‘even the neighbors hardly notice it’”
(121d). Thus Socrates has hinted at the importance of some sort of regulated birth
program (one of which is developed in the Republic173) but he moves on then to show the
orderly and well-planned nature of the education received by the rulers of Sparta and
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Cf. Friedlander 1964 ii, 236.
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Persia. When the child is raised it is “not by some nanny of no account, but by the most
highly respected eunuchs in the royal household” (121d).
Then, when “he is twice seven years, the boy is entrusted to people called the
‘royal tutors.’ These are four Persians of mature age who have been selected as the best:
the wisest, the justest, and most self-controlled, and the bravest” (121e-122a). That is,
there is a tutor for each of the cardinal virtues, so that, rather than naively supposing as
the Athenians do (Cf. Protagoras 322d), that everyone teaches virtue, the Persians find
those who are the best in each of the virtues (virtue may not be teachable, but one has a
far better chance if one picks the best rather than letting anyone try to teach it). Socrates
says that the “rest of the upbringing and education of your competitors…would be a long
story” (122b), while glossing over what now seems to be Alcibiades’ meager education.
“But for you, Alcibiades, Pericles chose from among his household Zopyrus the
Thracian, a tutor so old he was perfectly useless” (122b). Socrates concludes that “your
birth, your upbringing, your education—or that of any other Athenian—is of no concern
to anybody, to tell the truth—nobody, that is, except perhaps some man who may happen
to be in love with you” (122b).
Socrates concludes his humiliation of Alcibiades by showing that “even our
enemies’ wives have a better appreciation than we do what it would take to challenge
them” (124a).174 His next comment makes it clear that not only does Alcibiades does not
know his true competitors, but he does not know himself. “No, my excellent friend, trust
in me and the Delphic inscription and ‘know thyself (gn«yi sautÒn).’ These are the
people we must defeat, not the ones you think, and we have no hope of defeating them
174

In a recent dissertation Andre Maurice Archie points out the importance of the role of women in this
section of the dialogue (2003, 96-111).
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unless we act with both diligence and skill” (124a-b). When Socrates concludes by
assuring Alcibiades he will not achieve the fame he so desires unless he does this (124b),
Alcibiades asks “what kind of self-cultivation do I need to practice” (124b). For the rest
of the dialogue Socrates will first have to show him what his true self is and then how to
cultivate it so that “we can become as good as possible” (124b-c).
In order to do this, however, Socrates has to lead Alcibiades through an elenctic
discussion (124e-127c) designed to show Alcibiades that he does not know himself at all,
much less know what “good,” “friendship,” or “agreement” mean. When Alcibiades
realizes this, it seems as if he has finally come to himself, discovered himself again. He
exclaims, “I think I must have been in an appalling state (a‡sxista) for a long time
(pãlai), without being aware of it (lelhy°nai)” (127d). This is an important remark
for Alcibiades. He recognizes he has been unaware of himself (lelhy°nai §µautÒn) for
a long time (pãlai). Alcibiades is saying that he has escaped his own notice, and
forgotten himself.175 In the preceding chapters, I have already shown that Plato portrays
Alcibiades as forgetful of himself, shows time as responsible for forgetfulness and finally
shows forgetfulness is responsible for vice. Here, Socrates makes similar claims, though
as elsewhere in the Alcibiades, this passage focuses on Alcibiades’ inability to connect
his previous training with his future accomplishments and the glory he hopes they bring
him.
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This is the same word used of Epimetheus forgetting humanity in Protagoras’ Great Speech (Protagoras
321c).
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The Self and Its Cultivation
Thus far I have focused on the role that time plays in the first part of the
Alcibiades. I have spelled out the temporal grammar that accounts for his present
ambition and his future failure as a result of a lack of training in the past. Alcibiades’
wavering, I have shown, is a result of forgetting himself and thinking that he knows what
he does not know. This forgetfulness is so strong that even when Socrates reminds him,
Alcibiades nearly immediately slips back into ignorance, to the point that he is often
surprised to find himself as he is.176 Now, I show the way Socrates turns the conversation
in order to show Alcibiades “how to escape from your present state” (135c). First
Socrates discusses self-cultivation, but in order to complete this discussion he must show
what the self really is. Though he wants the self-itself, they end up settling on a particular
self (130d). This is an important point. I show that in Socrates’ separation of the soul
from the body and the things that belong to it, he is stripping away time from the rational
part of the soul. Socrates urges Alcibiades to use the rational part of his soul to think the
rational part of the soul and escape the major pitfall of forgetfulness.
Socrates asks Alcibiades “what does it mean to cultivate oneself (t€ §stin tÚ
•autoË §piµele›syai)?” (127e). Socrates goes on to show Alcibiades that “we often
think we are cultivating ourselves when we are not (µØ pollãkiw lãyvµen oÈx ≤µ«n
aÈt«n §piµeloÊµenoi)” (128a). If we translate this passage more literally we see that
he is really saying, “We often escape our notice, not cultivating ourselves.” The wording
of this passage helps us to see exactly what the articular infinitive tÚ §piµele›syai
means. It is the opposite of self-forgetfulness, the lãyvµen. Often—in the thick and fast
176
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rush of moments—one forgets oneself so thoroughly that one does not only not care for
oneself, but one is not aware that one is not caring for oneself. As we see later, the care
is precisely this: remembering oneself which is construed as knowing oneself.
Socrates is going to have to lead Alcibiades towards himself. If people think they
are cultivating themselves when they are not, are they not cultivating something other
than themselves? Socrates directs the dialogue in the direction of this question. He asks:
“Is he cultivating himself when he cultivates what he has? (îrÉ ˜tan t«n aÍtoË
§piµel∞tai, tote ka‹ aÍtoË;)” (128a). Alcibiades answers that when one cultivates
the things of the self (t«n aÍtoË) that he is cultivating himself, but by the time he gives
his next answer he admits that he doesn’t understand (128a).
Socrates brings Alcibiades through a number of lowly examples in order to get
the younger man to admit that “when you’re cultivating what belongs to you, you’re not
cultivating yourself” (128d). Most often when we think we are cultivating ourselves we
are in reality cultivating what belongs to us by acquiring fame or wealth. Socrates is
clear that the skill (t°xnh) they need to cultivate themselves is a skill “that won’t make
anything that belongs to us better, but it will make us better” (128e). If my previous
supposition was correct, then this skill or t°xnh is a sort of mnemonic technique
whereby we can recall ourselves to ourselves and check our memory. We cannot recall
ourselves, however, if we do not know what that self is. This is an intricate part of the
dialogue, for as Socrates leads the discussion towards the “true self” he is in fact enacting
the t°xnh of recall, through rational discussion.
After agreeing that they need some sort of techne to make the self better, Socrates
asks “could we ever know what skill makes us better if we didn’t know what we were”
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(128e). Alcibiades agrees and Socrates points out how difficult it is to know oneself
(129a). Alcibiades again admits to wavering, saying “Sometimes (pollãkiw) I think,
Socrates, that anyone can do it, but then sometimes (pollãkiw) I think it’s extremely
difficult” (129a). 177 Socrates does not shy away from the difficulty, for “nevertheless,
this is the situation we are in” (129a). Socrates will continue to try to hold Alcibiades
steadfast. Then Socrates says, “if we know ourselves, then we might be able to know how
to cultivate ourselves, but if we don’t know ourselves we’ll never know how (gnÒntew
µ¢n aÈtÚ tãxÉ ín gno›µen tØn §piµ°leian ≤µ«n aÈt«n, égoËntew d¢ oÈk ên
pote)” (129a). If we do not know ourselves, then surely we cannot care for that self.
Socrates really says “how can we come to know the self itself (aÈtÚ taÈtÒ)” (129b),
because the knowing of the self itself is the art of caring for it.
Socrates asks whether “the thing being used (ı d¢ xr≈µenow) and the person
using it (⁄ xr∞tai)” are different (129c). After asking whether a shoemaker and a lyreplayer each use their hands and their eyes as well as their respective instruments in order
to accomplish their primary activity, Socrates is able to ask: “Doesn’t a man use his
whole body, too?” (129e).178 When Alcibiades agrees, Socrates reminds him of their
previous agreement that “the user is different from the thing being used” (129e). When
Alcibiades agrees to this, the conclusion is inevitable “A human179 is different from his
own body” (129e). This leads Socrates to ask “what is a human?” (129e). In antiquity this
177

A better translation is “sometimes it seems like everything to me, oh Socrates, and sometimes is seems
like a total pain”
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In the de Anima, Aristotle similarly claims that the body is an organ, or tool of the soul (412a25).
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The translations that follow adhere to Hutchinson’s except where he consistently translates “ı
ênyrvpow” as “man” I substitute the preferable “human” or “person.” Though, in English, “man” is often
used to mean “humanity” Greek has no such tradition in usage where “ênyrvpow” is always gender
neutral (except in grammar) and “ énÆr” is always gender specific. Therefore there is a scholarly—as well
as an ethical or political—argument to be made against such usage.
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was considered to be the fundamental question of the dialogue (as its subtitle “On the
Human” evinces). The question of the nature of humanity must be answered and
Socrates gives three possible options for the essence of the person “the body, the soul, or
the two of them together, the whole thing” (130a).180 Socrates says that they have already
agreed that the true human rules the body and so the body cannot be the same as the
human (130b). Then he eliminates the possibility that the soul and the body together both
rule the body, on the grounds that if “one of them doesn’t take part in ruling , then surely
no combination of the two of them could rule” (130b). This move leaves only one
possibility and Socrates is able to conclude that “if he is something, he’s nothing other
than his soul” (130c). Thus, we know that the human is the soul, but we know very little
about the soul other than that it rules the body.
Socrates makes an immediate distinction. He says: “What we mentioned just now
that we should first consider what the self itself (aÈtÚ tÚ aÈtÚ) is. Instead of
considering that, we’ve been considering what a particular self (toË aÈtoË aÈtÚ
ßkaston) is” (130d). Socrates then suggests that this may be enough and seemingly says
no more about the distinction. But it seems like a real distinction is being made. In fact,
it is a distinction we have already seen. It seems as if what we have seen is a “particular”
self instead of the “self itself” because all we know about this soul is that is rules the
body. This distinction explains Socrates’ redoubled effort to strip away physical things
from the self, which has now been defined as the soul. Socrates shows first that “being
self-controlled is knowing yourself” rather than having medical, economic or agriculture
knowledge (130e-131c). The particular soul that rules the body needs to be self180

Aristotle’s use of this argument at the end of Metaphysics vii 3 helps demonstrate the authenticity of the
dialogue.
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controlled and keep itself in mind, in order that it may know itself and know the self
itself.
Thus, Socrates continues to strip away all but the soul itself. He says that “if
someone takes care of his body, then isn’t he caring for something that belongs to him,
and not for himself?” (131b). From here he shows that “someone who takes care of his
wealth (tå xrÆµata181)” cares “neither for himself nor for what belongs to him, but for
something even further away” (131b).
In the examples that follow, when Socrates tries to remove the self from the
things that belong to the self, he is also de-temporalizing the soul. Time is a measurement
of motion and motion is a characteristic of bodies.182 The self-motion of the soul is
motion, but it is an eternal motion (Phaedrus 245d)183 and it “bears the greatest kinship to
understanding and the motion of the universe” (Timaeus 89a).184 Thus, Socrates needs to
separate the soul from the body so that Alcibiades does not forget the self-motion of his
soul in the transitory nature of bodily motion. This further explains what was meant by
thinking of one’s life as a whole in the Protagoras, but it also raises problems. One of the
main points of the Platonic or Socratic “discovery” of the soul, is in fact that it is nontemporal and not subject to change. Socrates dismisses the idea that the true human is the
body and the soul, but he is talking to a human who in fact is a body and a soul and who
is subject to time. That is in fact why this is so important. It is the souls that have in fact
been speaking and not the faces. This explains the lack of dramatic setting—in the spatial
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tå xrÆµata means “wealth” but the word derives from xrãv and means things that are used.
Socrates is punning on the series of cognates that occur from 129c-130b.
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Aristotle says “Time is the measure of motion and being moved” (Physics 220b30-221a5).
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This is one reason that the human cannot be, but can only become, virtuous. Cf. Chapter 4 above.
184
Cf. also Laws where soul is defined as “self-generating motion” (896a).
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sense of a “set”— for the dialogue. Socrates says “when you and I talk to each other, one
soul uses words to address another soul” (130d). He goes on, citing himself and
Alcibiades in indirect discourse, “Socrates converses with Alcibiades not by saying
words to his face, apparently, but by addressing his words to Alcibiades, in other words to
his soul” (130e). Socrates addresses words to the soul of Alcibiades, to remind that soul
that it exists, that it is not the body, nor truly joined with it, and that is free from time.
This helps us understand in one of the ways that Plato may mean that learning is
recollection. No matter what we learn, we learn with the soul and thus recollect what we
have always known but always forget: the self itself and the freedom from time.
Socrates goes through another list of examples to show that a various experts are
only experts at things that belong to the true human, the soul, and that none of them know
themselves and then he turns the matter personal and says to Alcibiades “I’m the one who
will stay with you, now that your body has lost its bloom and everyone else has gone
away” (131d). It is as an effect of time that the others have fled. Socrates explains saying,
“ I was your only lover—the others were lovers only of what you had. While your
possessions are passing their prime, you are just beginning to bloom” (131e-132a). This
is where the difference between the self itself and the particular self discussed above
becomes more important. The particular self is the temporal, embodied self, whereas the
self itself is a non-temporal rationality.
Now that Socrates has succeeded in stripping the body and the things of the body
(including motion and time) from the soul, we can make sense of what seems difficult
here. For, to claim that Alcibiades’ soul “is just beginning to bloom” (132a) makes it
seem as if the soul does change. Not only, however can it bloom, it can also be corrupted,
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for Socrates claims that “I shall never forsake you now, never, unless the Athenian people
make you corrupt and ugly” (132a). This will turn out to the very point that Socrates is
trying to make and reason that it is so important. It is because of our bodies that our
particular souls are subject to time by means of the body that moves and changes in time
and they forget themselves and become ruled by the things that belong to the body.
Forgetfulness is tied to the body through time. As Aristotle says in the physics “people
forget owing to the lapse of time” (Physics 221a30). It seems as if the particular
soul—Alcibiades, or Socrates—tries to know what the self itself is. In doing so, the
particular soul uses its rational part to contemplate its rational part and is reminded of
itself. Socrates leads us to the final section of the dialogue by asking how to do this:
“How can we get the clearest knowledge of our soul?” (132c). The very soul that knows
is forgetful of itself, has forgotten itself and doesn’t know itself. It is self-alienated in
ignorance, the very state that Socrates diagnoses in Alcibiades (117a-118d). From here
Socrates moves to a discussion of how the soul knows itself and also, though less
obviously, how it is that the soul does not know itself.
Socrates cites the Delphic oracle for a second time, as an answer to his own
question. Socrates first claims that if we knew the best way to know our souls, we would
also know ourselves (132c). Then, half way through his short answer he exclaims, “By
the gods—that admirable Delphic inscription we just mentioned—didn’t we understand
it” (132c). Thus, Socrates has gone from the Delphic inscription “know thyself” (gn«yi
sautÒn) (124b, 129a) through a discussion that separated the self from the things that
belong to the self and has now come back to the inscription “know thyself” to explain
what was supposed to explain it. When Socrates asks did they not understand the
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inscription, I want to argue that he is directing Alcibiades to look at the grammatical,
reflexive structure of the syntax. The one being commanded to know is also the object of
knowledge. In asking Alcibiades to reconsider the Delphic oracle, Socrates is asking him
to reflect upon himself again. It is also the soul that is reflecting, but the rational part of
the soul.
Alcibiades’ problem is that he does not like repetition. Earlier Socrates ridiculed
Alcibiades’ “delicate stomach” which “wouldn’t enjoy another taste of the same
argument” (114a). Here, he balks at Socrates for “bringing that up again” (132c). If
learning is recollection,185 it is a kind of repetition and learning is precisely what
Alcibiades has rejected, preferring to lean on his “natural talents” (119b-c).186 He forgets
himself and does not want to learn to recollect. When Alcibiades fails to read into the
reflexive nature of the command, Socrates explains it to him as “what I suspect the oracle
means and what advice it’s giving us” (132d). Then he admits that sight may be the only
example. Socrates makes expert use, however, of this analogy in order to get Alcibiades
to see the reflexive nature of knowledge and thought.
Socrates says, “You think about it too. If the inscription took our eyes to be men
and advised them, ‘See thyself,’ how would we understand such advice. Shouldn’t the
eye be looking at something in which it could see itself” (132d). There is a great deal to
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Cf. Meno “And in not finding knowledge within oneself recollection” (85d). The point in the
Alcibiades is that in order to find in other knowledge in oneself, one must first recollect one’s self. Cf.
Phaedo 73b-76c.
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Kierkegaard is very astute on this issue. He sees repetition and recollection as opposed, but inextricably
related. He says: “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions; for what
is recollected has been, is repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so called is recollected
forwards” (Kierkegaard 1941, 33). It is possible to discern enough similarities between Repetition and the
Alcibiades, to think that Kierkegaard had the dialogue in mind when writing it. For instance, the young
man with whom Kierkegaard begins the dialogue is described as “in that seductive age when maturity of
spirit announces itself” (1941, 36). Though it is beyond the scope of this chapter, a further comparison of
these two works would be well worth while.
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unpack in this passage.187 Socrates’ analogy with sight, shifts it to an active voice, which
is the most important part, since if we know what knows then we know what is known.
A comparison with Aristotle’s similar analogy may help us see what is going on
here. Aristotle asks us to “suppose that the eye were an animal—sight would have been
its soul, for sight is the substance of the eye which corresponds to the account, the eye
being merely the matter of seeing” (De Anima 412b17-26).188 Thus, if the oracle says
“See thyself (ﬁd¢ sautÒn)”, and it is commanding the eye to see its true self, it is
commanding the eye to see sight. Thus, knowing oneself would be to know one’s
knowing or not knowing. If the eye does not see sight, it is seeing “merely the matter of
seeing,” that is, something that belongs to seeing. The eye of course does not readily see
itself, or its seeing. Or rather it is not aware of seeing sight, but as Aristotle says “since it
is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing or hearing it must be either be by
sight that we are aware of seeing or by some sense other than sight” (425b12-15). Since
there are only the five senses it must be sight that sees sight. Though this is a difficult
issue, it becomes clear that is must be by sight that one is aware of seeing. This means
that all sight is, in some sense, a seeing of sight. This will be important for the soul part
of our analogy, but it would be lost on Alcibiades and so Socrates provides some more
concrete illustrations of his point, in order to guide Alcibiades towards self-reflection.
He says, “I’m sure that you’ve noticed that when a man looks into an eye his face
appears in it, like in a mirror. We call this the ‘pupil,’ for it’s a sort of miniature of the
187

The command Socrates uses is skÒpei ka‹ sÊ, is an imperative, but it emphatically uses the secondperson pronoun and emphasizes it further with the use of an intensive ka‹. He is stressing the active role
Alcibiades should take.
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Aristotle’s analogy will be different from Plato’s for he argues that “as the pupil, plus the power of sight
constitutes the eye, the soul plus the body constitutes the animal” (413a1-4). The Alcibiades has already
rejected this option.
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man who’s looking’ (1333a). The person looking sees him or her self in the part of the
eye of the other that sees, that is in the pupil, but the “little reflection” is too small for the
eye to see itself. In fact, this is not Socrates’ point. At this point, he is simply
establishing that the pupil is reflective. Then he makes the point that the eye can only see
itself in something similar (133a). Socrates continues: “So if an eye is to see itself, it must
look at an eye, and at that region of it in which the good activity of an eye actually
occurs, and this, I presume is seeing” (133b). Thus, if the eye is to see what it truly is it
must seek out that which makes an eye an eye, or its essence. For, an eye that does not
see is only an eye in name (de Anima 412b20). Since Socrates cannot tell Alcibiades to
look at sight, he directs him towards the part of the material eye in which sight resides.
Now Socrates is ready to pull out the point of his analogy. He says: “Then if the
soul, Alcibiades, is to know itself, it must look at a soul, and especially at that region in
which what makes a soul good, wisdom occurs, and at anything else which is similar to
it” (133b). In order for the soul to know itself, it must look at reason, which we may now
suggest is the “self itself” rather than the “particular self.” Socrates makes this point,
asking if we can “call anything in the soul more divine than the part in which knowing
and thinking take placed” (133b-c). Since the soul is alienated from its own essence and
has forgotten itself, it must look for another who is wise. In order to look for another who
is wise, one must test that wisdom by asking questions. By asking questions, one sees
wisdom, or the best part of the soul reflected in others. Socrates says that the rational
part of the soul “resembles the divine and someone who looked at it grasped everything
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divine—god and intelligence—would have the best grasp on himself as well” (133c).189
The rational part of the soul contemplates those things which do not change and it does
not change itself, except insofar as it is subject to its own self-motion.190 If someone
understands divine things—of which there are god and intelligence—then that person
will have control over him or herself, because the person’s intelligence will know itself.
How is the person to understand god? Through god’s oracle, just as Socrates does in the
Apology (20e-21e). The service to the god is trying to awaken people to themselves. The
oracle’s command to “know thyself” is a command issued directly to the very self that it
wants it to know. Knowing anything is knowing that (rational) self.
It is important to say a few more words on self-knowledge as self-control and on
Socrates’ analogy between the eye and the human being and the necessity of another eye.
Gary Alan Scott asks “how will the less-capable partner—presumably the one inferior in
wisdom—facilitate the self-knowledge of the wiser person? (2000, 1997). He concludes
that “with the notion of ‘the Self itself,’ perhaps Socrates means to suggest that human
beings are never without recourse for a paradigm of this ruling part of the soul; one can
always look to the heavens, to everything divine as a guide” (2000, 97). I think that Scott
is correct, but we need to add that it is through questioning and continually testing one’s
reason that one begins to uncover the divine. Thus, we can begin to see what Socrates
gains from his constant questioning of others. It is a mnemonic device devised to keep
him from forgetting the god’s mission and slipping into self-forgetfulness. This explains
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I reject Hutchinson’s emendation of yeãn for yeÒn and thus do not use his translation here. There is no
good reason to accept the emendation. If we allow yeãn we have a difficult syntax and not much of a
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also Socrates’ claim at the beginning of the dialogue that as he spent years watching
Alcibiades the god kept him from speaking. Socrates watched Alcibiades in order to see
the divine part of himself and god.

A Return to Error
Now Socrates offers an argument to show that if one does not know oneself, then
one will make mistakes and “conduct himself badly, both publicly and privately” (134a).
He begins by explaining the identity between knowing oneself and self-control, but
expressing it in the negative form, so we can see that he is now turning the conversation
to diagnose error once again, which is, if we are ignorant part of knowing ourselves.
Indeed, an eye would have a very unclear picture of itself, if it could not see that it could
not see itself—that is it to say, if it looked in a reflection and thought it was seeing itself.
Recognizing the divine part of us is using logic or reason to reach the atemporal and
unchanging. Nevertheless, part of the human failure, and of Alcibiades’ failure, is to fail
to recognize one’s own limitations and correct them. Socrates says: “So if we didn’t
know ourselves and weren’t self-controlled, would we be able to know which of the
things that belong to us were good and which were bad?” (133c). This is remarkably
similar to the Socratic intellectualism that we saw in the Protagoras. We must first know
ourselves to know what belongs to us. If we do not know ourselves, we do not know what
belongs to us and do not know what among those things is good and what is not. Because
I do not know what is good and what is not, I go after what is not good, thinking that it is
good and I am not self-controlled, because I am not self-consistent.
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Socrates makes the point clear when he says “I suppose it would seem impossible
to you to know that what belongs to Alcibiades belongs to him, without knowing
Alcibiades” (133d). This is a quotidian example. If someone asks Jones, “How much
money does Smith have?” Jones can’t possibly answer if he does not know (of) Smith.
Socrates makes the point of the example clear only with his next statement “And
similarly, we couldn’t know that what belongs to us belongs to us, without knowing
ourselves’ (133d). If we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what belongs to us, i.e.
the body and its properties. Then Socrates shows how the problem compounds itself. If
we do not know what belongs to us then we do not know what belongs to our belongings.
Time and change belong to bodies and it is necessary to know the eternal of
which time is a “moving image” in order to know time. Then Socrates shows if one
doesn’t know one’s own belongs, one won’t know other people’s either (133e). If one
doesn’t know other people’s belongings “nor will he know what belongs to the city”
(133e). If one does not know what belongs to the city, then one cannot manage a city, nor
even a household for such a person will know neither himself “nor indeed will he know
what he’s doing” (133e-134a). Now, Socrates shows how it is that mistakes occur,
asking, “if he doesn’t know what he’s doing, won’t he make mistakes” (134) and since
“he makes mistakes, won’t he conduct himself badly, publicly and privately” (134a).
Finally Socrates delivers the final blow and asks: “Since he conducts himself badly,
won’t he be a failure?” (134a). This is the last thing Alcibiades wants to be called and
Socrates is prodding him, earnestly attempting to get Alcibiades to get control of himself.
Now Socrates goes on to show the disastrous effects of someone as impressive as
Alcibiades entering politics before being educated. Socrates knows that the many will
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adore Alcibiades and thus he knows that the decision, and the constant work to resist, is
up to Alcibiades. Alcibiades agrees that nothing will do a city any good without virtue
(134b) and from this Socrates concludes that, “if you are to manage the city’s business
properly and well, you must impart virtue to the citizens” (134b-c). We have already seen
that Pericles was unable to bestow virtue and that Alcibiades agreed that if one knew
something one should be able to impart it. Now Socrates argues towards the same point,
from the other end. He has shown that if you want to rule a city, then you must impart
virtue. Now he will ask whether it is “possible to impart something you haven’t got”
(134c). When Alcibiades agrees to this, he is unable to escape the conclusion that “what
you need is justice and self-control” (134c).
Socrates does not let the point rest, but tries to point out the danger Alcibiades
faces with a medical and a nautical example (134e-135a). From there it is easy for
Socrates to show Alcibiades that he is like a slave and Socrates asks him if he knows how
to escape this state (135c-d). Alcibiades says he will follow Socrates. Alcibiades ends
with two “speeches” full of the present tense and temporal markers. He says, “we’re
probably going to change roles, Socrates. I’ll be playing yours and you’ll be playing
mine, for from this day forward I will always attend on you, and you will have me as
your constant companion” (135d). Alcibiades claims that their roles have reversed and
that from now on he will follow Socrates about.
Socrates responds, “I should like to believe that you will persevere (diatel°sai)”
(135e). This is a form of the word that diatet°leka that Socrates uses to describe his
steadfast devotion to Alcibiades at 105a.191 Thus, the dialogue both begins and ends with

191

For the reversal of the positions of Socrates and Alcibiades, Cf. Friedlander 1964, 204.
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a perseverance or a constancy. In this chapter I have argued that the self-knowledge that
Socrates recommends is none other than the constancy to keep oneself in mind and to
care for and control oneself. Thus many of the important technical terms of the dialogue
actually mean the same thing and each of these is the same as the “human wisdom” that
we have seen in both the Apology and the Protagoras. Self-control is to know oneself and
to keep oneself in mind constantly, to keep from slipping into an ignorance of one’s own
ignorance, an ignorance of one’s self.

The Particular Self and Historical Resonance
The reader, however, knows that Alcibiades does not follow Socrates all of his
life, is not educated before he goes into politics and leads the city on a disastrous
course.192 After this we know that he had a chance to observe both the Spartans and the
Persians first hand and that his “wavering” as well as the city’s “wavering” over him
became famous. What are we to make of this? What is the author of the dialogue trying
to tell us and what sorts of temporal schemata are invoked?
It has often been said that there is no description of the setting of the dialogue, no
effort made to show where or how these two came into contact.193 This is for at least two
reasons. As Friedlander points out that the “economy with which this dialogue
concentrates upon the two protagonists is also its unique strength” (1964, 232). One
could say that Plato employs such a strict economy in order to present the souls of the
two, speaking to each other in words (130d). The setting is also unimportant because of
192

If Alcibiades has not been recalled, the Sicilian expedition may not have been so immediately
disastrous, but it seems that Alcibiades’ pleonexic idea of empire would have ultimately ended poorly. Cf.
Thucydides VI. 18 and VI.VI. 53.
193
As Friedlander puts it “there are no secondary figures in the Alcibiades nor is there any setting full of
charm or symbolic meaning” (1964, 232).
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Socrates’ constancy. Wherever Alcibiades has gone, Socrates is there. What is extremely
important is the temporal setting of the dialogue, which structures and defines both the
course and the purpose of the dialogue. The particular soul, ruling a body, is subject to
time and must somehow come to recognize the self itself, the rational and unchanging,
atemporal soul. Plato uses Alcibiades in this dialogue so that he can allow the argument
to resonate not only with what is presented in the dialogue, but the awareness—whether it
come from oral or written sources—of the historical Alcibiades and his fate after the
events depicted in the dialogue, many of which are designed to call to mind in the reader
some future event. I have pointed out several instances of this type of allusion in the text
of this chapter. In what space I have remaining, I briefly highlight Plato’s use of the
interlocutor’s future.
When Alcibiades finally realizes that he is ignorant, Socrates says, “But don’t lose
heart. If you were fifty when you realized it, then it would be hard for you to cultivate
yourself, but now you’re just the right age (≤lik€an) to see it” (127e). Previously
Socrates has said that Alcibiades is “hardly twenty years old yet” (123d) and that “it was
a god who prevented me from talking to you before today” (124c). If Alcibiades is close
to twenty here and we recall that he was most likely seventeen in the Protagoras, we can
clearly see some discontinuity between the dialogues, for in the Protagoras, up to three
years prior by this reckoning, Alcibiades was already quite familiar with Socrates.
Nevertheless, this statement of Alcibiades’ age as the appropriate juncture for Socrates to
approach him is telling. This hint as to the age of Alcibiades, places the dramatic date of
the Alcibiades very shortly before both men leave for Potidea. Nails points out that
Alcibiades must have been at least twenty at the beginning of this campaign for by “the
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5th c. , eighteen- and nineteen year-old Athenian youths were not sent on military
campaigns outside Attica…. So Alcibiades III must have been in at least his twentieth
year in 432” (2002, 13). This assessment, of course, gives something of a prophetic cast
to Socrates’ statements about the Spartans (121a-124c).
The clearest statement of this is Socrates’ prophetic final remarks (and Plato’s use
of “historical irony”) comes in the final words of Socrates, words expressing fear, “but
I’m afraid—not because I distrust your nature, but because I know how powerful the city
is—I’m afraid it will get the best of you and me both” (135e). Thus, when Scott says that
in “the Alcibiades I, Socrates is shown effecting a beneficial transformation also in
Alcibiades’ self-awareness, convincing him that he must take more trouble over himself
if he desires to advise the city about its affairs” (2000, 84), we can see that the point is
that Socrates does not effect any lasting change in Alcibiades. It appears as if he has, but
the nature of Alcibiades’ forgetfulness—as much as the power of the city—will
overpower him. Nevertheless, since there is no record of Alcibiades advising the
Athenians any time before Potidaea—and not in fact until long after it—Plato is
presenting us with a picture of a limited success. The limits of this success show us
something important and often overlooked regarding Socratic “human wisdom.”
Philosophy cannot rely on a simple “conversion,” or it becomes mere platitudes.
Alcibiades’ effusive desire to follow Socrates is forgotten, because he continually forgets
that he does not know. One must continually be guard, let one forget oneself so
thoroughly that one forgets even that one has forgotten.

164

In the next chapter, I will look at Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium, in order to
look at his own account of what happened after leaving Socrates at the end of the
Alcibiades.
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Chapter 7
History and Forgetting in the Speech of Alcibiades

One of the charges against the Alcibiades I is that it lacks a rich dramatic element.
The Symposium may suffer from the opposite fate: it offers such a rich presentation that
commentators are dazzled and befuddled by its beauty. Many commentators tend to
over-mythologize the dramatic elements of the dialogue. That is, they do the opposite of
those “intellectuals” in the Phaedrus who “give a rational account of the form of the
Hippocentaurs, and then of the Chimera, and a whole flood of Gorgons and Pegasuses
and other monsters” (229d-e). Many modern commentators offer mythological
interpretations of rational—or at least psychological—phenomena. They read it like
James Joyce’s Ulysses, seeking esoteric symbols and “masks of Dionysus” everywhere.194
While I do not want to deny that there is a mythological level of the dialogue, I will pay
close attention to the dual psychological portrait offered by the speech of Alcibiades,
taking particular care to lay out the temporal structure of both the account and the souls
that are its subject.
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Leo Strauss’s courses on the dialogue apparently influenced—either directly or indirectly—those who
tend to read the dialogue this way. Strauss says, for example, “Thus Alcibiades fulfills the prophecy…Now
Dionysus, represented by Alcibiades, is the judge and crowns Socrates” (Strauss 2001, 257). Strauss
glosses over the fact that he precisely does not judge by giving the fillet to both. He continues saying that
“the god, whose raw material is Alcibiades, would seem to be Dionysus” (2001, 257-258). Rosen says,
“Dionysus is neither Socrates nor Agathon. If it is permissible to identify him with any character in the
dialogue, the only serious candidate would be Alcibiades” (1968, 29). Later, of the seating arrangement
Rosen says, “Alcibiades sits halfway between sophistry and philosophy; like Eros, he is ‘in between’
(213b1) the human and the divine” (1968, 288). Anderson, to whose title I alluded above, takes this
tendency the farthest. Anderson begins his book by acknowledging his debt to Stanley Rosen’s study
(1993, 1). Anderson says that “Sokrates identifies himself as Eros, and he also ‘contains’ or ‘is possessed
by’ Dionysus. Thus, while Socrates is the mask through which Dionysus speaks, on another level not
Sokrates, but Eros is the mask” (1993, 106).
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I argue that Alcibiades’ speech offers two very clear psychological and
philosophical portraits, one of Socrates and one of himself. Both portraits—the explicit
portrait of Socrates and the implicit portrait of Alcibiades—are characterized by some
basic rift or division—much like the circle people of Aristophanes.195 Only when we have
excavated Alcibiades’ account of himself can we understand his account of Socrates.
Socrates’ rift—his famous irony—is the difference between his shabby appearance and
magnificent reality, between his body and its possessions and his soul, or self. He
maintains such an ironic distance and difference because of the difference in Alcibiades
(and most other Socratic interlocutors) between himself and himself. Socrates could say
to Alcibiades, as he does to Callicles, replacing only the names, “Alcibiades will not
agree with you, but will be dissonant with you all your life long’ (cf. Gorgias 482b).
Alcibiades’ account of Socrates not only shows the deep division in Alcibiades, but it
adds to my overall analysis by showing how attached to his forgetfulness Alcibiades is.
He willfully forgets, because it is difficult and sometimes immediately painful to
remember.196

The Question of Alcibiades and the Dramatic Date of the Dialogue
Martha Nussbaum argues that the figure of Alcibiades is central to an
understanding of the entire dialogue. She offers a reading of the frame-tale, where
Apollodorus is asked first by a wealthy businessman Glaucon197 and again two days later
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Rosen goes much too far when he says “Alcibiades is another instance of the hybristic circle-men, who
imitate completeness by a harmony of opposites” (1968, 280). This is another example of the heavyhanded tendency to turn allusion or similarity into symbolic or metaphoric identity.
196
All things considered, it must be ultimately more pleasant (cf. Chapter 5 above on the Protagoras).
197
On this Glaucon’s identity see Nussbaum 1986, 465, n. 14. See also Guthrie 1975, 366 and Bury 1966.
Nussbaum supports the idea that this is the same Glaucon of the Republic, while Bury argues that this is the
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by a nameless friend, about a party attended by both Socrates and Alcibiades. Nussbaum
dates the frame-tale at 404,198
shortly before the assassination [of Alcibiades] at the height of the frenzy over
Alcibiades… Now suppose a rumor circulates, to the effect that there has been a
party, attended by Socrates and Alcibiades, where speeches were made about
love. A political man (ignorant of the cultural facts that date this story) would
immediately wonder whether the spurned leader had finally agreed to return to
Athens, drawn perhaps by his famous love for Socrates” (Nussbaum 1986, 170).
Nussbaum persuasively argues that this story explains the seemingly incongruous interest
expressed in speeches made about Eros at a drinking party. Nussbaum links this Glaucon
with the oligarchs, based partly on the anti-democratic association of his name and his

Glaucon of Charmides 154. Nussbaum sees chronology as the primary deficiency with her own
interpretation, but the point of the prologue is its chronological confusion. A larger difficulty is that Plato’s
brother would have presumably been close enough to Socrates that he could ask the man himself and that
he would have been aware that Agathon had long ago left the city.
198
Leo Strauss places the dialogue in 407. This allows him to arrive at conclusions quite different from
Nussbaum’s. He thinks that, “Alcibiades was in Athens. Alcibiades had returned to Athens in 407. He was
such a genius that he compelled the city which he had betrayed to permit him to return and acquit him. That
is also the reason why the story is told now. The open hysteria and indignation have now been overcome.
The most endangered Alcibiades is now restored. He is the leader of the procession to the shrine at Eleusis
of Demeter and kore, the object of the profanation of the mysteries” (Strauss 2001, 15). There is no way to
demonstrate conclusively whether Plato set the dialogue in 407, 404 or some other year. Strauss’s reading
makes the dialogue serve as “the true report of what happened in 415 or 416. Not the vulgar, hysterical
kind….but we see how things become distorted” (2001, 15). Nussbaum’s account is actually a better
explanation of distortion, because it occurs when there was the most uncertainty about Alcibiades within
the city. I would like to suggest that the fact that the dialogue can plausibly occur at either dramatic date
heightens Plato’s point about the temporal certainty of Alcibiades and demonstrates how haphazard his
situation actually was. I suggest that Nussbaum’s account is stronger than Strauss’s because she does not
ask “was it not proper to tell this story earlier?” (Strauss 2001, 14), but instead why would the two different
people (Glaucon and the associate) be interested in the story. If Strauss is correct, the proper time to relate
the story would have been exactly precisely after the event, when Alcibiades offered to defend himself
against the charges. Strauss suggests that Socrates’ speech “profanes” the mysteries, but this does not
correspond to the situation. Socrates was never implicated, so if any speech revealed the mysteries, it must
in fact have been Alcibiades’. Stanley Rosen offers a confused account. He takes Glaucon’s “special
interest in beautiful young men” (1968, 15, n. 38) as the reason for his interest and goes on to say that,
“Glaucon’s belief that the banquet was a recent one, shows that the prologue takes place after 407, when
Alcibiades was back in Athens” (1968, 15, n. 38). First, both the Protagoras and the Alcibiades I indicate
that most suitors no longer thought Alcibiades young and beautiful in the 430s, and he certainly could not
have been considered such by 407. Neither Socrates nor Agathon would have been young in 407, either.
Glaucon did not know that Agathon had been away from the city for a number of years and so he certainly
was not overly interested in his beauty. In addition, Rosen is very vague to say that the prologue takes
place “after 407, when Alcibiades was back in Athens,” for, Alcibiades was only briefly in the city after
407. If he were in town at the time, Glaucon surely could have found out whether or not there was a recent
banquet from a different source.
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“silence about his deeper concerns” (Nussbaum 1986, 170). This suggestion takes on a
sinister bent when one considers the role that the oligarchs played in Alcibiades’
assassination. It is in fact this assassination that Nussbaum—more speculatively—thinks
has occurred in the two days separating Apollodorus’ two tellings of the tale.
She says that, “the ‘friend,’ apparently, is not laboring under Glaucon’s
delusion that the rumored conversation was recent; and yet he wants to hear it any way.
One sufficient explanation for his greater clarity, which would also account for his desire
to hear the story again, would be the death of Alcibiades in Phrygia” (1986, 170). She
acknowledges that
this remains conjectural; but in any case we are surely intended to tie the dialogue
closely to the death, to think of Alcibiades as dead, or dying, even while ‘he’
speaks, and to see the oligarch’s fear of a love that would reunite Alcibiades and
Athens as one of the fears that lead to the killing (1976, 171).
I have reported Nussbaum’s conjectures at such length, not only because of their inherent
interest, but in order to open up the temporal ambiguity that frames this dialogue. It is
clear that there was a great uncertainty and inconstancy that surrounded the figure of
Alcibiades. There were reports, sightings and theories that left a cloud of uncertainty
surrounding him. He was a troublesome epistemic object for the city. What is at stake,
for Athens, in the problem of Alcibiades, is the relation between the past and the future,
between memory and hope. Athens, like Alcibiades, clings to a forgetfulness full of
ambition for the future.199

199

Nussbaum herself makes a much different case. Her discussion of Alcibiades addresses the problems
raised by Vlastos 1981, 1-31, regarding the “Individual as Object of Love in Plato” (as his essay is
entitled). She argues that “what they [the accounts of Aristophanes, Diotima and Socrates] is now
movingly displayed to us in the person and the story of Alcibiades. We realize, through him, the deep
importance unique passion has for ordinary human beings; we see its irreplaceable contribution to
understanding” (1986, 197).
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In the Frogs (produced in 405), when Dionysus judges between Aeschylus
and Euripides partly on the basis of their solution to the problem of Alcibiades, the entire
problem is presented by Aristophanes as one between the past—both of the poets are
dead and in the underworld—and the future. Dionysus—and by extension
Aristophanes—is asking how two of the great poets of the past would deal with the
present problems that plague the future of Athens, and of drama. Though Aeschylus is
chosen in the end (after another question regarding the salvation of the city), both poets
answer the question in a way that indicates Alcibiades’ problematic relation to time. The
contrast of the two answers, shows how the city is temporally divided by his figure.
Those opposed to Alcibiades recall the past, whereas those who support him, like
Aeschylus, also recall the past, regretfully, but like him with an eye to the future. The
city is divided on the question of Alcibiades, not only in factions, but within the
individual citizens themselves. When Euripides asks Dionysus to clarify his question by
explaining the city’s current feelings about Alcibiades, the god answers, “It longs for him
on the one hand, but hates him, and wants to have him”(1425). This answer is a highly
condensed version of Alcibiades’ encomium to Socrates. And, even though Aeschylus
wins the contest for recommending that “the lion have his way” and Alcibiades return,
we know that he did not return to the city and that a year after the play was produced he
was assassinated in Phrygia. Likewise, Alcibiades rejects “recalling” Socrates into the
acropolis of his soul.200

200

Alcibiades played such a prominent role in the city—and particularly the democracy—because in many
ways his own confusion embodied the confusion of the city. In many ways, the forgetful Alcibiades is
many. In this way he is the perfect representative of the democracy, torn between the past and the future.
Nussbaum points out that when Alcibiades appears it is not only crowned in ivy, but also in violets. She
refers us to a poem by Pindar that identifies violets with Athens (1986, 193). Thus, it is possible that
Alcibiades intentionally chose to try to identify himself with the city.

170

Temporal Frames
In the Protagoras and the Alcibiades I, we see Alcibiades in the 430s, before
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian conflict. In the Protagoras we have Socrates urging
Alcibiades and the other interlocutors to take their entire lives into account, instead of
accepting the systematic temporal illusion of temporal relativism. In the Alcibiades I,
Socrates encourages Alcibiades to care for himself and shows him that his soul is his
non-corporeal and therefore non-temporal soul. These are both set some time shortly
before both men end up in Potidaea in 432. The Symposium shows vividly and
dramatically, on several different levels, that Alcibiades ultimately did not take the advice
of Socrates and in fact actively strove to forget.201
He strove to forget, however, because of the immense effort of remembering,
the effort to which Socrates pushed him. In this Alcibiades shows us something
important about Socrates. If his life is a “constant game” and irony, it does not come easy
to Socrates. He must continuously strive against forgetting. Part of the irony may be to
make it look easy to others, but they fact that Socrates has continued to ask the same
questions and does so up until his death, shows how difficult the struggle is.
Thus, while Alcibiades’ Socrates is an ugly statue that one opens to find
shining figures of gods inside (215b-e), Plato shows Alcibiades as the related toy that one
opens to find a smaller egg in which is one that is even smaller.202 As Stanley Rosen puts
it the “Symposium may be tentatively described as a series of recollections within a
201

This is perhaps the closest thing to “intentionally erring” shown by Plato. If we know that we err
because of ignorance and yet are so ignorant that we willfully choose to be ignorant.
202
Nussbaum suggests this image, but she is not sensitive to its temporal nature, to the way that the
different temporal representations are nested one inside the next (1986, 167-168). She does point out the
effect of the extended indirect discourse that is the result of this narrative strategy.
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recollection” (1968, 2).203 The Symposium is constructed in this way, so that we see
Alcibiades most recently and work our way back to the time just after the Protagoras and
the Alcibiades I. In the Symposium, we see Alcibiades first, if Nussbaum is right, after he
has died (172b). Then, we see him as Athens saw him, just before the assassination
(172b-d), when he was the big question for the city. Then, inside of this, when
Apollodorus begins his story, we see Alcibiades in 416 when Agathon won his first tragic
victory, some time just before the mutilation of the Hermae, the profanation of the
mysteries and the Sicilian Expedition. Inside this, the direction again shifts into a
“normal” narrative order, proceeding from some time that falls dramatically between the
Alcibiades I and the beginning of the campaign in Potidaea during the “seduction” of
Socrates (217b-219e) and goes to Potidaea, sometime between 432 and 430 and then to
Delium in 424.
Between the two battles, we can infer the changes that have occurred. After
Socrates saved Alcibiades and his armor at Potidaea, Alcibiades was decorated by
generals who “seemed much more concerned with my social position” (220e). This is the
last thing we hear about Potidaea and the first thing we hear about the “horrible retreat
from Delium” is that Alcibiades is this time on horseback and we can therefore infer that
he has fulfilled the promise of his “social position.” We know that he will plug his ears
against the enchantments of Socrates and spend his life trying to escape him and we can
imagine that the Symposium shows Alcibiades’ final rejection of the advice offered in the
Alcibiades I. He will now advise the Athenians about who to go to war with and when
and how. He declares his will to forget in the speech given that night and Socrates does
203

Rosen says further that “the Symposium is an evocation of the past, not in a historical but in a mythical
sense” (1968, 3).
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not pursue him when the second party bursts in. Socrates finishes the night talking to
Agathon and Aristophanes. After he puts those two to bed, “Socrates went directly to the
Lyceum, washed up, spent the rest of the day just as he always did (Àsper êllote tØn
êllhn ≤µ°ran diatr€bein)” (223d). We can imagine exactly how he spent the day,
because Plato has portrayed it so vividly in so many dialogues. We also know that
Alcibiades lives one of the most famously disordered lives in the Western tradition.204

Cinematic Images: Alcibiades reflected in Socrates
Alcibiades presents two portraits, but they are inextricably interwoven. His
portrait of Socrates is only possible because of his own position, but his position is made
clear to him by its contrast with Socrates.205 Socrates differs from his appearance because
he knows the difference between appearance and reality and his irony is the manipulation
of that difference. Alcibiades differs from himself because he does not know what is
appearance and what is not, which is to say that he, perhaps instinctively, holds the
Protagorean claim that “most things are for the individual what they appear to him to be”
(Theaetetus 171e). It is this same relativistic position that Alcibiades occupies—which is
in fact not a position at all but a series of positions that each forget and obliterate the
others—that makes Socrates’ irony both possible and necessary. Alcibiades recognizes
his own difference and distance from himself only in noticing the difference between
Socrates’ appearance and his reality.

204

Rosen says that Plato’s turn toward the past is thus “a turning away from history, not a total repudiation
of man’s temporal existence but as an effort to recollect the origins of existence” (1968, 4). Though Rosen
does not do much to clarify what he means by the “origins of existence,” I agree with him that Plato turns
away from history in order to present time as it is experienced and the relation of that experience to history.
205
Cf. Rosen: “Alcibiades is divided against himself; he lacks the coherence of genius and fanaticism. This
uncertainty is crystallized in his relations with Socrates” (1968, 290).
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Alcibiades arrives at the party just as Socrates finishes his speech (212d).
Socrates has described the ascent of the “ladder of love.” During the ascent of Diotima’s
speech she describes a movement from the appearance of beauty, to Beauty itself, or the
cause of that appearance. Thus one moves from loving one body to loving what is
beautiful in all bodies, then to the beauty of souls and the products of souls. Then this
lover will go through the beauty of knowledge to the “great sea of beauty” (210a-d).
When Diotima describes the “sea of beauty” she says:
First it always is and neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor
wanes. Second it is not beautiful in this way and ugly in that way and beautiful at
one time and ugly at another, nor beautiful in relation to one thing and ugly in
relation to another; nor is it beautiful here and ugly there as it would be if it were
beautiful for some people and ugly for others (211a).
In this description, everything physical, temporal and changing is eliminated. Perspective
and relativism are progressively stripped away. Diotima continues to say that beauty will
not appear to him in the guise of a face or hands or anything else that belongs to the
body” (211b). In the last chapter, we saw that time belongs to the body and that
Alcibiades is overly subject to its vicissitudes due to forgetfulness. Beauty will not
appear as a face or hands, for it will not appear at all, but is non-temporal and non-spatial.
Diotima continues to describe “Beauty itself,” as “absolute, unmixed, not polluted by
human flesh or colors or any other great nonsense of mortality” (211e-212a). If one
contemplates this Beauty itself “only then will it become possible for him to give birth
not to images of virtue (because he’s in touch with no images), but to true virtue” (212a).
By this account true virtue means not being in touch with images and becoming as much
like the unchanging, non-temporal, non-physical form of Beauty itself. Virtue is
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recognizing the eternal part of oneself. Diotima says that “mortal nature seeks so far as
possible to live forever and be immortal” (207d).
We have seen that in both the Protagoras and the Alcibiades I, Socrates has given
advice remarkably similar to this (as he does often). The uniting element in all three
dialogues is the necessity to overcome the effects of the body and time—the two of
which together constitute mortality. When Alcibiades enters the house of Agathon, heard
shouting first from outside and then “half carried into the house by the flute-girl and by
some other companions of his” (212d), he does so amidst the applause for this speech in
which Socrates recounted the words Diotima told him. Socrates spoke philosophically
about “Beauty itself” but Alcibiades’ account of Socrates shows precisely what a person
who contemplates Beauty itself looks like to someone who doesn’t. This is an important
point. It is worth remembering that the philosophy can only be a love of wisdom
precisely because we live in the world of becoming, a world that comes to be and passes
away. Thus, philosophy is a means of combating the effects of time. Contemplating
Beauty itself makes a beautiful speech for those present at Agathon’s who offer applause,
but, despite the power of Socrates/Diotima’s arguments, it is Alcibiades’ description of
Socrates that lends real authority and power to the arguments in the eyes of a changing
human being. Long before we ever see Beauty, we must see a lover of Beauty.
It is often remarked that the Alcibiades I has no dramatic setting. This remark is
generally made in comparison—whether acknowledged or implicit—to the rich
description of the drunken entrance of Alcibiades in the Symposium. After the
philosophical speech, Alcibiades bursts in, as unexpected and as uncontrollable as
Aristophanes’ hiccups (185c-e). He brings us back into the time and the place. His
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entrance reminds us of the occasion because of the garland he wears (212e). Alcibiades’
account of Socrates shows what it looks like when a particular soul does its best to model
itself on the unchanging. Socrates has a body that changes in time, just like Alcibiades,
but something about his soul is presented as steady. He is a human nevertheless and so it
is important to remember that his soul is not Beauty itself, rather it tries to imitate beauty
itself, as much as it can, in a changing world.206
Alcibiades’ drunkenness is the first sign of his inconstancy, or his forgetful
relation to the transitory nature of time. He sees things in one way—drunkenly—now and
in another way—soberly—in the morning. He wants to get everyone else drunk as well,
but presents Socrates, almost immediately, as a contrast. After having the slaves fill the
entire cooling jar with wine and draining it, Alcibiades orders the slaves to fill it up again
for Socrates. “ ‘Not that the trick will have any effect on him,’ he told the group.
‘Socrates will drink whatever you put in front of him, but no one yet has seen him drunk”
(214a). Later, he says of Socrates in the army that “no one stood up to hunger as well as
he did. And yet he was the one man who could really enjoy a feast and though he didn’t
much want to drink, when he had to he could drink the rest of us under the table. Still,
and most amazingly, no one ever saw him drunk” (220a). Though drinking wine was a
large part of Greek culture, we should not assume that Plato is simply interested in
alcoholic gossip. Plato is able to use these references to Socrates’ drinking ability in two
regards. First, it further helps to set the stage and to characterize the drunken Alcibiades.
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Rosen argues that “Socrates takes the place of the divine, of beauty in itself, and not of Eros. Socrates is
loved but does not love in return” (1968, 286). Rosen’s study is flawed by a desire to treat the characters as
big symbols, where every thing must correspond to something else. Here, he misses the point altogether.
Socrates is not divine, nor is he virtuous or wise. He loves Beauty itself, but he is not either Beauty itself, or
Eros. In Alcibiades eyes, it is true, that he is the object of love—in a certain regard, but surely not as the
“divine.”

176

Second, and more importantly, however, it characterizes Socrates’ constancy. The first
instance lets us know that in this very dialogue, we should not expect to see Socrates
differently from how we do in other dialogues, when he is in the agora, or indeed,
meeting his death. Despite the fact that claims that “I took great pains with my
appearance” (174a) and that he had “just bathed and put on his fancy sandals,” (174a), we
should expect to see the same Socrates that we always see, even if he downs a watercooler of wine. He has just turned his speech into a dialogue and he will not become
frivolous with the introduction of wine.
When it is suggested that Alcibiades give an encomium to Socrates (in the midst
of much domestic banter), Alcibiades promises that “I will only tell the truth (télay∞
§r«)” (214e).207 This shows us that Alcibiades thinks that his particular perspective is the
truth and yet we have already seen how what he considers to be true, is in fact be the
result of a lack of vision. When he first entered the party, he declares Agathon the
“cleverest and best looking man in town” (212e-213a), and thinks that it is true, until he
sees Socrates. As he points out himself, that “at worst, there’ll be mistakes in my speech,
not lies (•k∆n går e‰nai oÈd¢n ceÊsoµai)” (215a).208 These mistakes will come from
taking his limited perspective top be true.
Socrates, unlike most of his interlocutors, would “certainly like” to hear the truth
about himself (214e) and Alcibiades offers him the opportunity to interrupt the speech if
anything is inaccurate. Finally Alcibiades says, “But you can’t hold it against me
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As Forde points out of Thucydides’ portrayal of Alcibiades, “one of the respects in which Alcibiades is
a true Athenian is his unabashed frankness of speech, And Alcibiades always speaks frankly about the
comprehensive issues” (1989, 71).
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It should be noted that there is no word for mistakes. Rather Alcibiades says, “I will not lie willingly.”
Cf. Hippias Minor 365c, ff. For a discussion of willing error, see chapter 4 above.
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(yauµãs˙w) if I don’t get everything in the right order—I’ll say things as they come to
my mind (énaµiµn˙skÒµenow êllo êlloyen l°gv). And even a sober and unclouded
mind would find it hard to come to terms with your bizarreness” (215a). Nehemas and
Woodruff again cloud the real intention of the sentence by filling out Alcibiades’
extremely compact diction, that appears, in that respect, almost Aristotelian. There is
nothing to correspond to Nehemas’s and Woodruff’s sentence: “If I don’t get them in the
right order.” More literally and less floridly, Alcibiades says, “don’t marvel if209 I say one
thing from another, as I remember them.” It is important to notice the role of memory
here. Alcibiades is telling the symposiasts that his speech will be governed by memory,
rather than logic. He does not hold the whole in his mind, or consider his life in any
holistic way. Rather, he moves from moment to moment. Memory, of the sort Alcibiades
relies on, is the correlate of forgetting. He could say, I will say something between the
time that it was forgotten and is forgotten again. Alcibiades’ story is a narrative that relies
on forgetfulness as much as it relies on memory. One event must pass before another can
take its place. Alcibiades remembers and forgets, moving in a narrative manner from one
thing to another, as the locative, or ablative ‘-yen’ in ‘êllo êlloyen’ shows.210 The
construction ‘êllo êlloyen’ is not uncommon, but it shows us something else about
the way Alcibiades’ mnemonic narrative works. He remembers from another to another.
Without the ‘-yen’ the words are identical, but they each mean “other.” Thus, it is a
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sameness in difference. It is the constant difference that is the same in the everyday flow
of forgetfulness and remembrance.211
Alcibiades’ speech highlights both his own shifting perspective and Socrates’
steadfastness. Commentators focus most often on the subject of the speech, that is to say
Socrates. For instance, Schleiermacher says that the “panegyric of Alcibiades, which is
manifestly the crest and crown of the dialogue and exhibits Socrates… in that perfect
soundness of body and mind, and consequentially of existence generally”
(Schleiermacher 1973, 278). This picture of perfect soundness is from the perspective of
an admittedly and necessarily corrupt memory. Alcibiades presents us with an equally
compelling picture of himself and he begins with his own perspective, which sees
Socrates as a bizarre satyr.
Alcibiades has already demonstrated his inconstancy, not only in his temporarily
drunken state, but he has (somewhat playfully) demonstrated it in his behavior towards
Socrates.
‘I shall never forgive you! (d oÈk ¶stin... §µo‹ ka‹ so‹ diallagÆ)’ Alcibiades
cried. “I promise you, you’ll pay for this! But, for the moment (nËn),’ he said
turning to Agathon, ‘give me some of these ribbons. I’d better make a wreath for
him as well” (213d-e).
Liddell and Scott show that the primary sense of diallagÆ is one of change, or
interchange, specifically from “enmity to friendship” (1897, ad loc). Indeed, saying that
one will never forgive someone is saying one’s negative feelings towards someone will
never change. Literally Alcibiades is saying that “it is not in me to change towards you”
and yet Alcibiades’ changes almost immediately. His vow to never forgive Socrates does
211

It is possible that Alcibiades’ is proposing a narrative that is associative and prefiguring works like
Lawrence Sterne’s Tristram Shandy.
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not last for any longer than it takes to read the sentence in which it is declared. With
Alcibiades’ speech, Plato shows that this claim was not just part of the comedic and
drunken banter, but that it characterizes Alcibiades’ constantly shifting feelings and
perspective towards Socrates.
At the beginning of his speech, he compares Socrates to a statue of Silenus
(215b). When we examine the speech, we find that Alcibiades is saying as much about
himself as he is saying about Socrates. He is contrasting Socrates’ appearance—both
physical and ‘ethical’—with his reality. Alcibiades says: “Nobody, Socrates, not even
you can deny that you look like them. But the resemblance goes beyond appearance, as
you’re about to hear” (215b). In fact, we have just heard it as well. Alcibiades begins his
comparison by describing the statues. “It’s a Silenus sitting, his flute, or his pipes in his
hands, and it’s hollow. It’s split right down the middle, and inside it’s full of tiny statues
of the gods” (215b). The point is the difference between the grotesque and vulgar satyr
that appears and the beautiful gods inside it. But the appearance is hollow. Underlying the
appearance is the true divine reality.
Socrates himself is not only this way, but his speech as well. Socrates’ words
aren’t impressive, like those of Pericles or some other orator, but people “listen to you or
even to a poor account of what you say—and we are all transported, completely
possessed” (215d). Alcibiades mentions Socrates’ speech here, but forgets it until he
says, “Come to think of it I should have mentioned this much earlier (toËto §n to›w
pr≈toiw par°lipon): even his ideas and arguments (oﬂ lÒgoi) are just like those
hollow statues of Silenus” (221d-e). Alcibiades is remarking on his announced technique,
saying that this point had not come to him before. Of course, it did at 215d, but in a
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different way. His forgetfulness forgets even the forgetting, as all forgetfulness must.
This is the principal way that Alcibiades is divided from himself and makes errors and
unintentionally speaks falsely.
Alcibiades’ speech shows not only that his own life is rent in two, but that
Socrates’ life is also split. Many lives are split between the appearance and the reality,
but in most cases, people appear or want to appear to be better than they actually are. In
the case of Alcibiades—and I believe that Plato portrays him as cognizant of this—there
is nothing but that appearance, even in his military and athletic success; he is the
Heraclitean man who finds no constancy in his soul. He appears (and therefore is) this
way now when he is with Socrates, and another way later when he has left his side.
Socrates, on the other hand, will always appear in the same way (vulgar like the satyr)
while leading those around him towards the divine reality.
Socrates appears singly (as well as singular, cf. 221d) to those who observe him.
It appears that “he’s crazy about beautiful boys; he constantly (ée€) follows them around
in a perpetual daze (§kp°plhktai). Also he likes to say he is ignorant and knows
nothing…And all of this is just on the surface (perib°blhtai ¶jvyen), like the outside
(gegluµµ°now) of those statues of Silenus” (216d). Even his appearance is one of
constancy, where he “constantly” follows beautiful boys in a “perpetual” daze. In the
Greek, there is no word for “perpetual” but Nehemas and Woodruff’s translation
highlights the sense of the passage. In fact, §kp°plhktai has more of a sense of
immediate action along the lines of “he is always following them around getting knocked
out [by them].” For, the erotic state Alcibiades is describing is one of constant agitation.
But it only appears this way, on the outside. Socrates throws this appearance over the
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outside perib°blhtai ¶jvyen, and it is really, like all appearance, hollow. It is the very
hollowness of the appearance that is compelling. The recognition of appearance as a
appearance is the first promise of what is “underneath.”
As opposed to most people, who try to appear better than they are. Socrates
appears to be vulgar but is truly divine and he recognizes that all appearances “images of
virtue” are ugly and inconsequential. Others are vulgar because they are concerned with
appearances. As Alcibiades says:
it couldn’t matter less to him whether a boy is beautiful. You can’t imagine how
little cares whether a person is beautiful or rich, or famous or in any other way
that most people admire. He considers all of these possessions beneath contempt”
(216d-e).212
Appearances are worth nothing to Socrates and yet he knows that appearances are what
people pay attention to and thus he consciously constructs one. Alcibiades says, “In
public, I tell you, his whole life is one big game—a game of irony (eﬁrvneuÒµenow d¢
ka‹ pa€zvn pãnta tÚn b€on prÚw toÁw ényr≈pouw diatele›)” (216e). It is not
that his life is one big game, as Nehemas and Woodruff translate, but rather that he
incessantly continues (diatele›)213 his life (tÚn b€on), in every way playing (pa€zvn
pãnta) for people and being ironic (eﬁrvneuÒµenow). Thus, we can see that Alcibiades
is again stressing the seamless nature of Socrates’ appearance. He always lives ironically,
or even from some perspectives dishonestly, with a distance between what appears and
what is. It should be noted that it is not the irony, but the constancy that should be
stressed. Socrates is not occasionally ironic and it is the completeness of his irony that
makes him unique. He does not leave his behavior to whim or chance. Recognizing the
212
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uncertainty of human life, Socrates makes a very orderly and studied game of it. In fact
only once Alcibiades claims to have seen Socrates
when he’s actually serious. But I once caught him when he was open like Silenus’
statues, and I had a glimpse of the figures he keeps hidden within (tå §ntÚw
égãlµata): they were so godlike—so bright and beautiful, so utterly
amazing—that I just (¶µbraxu) had to do (poiht°on) what he told me” (216e217a).214
The word ¶µbraxu is important here. It means “shortly,” but it may mean either
“shortly, I had to do what he told me” which is the general sense of Nehemas and
Woodruff’s translation. It may, however, also mean “I had to do what he told me,
shortly” or “for a short time.”215
Alcibiades is well aware of the short-lived nature of his “obedience” to Socrates.
He has just described the devastating effect Socrates has on his life and says “I know very
well you could make me feel that way now (¶ti g¢ nËn) if I gave you half a chance”
(216a). This shows how Alcibiades is struggling to forget what Socrates has shown him.
He opposes the past and the present with ¶ti and the nËn and he shows that it is the nËn
that is important to him. He says, “I refuse to listen to him; I stop my ears and tear myself
away from him” (216a-b). Alcibiades is referring to the Odyssey, but the situation is
precisely the opposite of that described in the epic. For, there, Odysseus stops up his ears
in order to remember the home to which he wants to return (XII. 36-45); Alcibiades stops
up his ears in order to keep wandering haphazardly through life.
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It is easy to see here a reference to the last lines of the Alcibiades I. Those who see the dialogue as
spurious, believe that the Alcibiades I was written by an imitator in order to give this impression. For my
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Alcibiades offers his description of Socrates’ irony in direct contrast to his own
split nature. He says that when he hears Socrates he is upset “so deeply that my very own
soul started protesting that my life—my life!—was no better than the most miserable
slaves” (215e). He goes on to say, “And yet that is exactly how this Marsyas here at my
side makes me feel all the time (pollãkiw): he makes it seem that my life (bivtÒn) is
not worth living” (215e-216a). Alcibiades focuses on his “soul,” and his “life” which are
at odds with one another. His comments make it clear that Socrates takes away his
forgetfulness. Alcibiades is upset because Socrates makes him feel like his life is not
worth living “all the time,” or “often” (pollãkiw). Nehemas and Woodruff translate
pollãkiw too strongly. The point is that Alcibiades can only see “many” moments, or
“often” but not a whole life. He should welcome the feeling that he often sees his life
clearly; it should cause him to try to make that “often” into “all the time.” That shift
from “often” to “always” would be precisely the thing that would change Alcibiades’ life
and make it seem worth living. It is the inconstancy of the unexamined life that makes it
not worth living.
His account makes clear that his misery is a result of his inability to take his life
into account. Socrates briefly shows Alcibiades his life, but Alcibiades forgets—or
suppresses—it the moment he leaves Socrates. Instead of welcoming the chance to
change his life, Alcibiades says he stops up his ears and “the moment (§peidãn) I leave
his side, I go back to my old ways” (216b). This shows how short-lived Alcibiades’
obedience to Socrates was and it shows that he is not simply forgetful, but that he desires
to forget, he is miserable when forced to recall himself and look at the way that his life
truly is. This desire to forget, to stop up one’s ears against the truth in favor the flattery of
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the crowd (216b), defines Alcibiades’ fragmented nature. Ironically, perhaps, Alcibiades
tries to unify his entire life in the other direction, an effort which fails.
My whole life has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep away,
but when I see him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I’m doing nothing about my
way of life though I have already agreed with him that I should (drapateÊv
oÔn aÈtÚn ka‹ feÊgv, ka‹ ˜tan ·dv, aﬁsxÊnoµai tå …µologhµ°na)”
(216b-c).
Again, the Greek does not have any equivalent of “My entire life has been one constant
effort.” The phrase is seemingly invented by Nehemas and Woodruff, but it nevertheless
brings out the spirit of the text. This effort fails precisely because one cannot turn one’s
whole life into an effort to escape seeing the truth of one’s whole life. Nor is there any
Greek equivalent of “ because I’m doing nothing about my way of life.” Alcibiades’
Greek is much more compact. He says, “I flee and escape him, and whenever I see him, I
am ashamed about the things having been agreed upon.” Though it is difficult to accept
our translators’ additions as translations, I can unreservedly endorse them as
interpretations.
Alcibiades is expressing something about his inability to see his life as a whole
and his desire not to see it in such a way. Socrates’ life is divided into ironic game that
corresponds with the hollow shell of the physical and the true virtue inside. By contrast,
Alcibiades’ life is temporally divided between the two poles of when he is with Socrates
and when he is not with him, that is between now and not-now. Alcibiades finally
expresses his divided soul saying “I can’t live with him and I can’t live without him”
(216c).
The solidity of Socrates’ life really becomes clear in the description of the battles
at Potidaea and Delium. Alcibiades’ speech almost makes Socrates seem supernatural.
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He doesn’t get drunk, can withstand both hunger and cold (219e-221c). The point,
however, is not intended to show what a great soldier Socrates was, but rather how little
he needed to change his ordinary life in order to be one. Alcibiades describes how cold it
was in the winter and says that “Socrates went out in that weather wearing nothing but
the same old light cloak, and even in bare feet he made better progress on the ice than the
other soldiers did in their boots” (220c). This shows that Socrates is barefoot as he
normally goes in the city and wearing the same kind of cloak.216 It also shows to what an
extent his body is truly a shell that is really ruled by his soul.
The extent to which he is ruled by his soul becomes clear in the next passage.
One day, at dawn, he started thinking about some problem or other; he just stood
outside, trying to figure it out. He couldn’t resolve it, but he wouldn’t give it up.
He simply stood there, glued to the same spot… he stood on the very same spot
until dawn. He only left next morning, when the sun came out, and he made his
prayers to the new day (220c-d).
To know that this is how Socrates behaved on a regular basis we need only to look back
towards the beginning of the dialogue, before he and Aristodemus arrived at Agathon’s.
Apollodorus says that, “as they were walking Socrates began to think about something,
lost himself in thought, and kept lagging behind. Whenever Aristodemus stopped to wait
for him Socrates urged him to go ahead” (174d-e). When asked about Socrates’ absence
Aristodemus replies that it’s “one of his habits: every now and then he just goes off like
that and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be” (175b).217
Though he doesn’t say so directly, it is seemingly this same quality that allows
Socrates to save Alcibiades’ life at Potidaea (220d-e). Alcibiades, being wounded and in
need of saving, was not in a position to observe Socrates clearly and mainly discusses his
216
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decoration after the battle. The generals “who seemed more concerned” with Alcibiades’
“social position” (220e) gave the decoration to him. Socrates shows no sign of jealousy,
because he was acting as he always would, not abandoning his post (Apology 28d-29a).
At Delium, however, Alcibiades says: “That day I had a better chance to observe
Socrates than I ever had at Potidaea, for, being on horseback, I wasn’t in very great
danger” (221b). Alcibiades describes what he saw saying, “it was easy to see that he was
remarkably more collected (¶µfrvn) than Laches” (221b). He continues, introducing a
quotation from the Clouds and summarizing his entire account of Socrates “in the midst
of battle he was making his way (diaporeÊesyai) exactly as he does around town
(§nyãde)” (221b). If any point summarizes Alcibiades’ encomium of Socrates, it is this.
Alcibiades elaborates, enumerating the benefits of such a solid state of soul, of such
¶µfrvn. He says: “he was observing (paraskop«n) everything quite calmly (±r°µa),
looking out for friendly troops and keeping an eye on the enemy” (221b).
As I pointed out above, Alcibiades makes the point that it is not only Socrates, but
his words as well are uniformly plain in rhetoric, but god-like in meaning. He says:
If you were to listen to his arguments, at first (tÚ pr«ton) they’d strike you as
totally ridiculous (gelo›oi); they’re clothed in words as coarse as the hides worn
by the most vulgar (ÍbristoË) satyrs. He’s always going on about pack asses, or
blacksmiths, or cobblers, or tanners; he’s always making the same tired old points
in the same tired old words (ka‹ ée‹ diå t«n aÈt«n tå aÈtå fa€netai
l°gein)” (221e).
Though Nehemas and Woodruff do not translate the word “fa€netai,” Alcibiades is
pointing out that the appearance of the words is ordinary, “always going on about pack
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asses”218 and the like. But they also appear to always be the same. In this second regard,
there is something true of the appearance. Its lack of pretension is designed to show its
nature as appearance. Socrates’ discussions are ée‹ diå t«n aÈt«n tå aÈtå in more
ways than one. His discourses are very similar and use very similar words, but they are
also, really, about ée‹ diå t«n aÈt«n tå aÈtå. Alcibiades says that, “if you go
behind their surface you’ll realize that no other arguments make any sense. They’re truly
worthy of a god (yeiotãtouw), bursting with figures (égãlµata) of virtue inside”
(222a).
Alcibiades concludes his speech by saying: “He has deceived us all: he presents
himself as your lover, and before you know it, you’re in love with him yourself!” (222b).
This is the same claim that he has been making throughout. Socrates always presents this
picture to the world, but he does so in order to get you to love virtue. Socrates’ life is
singular and calculated for its long-term effect.
After this, Socrates gets the upper hand with Agathon and Alcibiades’ last words
are “It’s the same old story: when Socrates is around nobody else can get close to a goodlooking man (Svkrãtouw parÒntaw t«n kal«n µetalabe›n édÊnaton êllƒ).
Look how smoothly and plausibly he found a reason for Agathon to lie down next to
him” (223a-b). His words once again focus on Socrates’ repetition, but the proceedings
are disrupted by a second large drunken group bursting in. Alcibiades is lost in this
group, lost to Socrates forever.
In this chapter, I have shown the temporal and historical aspects of the
Symposium. This analysis enabled me to make a detailed study of the dual portrait
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presented by Alcibiades’ speech. The portraits vividly and dramatically show the effect
that Socrates’ split life has on a scattered soul. These portraits also show the inconstancy
of Alcibiades’ soul in the flow of time is the cause of Alcibiades’ failure and the failure
of Socrates to reach him.
Though, it appears that Plato may have presented Socrates as having achieved a
limited success with Alcibiades by dissuading him from giving advice to the city in the
years between 432 and 416. Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium shows, however, that
it is precisely because of time that such a limited success ultimately means very little.
Alcibiades’ forgetfulness allows him to address the city in 416 with no more success than
had he done so in the 430s. Nevertheless, Socrates’ attempts to win over Alcibiades
show us a great deal about the nature of Socrates and of philosophy itself. The character
of Alcibiades shows us to what extent philosophy is the struggle against forgetting and
how difficult that struggle is. In the next two chapters, I will follow Plato’s portrayal of
the relationship between Critias and Socrates.
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Chapter 8
Amazed by Remembering: The Timaeus-Critias

The Prologues of the Timaeus and the Critias present tales of memory and
forgetting and they cast serious doubt on the project of historical investigation. These
dialogues show the ways in which Critias fares poorly due to his relation to time and
change. The identity of the Critias of the dialogue has been hotly contested within the
scholarly commentary. In this chapter, I argue, first, that Plato intended the temporal
inconsistencies and resulting confusion about the identity of the character. Then, I show
the way that Plato uses this temporal confusion to characterize the soul of Critias and
characterize his discourse in the Timaeus and the Critias as an attempted coup of the city
described by Socrates on the previous day.
Socrates recalls the assignment that he gave his three interlocutors on the previous
day, and he does so in a temporal form (19b-c). He wants to see his city in motion, in
time and war. The problem of time unites the cosmological discussions of the Timaeus
with the political discussions of the prologue of the Timaeus and the Critias. If we
assume that Socrates in this dialogue is like the Socrates of the other dialogues (and there
is no reason not to) then we can see that he has asked his question in order to assess the
interlocutors’ souls in terms of its relationship to time and becoming. We see that Critias
sees true being as an image of becoming (20e, 25e, 26d),219 whereas Timaeus famously
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sees time as “a moving image of eternity” (37d). This difference must have a profound
effect on the souls of the interlocutors, or else philosophy would not be important.220
In this chapter I will take a particularly close look at what the dialogue says about
the soul of Critias.

Ambiguous Generations: the Identity of Critias
There has been a great deal of scholarly confusion surrounding the identity of the
Critias in the Timaeus and the Critias. The difficulty arises as an issue of chronology and
ultimately of generations. Ausland notices that “Critias is a recognizable Athenian (if of
ambiguous generation” (2000, 189). The problem of generations is one of the problems
presented in the text and it will resurface again and again.221 Debra Nails notes:
Until 1949, it was difficult to take seriously Plato’s representation of historical
persons in the dialogues when it could be pointed out that he did not, or could not,
present his own ancestors accurately: there were too few known individuals to
cover the amount of time Plato described between the days of Solon…and the
days of Critias IV, who was at the time assumed to be the speaker in the Timaeus
and the Critias (Nails 2002, 106).
The assumption in the passage above is that Plato wanted to portray his ancestors in an
historically “accurate” manner and every major interpretation of the character of Critias
or the date of the dialogue rests upon this assumption. Burnet, first argued, in 1914, that
the speaker of the dialogue was Critias’ grandfather (338 and appendix).222 The
discovery of an ostrakon saying, “Critias, son of Leaides, was a candidate for ostracism
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Welliver rightly remarks that a “remarkable aspect of the beginning of the work is the repeated and
growing emphasis on Socrates’ high regard for Timaeus in contrast to his other two hosts” (1977, 8).
221
Ausland is most interested in the question of why Diogenes “for some reason does not seem to think
that Plato ‘dogmatizes through Critias’” (2000, 189). I will argue that Plato does in a sense “dogmatize”
through Critias, but as a paradigm of negative manners of thinking and relating to the soul and the world.
222
Taylor agreed in 1927 and Cornford in 1935 and most contemporary scholars have followed suite.
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in the 480’s” (Nails 2002, 107), bolstered his claim. Thus, many scholars conclude, that
the speaker must be Critias III, the grandfather of the leader of the Thirty.223
While ultimately endorsing the identity of Critias III, Nails points out some of the
difficulties with this interpretation. She remarks that Critias the grandfather would “be
nearly ninety in 432, when the Peloponnesian war broke out. To make matters worse,
Socrates was probably out of the city in August of 432 and certainly in August of 431 and
430, so the earliest possible dramatic date of the dialogue would be 429, when Critias III
was ninety-one” (2002, 107).224
Lampert and Planeux follow Taylor in making the dialogue far later. These
scholars set the dialogue in 421 (Taylor 1928, 16-17; Lampert and Planeux, 1998, 94).
A.E. Taylor’s argument is seriously flawed due to his attempt to place the Timaeus two
days after the events described in the Republic (and one day after its narration).225 Taylor
also follows Burnet in dating the dialogue based on the fact that “both dialogues
presuppose a state of peace” (1928, 160). Lampert and Planeux offer the most
convincing account of that peace based on the history of Atheno-Locrian hostilities
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Burnet also makes an argument based on a passage in the Laws about giving “due worship to the
ancestors” (740b). He thus concludes that Plato would know the chronology of his own family (1914,
388). Assuming Plato knows the chronology of his family, does not mean that we can assume that he
would not create a deliberate puzzle with it, in order to make a philosophical point. Voegelin claims on the
one hand that “Critias is barely a name” (2000, 177) and on the other that we “meet again Plato in the
person of Critias” (2000, 178). Both of these responses are absurd.
224
Kalkavage agrees with Lampert and Planeux but acknowledges that “it is impossible to see so notorious
a name and not think of the grandson who helped overthrow the democracy. The name suggests that behind
the civil and ceremonious drama of the Timaeus-Critias there lurks the civil war and tyrant that that
infected Athens when ambitious aristocrats tried to impose the rule of the best, when a presumed ideal was
forced upon the humanly real. Perhaps the seeds of that future tyranny were somehow sown with the Critias
we have here in the dialogue, with his political idealism and nostalgia for the ‘good old days’” (2001, 6).
Cf. chapter 11 below for an account of such generational decline.
225
While there is a nice economy to this scheme, see Cornford 1935, 4-5 for numerous the numerous ways
in which this is impossible. Cf. Ausland 2000, 197.
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(1998, 94).226 Their argument for the date is convincing, but they also want to argue that
the speaker is the grandfather of Critias IV, who would be over one hundred years old at
that date (1998). Much of their account of the identity of Critias is based on the fact that
there were “too many years between Solon and Kritias the tyrant to be covered in four
generations…however no chronological problems occur if we suppose that the Kritias of
the Timaeus-Critias is the grandfather of Critias the tyrant” (1998, 96). None that is
except for this extreme age at the time of the discussion. The age of one hundred calls for
being remarked upon and that it is not does serious damage to this interpretation. As
A.E. Taylor contends that “we have to suppose that this Critias is a remarkably old man”
(127, 23). Since no interlocutor remarks upon it, this claim seems to ruin the identity of
Critias.
Most scholars who hold that the Critias of our dialogues is Critias III, the
grandfather of the tyrant, follow Taylor and back up their by claiming that “it is implied
that he is extremely old when he says (Tim. 26b) that, though he recollects his childhood
so vividly, he can hardly remember what he was told yesterday, and moralizes on the
durability of ‘early impressions’” (1927, 23).227 In fact, however, if we recall that
Socrates gave some version of the Republic the day before, it is easy to see how someone
of any age could find it difficult to remember “everything that was said yesterday,”
especially when trying to remember another story while listening.
There are several other problems with this interpretation. Socrates makes no
concession or mention of the age of this Critias—who shows a great deal of deference to
Socrates in fact, who had given an “assignment” (§p€tajin) to the interlocutors the
226
227

Again, they follow Taylor (1927, 26) but offer more detail.
Cf. Cornford 1935, 1; Nails 2002, 107;
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previous day. Socrates mentions Cephalus’ advanced age repeatedly in the Republic and
it is strange that he should make no distinction in age between the ninety-one year old228
Critias and the twenty-six or twenty-eight year old Hermocrates.229 In the Charmides
(which is set either in the same year as this dialogue, or a few years earlier, depending on
one’s chronology), Socrates remarks on the far lesser difference in age between Critias
and Charmides (162e) and in the Protagoras, Plato has the great sophist remark upon his
age (318c). But, in the Timaeus, Socrates describes all three interlocutors as people of
the same sort, people who “take part in both philosophy and politics at once” (19e).
Timaeus gets the most detailed praise. He has “mastered the entire field of
philosophy” (20a). Plato makes Socrates vague when giving the credentials of Critias,
simply saying that “I’m sure all of us here in Athens know he’s no mere layman
(ﬁdi≈thn) in any of the areas we are talking about (ˆnta œ l°goµen)” (20a). At this
point, the reader has no reason to think that the interlocutor would be any other than the
tyrant Critias. It is not until 20e that the reader gets any of the evidence that scholars use
to identify the speaker as Critias III. The knowledge that Critias is no private person,
might have a wide range of signification to the “first reader” at this point. Since the
dialogue was written many years after its dramatic date, a reader will immediately think
of Critias’ “experience” in politics. But, if we start to consider the statement
228

They would be one hundred and one and thirty-six respectively according to Lampert and Planeux’s
dating of 421. I generally follow Nails dating of 429, but there are advantages to Lampert and Planeux’s
dating. Since I argue that Plato is intentionally creating a temporal and generational ambiguity, I do not
hold either year firmly.
229
A.E. Taylor is one of the few commentators to offer an account of the age discrepancy. He says that
“the youth of Hermocrates explains why he remains silent through the dialogue” (1928, 49). Cornford
thought that Plato truly planned a dialogue with Hermocrates’ name, but was for some reason unable to
complete it (1935, 1-3). He presents a convincing parallel between the Atlantic invasion and Athens’ own
invasion of Syracuse (1935, 2). Voegelin argues that Hermocrates represents a threat to Athens (2000, 182).
While, it was really Athens that was a threat to Athens, Critias’ obsession with the past shows a lack of
vision regarding the slow decline of the present. See also Lampert and Planeux 1998, 100-107).
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dramatically, as Socrates (not Plato) must have meant it, we see another level of irony.
Critias did remain virtually private (ﬁdi≈thn) until after the war. Nails says that until
“410 or later, i.e. until after he was about fifty, Critias IV did nothing that was known,
unless he was at that time producing his literary works” (2002, 108). She continues,
saying that since he was in his late twenties in the Protagoras and his early thirties in the
Charmides, “[t]wenty years of obscurity thus need to be accounted for before his
notoriety began” (2002, 109).230 The double irony of the discussion of Critias’
experience in politics, further reinforces the sense that this is Critias the tyrant.
It is also unclear what Socrates means by “any of the areas we are talking about
(ˆnta œ l°goµen)” (20a). He has mentioned politics and philosophy, but he was also
just talking about poets and sophists (19d-e).231 Thus, whereas Socrates was clear that
Timaeus was a statesman and a philosopher, he may be implying that Critias is
experienced in poetry and sophistry, a trait shared by Critias of the Thirty and the
“Critias” of the dialogue (21c, 26d).
Socrates is even more vague, perhaps because less familiar with Hermocrates. It is
strange that Hermocrates (if he is the Hermocrates of Thucydides) should be staying
either with the extremely elderly Critias III or Critias IV who was much closer to his age,
though for different reasons.232 Hermocrates commands Critias to tell his story, using the
imperative l°ge (20d). It is unlikely that the twenty-six (or thirty six) year old guest of a
ninety-one (or one hundred) year old man would presume to use the imperative to
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For a man of Critias’ station to refrain from politics until he was fifty would have been remarked upon.
Compare Plato’s statement in Letter VII that when “I was a young man I had the same ambition as many
others: I thought of entering public life as soon as I came of age” (324b).
231
Cf. Welliver 1977, 11, n. 7.
232
Welliver argues that the two are “chummy” (1977, 10).
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command the old man to speak. Whichever the Critias, we must wonder why these two
Italians would be staying with him. Welliver remarks that “the strangest of all…is the
dialogue’s cast of characters” (1977, 19). Whatever the (remotely plausible) dramatic
date, there would be tension between the cities. Taylor’s date of 421 (followed by
Lampert and Planeux) offers the most plausible explanation of the presence of Timaeus
and Hermocrates in the city, a year after a treaty was signed between Athens and Locri
(1998, 95). If this were the case, it is possible, but unlikely that the rather young foreign
delegation would be staying with a hundred year old man, even if he were alive.233 If it is
Critias IV, we see an interesting tableau in the middle of temporarily submerged
hostilities. When Socrates says he wants to see his city in motion, he is necessarily saying
that he wants to see it in decline. Hermocrates represents the first great defeat of the
democracy, while Critias IV represents its destruction.234 The city ruled by Critias and
the Thirty “showed in a short time that the previous constitution had been a precious
thing” (Letter VII).
Whichever Critias we choose will create temporal problems that the other
interpretation solves, bringing with it a whole new set of problems. 235 Thus, Plato may
have intentionally created a temporal ambiguity. His Saitic priests, after all, are amused at
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The older Protagoras stays with Callias, a man who could be his son. The Republic takes place at
Polemarchus’, not Cephalus’.
234
If we take the Timaeus not as an account of creation, but instead a description of the “continual”
creation, or structure of the cosmos, then we could see each of the non-Socratic interlocutors, representing a
temporal mode. Timaeus would be the present, Critias with his speech of ancient ages (and either a very old
man or a conservative) representing the past and Hermocrates, who is to give his speeches in Thucydides,
the future.
235
Cf. Nails 2002, 107.
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Solon’s attempt “to compute their dates by calculating the number of years which had
elapsed since the events of which he spoke” (22b).236
John Davies, who identifies the speaker as Critias IV considers “Plato’s literary
motivation for telescoping of two generations of his ancestors” (1972, 325). Davies
argues that Plato intends the interlocutor to be Critias the tyrant, but that he condenses the
number of generations so that Critias seems closer to Solon. Welliver is rightly
dissatisfied with Davies’ speculation about the motive of the “telescoping” or
anachronism. Welliver, while he accepts Burnet’s identification of Critias, shows how
Plato has Critias misrepresent the chronology in order to show something about Critias’
soul. Welliver claims that “Plato had him lie because he is a liar---that this anachronism
stamps him as a liar from the beginning” (1977, 57). Welliver concludes saying: “The
anachronism is his [Critias’], not Plato’s” (1977, 57).
I follow both Davies and Welliver insofar as I believe that Plato is using
anachronisms in order to make a philosophical point about anachronism and the use of
the past.237 Critias may be a liar, but Plato is up to something far more profound. Plato
may have had Critias make an anachronistic lie in order to tell us something about his
character, but Plato also uses the character precisely in order to observe the “telescoping”
of time. My interpretation solves the problems of both Davies on the one hand, and
Burnet, Taylor, et al on the other. In this chapter, I argue that the prologues of both the
Timaeus and the Critias are intended to cast doubt upon the stories we tell about the past,
while highlighting the character of Critias as an opportunistic conservative in thrall to it.
236

Welliver uses this same passage to argue that Plato “the man whose powers of inquiry have been the
admiration of all posterity… did not accurately count the generations back to Solon” (1977, 55).
237
Cf. Pownall 2004 for a discussion of the “use” of the past, especially among aristocrats, in the fourth
century.
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The speeches of Critias in both dialogues are about temporal uncertainty and
forgetfulness and Plato created the dramatic frame of the dialogue so that we are
uncertain of the speaker’s identity or the date of the dialogue,238 Our very desire to pin
these down—to retrieve the past and date the dialogue—add a layer of meaning to the
dialogue, as we grapple with our necessary and fundamental ignorance of the past in the
same way that Solon and Critias both do in the course of the prologue, and like them, we
often become so absorbed in our fantasies of the past that we miss much of the point
along the way.
I suggest that Plato deliberately created a hermeneutic box that uses a principle of
temporal uncertainty. The assumptions that it is necessary to make in order to pin down
the identity of Critias change that identity’s function in the dialogue and thus change the
meaning of the dialogue and say something about our own interpretation of the past. In
his influential study of the Golden Ass, John Winkler suggests that Apuleius’ novel is a
“hermeneutic entertainment” that is “about the process of interpretation” (1985, 11). I
suggest that Plato uses a similar strategy in the prologues to the Timaeus and the Critias.
The relevant sections are about the interpretation and use of the past, and Plato
deliberately creates confusion about the time of the dialogue.

Memory and Forgetting in the Prologue of the Timaeus
One of the important points made by the prologue to the Timaeus is that, while
Critias thinks he is telling a story of the past greatness of Athens, he is, in fact, saying
more about its continual loss of knowledge. The prologue of the Timaeus is a story of
238

Plato, I suggest, is intentionally creating the kind of confusion created by William Faulkner in the Sound
and the Fury, when two characters of different generations have the same name.
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forgetting and remembering. The Athenians had forgotten their past due to disaster, but
when it is recovered by Solon, it is again forgotten. It wasn’t written as an epic by Solon
because of political matters and, though it is told, it is forgotten for many years by
Critias, who remembers it in pieces as a result of “yesterday’s” discussion with Socrates.
Critias has Solon speak on the level of cities and populations, but, if we are to pursue
even the lowest level of analogy between the city and the soul, we can see how it mirrors
precisely what I’ve been talking about. The population loses its knowledge and has to
struggle in order to reclaim it. People do that precisely when they are able to recognize
that they do not know and then they recollect the scattered knowledge of the past. The
process shows how most learning is a product of the complex interplay of past, present
and future. But we can also see how difficult memory is. If I am correct, our forgetfulness
occurs like a disaster. It is a plague of water and fire leaving devastation. Or rather, in
the myth disaster precedes forgetfulness, but in our individual lives forgetfulness also
precedes disaster. We have seen, we most often think that we are pleasantly deluded, and
will fight for our delusion, because we think that it is knowledge, and think that there is
nothing to remember, nothing to look for. Again forgetfulness is most forgetful of itself.
This forgetfulness uses memory itself to forget. Critias is full of memory, but these
memories cause him to forget himself.
The Timaeus opens with counting,239 but moves very quickly to memory. Ten
lines into the dialogue, Socrates says “Do you remember (µ°µnhsye) the subjects I
assigned you to speak on?” (17b). Timaeus responds, saying “Some we do (tå µ¢n
µeµnÆµeya). And if there are any we don’t—well you’re here to remind us (sÁ par∆n
239

Lampert and Planeux argue that the missing fourth person is Alcibiades (1998, 107-119). While such
an interpretation would serve my purposes, the argument is, unfortunately, weak and overly speculative.
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ÍpoµnÆsiw)” (117b). Then he asks Socrates to refresh them and Socrates recounts a
discussion very similar to parts of the Republic.240 He is reminding them of what he said
the previous day, but not of any historical fact (in the way that a historian or archivist
reminds us).241 He is reminding them of an ideal and is showing us something about the
way that recollection should work. Recollection is not remembering events, but the
whole.242
When Critias introduces his story, he says that Solon told it to his grandfather
Critias “and the old man in his turn would tell it to us from memory” (20e). Critias is
notably proud of his connection to Solon and his family history. Socrates mentions the
connection twice in the Charmides (154d, 155a). This indicates a certain relation to the
past that will continue to inform the character of Critias. Peter Kalkavage notices the
importance of genealogy to Critias and Solon in the dialogue. He says that “Critias also
displays the vanity that attends our interest in our own families and genealogies” (2001,
11). Critias has something to gain through his identification with Solon.243 Kalkavage
continues, saying “He is clearly proud of the fact that the story he has for Socrates is a
family heirloom passed down from generation to generation and that the great Solon is a
distant relative” (2001, 11).244
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As the next chapters show, there is something sinister in this. Socrates is recounting to someone named
Critias (the reader has not yet been given enough information to assume that it is anyone but the tyrant at
this point) a discussion very similar to that he had with Polemarchus, one of the victims of the tyrant. That
Socrates uses the term kefãlaion to begin his account is no accident.
241
Socrates continues to use memory words to frame his brief speech. See eÈµnhµÒneuton (18c) and
µeµnÆµeya (18d).
242

Cf. Harte 2002 for an excellent discussion on the relationship between parts and wholes.
Cf. Welliver 1977, 57.
244
Kalkavage is sensitive to the importance of this, especially in the present dialogue’s relation to the
Republic. He says: “The rootedness in the love of our own—in our own families and family histories—is
one of the reasons why it would be so difficult to actualize the city” (2001, 12). He goes on to point out that
243
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Neither Critias nor Solon, however, gives an accurate account of the past,245 but
the politically expedient one.246 Socrates has asked us to remember a discussion of the
ideal city, and in response a Critias of whose identity we are suddenly no longer certain
(wasn’t there longer between Solon and Critias than that?) remembers his grandfather
remembering the story of which the Egyptian priest reminded Solon.
Critias says that the “story is that our city had performed many great and
marvelous deeds in ancient times, which, owing to the passage of time (ÍpÚ xrÒnou)
and to the destruction (fyorçw) of human life, have vanished” (20e). Critias is telling
two means of forgetting, the passage of time and the destruction of people. The two are,
ultimately, co-implicatory. Only so much time can pass before the destruction of people
and people always die as a result of time (Cf. Republic 546a-c).
When Socrates asks about the story, Critias says: “It’s an ancient story I heard
from a man who was no youngster himself (palaiÚn éko∆w logon oÈ n°ou éndrÒw)”
(21a). 247 In fact, at the time Critias was “pretty close to ninety years old already—so he

“Critias is the very paradigm of this all-too-human rootedness in time, Becoming, and self-love” (2002,
12).
245
Welliver mistakenly sees Critias’ claims of the story’s veracity as Plato’s. He says that “the authority of
Egypt and Solon is a stern warning against assuming the story to be entirely false. In some sense it must be
true; in some way it must fit history” (1977, 39). The story tells us a great deal about history, but Welliver
is entirely wrong when he argues that Plato would use the authority of “Egypt and Solon” to warn us that
this is in some ways a true historical account. To his credit, however, Welliver is careful to guard against
over particularizing this history and rejecting claims as to the identity of Atlantis. Like others, he looks
towards the Persian and Peloponnesian wars for the “truth” of the account. He is correct to say that “this
one story accurately describes the moral and theological aspects of both great wars in Greek history, we can
suppose it explains many others as well” (1977, 43).
246
“Solon was appointed Chief Archon at Athens for the year 594/ 593 B.C. during a period of acute
conflict between the noble ruling families and the impoverished peasants, many of whom had already been
reduced to slavery. Fearing the possibility of a general uprising and the installation of a popular tyrant, the
nobles appear to have been willing to make certain concessions. Although Solon was born into a noble
family, he was not himself wealthy. He was perceived as a moderate, and yet, remarkably, each faction
apparently expected him to protect its interest” (Anhalt 1993, 1).
247
The Greek is much more elegant than Zeyl’s translation allows. More literally it says, “an old story
heard from a not young man.”
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said—and I was around ten” (21a-b). The theme of youth and age is everywhere present,
and it is in this way that the dramatic frame of the dialogue continues with the concerns
of the Republic.248 Critias says that it was the time of the Apaturia. The Apaturia
occurred in October-November and during three days the young men were presented to
their phratres. This locates the story between temporal frames. The Apaturia was one of
those occasions—like marriage—that marks the passage of one’s life, which is set to
occur at a particular time of the year and marks that part of the year. This occurs, of
course, within the context of some festival honoring Athena, perhaps the Panathenaic
festival in July/August.249 As was customary, Critias says, “our father’s started a
recitation contest” (21b). This means that it is a specifically educational event whereby
the children are initiated into the life of their phratres by means of sacrifices and
stories.250
Critias says that “many of us children (pa€dvn) got to sing the songs of Solon,
because they were new at the time (ëte d¢ n°a katÉ §ke›non tÚn xrÒnon)” (21b). The
formulation here is a parallel of 21a above. There it was the old story of the not young
man and here it is the new songs sun by the not old boys. This creates another temporal
problem. As Nails bluntly puts it, “Solon’s verses were not ‘new at the time’ (Ti. 21b) in
+510 although they may have seemed so to ten year olds singing them for the first time”
(2002, 107). Nails correctly points out that the anachronism is greatly aggravated if
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Again this seems designed to produce an ambiguous identity for Critias. For on the one hand, maybe
they talk about youth and age so much because Critias is old and Hermocrates is young,. On the other hand,
one assumes that if Critias were older than his grandfather himself, he would mention it.
249
Cornford says that the “Panathenaic festival would provide an obvious occasion for the strangers’
presence in Athens, as it does for Parmenides and Zeno in another of the late dialogues” (1935, 1). It does
not explain why these particular strangers would be staying with Critias and conversing about politics with
Socrates.
250
For an excellent discussion of the cultural role of story-telling see Burnyeat 1997.
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Critias IV is the interlocutor of the dialogue.251 Amynander, a member of their phratres
“said that he thought that Solon was not only the wisest of men in general but that his
poetry in particular showed him to be the most civilized of the poets” (21b-c). Critias
does not know whether the remark is made to flatter his grandfather, or not. Nevertheless,
“the old man (g°rvn)—how well I remember it (µ°µnhµai)—was tickled” (21c).
The elder Critias (either Critias II or Critias III) says that “it’s too bad that Solon
wrote poetry only as a diversion and didn’t seriously work at it like the other poets”
(21c). Of course, Plato, also a descendent of Solon,252 may think otherwise, as he has
Socrates say in the Phaedrus (276c-d) and Plato himself expresses in Letter VII (344c).253
In both of these cases, seriousness in writing was spurned. Critias thinks that it is “too
bad that he never finished the story he brought back from Egypt. He was forced to
abandon that story on account of the civil conflicts and all the other troubles he found
there when he returned” (21c).254 Welliver remarks that “the grandfather’s view is almost
precisely the opposite of Socrates’” (1977, 13) who would have wished that Solon had
spent no time on poetry at all, but had rather attempted wholeheartedly to improve the
city.
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Nails’ solution does not seem plausible. If, as she argues, Critias III is ninety-one, would he still speak
in the voice of his ten year old self? I think not. For instance, a ten year old of today, may hear the Beatles
and think that they are new, but when that person is old, he or she is far more likely to say, “We sang the
Beatles that November, because we thought they were new.”
252
For an excellent discussion of the relation between Solon’s poetry, thought and politics, see Anhalt’s
excellent study (1993).
253
I do not, however, wish to go as far as Voegelin, who claims that Solon (and Critias!) are Plato (2000,
179).
254
If our interlocutor is Critias III, these comments make more sense. At the time of the dialogue, he would
not yet have conceived of his ambition (or if he had, there would be a great many years before he was able
to fulfill it at all). Nails’ suggestion that this was the period in which Critias practiced his literary works
makes sense.
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The elder Critias believes that had he not abandoned the story “not even Hesiod or
Homer, or any other poet at all, would ever have become more famous than he” (21d).255
The elder Critias’ pride in his association with the great man is evident and he is in fact
increasing his own and his city’s stature by repeating such a story. Critias says that this is
the greatest deed the city had ever accomplished but “owing to the march of time (diå d¢
xrÒnon) and the fact that the men who accomplished it have perished (fyorån t«n
§rgasaµ°nvn), the story has not survived (oÈ diÆrkese) to the present” (21d). This
seems an odd thing for him to say of a story that he is about to tell. In reality, however, it
establishes Critias’ position as the next best thing to Solon who after all didn’t make up
the story.256 Solon is claiming the nine thousand year old authority of the priest, just as
the younger Critias who is telling it to Socrates, Timaeus and Hermocrates is gaining the
authority of his grandfather and ultimately of Solon and the priests all the way back to the
Ancient Athenians. By means of this story, he increases his own authority and attempts
to “take over” Socrates’ kallipolis257 In doing so, Critias remembers the past and forgets
himself.
At this point, the elder Critias merges with the younger Critias, as they tell the
story with narrative simultaneity. That is to say, the younger Critias tells Socrates and his
255

This Panathenaic festival is one of the prime occasions for the recitation of poetry. Cf. Nagy 2003.
Arieti points out that the Apaturia is a festival of Dionysus and that we are to take the entire story as “poetic
invention” (1991, 20). Arieti differs from most commentators in seeing Timaeus as the parodic figure in the
dialogue. Taylor made a similar suggestion when he said that: “No one, so far as I know, has yet seen that
the Timaeus and the Clouds deal with the same period of Socrates’ life, but that fact is really undeniable.
When we recognize it we are beginning to be in a position to appreciate the consummate art which
Aristophanes himself expressly attributes to this particular comedy” (1927, 22).
256
It also casts doubt on Thucydides’ claim that “though the events of remote antiquity, and even those that
more immediately precede the war, could not from a lapse of time be clearly ascertained, yet the evidences
which an inquiry carried back as far as was practicable lead me to trust, all point to the conclusion that
there was nothing on a greater scale, either in war or other matters” (I.1)
257
Cf. Welliver. “Obviously the city which Socrates describes could hardly be a historical city, but Critias,
good Athenian that he is, takes possession of it by dubious means for his own purposes” (1977, 18).
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friends the story in the form of his own hearing of it from his grandfather, the elder
Critias. We have a situation where the younger Critias is quoting his grandfather, who is
quoting Solon, who quotes the Saitic priest. Luc Brisson claims that Plato is commenting
on the very structure of myth, whereby at religious festivals, the important stories of a
culture are passed down by generation. For Brisson, it is a case where “genealogies
constitute the framework of the story” (1998, 136). Brisson defines myth as a “discourse
through which is communicated everything that a given community conserves in memory
and transmits from generation to generation” (1998, 137). This is precisely what we see
in the prologue of the Timaeus and Critias.
Marcel Detienne is suspicious of Brisson’s reading and remarks, more ominously
that the “prologue of the Timaeus does not conceal the extent to which conjuring up
memories of the origins of Athens is risky, perilous, in short, unreliable” (1989, 145).258
Detienne offers as his first bit of evidence the fact that “the Egyptian story is now
generally forgotten” (1987, 145) and even Critias had forgotten it. Brisson is correct, in
so far as, I think, Plato is remarking on the way that such stories function socially and
describing their layered—and thus unverifiable, unrepeatable259 structure. I claim,
however, that he is doing so in the form of critique. Such stories are a way to preserve
cultural memory and yet they often encourage and manipulate forgetfulness, of which
they are also a product. We are amiss if we look at the story of Critias as one of
remembering and forget the forgetfulness that allows for it.
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For Brisson’s response see the “Conclusion” to the second edition (1998, 136-139).
A truly logical argument should be identical, no matter who is involved in the discussion. A story such
as that presented here is much different if I hear it from Solon than if I hear it from Critias some
generations later. Cf. Brisson for a distinction between myth and “falsifiable discourse” and argument
(1998, 91-121).
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Solon in Egypt
Solon traveled to Egypt and went to the city of Sais where they “are very friendly
to Athens and claim to be related to our people somehow or another” (21e). When Solon
asked “those priests of theirs who were scholars of antiquity about ancient times, he
discovered that just about every Greek, including himself, was all but completely
ignorant of such matters” (22a). Here, again ignorance will be described in terms of
forgetfulness, destruction and time. Solon was completely ignorant of his own city,
without being aware of it. After Solon “tried to compute their [the ancient myths of
Phoroneus and Niobe and Duecalion] dates by calculating the number of years (xrÒnouw
ériyµe›n) which had elapsed since the events of which he spoke” (22b), one of the
priests, “a very old man, said ‘Ah, Solon, Solon, you Greeks are ever children (ÜEllnhew
ée‹ pa›d°w §ste)” (22b). This is an interesting formulation, because the Athenians are
always children precisely because they are not always anything. When Solon asks the
priest what he means, the answer is a litany of temporal terms.
‘You are young,’ the old priest replied. ‘Young in soul (N°oi §st°), every one of
you. Your souls are devoid of beliefs about antiquity handed down by ancient
tradition (oÈdeµ€an går §n aÈta›w ¶xete diÉérxa€an ékoØn palaiån
dÒjan). Your souls lack any learning made hoary by time (oÈde µãyhµa
xrÒnƒ pol€on oÈd°n ). (22b-c).
There are several interesting points in the priest’s claim. We see that an individual soul,
in this account, gains age by means of collective, traditional, knowledge. Not only the
individual soul, but “learning” (µãyhµa) is made venerable (pol€on) by time (xrÒnƒ).
It should be “truth” that makes learning “venerable,” not time. Time may, however, allow
theories to have been extensively tested. The result is more often the opposite of this and
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we see in this case that Solon does not test the priest’s claims any more than Critias tests
those of Timaeus.
The priest then tells Solon the reason for the youth of the Athenians: disaster. The
disaster is a result of both the heavens and the earth. “There have been, and there will
continue to be, numerous disasters that have destroyed human life in many kinds of
ways” (22c). There are two major causes of disaster—fire and water—but “lesser ones
have numerous other causes” (22c). When the world is destroyed by fire it is due to a
“deviation in the heavenly bodies that travels around the earth, which causes huge fires
that destroy what is on the earth across vast stretches of time” (22d). People on hills burn
up more quickly and only those near water survive. To the contrary, when floods occur,
“the herdsmen and the shepherds preserve their lives, while those who live in cities, in
your region, are swept by the river into the sea” (22e). Because of the Nile, Egypt is
subject to neither of these disasters. Thus the “antiquities preserved here are said to be the
most ancient” (22e). Athens, to the contrary, is often destroyed.
The priest says that “the truth is that in all places where neither inordinate cold
nor heat prevent it, the human race will continue to exist, sometimes in greater,
sometimes in lesser numbers” (23a). The existence of the species is not in danger from
these disasters, but, except for Egypt, the cultural memory of the species is at stake with
each of these common disasters. The Egyptians keep scrupulous records in their temples,
whereas “in your case, on the other hand…no sooner have you achieved literacy and all
the other resources that city’s require, than there, again, after the usual number of years,
comes the heavenly flood” (23a). When the floods come they take the cultural knowledge
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that allows cities to be (by preserving only those who live isolated in the hills).260 When
the flood comes “it sweeps upon you like a plague, and leaves only your illiterate and
uncultured people behind. You become infants all over again, as it were, completely
unfamiliar with anything there was in ancient times” (23a-b). This explains how
collective wisdom adds “age” to the particular soul: the possibility of better education.
When only the illiterate and “uncivilized” survive, humanity (or that region of humanity,
who, to themselves, must seem like the totality of humanity that remains) finds itself in a
state of ignorance that is not aware that it is ignorant.261 A child of the scattered shepherds
who survived a flood would have no experience of cities at all, but would know them, if
at all, only as strange and incomprehensible stories.
This story of cultural forgetfulness also allows for progress, and constancy. It
explains the development of society, without supposing shameful beginnings. The whole
point of the priest’s story is that both Sais and Athens were “founded, nurtured and
educated” by Athena (23d). The seed came from Earth and Hephaestus. They were
created with divine laws in a suitable location to war and wisdom. And yet the Athenians
were still able to improve their laws (24d). The Priest tells Solon that “the race from
whom you yourself, your whole city, all that you and your countrymen have today, are
sprung, thanks to the survival of a small portion of their [the ancient Athenians] stock”
(23b-c). The priest is teaching Solon what he claims is part of his own being, his true

260

Cf. Gallant 1991 on the life of rural Greeks.
“The rest of the tradition has been added later as a means of persuading the masses and as something
useful for the laws and for matters of expediency; for they say that these gods are like men in form and like
some of the other animals, but if one were to separate from the later additions to attend to this alone….he
might realize that this was divinely spoken and that, while probably every art and every philosophy has
often reached a stage of development as far as it could and then again has perished, these doctrines about
the gods were saved like relics up to the present day” (Metaphysics 1074b5-15; Apostle’s trans.)
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ancestry. He explains why, saying “this has escaped you, because, for many generations,
the survivors passed on without leaving a written record” (23c).
The priest tells Solon that “all of the events reported to us, no matter where
they’ve occurred—in your part or ours—if there are any that are noble or great or
distinguished in some other way, they’ve all been inscribed” (23a). Just after this, he
comments on the necessity of writing for cities and the loss of it by most of humanity
every so many years due to flood. The priest says, “I’ll tell you the story for your own
benefit as well as your city’s and especially in honor of our own patron goddess” (23d).
And yet, Solon did not write and share it with the city, because he came back to Athens to
find political turmoil (21c). This shows us that knowledge is lost other than by natural
disaster, but is also subject to political disaster and simple forgetfulness.
After Critias finishes his sketch of the Egyptian story, he gives an equally
interesting account of his own forgetting, which has a psychic effect analogous to the
natural disasters. That there have been many disasters show that it is possible to relearn
everything that has been forgotten, even without a “source” like Saitic priest. Athens had
been destroyed nine thousand years prior and had developed the arts again, even without
such contact. The element of reconstruction is forceful enough in Critias’ telling of the
myth to make Cornford ask “what could Hermocrates do, if not describe the reemergence of culture in the Greece of prehistoric and historic times” (1927, 7). Just as
Critias’ story of ancient Athens and Egypt depicts historical and political destruction and
reconstitution, Critias’ personal account of his relationship to the story presents a picture
of psychic catastrophe and attempted reconstruction.
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The Forgetfulness of Critias
When Critias finishes his “concise version of old Critias’ story, as Solon
originally reported it” (25e), he tells Socrates how he recalled it. “While you were
speaking yesterday about politics and the men you were describing I was reminded
(énaµiµn˙skÒµenow) of what I’ve just told you” (25e). This is a sort of perversion of
any understanding of “Socratic” recollection. Critias’ memory is one in which the
“ideal” reminds him of a particular set of events, rather than using the particulars to arrive
the universal. Critias goes on to say that he’ll “translate the citizens of the city you
described to us in mythical fashion yesterday to the realm of fact, and place it before us
as though it is ancient Athens itself” (26d).
Critias makes his point even more explicit when he says “our song will be in tune
if we say that your imaginary citizens are the ones who really existed at that time” (26d).
Critias is making Socrates’ ideal city into the image of an actual historical city (or at least
a mythological historical one), instead of seeing that historical city as a contingent copy
of the true city.262 Critias and Solon—had he written the poem—would be at third
remove (if not much more, due to indirect discourse) from the truth. If Critias’ story
were true, it would actually prove Socrates’ point. If his city was indeed the true city,
then the goddess would have looked—though far more clearly—at the same model in
order to make a moving image of it.263 But Critias’ account misses its nature altogether,
for he is remembering a story of a story of a story, told at a particular time in a particular
place and forgotten and he takes that to be the “original.” In this way, by manipulating
262

Cf. Kalkavage: “Critias makes a bold claim: he will transfer the merely mythical city into ‘the truth’
(2001, 13).
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Socrates wants to see his city “in motion” (19b) and Timaeus describes time as a “moving image of
eternity” (37d).
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“history” Critias is able to “claim” the credit for the type of government, if not for
himself, at least for his ancestors. Based on this “ancestral constitution” Critias tries to
take over Socrates’ city.
We learn other things about Critias during this account. We see that he may not be
listening to the account as closely as he should, since he is remembering the story of his
youth, “amazed” (§yaÊµazon) by remembering (25e).264 Critias continues and says
“Because it had been so long ago, I didn’t remember Solon’s story very well (diå
xrÒnou går oÈx ﬂkan«w §µeµnÆµhn). So I realized that I would first have to recover
the whole story for myself well enough, then tell it that way” (26a). Here Critias admits
the nature of his tale. He has just told us that he does not remember the story well and so
he will have to tell it his way. What is Critias’ way to tell it? He says, “the most
important task in situations like this is to propose a speech that rewards people’s
expectations” (26a). He will tell a story that rewards the expectations of his guests. He
may think he flatters Socrates for attempting to “translate the mythical citizens of the city
you described to us in mythical fashion yesterday to the realm of fact” (26c-d).
Critias does not immediately tell us his story, but tells us of the process of
remembering during the intervening night. He says, “the moment I left here yesterday, I
began to repeat the story to him [Hermocrates] and to Timaeus as it came back to me.
After I left them I concentrated on it all during the night and recovered just about the
whole thing” (26b). After this comment, as if he has convinced himself, Critias’ attitude
changes. He has just been talking about how he was trying to recall the story and how it
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Critias’ relationship to memory and the past may be likened to that of Nestor in the Iliad. In the next
section I will show that the types of details provided by Critias show how thoroughly he ignored Socrates’
discourse.
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had been so long ago that he didn’t remember well. Now he says, “I don’t know if I’d be
able to recall everything I heard yesterday, but I’d be extremely surprised if any part of
this story has gotten away from me though it has been a very long time since I’ve heard
it” (26b). This shows that he was not listening to Socrates’ story, and that he was not
telling the truth just a moment before when he discussed the difficulty of remembering
the tale. In the Critias, we see precisely what sort of things he remembers and we see that
he is not much interested in justice. He says that he remembers the story so well because
“what I heard then gave me so much pleasure—the old man was eager to teach me
because I kept on asking one question after another” (25b-c). Critias does not ask a
single question of Timaeus, in his extremely long and difficult account, and most likely
had no questions for Socrates on the previous day.

The Critias
The Critias begins with a prayer and ends in mid-sentence as Zeus is about to
speak. It is a fragment about what we might call history and theology, or mythology and
religion. As was the case with the Prologue of the Timaeus, it says as much about Critias
as about ancient Athens.
Timaeus begins the dialogue with a prayer that the god who had
existed long before in reality, but who has now been created in my words…that
he grant the preservation of all that has been spoken properly; but that he will
impose the proper penalty (d€khn tØn pr°pousan §pitiy°nai) if we have,
despite our best intentions, spoke any discordant note (106b).
The dialogue drops off with very similar words, in a far different context. Critias is
describing the decline of the Atlantians, saying “they became disordered” (121b). Critias
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goes further to say that “to those who were blind to true way of life oriented to happiness
it was at this time that they gave the semblance of being supremely beauteous and
blessed. Yet inwardly they were filled with an unjust lust for possessions and power”
(121b). Critias then points out that “Zeus, god of gods, reigning as king according to law,
could clearly see this state of affairs” (121b). When he “observed this noble race lying in
this abject state and resolved to punish them (d€khn aÈto›w §piye›nai) to make them
more careful and harmonious as a result of the chastisement” (121b-c). This phrase of
Critias, d€khn aÈtoiw §piye›nai, mirrors Timaeus’ d€khn tØn pr°pousan §pitiy°nai
from the beginning of this dialogue. The similarities go further, with both accounts
describing the point of the correction as bringing those who err into tune.
The similarities here may explain a certain number of difficulties with this
fragment. I agree with Eric Voegelin, who argues that the dialogue is a “formal fragment,
not an accidental one” (2000, 182).265 Voegelin argues that this is so because it breaks off
at a “formal incision in the dialogue” and therefore “its meaning is rounded in itself and
does not depend on what might have followed” (2000, 182).266 I think we need to push
this point farther and say that if we compare the conclusion with the prayer at the
beginning of the dialogue, we may surmise that what was previously unmeasured in deed
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As a fragment the Critias interestingly—but certainly unintentionally—mirrors the state in which we
find out much about “antiquity” at Oxyrhincus, for the very reasons listed by the Saitic priests. Welliver
agrees, in so far as he sees the Timaeus-Critias as a whole (1977, 3); Cornford (1935, 7) expected a
dialogue entitled the Hermocrates.
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Welliver similarly argues for the intentionally fragmentary nature of the Critias, citing “its frequent
references to incompleteness” (1977, 34). More dubious are the speculations as to the dramatic cause of
Critias’ sudden silence. He cites the illness of the missing “fourth” as a hint and says that one can “ascribe
also Critias’ sudden silence to a sudden illness; and judging from Critias’ moral state at this point, the
illness must have been serious, though perhaps not immediately fatal” (1977, 37). This speculation is
ridiculous. We need not think of Critias falling dead, or even ill, in mid speech in order to see the dialogue
as a formal fragment. That is, we need not account for its silence within the drama, but outside of it. The
question then is not what happened to cause Critias to fall silent (if he had fallen ill, would they not remark
on it?) but why Plato chose to represent his story in such a fragmentary way.

213

(Atlantis) is now unmeasured in speech and Zeus—as it were—refuses to speak for
Critias. That is, Plato intentionally ended the dialogue at this point in order to allow the
god to accept Timaeus’ prayer.
There are a number of hints that the Critias of the dialogue may hold the atheistic
views often attributed to him in the Sisyphus fragment. I am not making a claim that
Critias authored the fragment, but rather that such ideas were certainly common among
certain circles of Athenians. We have just seen that Zeus “could clearly see” inside of the
Atlantians (121b-c). This is the purpose of inventing gods in the Sisyphus fragment.
Further, at the beginning of the dialogue, after Timaeus had completed his prayer, Critias
asks for a greater indulgence than that shown to Timaeus. He explains his request by
saying:
It is easier, Timaeus, for someone to give the impression that he is a successful
speaker when he speaks of the gods to an audience of mortals. The audience’s
lack of experience and sheer ignorance concerning a subject they can never know
for certain provide the would-be speaker with great eloquence (107b).
Critias is showing how one may deceive people on the basis of that with which they have
little familiarity, and in particular the gods. He ends up describing the art of the sophist,
as he continues. He says, “everything we have all said is a kind of representation
(µiµÆsin) and attempted likeness” (107b). He continues, using the same image that is
often used by Plato to describe the sophist’s art. He wants them to consider “the graphic
art of the painter that has as its object the bodies of both gods and men and the relative
ease and difficulty involved the painter’s convincing his viewers that he has adequately
represented the objects of his art” (107b). Then he says that “we are satisfied if an artist
is able to represent—even to some small extent—the earth and mountains and rivers and
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forests and all of heaven and the bodies that exist and move within it, and render their
likeness” (107c). It seems as if Critias is attempting to discredit Timaeus’ account. This
would explain the strange relation between the accounts of Critias and Timaeus, the first
of whom spoke in the prologue of the Timaeus and gave an overview of his story, but
returns to it later, after Timaeus speaks, for a detailed, but fragmentary and ultimately
failed account. He spoke at the beginning of the Timaeus, with great pride—both in his
family and his story—and he was sure that his account was to meet the expectation of the
listeners (26a). After Timaeus’ account, he must now make his story look better. In
Critias’ story, however, he spends far more time discussing precisely “the earth and
mountains and rivers and forests” (107c) than the actions of human beings.
He continues, saying that
since we have no precise knowledge of such things, we do not examine (oÎte
§l°gxoµen) these paintings too closely or find fault with them, but we are content
to accept an art of suggestion and illusion (skiagrãfia) for such things as vague
and deceptive (ésafe› ka‹ épathl“) as this (107c-d).
The language in this passage is quite similar to that in the Sophist (235e-236d). He is
clearly describing that whereby deception about the “biggest things” occurs. He offers
one last attack on Timaeus’ discourse, saying “we embrace what is said about the
heavens and things divine with enthusiasm, even when what is said is quite implausible
(sµirk«w eﬁkÒta legÒµena), but we are nice critics of what is said of mortals and
human beings” (107d). Timaeus called his story a “likely account” and now Critias is
saying that it is hardly likely (sµirk«w eﬁkÒta) at all. He points out again the difficulty
of representing humans “if we are to satisfy people’s opinions” (107e-108a). Critias,
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perhaps, notices that Socrates was impressed with Timaeus’ speech, and thus reminds
(Ípoµn∞sai) him of the difficulty of his own task (108a).
In effect Critias has attempted to discredit Timaeus’ account in a way that is quite
similar to his belittling of Socrates’ account at the beginning of the Timaeus.267 There (as
he does again here) he makes Socrates’ account into an image of his own, and here he is
calling Timaeus’ account a skiagrãfia that is sµirk«w eﬁkÒta.
Critias then begins with his own prayer to Mnemosyne. He says that “the success
or failure of everything that is most important in our speech lies in the lap of this
goddess” (108d). We must ask what is most important in Critias’ speech. He explains the
remark, saying, “if we can sufficiently recall (µnhsy°ntew) and relate what was said long
ago by the priests and brought here to Athens by Solon, you the audience in our theater
will find, I am confident, that we put on a worthy (µetr€vw) performance” (108d). Thus,
Critias begins as a poet, calling on the Goddess of memory. Or rather he claims to. He
says that “I must…invoke the other gods and make a special prayer to Mnemosyne”
(108d), but he does not actually make the prayer. Instead, after explaining why he should
make it, he says “So much said. Now we must act. Let us delay no more” (108e).
We know that Critias IV was a poet and we have several fragments attributed to
him. He begins more like a sophist than a poet, however. He relies on memory for his
story, he says, but he relies on the wrong sort of memory. He is amazed by memory, lost
in the fantasy of details of the geography and weather of the ancient cities, the details
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216

which are in many ways irrelevant to the assignment and which Critias has already
mentioned are most difficult to judge or verify (107c).
As Kalkavage puts it, “through him [Critias] wisdom, in the dialogue comes to be
identified not with recollection… of eternally unchanging Being but with the detailed
memory of our own past” (2001, 12). It is important to note that Critias’ story is as much
fantasy as it is memory. He mixes his own past (the Apaturia when he was ten, Socrates
speaking the previous day) with a mythical past that he does not so much remember as
imagine. Kalkavage continues, saying that Critias’ “nostalgia reminds us with great
vividness and detail that human beings for the most part locate the meaning of their lives
in the temporal flow of their lives” (2001, 11). What he does not recognize is the element
of social or political expedience in the history claimed.268 There is a sense in which
Critias is “taking over” kallipolis.
In reality his speech shows us the decline and failure of a city. It is important to
recall that in Socrates’ account of the ideal city at the beginning of the Timaeus does not
include a discussion parallel to that in Republic VIII, where the decline of cities is
discussed at length. In the Critias, we see two sorts of decline. The decline of the
Atlantians and the sudden destruction of both the Atlantians and the Athenians.
Critias seemingly begins his discussion with prewar Athens (109a). In reality,
however, he starts with a discussion of the allotment of the earth between the gods and
their rearing of humanity (109b). He moves from there, however, not to Athens in its
glory, but in its destruction. He says, “And they [Athena and Hephaestus] fashioned in it
good men sprung from the land itself and gave them a conception of how to govern their
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society” (109d). The very next sentence begins, not with a picture of that society, but
with its dim memory. “The names of those first inhabitants have been preserved, but their
deeds have perished on account of the catastrophes that befell those who succeeded them
and the long passage of time intervening” (109d). All we have of these first Athenians are
their names, because “those of their race who survived these successive destructions
were…left as an illiterate mountain people” (109d). These people, according to Critias,
named their children by the names of the old rulers “even though they were unaware of
their ancestors virtues and institution—except for some dim legends” (109e).269
Critias describes the kind of post-apocalyptic life for the hill people. He says that
“for many generations, these survivors and their children lived in distress for their
survival and gave thought to their needs; they spoke only of supplying these needs, and
have no interest in the events of the distant past” (109e-110a). Even had some educated
people survived the catastrophe, they would not have been able to spend much time to
educate their children in anything but survival. Critias explains saying that it “is in the
train of Leisure (µetå sxol∞w) that Mythology (µuyolog€a) and Inquiry into the Past
(énazÆths€w) arrive in cities” (110a). This picture is a catastrophic inversion of the
expulsion of people over ten in the Republic (though there is no mention of this in
Socrates’ Timaeus speech). The old ways are destroyed, at once, but there is nothing
better to replace them, only hardship.
It is unclear at this point whether mythology and the investigation into “the events
of the distant past” (110a) are memory or invention. For, if one is not as fortunate as
Solon and cannot travel to Egypt, where memory and been preserved, one may try some
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primitive archeology—finding a statue or some pottery here and there. Even if one is so
fortunate as Solon there is really no means of verifying the story, by the very nature of
the story. Critias says only that the “report of the Egyptian priests concerning our
territory was plausible and true” (110d). He then goes into a long description of the
geography of the ancient city, as “evidence” (110e, 111c).
When he moves to a discussion of the people of ancient Athens he does not get
very far—except in time. He repeats the phrase “for generation after generation”
(§kgÒnvn ¶kgonoi) three times. He describes the way that the warriors live
communally on top of the Acropolis “as if they belonged to a single household” (112b).
Nevertheless,
in pursuing a mean between ostentation and servility, they built for themselves
tasteful houses and they grew old in them and in the company of their
grandchildren; and for generation after generation (§kgÒnvn ¶kgonoi) they
passed these dwellings down to descendents who were like themselves (112c).
This passage shows the ways in which Critias misunderstood—or rejected—Socrates’
proposals and is here slightly but significantly altering them. Critias most particularly
rejects what Socrates calls their “unusual” proposal for the procreation of children (18c).
Critias maintains the private household and in doing so he calls Socrates’ guards
“servile” (112c). Socrates clearly said that they had decided that
they should all have spouses and children in common and that schemes should be
devised to prevent any one of them from recognizing his or her particular child.
Everyone one of them would believe that they all make up a single family, and
that all who fall within their own age bracket are brothers and sisters, that those
who are older, who fall in an earlier bracket, are their parents or grandparents,
while those who fall in a later one are their children or grandchildren (18d).
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Because of his pride in his family—his essentially aristocratic tendency—Critias is
unable to accept such a suggestion. He identifies too strongly with his family and its
history to accept Socrates’ abolition of it. This, of course, shows one of the main reasons
that Socrates thinks that the family needs to be abolished.270
They also “kept the population stable as far as they could—both men and
women—for generation after generation, maintaining the population of those who had
reached military age or were still of military age at close to twenty thousand at the most”
(112b). Thus, though generations pass, the size of the population is relatively stable.
Finally, Critias summarizes, saying that “the character of these people was such and such
was their life generation after generation” (112e). It is interesting that in all three
instances it is the generations that are of great importance. He does not stress the
education, or the tendency of each to identify with the whole, rather than with the
household, as Socrates did, but rather stresses the role and continuity of tradition, as a
fifth century aristocrat would be expected to do.
Critias moves on to the discussion of Atlantis with another appeal to memory, but
one that has been supplemented by writing. 271 Of Atlantis he says “we will now openly
reveal its history to you our friends, as the common property of friends, if we have not
lost the memory (µnÆµhw) of what we heard when we were still boys” (112e). Then, in
an excursus on names, Critias mentions written notes taken by Solon “when he was
contemplating his own poetic version of the legend” writes down the meaning of each of
the “Greek names frequently used for people who are not Greek” (113a). Critias says
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that these “manuscripts (tå graµµãta) were in the possession of my grandfather and
they now remain in my possession” (113b). Though Critias explains some names (114b),
it seems as if his true concern here is to mention that he has Solon’s notes in his
possession. This lends credence to what he says, and authority to his voice.
It is with this that Critias launches into an elaborate description of the island of
Atlantis, a description which has become part of the cultural mythology of the Western
world.272 Critias’ story ends up being far shorter than Timaeus’ and also far less
interesting or philosophically germane. In fact, Plato shows the way that Critias himself,
in the telling of the story, succumbs to the luxury of his description in the same way that
the people in his description fall under the thrall of its luxury. For much of the time, they
are free of this enthrallment. Critias says that “in their attitude to the disasters and chance
events that constantly befall man and their relations with one another they exhibited a
combination of mildness and prudence” (120e). In fact, throughout, it appears as if Critias
has more sympathy with the means of government and the national character of the
Atlantians than the ancient Athenians. It is for this reason that he shares their downfall,
forgetting himself, hardly recognizing it. They did not, Critias tells us “become
intoxicated with the luxury of the life their wealth made possible; they did not lose selfcontrol and slip into decline” (121a). Eventually, however, the passage of time begins to
dim the divine part of them and thus they became “disordered”(121a). This disorder
brings Zeus, who can see the situation, to call the gods in order to chastise the Atlantians
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See Welliver 1977, Appendix C for “Francis Bacon’s Understanding of the Timaeus-Critias” (61-63).
In addition to philosophical works like Bacon’s Plato’s myth has helped produce cultural products that
Plato never could have foreseen, such as a television drama “The Man from Atlantis” for only one instance
of the vast legacy of this myth. In itself, this says something about our cultural memory, though we are still
less than a third of the way to the nine thousand years separating the event and Solon’s discovery of the
entire subterranean history of his city.
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(121c). Then, whether intentionally, or by accident, the dialogue, like Atlantis, drops off
the face of the earth.
Where the text breaks off and ends in the middle of a sentence we see the effects
of forgetting, which forgets that it has forgotten, which is blank and illiterate, unaware
that anything should be there, the Atlantic Ocean, beyond the pillars of Heracles.
In the next chapter, I show how many of these same concerns are played out in
the Charmides.
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Chapter 9
Knowing What We (Don’t) Know: Knowledge and Politics in the Charmides

The Charmides makes as much use of historical detail and inference as any other
dialogue. The dialogue is set just after the extended siege of Potidaea and the ambush of
the Athenians that followed. Those events were the beginning of the extended war which
no one in the late 430s or early 420s expected to rage on as it did. Of the characters
present in the dialogue, only Socrates has experienced the nature of the world to come.
The characters of Charmides, Critias and Chaerophon bring to mind the end of that war
with the establishment of the Thirty, the exile of the democrats and their final return.273
Attention to these details reveals a peculiar progression. As the dialogue opens, only
Socrates knows the horrors that at least two generations of Athenians (and Greeks in
general) would come to know so well. At the beginning of the dialogue there is a
distinction between war and civic life. Plato presents Socrates as having the presence of
mind to act in battle just as he acted in the city. Critias blurs the distinction between
politics and war in a different way. When the Thirty take over and when Thrasybulus
and the democrats return, this difference is erased, and there is no politics but war.
Plato shows this difference between Socrates and Critias in terms of their
arguments and their respective understanding of their own accounts of sophrosune, or
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Schmid says: “with a masterly brevity, the initial scene projects the reader forward to the entire tragic
story of the Peloponnesian War, beyond that to the tyranny of the Thirty, and beyond that to Socrates’ own
trial and execution” (1998, 3). On the relation between these cf. especially Brickhouse and Smith 1987.
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temperance.274 He does this most clearly in the prologue of the dialogue, before
Charmides gives his first definition and in the last section, when Socrates and Critias
investigate Socrates’ dream of knowing ignorance and Critias’ interpretation of this as
knowing.

War and Peace
The introduction to the Charmides, stresses time and absence (diå xrÒnou
éfigµ°now) (153a). The dialogue opens with Socrates’ return from Potidaea in 429.275
We have already discussed this battle in the previous chapters on Alcibiades, with whom
Socrates served on this campaign between 432 and 429. Here we see Socrates after the
terrible retreat following the defeat of the Athenians (II. 79), not, as commentators have
suggested, after the initial battle. Athens attacked Potidaea (Thucydides I. 57, I. 61) and
then held it under siege (II.70) until the citizens finally turned to cannibalism to stave off
starvation. Potidaea finally surrendered in 430/429. The Athenians were on their way
home when they were ambushed and badly beaten (II. 79).276 It is after this final battle
that we see Socrates.
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Enough has been written on the Greek virtue of sophrosune in English to treat the transliteration as an
English term. Temperance as self-control will also be used as translations, in accordance with the
preferences of the scholars discussed in this chapter.
275
I follow Planeux’s chronology, which keeps Socrates and Alcibiades in Potidaea for three years (1999).
Nails astutely comments that “Near unanimous past agreement that the Charmides place after the initial
battle of 432…as if the soldiers had marched back home after the first action of the campaign, before the
siege, before Potidaea surrendered, has always been untenable historically” (2002, 311). Kahn erroneously
states that “Plato has forgotten or simply ignored the fact that the battle of Potidaea occurred at the
beginning rather than the end of the long siege” (1996, 185, n. 3).
276
The connection of this dialogue with the Laches also closely relates it to martial concerns. Cf. Kahn
1996, 184. Schmid points out that the plague may have stricken Athens for the first time during Socrates’
absence (1998, 3, ).
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In the dialogue’s opening, he says that “since I was arriving after such a long
absence sought out my accustomed haunts with pleasure” (153a).277 Sprague’s word
“haunt” is not very accurate. Lamb’s Loeb translation is better here where Socrates says
that he sought out his “wonted conversations.” Though Socrates proceeds to list the
places he goes, it is the conversation and not the place that interest him. Indeed, the other
senses of “diatribãw” carry temporal and not spatial connotations at all. The “focal”
meaning uniting the definitions listed Liddell and Scott is a wearing away of time (1897,
ad loc). Socrates has been away for a long time and now he is glad to be able to pass his
time as he will, in conversation.
Socrates is looking for conversation, not necessarily for particular friends. He
says: “I went immediately to the palaestra of Taureas… and there I found a good number
of people, most of whom were familiar, though there were some too that I did not know”
(153a). Plato has already invoked Socrates’ long absence from the city, the long
campaign at Potidaea and the hardships Socrates would have endured. He has also, in
these very few lines, told us very specifically where Socrates goes to seek conversation.
Finally, Plato brings Socrates in to a crowd of people and when “they saw me coming in
unexpectedly, I was immediately hailed at a distance by people coming up from all
directions” (153b).278 Socrates presents this in way that both shows the contrast between
the city and life on campaign, while also showing their similarities. There is the
confusion of the crowd. This had been Socrates’ customary life before his three year
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In an unpublished article Polansky and Brouwer persuasively argue that this absence and homecoming
signal an extended analogy with the Odyssey, so that Socrates, the returning Odysseus, argumentatively
slay the suitors, Critias and Charmides. Their account is one of the few that stress the barely veiled hostility
between the interlocutors.
278
Hyland says that “Socrates is something of a celebrity” (1981, 29) and asks whether news of his heroics
may have already reached the city (1981, 29).
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absence. Now there is a difference in the sameness. Socrates must appreciate the same
things differently.
The question of Socrates’ experience of the crowded wrestling school in
comparison with the campaign from which he had just returned is heightened when
“Chaerophon, like the wild man he is, sprang up from the midst of a group of people and
ran towards me” (153b). A “wild man” (µan€kow) springing up from the midst of a
crowd and springing at one is more likely a description of a battle than a conversation,
until, when Chaerophon seizes Socrates, he speaks instead of slays.279 Indeed, the setting
of the dialogue at the palaestra of Taureas, places in mind the sport of wrestling which
was practiced there. Wrestling is a kind of simulated warfare, a fight in which nothing
other than pride and reputation are stake. Critias’ sophistic brand of discussion is like
wrestling when compared with the true battle of Socratic dialectic.
But Critias and the others have not been introduced yet. Socrates has a kind of
knowledge that the others lack and they eagerly question him. While they are both still
standing, Chaerophon immediately asks Socrates “How did you come off in the battle?”
(153b). Socrates responds “exactly as you see me” (153b). This is where we see the
meaning of the martial description of the crowd at the wrestling school.
In the Symposium Alcibiades describes the difficulties of the battle in both
Potidaea and in Delium. Alcibiades presents Socrates as a great soldier precisely because
“in the midst of battle he was making his way exactly as he does around town” (221b).
Socrates’ answer here fits well with that. Chaerophon says “the way we heard it
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Friedlander says that “Chaerophon represents the kind of spiritual turmoil that is not fit for
philosophical discussion. It is a preliminary stage of the mania that, in its higher forms, appears over and
again from the Ion to the Laws” (1964, 69).
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here…the fighting was very heavy and many of our friends were killed” (153b-c).
Socrates responds that the report is “pretty (§pieik«w) accurate” (153c). In fact, more
than four hundred people and all of the generals were lost in the battle (Thucydides II. 79.
1-7). That, of course, was just the finale of the long campaign during which they were
“cut off from our supplies, as often happens in the field” (Symposium 220a) and often
endured difficult weather, such as the winter described in the Symposium (220b-c).
Alcibiades’ entire description of Socrates in battle is focused almost exclusively
on his endurance and courage which seemed to stem from his ability to maintain the same
calmness that he showed in the city in battle. Alcibiades describes him at Delium280:
He was observing everything quite calmly (±r°µa), looking out for friendly
troops and keeping an eye on the enemy. Even from a great distance it was easy to
see that this was a very brave man, who would put up a terrific fight if anyone
approached him. That is what saved them both. For as a rule, you try to put as
much distance as you can between yourself and such men in battle; you go after
others, those who run helter skelter (Symposium 221c).
This shows us, first hand, the value of philosophy. Virtue is knowledge, because it is
knowledge of oneself in the most difficult times. We fail when we escape our own notice
and forget ourselves. I shall show how the Charmides works to make this point
throughout the entire dialogue.
None of the other interlocutors has experienced the battle. Chaerophon wants a
complete account of the events (153c) and brings Socrates over to the table where Critias
has been sitting. This is strange in itself, since Chaerophon was later in exile with the
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Though this battle is in the future of our dialogue, Alcibiades does not note any change in Socrates’
behavior in the two campaigns. Rather he stresses the constancy, remarking only on his different
perspective (221a-b).
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democrats during the reign of the Thirty and returned with them (Apology 21a).281 It has
been said that Plato includes Chaerophon in the dialogue as a counter-example to Critias
and Charmides, to show that not all of Socrates’ associates were either corrupt or
oligarchs (though they may have been crazy). More than this, the juxtaposition of Critias
and Chaerophon, as associates at the beginning of the war, shows the extent to which the
series of historical events destroyed the unity of the city in ways that no one predicted.
Both Chaerophon and Critias are inexperienced, as of yet, in the matters of war. They
have not yet been tested by the events that become history.
We may think that Socrates would be happy to play the historian and relate the
news of the battle and his own exploits.282 While he does answer the questions of “Critias
and the rest” (153d), he does not go on with his narrative any more than necessary. He
says, “when they had had enough of these things, I in my turn began to question them
with respect to affairs at home” (154d).283 Socrates the narrator is not interested enough
in this part of the story to recount in any detail what he told them about the battle, and
neither is Plato, the author.284 Plato the author is not a historian. He uses historical
characters, but the Charmides and the Timaeus-Critias, will show his deep suspicion of
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Kahn says that it “is significant that Socrates is led personally to Critias by Chaerophon…who was later
found among the democratic exiles when Critias was in power…The dialogue takes place in a happier and
more harmonious social world” (1996, 185 n. 4).
282
Hyland asks “what kind of virtue is this which enables a man to return from a battle which would have
been shattering to most men, and be apparently oblivious to its horror?” (1981, 28). I will suggest,
however, that Socrates is less oblivious than he seems. Schmid points out that “Chaerophon’s question,
which he impulsively failed to consider might have been a cause of intense embarrassment to his friend
(e.g., had Socrates saved himself by dropping his armor and running), might have tempted Socrates to
embark on a tale of his own heroism” (1998, 4).
283
Schmid says, “Almost immediately, Socrates’ narrative serves to contrast his own attitude toward the
war to that of the others present” (1998, 3). It is not only his attitude, but his experience of it, that contrasts
sharply with the others.
284
Friedlander marks this as a sign of temperance (1964, 70). Hyland points out that, because of the
reluctance of Socrates the narrator to go into detail about this, we do not know what account of the battle
Socrates may have given and nor the effect it may have had on the interlocutors (1981, 29).
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the portrayal of events. He immediately let us know what affairs at home he was
interested in, “the state of philosophy and about the young men” (153d).
Socrates has been away for three years. There is a sort of dance of memory
between Socrates and his associates. He gives them news of the battle and they, in turn
tell him about the state of philosophy and of the youths. Chaerophon and Critias are
united in their opinion of Charmides’ beauty, a subject about which Socrates says, “I am
a broken yardstick (leukØ stãyµh)” (154b). Here he broaches what will be one of the
important topics of the dialogue: criteria for measurement or judgment. Socrates claims
that he is a broken instrument that cannot make an adequate judgment about the matter.
This enables Socrates to model the appropriate behavior in such an instance: he questions
those who claim to know.285 Thus, after they tell him about the body of Charmides,
Socrates asks about his soul, and specifically whether or not it is well-formed (154d).
Socrates couches this question in terms of lineage, something that we have seen, is quite
important to Critias (154d, 155a).286 Socrates insists on the propriety of a conversation
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Hyland says that “even if Socrates cannot measure beauty, he might yet be able to measure wisdom
through philosophy…In this very dialogue we are forced to think through what it means to measure
according to a standard in such a way as to lead to something like the so-called ‘late theory of forms’”
(1981, 31).
286
Kahn remarks that this points to “Plato’s pride in his own family” (1996, 186). Nothing could, in fact,
be farther from the truth. Kahn continues, commenting that “what we know from the text is that the choice
of interlocutors permits Plato to elaborate on the fame and distinction of his own family and its connections
by marriage” (1996, 187). Kahn does not make it clear which text tells us this, for it is certainly not the
Charmides, in which both Critias and Charmides represent failure. Kahn goes on to cite the Timaeus as an
attempt “once again to emphasize Plato’s ancestral connection with Solon” (1996, 187). The entire
previous chapter is a rebuttal to this position. In the Timaeus and the Charmides, Plato shows the danger of
a reliance upon, or overly keen interest in, ancestry and lineage. Finally, and farthest from the point, Kahn
claims that “the presence of Critias and Charmides serves as a kind of personal signature, superimposed
upon the anonymity of the Socratic dialogue form” (1996, 187). If Plato uses those figures as a “signature”
it is to show the ways in which he himself may well have failed. Kahn’s reading directly and dramatically
opposes Plato’s claim about his relation to these members of his family. It is precisely because they are
related to him that Plato is more easily deceived by Critias and Charmides, in the same way we see
happening to Charmides in the dialogue that shares his name. In Letter VII, Plato has been describing his
youthful political ambition and the overthrow of the democratic constitution. Then he says, “Some of these
men happened to be relatives and acquaintances of mine and they invited me to join them at once in what
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since “you are both his guardian and his cousin” (155a). Immediately Critias consents,
but he suggests that Socrates pretend to be a doctor who can cure the headaches that
Charmides suffers in the mornings.287
When Charmides approaches before anything is said there is again a surge and
confusion whose description is reminiscent of warfare (155c). This time, however, there
is an erotic confusion so that “when everyone in the palaestra surged all around us in a
circle… I saw inside his cloak and caught on fire and was quite beside myself (oÈk°tÉ §n
§µautoË)” (155d). Socrates shows here one of the ways in which one becomes unaware
of one’s self. He is enflamed and knocked outside of himself (oÈk°tÉ §n §µautoË).288
Socrates will regain his control by asking questions of Charmides and Critias and indeed,
by narrating the dialogue to us. Socrates’ erotic slip shows that self-knowledge—that is
the knowledge of our own ignorance—is neither steady nor permanent, but that one can
train oneself to forget less often, using dialogue as a kind of moral mnemonics.289
It is Critias who says that Charmides is temperate (157e-158a), thus preparing the
way for him to enter the discussion under the assumption that he knows what sophrosune
is.290 After Charmides arrives and Socrates asks the young man about it, Charmides
answers in a way that Socrates characterizes as “quite dignified” (158c). He tells
seemed to be a proper undertaking. My attitude towards them was not surprising since I was young. I
thought that they were going to lead the city out of the unjust life she had been living and establish a path
of justice, so that I watched eagerly to see what they would do. But as I watched them they showed in a
short time that the previous constitution had been a precious thing” (324c-d).
287
Hyland suggests that the headaches are the result of immoderation in the consumption of wine and that
is why the headaches are in the morning (1981, 41-42).
288
Hyland stresses the relationship between eros and sophrosune (1981, 27)
289
Kahn says that this ‘episode prefigures the topic of the dialogue by exhibiting Socrates’ subsequent
success in regaining self-control whereas Critias is later shown to lose his self-restraint when his proposed
definition is subjected to ridicule” (1996, 188).
290
Schmid cites Helen North’s still relevant 1966 study, saying that “sophrosune was a virtue
characteristically (and propagandistically) identified with the conservative aristocratic tradition in Greek
political thought, and with Sparta in particular…This tradition is represented in the Charmides by the title
character and his guardian and uncle Critias” (1998, 4).
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Socrates that “it was not easy for him in the present circumstances, either to agree or
disagree with what he had been asked” (158c). The reason, he says, is because “if I
should deny that I am temperate, it would not only seem an odd thing to say about
oneself, but I would at the same time make Critias here a liar (ceud∞)…but on the other
hand, if I were to agree and praise myself that would appear distasteful” (158d). Critias,
of course, has already suggested that Socrates lie to Charmides and he himself has his
slave lie to Charmides to get him there saying “call Charmides and tell him I want him to
meet a doctor for the weakness (ésyene€aw) he told me he was suffering (ésyeno›) from
yesterday” (155b). It is only after this that he suggests to Socrates that he pretend to be
the doctor.291
Charmides asks Socrates if he has the remedy for his headaches and Socrates
answers that the does. The rest of the dialogue is an attempt to turn Critias’ lie into the
truth and to actually present Charmides (and himself) with a cure. Socrates already hints
at the use of force with which the dialogue will end, when he asks Charmides if he will
copy the charm “with my permission…or without it?” (156a).
Thus, the historical setting of the dialogue and the combination of interlocutors
come together to set the dialogue in motion. Chaerophon now disappears altogether and
Critias will only return when he has been implicated by Charmides.
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In his attempt to revise the images we have of Socrates (overwhelmingly positive) and his interlocutors
(overwhelmingly negative), John Beversluis implies that it is Socrates who is trying to lure Charmides into
the discussion “on false pretenses” (2000, 135). It is clear, however, that it is Critias who orchestrates the
deception.
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Charmides: Speed and Slowness
The initial discussion with Charmides is often maligned as an example of
unscrupulous and terribly fallacious arguments.292 While this may be true, it is necessary
to point out the way that Socrates uses Charmides' definition in order to turn the
discussion to the issue of time and in order to highlight the virtues required in war and the
unity of the virtues.
Socrates says that
it is clear that if temperance (svfrosÊnh) is present in you, you have some
opinion about it…[I]f it really resides in you, it provides a sense of its presence,
by means of which you would form an opinion not only that you have it, but of
what sort it is” (159a).
These assumptions prefigure much of what is to come in Socrates’ discussion of
reflexivity with Critias. I will return to this point, but it is worth noting here that it is
precisely this attempt to look “inside yourself” that may define sophrosune as a “knowing
oneself” that amounts to “knowing what one knows and what one does not know” (167b).
When Charmides looks inside himself he says that “taking it altogether that what
you ask about is a sort of quietness (≤suxiÒthw)” (159b). Socrates then gets Charmides
to say that temperance is admirable and then lists a number of other fields when
quickness is admirable. Beversluis points out that “the opposite of ‘quickly’ is not
‘quietly’ but ‘slowly’ and the opposite of ‘quietly’ in not ‘quickly’ but ‘noisily’” (2000,
138). Beversluis is partly correct, but he assumes that ≤suxiÒthw has precisely the
same connotations as the English word “quietness.” Rather, “calmness” may be the best
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Hyland calls Socrates’ move “sophistic equivocation” (1981, 59). Beversluis calls the arguments
“faulty” saying that “both [arguments] depend on bizarre contrasts” as well as fallacious (2000, 138). He
says that each set of arguments “concludes that temperance is not quietness (or a kind of quietness) on the
ground that temperance is admirable and quick actions are more admirable than quiet ones” (200, 138).
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English word for ≤suxiÒthw. Nevertheless, there is something strange going on,
something, I argue, that has to do with Socrates’ experience in battle and the unity of
virtue.
Socrates contrasts forms of tax°vw with ≤suxª but he also pairs brad°vw
with ≤suxª. tax°vw and brad°vw—which mean swiftly and slowly,
respectively—are more clearly opposed than ≤suxª and tax°vw. It is not difficult to
see someone doing something both quickly and calmly. In fact, this is a sign of
competence. We must look more closely at Socrates’ examples to see what he means.
First, however, it is worth recalling Charmides’ examples. He said that
temperance was “doing everything in an orderly and quiet way—things like walking in
the streets and talking” (159b). These are both actions of small consequence and matters
that are among the first things learned by infants—how to walk and to talk. In the chapter
on the Alcibiades I (111a), we saw Alcibiades use the example of speech as an analogy
for justice. He claimed that no one in particular taught him to speak, and so Socrates turns
almost immediately to the example of writing, for which one did have a teacher. Socrates
makes a similar move here. “Now when you are at the writing master’s, is it more
admirable to copy letters quickly or quietly?” (159c). Charmides answers that it is better
to write quickly. He answers that it is also better to read quickly and to play the lyre and
wrestle quickly and sharply (Ùjevw) than quietly and slowly (159c). The same is true of
“boxing and pancration” and finally they agree that “with running and jumping and all
the movements of the body, aren’t the ones that are performed briskly and quickly the
admirable ones, and those performed with difficulty (µÒgiw) and quietly, the ugly ones”
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(159d). The addition of “µÒgiw” of “with difficulty” will be crucial here. Socrates will
keep equating “calmly” as “with difficulty. ”
Before moving on to the matter of psychological speed, I will spend a moment on
these physical examples. In each case, it simply performing it quickly that is admirable
(when reading one does not care whether the letters were written quickly or not), but the
ability to do it quickly. For in each case, if one can do it quickly, one can also do it
slowly, whereas if one can do it slowly, it does not mean that one can do it quickly. When
we ask, how is it that one does it quickly, we would answer by much practice and
learning. That is, one has to have done is slowly many times in order to be able to do it
quickly. Socrates’ motives become more clear as he moves the discussion towards the
soul.
Here we find a different set of examples. All of the physical examples were
things that were learned, while here we see the process of learning itself. He asks “is
facility in learning more admirable or difficulty in learning?” (159e). Charmides answers
that facility is better and Socrates equates facility with speed and difficulty with
slowness. He then makes a similar case for teaching, remembering and being shrewd
(159e-160a). Here, there is a quickness that seems more easily equitable with the good.
But, it again depends on what I am thinking or remembering or teaching with speed. If I
quickly teach people to lie quickly and with facility, can we really say that I am acting
more admirably than if I slowly and ploddingly teach people to tell the truth slowly and
ploddingly, by continually questioning themselves and others?
We also need to point out, that this quickness of thought or memory may lead to
calm, ordered motion of the body. If we return to Charmides’ examples, we see that
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these are things that take no special training to do and things which (most) anyone could
do either quickly or slowly, calmly or boisterously. Socrates has already told us that we
must “pay attention to the whole” (156e), but he separated the whole in his examples. In
the physical examples, he spoke only of the quickness of the action, not what state of soul
allowed such actions to be swift. In the examples of the soul, Socrates speaks only of
means and not of the ends. This will be one of Critias’ largest failings over the course of
the dialogue.
There is also another reason that Socrates uses the examples that he does.
Socrates’ experience in battle helps explain this set of examples. If the virtues are virtues
then they must be unified, and, as we saw in the Protagoras, courage and temperance
must be mutually applicable (at least as “Pauline predications” in which the instance of
the universal and not the universal itself, would be mutually predicable).293 One of the
remarkable things about Plato’s presentation of Socrates is his extreme constancy over
the course of time. Nevertheless, Socrates’ experience in battle may partially account for
some of the peculiarities of this dialogue.

293

Cf. Vlastos 1973, 252. Hyland correctly says that Socrates is trying to show Charmides “the courage,
the sophrosyne needed to wrench oneself again and again out of the easy and comfortable acceptance of the
cultural mores and values which appeal most immediately to one’s desires” (1981, 68). Hyland continues
saying, “without claiming an utter identity of courage and sophrosyne, we can at least say that, far from
holding that they are opposed, Plato is suggesting their essential interconnection, arguing that the
investigation of the one necessarily involves the investigation and exhibition of the other” 91981, 69). Cf.
Statesman 309e ad finem.
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The Return of Critias and the Criteria of Judgment
Charmides abandons his own definition and admits his failure, thus demonstrating
a certain degree of temperance.294 He says that he has “heard someone say that
temperance is minding one’s own business” (161b). Socrates suggests that Charmides has
heard the suggestion from Critias in very strong language, calling him a wretch, or
polluted (µiar°). The definition here is similar to the definition of justice given in the
Republic. Here, as in the Republic, Socrates finds it necessary to show the danger of this
definition. The fate of Critias—and the 1,500 that he had executed—makes it clear that
such a definition only makes sense if one knows what one’s business is.295
Critias takes up the claim from Charmides. Socrates says that “Critias had been
agitated for some time and also that he was eager to impress Charmides and the rest who
were there. He had held himself in with difficulty earlier (µÒgiw dÉ •autÚn §n t“
prÒsyen), but now could do so no longer” (162c). This displays the character of Critias.
It is difficult for him to restrain himself, or to keep himself in mind. Socrates continues
and says that “Critias couldn’t put up with this but seemed to me angry with Charmides
just the way the poet is when his verse is mangled by actors” (162c). Critias then says to
Charmides “Do you suppose, Charmides, that just because you don’t understand what in
the world the man meant who said temperance is ‘minding your own business,’ the man
himself doesn't understand either?" (162c).
The above statements show the great danger of education and imitation. One must
ask, whose fault it is if the young ward does not understand his guardian’s definition of a
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Friedlander says that “the older cousin lacks the other’s purity: when Kritias is helpless in the face of an
argument, he will not admit his helplessness in the presence of others” (1964, 67).
295
I address this in the next chapter.
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virtue. This is particularly interesting when we recall that Critias told Socrates that
Charmides was among the most sophron of his generation (158d). Socrates began by
asking Charmides to look inside himself to see what sophrosune is (159a). He will not
begin that way with the sophistic Critias, for Critias has already shown us that there is no
connection between one’s account of a virtue and his or her possession of it and yet his
account turns out to be one that entails looking within oneself. He has declared
Charmides to be sophron (157d), but now claims that he doesn’t understand what it
means. It will turn out, of course, that the “man himself does not understand” (162c). The
irony of course could not be greater here, or more tragic. This definition is quite similar
to that given by Polemarchus in Republic I.296 Critias’ response to Charmides highlights
the question that plagues both: Who is to say what one’s business is?297 Charmides is not
minding his business when he gives Critias’ answer that he does not understand. But
more importantly, Critias has not been minding his business if he has not properly
educated Charmides.
The next definition of temperance as "the doing of good things" (163e) requires
that one knows what is good and brings us closer to the crux of this problem. Critias, it
seems thinks that “doing one’s own” and “doing good things” are synonymous.298 That is
it seems to Critias that “doing one’s own” or minding one’s own business means
296

Socrates’ seemingly flattering remark about Critias’ age and experience” (162e). The dramatic date of
the dialogue is some three decades earlier than the rule of the Thirty. Critias had very little experience that
we know of up to this point. Socrates had just returned from a long battle, and so any claims to experience
by Critias would have been, in comparison, quite limited.
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This is always part of what is at stake in politics. Slavoj Zizek puts it well in a discussion of Ernesto
Laclau. He says, “The struggle for ideological-political hegemony is thus always the struggle for
appropriation of the terms that are ‘spontaneously’ experienced as ‘apolitical,’ as transcending political
boundaries” (1999, 177-178).
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Schmid says that “Critias’ underlying thought is clear: the true meaning of sophrosune does not consist
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avoiding harm as alien” (1998, 34).
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something like “doing what is beneficial to oneself.”299 And, indeed, this would again be
a proper definition, if only one knew what were truly beneficial to oneself. Critias seems
to think that he knows what is best for everyone. As Hyland puts it, “as a tyrant, he wants
others to mind their own business—his version of being sophron—so he can rule” (1981,
72).
The problem of criteria does not disappear as the dialogue moves forward.
Socrates brings up the necessity of knowledge, saying “the doctor doesn’t know himself
whether he has acted beneficially or harmfully. Now if he acted beneficially, according to
your argument, he acted temperately” (164c). Critias agrees and Socrates concludes that
“on some occasions he acts beneficially and, in so doing, acts temperately and is
temperate, but is ignorant of his temperance” (164c). This would mean that temperance
would not be a kind of knowledge, because it could coincide with ignorance.300 Critias,
much to his credit among interlocutors, readily abandons his previous position.301 He
strongly says “I would rather withdraw some of my statements, and would not be
ashamed to admit I had made a mistake, in preference to conceding that a man ignorant
of himself could be temperate (égnooËnta aÈtÚn •autÚn ênyrvpon svfrone›n)”
(164d). This is a remarkable admission from any Socratic interlocutor and particularly
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Critias does not claim this directly, but it seems to motivate his claims of this section and his discussion
of Hesiod in which he distinguishes between doing and making. Socrates’ next remarks make this clear. He
says: “I understood the first part of your speech pretty well, when you said that you called things that were
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one with a reputation such as Critias.302 With these words Critias begins a new section of
the dialogue, which ends precisely when Socrates says of Critias that,
since his consistently high reputation made him feel ashamed in the eyes of the
company and he did not wish to admit to me that he was incapable of dealing with
the question I had asked him, he said nothing clear but concealed his predicament
(169c-d).
With these words, Plato shows the difference between Critias’ claims and his actions with
the subtle strokes of a literary master. It shows, further, that Critias does not know
himself. He is not actually capable of admitting his errors, or of recognizing them. He,
like Alcibiades, forgets himself in the eyes of others. Before moving on it is necessary to
look carefully at his discussion of the Delphic inscription.

The Delphic Injunction
After acknowledging his previous error, Critias says: “As a matter of fact, this is
pretty much what I say temperance is, to know oneself, and I agree with the inscription to
this effect set up at Delphi” (164d). Critias sees the inscription at the oracle as a
“greeting from the god to those coming in in place of the usual ‘Hail,’ as though to say
‘hail’ were an incorrect greeting, but we should rather urge one another ‘be temperate’”
(164d). Critias understands the inscription as a simple greeting, claiming that people who
made other inscriptions misinterpreted it as a “a piece of advice” (165a).
Critias does not wish to expend any effort in order to actually try to come to know
himself. Indeed, it seems as if he gives this answer partly because he thinks that Socrates
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will accept it (165b).303 But Socrates tries to show Critias the true meaning of the
injunction. He says,
you are talking to me as though I profess to know the answers to my own
questions and as though I could agree with you if I really wished. This is not the
case—rather, because of my own ignorance, I am continually investigating in
your company whatever is put forward (165c).
Socrates here sounds remarkably as he does in the Apology, though the trial is nearly
three decades after the discussion at hand. By the time Socrates is tried, the rest of the
interlocutors are dead, Chaerophon the only one among them who may have died of
natural causes (Nails 2002, 86).
It is unclear when Chaerophon went to the oracle at Delphi, but if we take
Socrates seriously in the Apology, we must assume that it was prior to this occasion. For,
Socrates uses Chaerophon’s trip to the oracle in order to explain his ignorance and
continual questioning . At any rate, one can be nearly certain that Plato intends us to
make the comparison between Critias’ interpretation of the oracle and Socrates’ in the
Apology. The comparison is stark, for Critias takes the command to know himself as a
simple greeting, whereas Socrates takes the answer to a question as a command or an
injunction, to do precisely that which the inscription commands. When Chaerophon
asked the oracle if anyone was wiser than Socrates and “the Pythian replied that no one
was wiser” (21a). Socrates, eventually, interprets this in such a way that he can say
“even now I continue this investigation, as the god bade me” (23b). The Pythian did not
put the answer to Chaerophon’s question in the form of a command, but Socrates
interprets it as one, whereas the blatant command is interpreted by Critias as a greeting
303

Cf. “By citing it [the inscription], therefore, Critias both manifests his own imaginative intelligence and
at the same time appeals to something dear to Socrates’ heart which he knows the philosopher must in
some sense or other accept” (Hyland 1981, 89).
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that requires no effort.304 When Critias grows angry and claims that “you are trying to
refute me and ignoring the real question” (166c), Socrates offers an explanation that
clearly recalls the Apology. He says of his refutation of Critias,
I would be doing it [refuting you] for any other reasons than the one I would give
for a thorough investigation (§l°gxein) of my own statements—the fear of
unconsciously thinking I know something when I do not (fobÒuµenow µÆ pote
lãyv oﬁÒµenow µ°n ti eﬁdenai, eﬁd∆w d¢ µÆ)” (166c-d).
Here again, Socrates is afraid that he will escape his own notice (lãyv) in terms of what
he knows and what he does not know.305 He is making it clear that the very point of
thinking that we know things that we do not know, is precisely that we think we have two
kinds of knowledge that we do not. We think we have the knowledge and think we have
the knowledge that we have it. I argue that this is the point of the rest of the dialogue and
the discussion of the “knowledge of knowledge,” for the ignorance of ignorance always
looks—to the ignorant one—like the knowledge of knowledge (Cf. Apology 21d-e).306
Questioning is the way to remain vigilant against this constant tendency to slip into the
pretense of wisdom.
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Socrates tests Critias’ definition and his soul at the same time when, after taking a
moment to think over the definition of sophrosune as knowing oneself, he says “if
knowing is what temperance is, then it clearly must be some sort of science and must be
of something” (165c). Socrates is testing Critias’ willingness to see what he means by his
“self.” Critias will ultimately display a sort of “will to power” in seeing his “selfknowledge” as the ability to know—and rule—the other knowledges. At this point,
however, he repeats claims that the object of this science is “oneself” (165c). Socrates’
next questions show how easy it is to forget oneself—even in the discussion of oneself. In
the next part of the discussion Socrates plays between showing Critias how easy it is to
forget and then calling him back to himself.

Reflexivity
Critias has defined sophrosune, as Socrates summarizes it, in terms of a “science
of self (•autoË §pistÆµh)” (165d). The self, or the soul, would seem to be a perfectly
acceptable object of a science, but Socrates turns it into a productive science by asking
what it produces by means of an analogy with house-building (165d-e). Critias correctly
objects that this is saying that this science “does not have the same nature as any other”
(165e). He tells Socrates that there is no product of other sciences, such as geometry
(165e). Socrates responds by saying that the sciences of geometry and calculation have a
subject that is other than the science itself (166a-b). At this point Critias is critically
distracted and proceeds along a sophistic line of reasoning that is not at all interested in
what the self is.
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Critias could have said that sophrosune is that reflective action whereby the soul
becomes aware of itself and then investigated this reflexivity with Socrates, much as
Alcibiades does in the Alcibiades I.307 Instead, Socrates and Critias end up discussing the
possibility of reflexive knowledge,308 but in terms of a “knowledge of knowledge itself”
instead of a knowledge of the self (166b). Commentators often remark on the similarity
between Critias’ definition here and Socratic conceptions of self-knowledge.309 In fact,
Socrates iterates such a position in the lines immediately following Critias’ introduction
of sophrosune as “ the only science which is both of other sciences and of itself” (166c),
when he expresses, as we have already seen, his “fear of unconsciously thinking I know
something when I do not” (166d). Indeed, when Socrates restates Critias’ position he
turns it into his own, though Critias will neglect precisely those features that allow
Socrates’ statement of the definition to be “Socratic.”
Socrates says that
only the temperate man will know himself and will be able to examine
(§jetãsai) what he knows and dies not know, and in the same way he will be
able to inspect (§piskope›n) other people to see when a man does in fact know
what he knows and thinks he knows, and when again he does not know what he
thinks he knows (167a).
This is, of course, precisely what Socrates is doing, as he just told us when he said he was
“examining the argument for my own sake primarily, but also perhaps for the sake of my
friends” (166d). The key point that will distinguish between Socrates and Critias for the
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Friedlander makes a similar comparison to the Alcibiades I (1964, 79-80). Cf. also Schmid (1998, 47).
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Kahn claims that the “subtle analysis of the reflexive and irreflexive concepts marks it as one of the
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remainder of the dialogue, is the stress that Socrates places on “examination” and
“inspection.” This is precisely what Critias’ account will neglect. Critias seems to see
sophrosune as something that is established in those who are sophron so that they know
what they know once and for all. Just as Alcibiades often forgot himself through
inconstancy, Critias forgets himself by a hyper-constancy in which one already thinks
that one knows everything one needs to know and forgets that one did not know. One
forgets one’s ignorance and with it the willingness to investigate.
Socrates’ next set of examples make precisely the point that Critias ignores the
investigatory process because he thinks that he knows. Socrates asks him to “consider,
for instance, if you think there could be a kind of vision that is not the vision of the thing
that other visions are of but is the vision of itself and other visions” (167c-d). If one
thinks only of oneself—as an isolated individual—this is clearly an absurd position,
because the eye cannot see itself. But, a brief comparison with the Alcibiades I makes
Socrates’ position clear. The soul cannot simply see itself, but rather can only be
reflected in conversation with another soul.310
In the Alcibiades I, it is also in discussion of the Delphic injunction that Socrates
brings up the same analogy of an eye seeing itself in order to examine the reflexive nature
of self-knowledge. But, in the Alcibiades I, instead of saying that it is “impossible”
(168e), he explains precisely how the eye may see itself, saying “if an eye is to see itself,
it must look at an eye, and that region of it in which the good activity of an eye actually
occurs” (133b). This can only be done by looking into the pupil of another eye (133a).
Socrates is even more explicit. He says “if the soul, Alcibiades, is going to know itself, it
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must look at a soul, and especially at that region in which what makes a soul good,
wisdom, occurs” (133b). Even more striking, is Socrates’ explicit claim that “knowing
oneself (gign≈skein aÍtÒn) was the same as being self-controlled (svfrosÊnhn)”
(133c).
Even more than in the Alcibiades I, Socrates makes it clear that this is “absolutely
impossible” (168e), if one does not continually engage and test oneself with others. This
is exactly what Critias shows himself incapable of doing when Socrates says that
since his consistently high reputation made him feel ashamed in the eyes of the
company and he did not wish to admit to me that he was incapable of dealing with
the question I asked him, he said nothing clear, but concealed his predicament”
(169c-d).
One should not expect to see oneself clearly if pride causes one to hide one’s own
ignorance. Socrates tries to bring discussion around, while also providing a model of
inquiry. He says: “I am in danger of being as confused as ever, because I still don’t
understand how knowing what one knows and does not know is knowledge of the self”
(170a).
Critias does not understand the problem and Socrates clarifies by asking whether
a science of sciences is anything “more than the ability to divide things and say that one
is a science and another is not” (170a). When Critias answers that “it amounts to this” he
shows that he has not given much thought to himself, except insofar as he thinks himself
capable of managing the sciences, or, of ruling. As Schmid points out, “in Critias’ case,
this art has no content—it is the mere self-assertion of the would-be ruler, the would-be
wise man” (1998, 57).
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Socrates shows this lack of content when he pushes the ides of temperance as the
“science of science” until he comes to the distinction between knowing what and
knowing that (170c). This distinction will again bring him back to community and the
criteria of judgment. If one only that one knows or does not know, “neither will he be
able to distinguish the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the man who
really is one” (170d).311 According to Critias’ definition, there is no criteria for
determining whether or not the doctor knows unless I know, which means that I can’t
mind my own business, for I must know everything. The worst part of the definition, the
absolutely fatal part, comes in what follows. Socrates asks “if the temperate man or
anyone else whatsoever is going to tell the real doctor from the false one, how will he go
about it?” (170e). The answer is devastating, because “he won’t, I suppose, engage him
in conversation on the subject of medicine, because what the doctor knows, we say, is
nothing but health and disease” (170e).

A World without Error
Socrates tells us what the benefit of such knowledge would be and sketches a
picture very similar to that we have already seen in the discussion of the art of
measurement in the Protagoras. He says:
If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know (and that he
knows the former but not the latter) and were able to investigate another man who
was in the same situation, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be
temperate. Because those of us who had temperance would live lives free from
error and so would all of those who were under our rule. Neither would we
ourselves be attempting to do things we did not understand—rather we would find
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those who did understand and turn the matter over to them—nor would we trust
those over whom we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly,
and this would be that of which they possessed the science (171d-172a).
Socrates is telling us here precisely how we make mistakes as well as sketching a portrait
of a world without error.312 His answer here extends the analysis we have so far seen.
Again and again, in some form or another, we have seen Socrates make the point that we
make mistakes because we think we know things that we do not know. Socrates is
making that point again here. If I leave the things that I know I don’t know to others, it
seems as if I will not err. But Socrates makes it clear, that there is still room for error.
Socrates says that I must be able to investigate others who claim to know, or I may err in
deciding to whom I should leave the things I don’t know. The very fact that I don’t know
the subject means that I am unable to know whether or not someone knows. Thus, it
should be the same knowledge that both knows that it does know and is able to evaluate
the expert. There is of course the paradox that Socrates has been pointing to, if I don’t
know, how can that same knowledge also decide who should know. Thus, Socrates says,
If temperance (svfrosÊnh) really ruled (êrxoi) over us and were as we now
define it, surely everything would be done according to science (katå tåw
§pistÆµaw): neither would anyone who says he is a pilot (but is not) nor would
any doctor or general or anyone else pretending to know what he does not know
escape our notice (lanyãnoi ên) (173b-c).
Thus, it turns out that sophrosune looks like it is defined as that whereby we do not
escape our own notice. But, it is only possible not to escape our notice in this manner, if
we ask questions and investigate the other people in order to “be able to inspect
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(§piskope›n) other people to see when a man does in fact know what he knows and
thinks he knows, and when again he does not know what he thinks he knows” (167a).
Socrates is presenting a utopian picture that bridges the gap between the promise of the
art of measurement in the Protagoras and the necessity of radical social change in the
Republic.
More specifically, the argument again points towards the true danger, that of
escaping our own notice, or having our forgetfulness exploited by others. The
forgetfulness that is exploited is of a certain kind, a certain telling of stories to recreate a
picture of the past that will have emotional resonance. Demagogues and unscrupulous
politicians play precisely on our lack of knowledge, but our tendency to forget that we
don’t have knowledge. We want someone who will lead the country out of the quagmire
that it is in and we don’t know what to do. Someone, like Critias, tells us that he knows
what to do, and forgetting that we have no way to evaluate his claims, give him the
authority and take his claims as our own.
John Beversluis interprets this problem as one that is
intended to show that the second-order knowledge (or meta-knowledge) under
examination—knowledge of knowledge—cannot enable its possessor to know
what he and other people know and do not know unless he has some first order
knowledge (2000, 153).
One certainly cannot have “first-order” knowledge of everything, or one ends up
precisely with Critias’ extreme version of “do one’s own” (161d).313 Ultimately, the
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danger of deception and the criteria for judgment is extremely important and, I think
motivates many of the proposals of the Republic. The training necessitated by that
dialogue is to ensure that there are those with the criteria (from generation to generation)
who are able to distinguish between those who know and those who don’t.314
Socrates makes an even more radical proposal. If we had some way to clearly
evaluate what others know we would even know the future, because we could distinguish
the true from the false seers (173c-d). In that case “the human race, if thus equipped,
would act and live in a scientific way—because temperance, watching over it
(fulãttousa)315, would not allow the absence of science (énepisthµosÊnhn) to creep
in (pareµp€ptousan) and become our accomplice (sunergÒn)” (173d). The lack of
knowledge creeps up, it slips in and we must constantly guard against it, as Socrates has
already pointed out (66c-d). If, as Critias thinks, we were able to know everything, the
past, the future and the present, we would still forget ourselves and would probably do so
more readily.
It is for this reason that Socrates now doubts whether or not such knowledge truly
makes us happy (173e). He says that “living by science” does not make us happy
because shoemakers and smiths and weavers and carpenters are not happy (173e).
Therefore it must be a certain kind of science. Critias agrees and Socrates asks him if the
happy man is the “man who knows all future events” (174a).316 Critias says that the man
who knows the future and another kind of person is happy. Socrates answers for him and
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says: “Isn’t it the sort of man who, in addition to the future knows everything that has
been and is now and is ignorant of nothing” (174a). Socrates asks which of the many
sciences possessed by this person makes him happy. Socrates is able to get Critias to
acknowledge that even such a radical idea of knowledge, would not be sufficient for
happiness. Rather, what is needed is a science of good and evil to be happy. Critias has
claimed that sophrosune is a knowledge of knowledge and not a knowledge of good and
evil which is necessary for happiness. Thus temperance would not be beneficial (174c).
He says “this science, at any rate, is not temperance, as it seems, but that one of which the
function is to benefit us. For it is not a science of science and absence of science, but of
good and evil” (174d).
This is the same difficulty that we encountered in the Protagoras. Socrates has a
knowledge of knowledge—a human wisdom whose what is precisely only a that— but he
does not seem to have a true knowledge of good and evil. This is, however, the only
knowledge that can make us happy.317 Even knowing the future and the past would not
necessarily make one happy for two reasons. First, the tendency to forget ourselves
would not be eliminated by such knowledge, for we would still have to keep the
knowledge in mind. Secondly, I argue that Plato is suggesting, as he does in the Republic,
that the ability to predict the patterns of shadows will not make us happy (516c), but
contemplation of the eternal. The knowledge of good and evil does not enable us to do
any of the arts, but it does enable us to do them well (174d). Thus, the wisdom is again
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telling us something about how it is done, but to do something well requires that we
know the good. Knowing the future is of little value, if we cannot evaluate what we see.
Socrates displays temperance again at the end of the dialogue, just before both
Critias and Charmides display the roots of the intemperance that will lead to the
establishment of the Thirty. The point is that one does not do wrong intentionally and
that Critias and Charmides truly thought—as Plato, their younger relative also thought of
them—that they were being virtuous in establishing the rule of the Thirty.
Socrates, however, is willing to question his own skill at investigation at the end
of the dialogue. He says “the thing we have agreed to be the finest of all would have
turned out to be of no benefit if I had been any use in making a good search” (175b;
emphasis mine). He continues saying that he does not believe that you “should derive no
benefit from temperance nor should it be of any use to you in the present life…rather I
think that I am a worthless inquirer” (175e).
This all suggests that it is the knowledge of good and evil that will unify the
virtues.318 It may be, however, that such a knowledge is impossible for humans when
taken as the “whole” of body and soul on the model of a Zalmoxian physician (156e).
That is to say that a “human wisdom” of knowing what we know and what we do not
know (170a), may be the best that we are able to do, to “become” virtuous through
continual questioning. Even this, however, is extremely difficult, because the moment
that we think we know something, we have lost this knowledge of knowledge. That is to
say, the knowledge of what we know and do not know is a process of discovery, a life of
constant questioning, the life that we see embodied by Socrates. It is Critias’ biggest
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mistake that he thinks that, like the public man in the Apology, “he thinks he knows
something when he does not” (21d).319
Critias will institute a form of government under the Thirty that claims to know
what is good for the city and to “establish her in the path of justice” (Letter VII 324d). In
reality, the it is the government of the Thirty that brings the truth of the previous
constitution to light (Letter VII 324d). Plato concludes the dialogue by pointing out
another problem with this conception of the knowledge of what one knows and what
others know: one must be a good inquirer and know how to ask questions (175b, 176a).
More importantly, one must be willing to ask questions. Socrates offers advice to
Charmides saying, “my advice to you would rather be to regard me as a babbler,
incapable of finding out anything whatsoever by means of argument” (176a). Charmides
is confused and says that he is unsure of whether or not he is temperate, since neither
Socrates nor Critias were able to discover it. Charmides had taken something from the
discussion and wishes to engage in conversation with Socrates (176b). Critias says “if
you do this, it will convince me of your temperance” (176b). This response shows Critias
as clearly as anything else in the dialogue. He is not willing to engage in discussion with
Socrates day after day and “ let nothing great or small dissuade” him from it (176b).
Critias has hidden the fact that he does not have knowledge and this leads, ominously, to
a threat of force.
With this threat of force that concludes the dialogue, Plato brings us in a circle.
We began the dialogue with an allusion to the campaign at Potidaea. I pointed out at the
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I would like to make the suggestion that the presence of Chaerophon in the dialogue as well as the
references to the Delphic oracle suggest that Critias is in fact the public man mentioned at Apology 21d and
that Socrates does not mention his name, in part, because of the amnesty. See Brickhouse and Smith 1987
for a discussion of the amnesty.
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beginning of this chapter, the ways in which Socrates’ experience at that campaign may
have influenced his conception of the virtue of sophrosune. Neither Socrates nor the other
characters in the dialogue knew the future that was the follow Potidaea. Plato did,
however, and I argue that he opened and closed the dialogue in the way that he did in
order to show the different ways in which Socrates and Critias eliminate the difference
between the battlefield and the city: Socrates acted with the same calmness and
sophrosune in battle that he showed in the city, while Critias turns the city into a battle
field, and acts everywhere with the same immoderation, showing, as Schmid puts it “the
terrible forces of the human psyche with which Socratic philosophy is fated to
contend—forces that themselves are the most irrational things, because they refuse to
submit to reason” (1998, 151).
In the next chapter I will offer an intertextual reading of Republic I and Lysias’
Against Eratosthenes in order to show the extent to which this is so. The analysis will
show the extreme dangers of a definition such as that offered by Polemarchus—so similar
to Critias’ first definition of sophrosune—unless one has the knowledge of good and evil.
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Chapter 10
The Ghost of Polemarchus and the Problem of Time in Republic I
It is not often noted that the passage of time is one of the central concerns of the
Republic. In this chapter I will show that the Republic shares the same concerns as the
other dialogues that we’ve read. It shows these concerns, however, on a larger, social
canvass. Whereas, however, the Protagoras, the Alcibiades and Charmides are all
concerned with the passage of time within an individual life and the problems that the
future presents and the Symposium and Timaeus-Critias highlight the problems that are
raised by our relationship to the past, the Republic shows the difficulties created for a
society by the passage of time. When we consider the passage of time on a large scale,
the existence of different generations becomes one of the most difficult problems. It is
indeed the problem of the human experience of generations that unites the political and
the educational concerns of the Republic.
Plato highlights these concerns early in the dialogue by the presence of Cephalus
and his brief and often over-looked conversation with Socrates. In order to set the stage
for the problems of the next chapter, this chapter presents an exploration of the
intertextual elements that pass between the Republic and Lysias XII Against
Eratosthenes. Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus and brother of Lysias, is the essential
figure in the early parts of both works, and Critias looms large in the background. The
dialogue that contains the “city in words” is contained within the house of
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Polemarchus,320 at the Piraeus. As the seat of generational difference, the household is
one of the fundamental themes of the Republic.
The dialogue does not begin there, however, but in the Piraeus. The house is also
in the Piraeus, but Plato’s narrative strategy situates us in the street and will bring us, by
invitation, persuasion, or force, into the enclosed space of the private residence. There is
a spatial and political distance between the Piraeus and the town (êstu) proper. Readers
of the Republic are likely to think of saying “I went down to the Piraeus yesterday”
(Kat°bhn xy¢w eﬁw Peiraiç) as akin to “I went to the market yesterday.” In reality, it is
more like saying that one went to Long Island from Manhattan. The Piraeus was only
four miles southwest of Athens, but it was a different political unit which was
nevertheless essential to the identity of Athens, thanks to the walls built by Themistocles
and destroyed by Theremenes and Lysander.
When Lysias discusses the reign of the Thirty he gives much attention to the
differences between the Piraeus party and that of the town (XII.53-60). This sense of
separation of the town and the port continued through the reign of the Thirty. Yet it was
heightened by those who followed, those “who were thought to be most opposed to
Charicles and Critias and their club (•taire€&): but as soon as they in their turn were
raised to power, they set up a far sharper dissension and warfare (polÁ µe€zv stãsin
ka‹ pÒleµon) between the parties of the town and of the Piraeus” (XII. 55). The real

320

Cf. Nails “There were three houses in Cephalus II’s family in 404 (Lys.12.18), with those of both
Polemarchus and Lysias in the Piraeus. In Republic, Plato does not represent all the men as living together
in the Piraeus…but as having gathered at Polemarchus’ house (R. 328b). It is natural, but incorrect, to infer
from the fact that Cephalus II is alive and still performing sacrifices that the conversation of the Republic
takes place in the house of Cephalus II (Ferrarri 2000, 350, Todd 2000,4; Howland 1993, 57, 63; Nussbaum
1986, 137). Neither place of residence nor the performing of sacrifices would affect Polemarchus’ being the
legal owner of the house, as the text describes him” (2002, 84).
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connection between the town and the Piraeus were the walls, so important to the history
and identity of Athens.
In his prosecution of Eratosthenes for arresting and killing Polemarchus, Lysias
anticipates that Eratosthenes will claim that he was supporting Theremenes, rather than
the more extreme Critias (by whom he was eventually killed) and so Lysias must also
condemn Theremenes.
Why, I suppose, if he had been in the government with Themistocles he would
have been loud in claiming that that he worked for the construction of the walls,
when he claims he worked with Theremenes for their demolition! For I do not see
that there is any parity of merit between them. The one constructed the walls
against the wishes of the Lacedaemonians, whereas the other demolished them by
beguilement of the citizens” (XII. 63-64).
These two events—the building and the demolition of the Long Walls connecting the
Piraeus to the town—could be said to be two of the major events in Atheno-Spartan
relations. In 479, in the aftermath of the Persian defeat, the Spartans “begged her
[Athens] not only to abstain from building walls for herself, but also to join them in
throwing down the remaining walls of the cities outside the Peloponnesus” (Thucydides,
1.90). Themistocles advised the Athenians to dismiss the Spartan embassy so that the
matter might be discussed. He then told the Athenians to delay sending the embassy until
they had raised their wall to the height from which defense was possible.
Meanwhile the whole population in the city was to labor at the wall, the
Athenians, their wives, and their children, sparing no edifice, private or public,
which might be of any use to the work, but throwing all down (1.90).
When the work had been completed Themistocles told the Spartans that “Athens was
now fortified sufficiently to protect its inhabitants” (1.91). Themistocles also
persuaded them (the Athenians) to finish the walls of the Piraeus, which had been
begun before, in his year as archon; being influenced alike by the fitness of a
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locality that has three natural harbors, and by the great start which the Athenians
would gain in the acquisition of power by becoming a naval people (1. 93).
Finally, in 457 Athens began construction on the “long walls to the sea, that toward
Phalerum and that toward the Piraeus” (1. 107). This series of walls that allowed for the
launch of the Athenian empire and which united the town and the Piraeus.
Xenophon reports the destruction of the wall and the downfall of the city in 405.
Like Themistocles, Theremenes also asks to be sent ahead to negotiate with the
Lacedaemonians. Lysias (who is clearly biased, but no less interesting for it) reports that
“though other people keep secrets to baffle the enemy, he refused to mention amongst his
own fellow-citizens what he was going to tell the enemy” (XII. 69).
It was out of desperation that the Athenians listened to Theremenes. As Xenophon
describes it “Now the Athenians, being thus besieged by land and by sea, know not what
to do since they had neither ships nor allies nor provisions; and they thought there was no
way out” (2.10). Despite the desperate atmosphere “no one wanted to make any proposal
involving the destruction of the walls” (2.14). Indeed, this was so distasteful to the
Athenians that “when Archestratus said in the Senate (boulª) that it was best to make
peace with the Lacedaemonians on the terms they offered—and the terms were that they
should tear down a portion…of the two long walls—he was thrown into prison and a
decree was passed forbidding the making of a proposal of this sort” (2.15). Theremenes
had negotiated with the Lacedaemonians, however, that the walls would come down and
he convinced the Athenians to accept this. “After this Lysander sailed into Piraeus, the
exiles returned, and the Peloponnesians with great enthusiasm began to tear down the
walls to the music of flute-girls” (2.23).
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The destruction of the walls occurred well after the dramatic date of the dialogue,
but far prior to the compositional date or (more interestingly) the dates of its early
reception. The Republic is filled with dramatic inconsistencies. Shorey safely situates
the dialogue “June…between 431 and 411” (1930, viii).321 Nearly every date between
these extremes has been chosen by some scholar or another. It is not necessary for Plato
to have had any particular year in mind. That is to say that it is not the historical
‘accuracy’ that matters, but the historical resonance. The mention of the Piraeus and of
Polemarchus in the first page of the dialogue would have brought all of this to the mind
of an early reader.
In fact, Plato does not just drop these important names but, in the opening lines of
the dialogue, he offers what seems to be an almost perverse parody of Polemarchus’
arrest. Both texts are concerned with the relation between what we call the public and
private spheres, and in both cases these intersect in streets and houses. In Lysias’
prosecution of Eratosthenes, the accused claimed that he was ‘just following orders’
(XII.24-33). He even claims to have spoken out against the measure proposing the arrest
and execution of wealthy resident aliens in order to gain revenue (cf. XII.6-7). Lysias
replies,
So then, most abandoned of mankind, you spoke in opposition to save us, but you
helped in our arrest to put us to death. And when our salvation depended on the
majority of your body, you assert that you spoke in opposition to those who
sought our destruction; but when it rested with you alone to save Polemarchus or
not, you arrested him and put him in prison (XII. 26).
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Cited also in Nails (2002, 326). For a discussion of the difficulties in dating the dialogue see Nails
(2002, 324-326). She sees the dialogue as difficult to date because of its “piecemeal” composition. She sees
several different dialogues, a “On Justice, or Thrasymachus” and an “Ideal State” or “Protorepublic” each
of which had a different dramatic date and a different set of characters whose ages may not be compatible
with one another.
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According to Lysias, Eratosthenes had a choice of whether or not to arrest Polemarchus.
The houses were divvied up between the oligarchs and most “entered your houses in
search of either yourselves or some member of your household” (XII. 30). But Lysias
admits that it would have been dangerous for them “not to go where they were sent, and
to deny that they had found their victims there” (XII.31). Polemarchus was not among
these who lived to judge those who entered their houses. “Besides, it was not in his house
( tª oﬁk€&), but in the street (tª ıd“), where he was free to leave him and the decrees of
the thirty in tact, that he (Eratosthenes) apprehended him (Polemarchus) and took him off
to prison” (XII.30). Because he just happened to see Polemarchus in the street,
Eratosthenes could have easily claimed that he never saw him at all and Polemarchus
may have escaped, like his brother Lysias.
This passage in Lysias highlights the distinction between the Piraeus and the
town, the public and the private, the street and the house. These same words are used to
set up the discussion in the Republic. While Socrates and Glaucon were at the Piraeus for
the festival of Bendis “Polemarchus saw us from a distance as we were setting off for
home and told his slave to run and ask us to wait for him” (327a). The slave grabs a hold
of Socrates from behind and Glaucon agrees to wait. When Polemarchus approaches he is
with Adeimantus, Niceratus and others.
When Socrates says that he and Glaucon are on their way back to Athens,
Polemarchus asks: “Do you see how many we are?”(327c). This is an implicit, if not
serious, threat of force. He then tells Socrates that “you must either prove stronger than
we are, or you will have to stay here” (327c). To which Socrates replies “Isn’t there
another alternative, namely that we persuade you to let us go?” (327c). Polemarchus
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replies in a way that is fitting of Eratosthenes “But could you persuade us, if we won’t
listen?” (327c).
An acute awareness of the tragedy of future events keeps this from being a sort of
cruel burlesque of Polemarchus’ arrest. It is through this exchange that Polemarchus
induces Socrates and Glaucon to come to his house. Commentators have pointed out that
due to this exchange we can see the discussion of the Republic as coerced.322 While these
final words particularly highlight one of the perennial problems of politics—that very
often people refuse to be persuaded and necessitate the use of force— I would like to
stress that here again Plato is using historical characters to open up a diachronic element
in the dialogue. The futures of the interlocutors highlight the extreme importance of the
conversation.
This becomes even more evident in the exchange with Cephalus which follows.
Lysias tells us that Pericles induced Cephalus to come to Attica (K°falow §pe€syh µ¢n
ÍpÚ Perikl°ouw). Cephalus appears in the Republic as a marker of time past; as
Protagoras in the dialogue named for him, Cephalus stands for better times, the “Golden
Age” of Pericles, whose democratic constitution the excesses of the Thirty would make
seem precious in retrospect (Letter VII 324d-e). Yet, he came from Syracuse and this
association should point us forward towards the Sicilian Expedition and ultimately, of
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“Socrates wishes to return to Athens, but is compelled to remain by the insistence of young men who
are not his close friends. Thus his subsequent speech, in which the just city is founded, takes place under
the shadow of constraint…The beginning of the Republic, the dialogue devoted to justice, shows
dramatically how the just city has its origins in injustice or constraint” (Rosen 1988, 106). There is
something perverse in Rosen’s comments if we do not take who is constraining and in what way into
account. The point seems rather to be that even if one were to attempt to found a just state it would be in a
world where Critias’ and Eratosthenes have already reigned. Thus, it is impossible to start from scratch.
The constraint is a necessary condition of history.
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course, to the disastrous rule of the Thirty. The initial conversation between Cephalus and
Socrates is a meditation on aging and the passage of time.
When Cephalus welcomes Socrates, his first words differ only slightly from those
of Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue, reproaching him for not “coming down to
the Piraeus” often enough. Cephalus immediately mentions his own inability to
reciprocate by coming up to the town because of difficulties of old age. He says, “If it
were still easy (eﬁ µ¢n går §g∆ ¶ti §n dunãµei ∏ toË =ad€vw) for me to walk to
town, you wouldn’t have to come here” (328c). Cephalus uses the word ¶ti or ‘still’ with
capability, or dunãµei, in a conditional clause. The complaints that his peers make
regarding old age are complaints about the impingement of time on possibility. He relates
his desire for conversation with his desire to see Socrates and so he stresses that Socrates
needs to come more often (puknÒteron deËro) (328d). Cephalus explains that his
desire for conversation is inversely proportionate with his desire for physical pleasures
(328d). The first words point towards the same concern with temporality that this
dissertation has examined. The statements of Socrates confirm this. He stresses his
interest in examining his life as a whole. He says,
I enjoy talking with the very old (to›w spÒdra presbÊtaiw), for we should ask
them, as we might ask those who have traveled a road (ıdÒn) that we too will
probably have to follow, what kind of road it is, whether rough and difficult or
smooth and easy. And I’d gladly find out from you what you think about this, as
you have reached the point the poet calls “the threshold of old age (328d-e).
Socrates brings together here everything that has already been said in the dialogue.
Socrates went down to the Piraeus and he and Glaucon are ‘arrested’ on the road home by
Polemarchus and his friends. Then at Polemarchus’ house, Cephalus remarks that
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Socrates needs to come down to the Piraeus often because his own age keeps Cephalus
off the road. Socrates knows that he too will go down the road into old age and so asks
Cephalus about it. He cannot, of course, know whom or what he will meet on the road,
only its basic contours. If one is prepared for these then one may be better prepared to
meet those occurrences that one cannot foresee. The remaining remarks of Cephalus
testify to this.
Cephalus answers not only with his own opinions, but also reports of those who
are in his age group, or generation. The word that Cephalus uses is ≤lik€an which means
a time of life, or as a substantive, ‘age group’ (Liddell and Scott 1897, ad loc). He says
that those of the same age “often get together” (329a). Age groups do not only associate
with one another. If this were true then, of course, there would be no such thing as the
education or the corruption of the youth. Nevertheless, it is age-group which is here
mentioned as a form of alliance of association, as opposed to national identity, clan,
deme, or any other such affiliations. When the age group of Cephalus comes together,
the majority complain about the lost pleasures they remember from their youth,
those of sex, drinking parties, feasts, and the other things that go along with them,
and they get angry as if they had been deprived of important things and had lived
well but are now hardly living at all (329a).
This group is unable to see their present situation in a clear fashion. In fact, he tells us
that they all but define life, or its value, as the “lost pleasures remembered from their
youth.”
Another faction of the elderly do not complain about the loss of the pleasures of
youth, but “moan about the abuse heaped on old people by their relatives (oﬁke«n), and
because of this they repeat over and over that old age is the cause of many evils” (329a-

262

b). For these it is the social implications of old age that seem onerous. Cephalus thinks
that both groups are mistaken “for if old age were really the cause, I should have suffered
in the same way and so should everyone else of my age (≤lik€aw)” (329b).
In order to explain the true cause, Cephalus recites a story where someone asks
Sophocles about sex and he replies “I am very glad to have escaped from all that, like a
slave who has escaped from a savage and tyrannical master” (329c). Cephalus claims that
we have many mad masters from which age helps to free us.
The real cause isn’t old age (g∞raw), Socrates, but the way people live (trÒpow
t«n ényr≈pvn). If they are moderate and contented (kÒsµioi ka‹ eÎkoloi),
old age, too, is only moderately (µetr€vw) onerous; if they aren’t, both old age
and youth are hard to bear (329d).
If we read this in light of what we have already seen, we could say that the miseries come
from the tendency to define pleasure in terms of the moment rather than the life as a
whole. When one is a youth one is obsessed with the momentary pleasures of youth.
When one is old, one may still be obsessed with the momentary pleasures of youth, but
now with their present absence.
Socrates asks Cephalus whether he is not happier than others in old age because
he is wealthy. Cephalus and his sons were among the wealthiest families in Attica. They
were Syracusean-born shield-manufactures, or arms-dealers. Cephalus claims that wealth
is somewhat accidental. It can keep one from suffering certain things, but it cannot make
one happy. Cephalus first quotes Themistocles. “When someone from Seriphus insulted
him by saying that his high reputation was due to his city and not to himself, he replied
that, had he been a Seriphian, he wouldn’t be famous, but neither would the other even if
he had been Athenian” (329e-330a). This acknowledges the element of chance in our
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fates but does not allow them to be counted either as a cause.323 One cannot control the
circumstances of one’s life, but one can respond to them in a variety of ways. In his next
statement Cephalus compares wealth with nationality. He says, “The same applies to
those who aren’t rich and find old age hard to bear. A good person wouldn’t easily bear
old age if he were poor, but a bad one wouldn’t be at peace with himself even if he were
wealthy” (330a).
The tragedy of temporality is that there was no way that he could have foreseen
that his son and heir Polemarchus would be killed precisely because of his city of origin
(at least negatively, i.e. that it was somewhere other than Athens) and his wealth.
Theognis and Peison pointed out to the other members of the Thirty that “among the
resident aliens there were some who were embittered against the administration, and that
therefore they had an excellent pretext for appearing to punish while in reality making
money” (Lysias XII. 6-7). The Thirty were able to use foreign origin as a pretext to take
money. “But our wealth impelled them to act as injuriously towards us as others might
from anger aroused by grievous wrongs” (XII. 19).324
Socrates’ question about inheritance brings the discussion again towards death.
Cephalus describes the differences in fortune that the generations of his family have
experienced (330b). Then Socrates asks him what is “the greatest good you’ve received
from being wealthy?” (333d).
Cephalus is aware that his account of death may not persuade many people. They
have been discussing wealth (ploÊtow) and Cephalus turns the discussion towards the
323

Cf. Protagoras 345b-c.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “even if someone has lived in blessedness until old age,
and has died appropriately, many fluctuations of his descendants’ fortunes may still happen to him”
(100a20-25).
324
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underworld. He has shown how many of the aged are obsessed with the distant pleasures
of their youth. Now he tells us that when one is “closer to what happens in Hades and has
a clearer view of it, or whatever it is, he is filled with foreboding and fear, and he
examines his life to see whether he has been unjust to anyone” (330e). This is, of course,
not the time that one should begin examining one’s life, asking after the fact, whether or
not they have been just. “If he finds many injustices in his life, he awakes from sleep in
terror, as children do, and lives in anticipation of bad things” (330e). Not anticipating
one’s life, or looking at it as a whole, forces one to contemplate it as such, when it is too
late. This in turn forces one’s glance forward into the underworld and the many bad
things to come. Money can help us avoid doing shameful things and thus eliminate a few
injustices for which we may have to pay later. We see that eventually we will be forced to
look at our lives as a whole and it is, therefore, better to do it sooner than later.
Many turn to philosophy at an old age, when, on the one hand, their desires
subside, and on the other, death draws near. Polemarchus, who here inherits the argument
and a promise of complete inheritance, turned to philosophy, we are told, before he died
at a young age. The difference is that he did not see his death coming immediately. This
is perhaps the point. We know that death will come and we do not know when and so one
must live in such a way as those old men who think about the justice and injustice of their
actions, as if death is always approaching. Yet, the Republic (book VIII particularly) will
show us that a good man is not enough; the generational nature of our life makes politics
necessary.
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The account inherited by Polemarchus says that justice is “to give each what is
owed to him” (331d).325 Plato has the character of Polemarchus defend this claim,
because his fate provides an ironic exemplum of how this definition can be disastrously
unjust unless someone truly knows what is owed. One may claim with Lysias that
This was not the treatment we deserved (éj€ouw) at the city’s hands, when we had
produced all our dramas for the festivals, and contributed many special levies;
when we showed ourselves men of orderly (kosµ€ouw) life, and performed every
duty laid on us (prostattÒµenon) (Lysias XII. 20).

Without any standard of truth, then it is a matter of the stronger enforcing what he
believes is owed to him and rather than receiving what he was “owed” for his service to
the city
Polemarchus received from the Thirty their accustomed order to drink hemlock,
with no statement made as to the reason for his execution…And when he was
being brought away dead from the prison, although we had three houses amongst
us, they did not permit the funeral to be conducted from any of them, but they
hired a small hut in which to lay him out (XII. 18).
The example of Polemarchus tragically shows that a seemingly reasonable definition
such as that offered by Cephalus and inherited by Polemarchus, has no stability unless
there is a standard by which to determine what is owed to each.326 If each determines
what is owed to him or her, then might truly makes right and justice is the “advantage of
the stronger” (338c).327 In that case, if the maniac, who demands his weapons back, is
stronger than the one to whom he lent them, it is just for the maniac to take them (331e).
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Cf. Critias’ definition of sophrosune at Charmides 161bff.
Devin Stauffer points out that Polemarchus’ statement of the definition differs from his father’s in that it
“leaves out part of telling the truth” (2001, 27).
327
That Critias’ definition is so similar to Polemarchus’ shows the danger of disagreement about what is
owed.
326
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Plato sets the Republic at the house of Polemarchus to show just how serious this
discussion is, and the human toll such man men may exact.
In this chapter I have shown how Plato uses the figures of Cephalus and
Polemarchus in Republic I to set up the effects that the passage of time and relativism
have on the effects of a particular conception of justice. The same conception of justice
that paid off for Cephalus, was disastrous for Polemarchus. In order to show this Plato
has relied upon his readers’ independent information regarding these characters, most
obviously Lysias’ speech Against Eratosthenes. In the next chapter, I examine Socrates’
explicit claims about the nature and dangers of generational decline as they occur in
Republic VIII.
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Chapter 11
On Generations and Corruption in Republic VIII
In Republic VIII, Plato presents his most specific and pessimistic view of
human generations and the decline that often accompanies generations. This chapter
shows that it is not only time within an individual’s life that makes virtue so difficult, but
intergenerational time, or history, compounds the problem and makes proper education
essential. I show that book VIII uses this experience of time and the multiple influences
within a city—beginning with individual households—to show that if one does not
establish a just society and leaves justice to chance, then the generational nature of
human life will compound this careless error until it reaches tyranny.328

Isomorphism and Decline
Since Aristotle, commentators on Republic VIII have been vexed by Plato’s
account of decline in Book VIII. Julia Annas complains that the account is “confusing
and confused” (1986, 294). When we look at Aristotle’s criticism of the Republic in
Politics I and recall Socrates’ reiteration of the importance of “the community of women
and children” at the end of VII and the beginning of VIII, we see that the household
(o‰kow) is the element missing from most accounts of the unjust regime. The account of
decline will necessarily appear confused if one does not take the household into
consideration. It is the household that begins and furthers each step of decline in both the
city and the soul. In this chapter I highlight the effect of the household on the decline of
328

Perhaps Plato is pointing out the impossibility of such a project—or at least the radical difficulty of
it—and explaining the inevitability of tyranny in human society.
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the city and the soul in book VIII. In so doing, I will show that it is the reintroduction of
the household that destroys the analogy between the city and the soul and allows for
generational decline. I will show how the passage of time affects larger
groups—households, clubs, factions and cities—and how these in turn affect the
individual’s experience of this passage.
Jonathan Lear329 argues that the point of VIII is precisely that what he calls the
isomorphism between the city and the soul is no longer simple, because of the processes
Lear calls externalization and internalization. Lear defines externalization as “the
process, whatever it is, by which Plato thought a person fashions something in the
external world according to a likeness in his psyche” (Lear 1992, 192) and internalization
as “the process, whatever it is, that Plato thought grounded cultural influence” (Lear
1992, 190).
Lear argues that internalization and externalization account for the
isomorphism—or the lack of it—existing between the city and the soul.330 “The point of
Plato’s argument is that there is only one relatively stable equilibrium position between
inside and outside. Only the just polis and its citizens are so structured that the various
internalizations and externalizations will maintain harmony in each” (Lear 1992, 207).
Of an unjust city or psyche Lear says,
So for any pathological structure F*, one should not expect that an F* polis is an
immediate and simple externalization of F* citizens. Nor should one think that F*
citizens are shaped by a simple internalization of the structure of the F* polis. The
329

I am greatly indebted to Lear’s article and agree with it on many of its main points. I think, however,
that Lear’s account leaves out an important element and thus fails to reach a comprehensive understanding
of the issues he discusses. My purpose is to flesh out that account and answer several other questions by an
analysis of the household’s role in internalization and externalization.
330
Myles Burnyeat claims that “The city side of the analogy takes over” in Book VIII, but he is speaking
primarily in a formal sense, “The soul is depicted in ever more vividly political terms” (1997, 226). It is
my intention to show why this is the case.
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whole point of F* being pathological is that no such simple mirroring relationship
can occur (1992, 207 n.112).
Lear’s account is compelling. It seems clear that a lack of harmony between city and soul
is the hallmark of pathology, or injustice. Lear is effectively saying that there is not
proper analogy between the city and the soul precisely because they are pathological and
they are pathological because there is not a proper relation between them. It seems as if
Plato maintains a parallel between unjust cities and unjust souls, but the point is that each
term in the isomorphism is itself skewed due to an improper relation with the other. The
real beginning of this impropriety lies in the private household.
In the explanation that follows, Lear accounts for one of the elements that
produces the disanalogous relation between the city and the soul. He says,
So, for example, the democratic polis is shaped not only by the degenerate son of
the oligarchy, but also by the rebellious poor (556c-557a). However, the
rebellious poor also had their psyches shaped via internalizations of previous
externalizations of oligarchic rulers. And both they and the democratic man—the
metaphorical and literal sons of the oligarchy—help to shape the democratic polis
via externalization of the structures of their psyches (207 n. 122).
The relation as Lear states it is still exclusively between the psyche and the city, or the
internal and external.331 He complicates the account by showing that the ‘other’ psyches
are also formed by the same process of internalization. He wants to portray Plato’s
account as “a dynamic account of the psychological transactions between the inside and
the outside of a person’s psyche, between a person’s inner life and his cultural
environment, between intrapsychic and interpsychic relations” (Lear 1992, 184). In
attempting to see “what holds a person together” (Lear 1992, 185), Lear discusses the

331

At least in terms of the soul of the philosopher, which is the true parallel to kallipolis.
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family, but he does not see it as the partition separating the ‘inner life’ from the ‘cultural
environment.’ The household, in all but the just city, is the seat of both money and
honor.332 It is also the site within which opposing forces form and create a child, often for
different reason. Thus the household is the seat of generational conflict. I will show that
the household provides an intermediate level between what one considers internal and
external and is the medium of the processes that Lear calls internalization and
externalization.

Household and The Externalization of Injustice
Aristotle says “we should all call the household more of a unit than the polis and,
and the individual more of a unit than the household” (1261a20-21).333 Aristotle claims
that, because of these degrees of unity, Plato’s attempts at a more unified polis would
produce “first a household instead of a polis, and then an individual instead of a
household” (1261a18-21). For Aristotle, this means the destruction of the polis.
Nevertheless, we can see in his criticism, part of the rationale behind Plato’s attempt to
eliminate not the polis, but the household. For, based on Aristotle’s claim, wherever the
household is present, any relation between city and soul will be mediated by the
household. In the just city one identifies with the entire city as mine.334 But in the unjust
city one must identify first with the household and then identify the household with the
332

Even in kallipolis it would seem that the artisans have private houses and money, but the sphere of
disturbance is limited by the strict segregation of classes.
333
James Davidson puts it in a similar way when he says “Between the citizen and the state lay the
oikos…In Athens it found itself in a rather precarious position, squeezed between the stronger claims of
individual and polis. For the special relationship between city and citizen which is such a defining feature
of classical Greece in general and of democratic Athens in particular could only be achieved by damping
down other affiliations that might get in the way”(1998, 183).
334
Cf. Republic 462c and Politics 1261a33-1262a30. It is worth noting that the ‘sense’ of family must not
be eliminated, but rather it must be transferred to the city (463d).
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city. One would most logically identify with the thing most like oneself and through it
with something less like one’s self. This is the essence of the argument given by Socrates
at 415a, 423e-424a, 449d, 462c-464c.
The private household is the fundamental locus of both wealth (property) and
honor and in it the two are inseparable. Household relations in Athens were more
complicated than ours are. Since the pre-industrial household is the site of production as
well as consumption, the Greeks meant by the household or o‰kow much of what we
mean by the ‘private sector.’335
One chose one’s marriage partner (or one’s father chose for one) very carefully.
There were economic alliances, ancestral nobility and the simple dowry itself to consider.
Indeed, when Glaucon is suggesting that the unjust man receive the benefits of justice, he
says,
He rules his city because of his reputation for justice; he marries (gaµe›n) into
any family he wishes; he gives his children to anyone he wishes; he has contracts
and partnerships with anyone he wants and in all these ways he profits . . . and he
becomes wealthy, benefiting his friends and harming his enemies (toÊw te eÔ
poie›n ka‹ toÁw §xyroÁw blãptein)” (362b2-c1).
Marriages, contracts, and partnership are sources of philia and are at least potential
sources of profit, honor, or pleasure. So, it is the identification with the household as
mine (instead of with the city as ‘mine’)336 that I create negative conditions in society at
large which inadvertently affect the children to whom I hoped to bequeath a better life.
That is to say that the conditions of my achievement of the ends proscribed for me by my
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The household was also a center of religion, but we must recall that the reforms of the Republic also
contain extensive religious reforms.
336
462c1-2
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overall conception of the good, will necessarily change the larger cultural situation and
will affect my children in unexpected ways. Lear describes the situation as follows:
His son, having his appetites both encouraged and held down, becomes an
interpsychic correlate of the appetites within the father. However, as a member of
the outer world, the son is open to other polis influences. The oligarchic father
encouraged prodigality outside the family, but Plato’s point is that this prodigality
cannot, finally, be kept outside (1992, 203).
The household was certainly not an insulated entity free from external influences. But the
father always thinks that it is. The identification with the family and the attendant attempt
to gain more money, honor, or pleasure for what is ‘mine’ causes a blindness to the
conditions of society as a whole. One always wants one’s family to be an “outstandingly
happy group” (420b7).
The household was, in fact, the primary means of both the acquisition and the
reinvestment of wealth.337 Aristotle notes the acquisitive nature of the household. Even
acquisition not directly concerned with the household arises ultimately out of it.338
Secrecy provided by households is one of first causes of strife in the city.
Such people will desire money just as those in oligarchies do, passionately
adoring gold and silver in secret. They will possess private treasuries and
storehouses, where they can keep it hidden, and have houses to enclose them, like
private nests, where they can spend lavishly either on women or anything else
they wish (ÉEpiyuµhta‹ d° ge, ∑n d §g≈, xrhµãtvn oﬂ toioËtoi ¶sontai,
Àsper oﬂ §n ta›w Ùligarx€aiw, ka‹ tiµ«ntew égr€vw ÍpÚ skÒtou xrusÒn
te ka‹ êrguron, ëte kekthµ°noi taµie›a ka‹ oﬁke€ouw yhsauriÊw, o‰ y°µenoi
ín aÈtå krÊceian, ka‹ aÔ peribÒlouw oﬁkÆsevn, étexn«w neottiåw
ﬁd€aw, §n ïiw énal€skontew gunaij€ te ka‹ o‰w §y°loien êlloiw pollå ên
dapan“nto) (5484-b).
The ability to acquire in secret creates both distrust and increases desire and lawlessness.
In this regard it is similar to the ring of Gyges. As the myth shows, when he had the ring,
337
338

When Socrates mentions the abolition of private houses, he does so in terms of ‘livelihood’ (464b9-c4).
Politics I.ix

273

first of all “he seduced the king’s wife, attacked the king with her help, killed him and
took over the kingdom” (360a7-b1).
One not only makes money through the house and stores it in its privacy, but one
makes money for the house; one saves it for the sake of future generations. This is part of
“ordering what nature provides”339 This is made clear by the discussion with Cephalus in
Book I. He says,
As a money-maker (xrhµatistÆw) I’m a sort of mean between my grandfather
and my father. My grandfather and namesake inherited about the same amount of
wealth (oÈs€an) as I possess but multiplied it many times. My father, Lysanias,
however, diminished that amount to even less than I have now. As for me, I’m
satisfied to leave my son’s here not less but a little more than I inherited (330a8b5).
It is important to notice that Cephalus wants to give more to his children than he had, but
not much more. Others, like his grandfather wanted to give much more, while his father,
as a result, was able to give much less.340 In any case one identifies with one’s family as
one’s own more than one does with the city for reasons that, as we have just shown, are at
least partly economic. This is what we could call the material element of the household
and it is one of the reasons Socrates wants to eliminate the family.341 But, even on this
ground floor of the household, we can see that its nature is primarily generational, or

339

Cf. Politics 1258a25-26. Jowett’s translation.
“The experience of Cephalus’ family seems to have been quite typical in the classical period and
fortunes went with an alarming rapidity. By tracing the family connections of those citizens who were on
record as performing ‘liturgies’ . . .the historian John Davies was able to calculate approximately the rate of
change among the upper echelons of Athenian society. He came up with only one family that was attested
in the wealthiest class over five generations and three hundred and fifty-seven families that seemed to pass
from ‘rags’ to riches and back to rags in the space of just one generation” (Davidson 1998, 184).
341
In the remainder of this chapter, I will show other reasons for eliminating the household.
340
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diachronic. One gets both one’s wealth and one’s character342 from the previous
generation and passes it on to the next; generations are demarcated along familial lines.
Though what we now term economics was an essential element of the household,
there was a great deal more involved. The household and the patronymic associated with
it, also provided the primary kind of what was called kl°ow in the Iliad and Odyssey.
One’s honor, or reputation is passed along by family name. So, indeed is citizenship,
often regardless of wealth.343 Before the reforms of Cleisthenes, familial lineage was
even more important.344 Thus, as the seat of both riches and honor the household is an
important source of pleonexia. Yet there was always a strong link between honor and
property, either human (slaves) or material (goods, or what we would call capital, the
ability to produce goods). Women, slaves and children increase the honor of the
patriarch, but his actions and accomplishments also lend honor to the family.345 The
household is the primary source of honor. One gained honor from one’s father (or
mother, in the case of Achilles) and later for one’s children.
The passage in Iliad XVI referred to by Socrates at 545d6-e1 may provide us with
an example of the interconnection between privacy and honor. Achilles’ honor was hurt
because his property was taken from him.346 The property has symbolic value in the
realm of honor or glory. The line referenced by Socrates actually concerns the setting fire
to the ships of the Achaeans, which is said to be it a direct result of the stasis, or quarrel
between Achilles and Agamemnon. Achilles himself says,
342

The myth of the metals, beginning at 415a, presents a pervasive comparison between character and
monetary value.
343
Cf. Politics. III.ii
344
Cf. Lintott (1982) 6,126.
345
Cf 549c8. I will return to this below.
346
This explains the easy transition from timocracy to oligarchy. It seems that it is often the same objects of
wealth that have a double value as objects of honor (551a5).
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The girl the sons of the Achaeans chose out for my honor,
and I won her with my own spear, and stormed a strong-fenced city,
is taken back out of my hands by powerful Agamemnon ,
The son of Atreus, as if I were a dishonored vagabond (Iliad XVI 55-58).347
This is passage highlights the connection between ancestral property, power, marriage,
and honor. It is because “Agamemnon, son of Atreus…goes in greater authority”
(XVI.53) that he takes the woman, who is a piece of property, an object of pleasure and a
sign of honor, from Achilles. This struggle over marriage (in a loose sense), honor, and
possession brought the flame of the Trojans upon the Achaean ships. Neither
Agamemnon nor Achilles thought of themselves in terms of the whole Achaean army,
rather both thought in terms of their own honor and possessions, their potentially
permanent and presently temporary household. The household keeps persons from doing
what their natural abilities prescribe for them. This is one of the main reasons the house
must be eliminated. It is a nexus of pleonexia. I want more; and since I will die, I want
more for my family. If I have a private house and family, we will all mean something
different by ‘mine’. Of this Socrates says,
If different people apply the term to different things, one would drag into his own
house whatever he could separate from the others, and another would drag into a
different house to different wife and children and this would make for private
pleasures and pains at private things ( Ùnoµãzontaw µØ tÚ aÈtÚ éll íllon
íllo, tÚn µ¢n eﬁw tØn •autoË oﬁk€an ßlkonta ˜ti ên dÊnatai xvr‹w
t«n êllvn ktÆsasyai, tÚn d¢ eﬁw tØn •autoË •t°ran oÔsan, ka‹
guna›kã te ka‹ pa›daw •t°rouw, ≤donãw te ka‹ élghdÒnaw §µoioËntaw
ﬁd€vn ˆntvn ﬁd€aw) (464c-d).
It is this identification with the family over the polis, as we saw above, that allows for the
production of detrimental societal relations. One must identify with the entire polis as

347

The translation is Lattimore’s.
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“kin” or there will be competing claims for loyalty. The identification with the family
causes one to neglect the welfare, or happiness, of the rest of the city, wanting only to
“benefit one’s friends and harm one’s enemies” (332d4).
Other forms of extra-familial association developed in the private sphere, but they
were always an outgrowth of the privacy of the family. Anything secret will be held in
suspicion. Once one moves beyond the individual, the private threatens the public.
Symposia and drinking groups were one important form of association, which, like the
family, threatened the separation, or what amounts to the unity, of the public and the
private.348 Instead of making the private public, as the just regime, such groups arouse
fear that they will privatize what is public and publicize what is private, not for the good
of the whole, but for the good of their group. Oswyn Murray notes that “the symposion
remained largely a private affair and aristocratic preserve; but the social attitudes which it
existed to promote required public display” (1990, 150). The couches Glaucon asks for
at 372d-e are furnishings for a private house and even a private room within that house
(the éndrÒn).349 The drinking clubs, or sympotic groups, were held in suspicion during
the democracy because of the secrecy of their meetings.350 In reality, however, these
associations were often based on the family and their activities could range from
business, to sex and politics. Whether or not one has actual family members in one’s
drinking group or political factions, it is the privacy of which the family is the primary
instance that makes these other forms of private association possible.

348

Even Socrates and those with whom he conversed were clearly deemed dangerous by the city.
For the privacy of the andron, see Davidson (1998) 44.
350
Fears of conspiracy are always the result of secrecy. See the almost incessant series of theories
concerning the Masons.
349
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That is not to say, however, that these other forms may not eventually overtake
the family, as happens in Thucydides’ description of the “civil war” in Corcyra in 427,
“Family relations were a weaker tie than party membership.” (III. 82). We shall see that,
for Plato, the forces within a household can destroy the household. Plato seems to have
learned something important by events like those described by Thucydides: if the
household can be destroyed by factions or other forms of civil strife, it may also be
eliminated by justice.351 The household is not just the casualty of civil war, for Plato, but
one of its root causes. If the household is the cause of civil strife, Plato cannot consider
the household ‘natural,’ for then justice is simply conventional, as Glaucon claimed
(359a2). In the description of the ‘primitive polis’ (372b5-6) there is no mention of the
family or the household. This does something to naturalize its absence in kallipolis.
Myles Burnyeat remarks, “No details are given to clarify the sexual arrangements, but if,
as seems clear, the children’s mothers eat, drink and then have sex with all the men…It
looks as though Socrates is sketching a primitive anticipations of the arrangements he
will propose” (Burnyeat 1997, 230).352 Indeed, he is doing more than that. In his
description of the primitive polis, Socrates is denaturalizing the household as the
fundamental mode of human organization.

351

The destruction of the household in stasis, or civil strife is not permanent. As Republic VIII makes clear,
it resurfaces even after its elimination by regime.
352
It is interesting that though Glaucon sees justice as conventional, his story of origins likewise neglects
the household as the fundamental unit of society (358e2, 359b5). Cf. Malcolm Schofield, “This general
approach to founding the city was taken up by Aristotle, but with the crucial difference that Pol.. I.2 makes
the basic form of self-sufficient community the household” (1999, 72).
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Household and the Internalization of Injustice
The identification with the household does not only introduce injustice into the
city, but also into the soul. We have already seen the ways in which the identification
with the family creates new social conditions, which in turn detrimentally affect the
family and the individual psyche. It is this aspect of internalization which Lear and others
focus on. Even within the family, however, there are many sources of psychic conflict.
Since the household is less unified than the individual, but rears the individual, the family
creates psychic discord from the very beginning. For Plato, all families are dysfunctional
because of their plurality.
The household consists of the ‘master’ the wife, the children and the slaves and
property (Politics 1253b,ff.). Each of these receives a different education, due either to
status, or in the case of father and son, time. Even if one is not formally educated, one is
always acculturated to hold something as good. Any group with a different education
will necessarily hold something different to be good, perhaps without even being aware
of it. Aristotle says that,
both classes (the ruled as well as the ruler) must share in goodness, but there must
be different kinds of goodness( one for the ruler one for the ruled)—just as there
are also different kinds of goodness among the classes of the ruled (1260a1-5).
While it may seem as if Aristotle comes close to quoting Plato here, the context makes
Aristotle’s argument completely different. For Plato, the only difference between the
young and the old within one class should be age and educational advancement. The
young should respect the old. So, Plato maintains something like Aristotle’s paternal
power within the class, but eliminates marital power and keeps the other, that between
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ruled and ruler, outside of the class. The entire city is the family (415a-c), but each class
will have its own good. Guards are not in constant contact with producers. Effectively
one’s class is one’s immediate family—the principle locus of rearing—and within a class
there cannot be different conceptions of the good. This is an important aspect in the
elimination of the family. Inequality among those rearing the same infant is potentially
disastrous to the character of the child. If only the guards educate the future guards, then
there will be no such disparity, but if each member of the family educates the child, then
the disparity will increase.
Socrates makes this clear when he argues for educational equality between the
sexes, “it’s foolish to take seriously any standard of what is fine and beautiful other than
the good” (453e1-2). The community of women and children is the “greatest good” (464)
and makes the “whole difference” (449d), partly because it eliminates the intrafamilial
strife which will be among the first things internalized by the child, because “it’s at that
time that it is most malleable and takes on any pattern one wishes to impress on it”
(377a10-b1). Before a child is ever exposed to the polis influences he or she is
bombarded with the various desires of his or her mother, father, other relatives and
slaves. The “other human beings” who first project images are family members and the
wall of the cave is the privacy of the household.353
The first way in which the child is conditioned by the family pre-exists the child
itself. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a complete analysis of Plato’s
program of eugenics. Nevertheless, to whatever extent he takes his analogy with
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I am referring to Myles Burnyeat’s discussion of the cultural implications of the allegory of the cave
(1997, 239).
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Glaucon’s hunting dogs (459a) seriously in what we would term a biological sense, the
family breeds worse children.
Lear claims any character type will organize his family around the good, which
organizes the rest of his life (1992, 202). If one marries for honor and one marries
someone who was already raised according to honor then one is not thinking about the
good of the child to be produced, but about honor. Likewise with money, or variety, so
that the stock of future generations will already be predisposed towards these goods even
before they are born. They are less carefully bred as a result of their parents’ often
conflicting notions of what is good and why one should marry.354 It is clear, however, that
the ‘biological’ damage is much less significant than the educational.
Women will be limited to certain goods by their own education and will marry for
the highest good expected of them as women.355 Socrates ironically claims that chance
will seem to govern sexual unions in the ideal city (460b). This statement is ironic for in
every other city the foundation of households involves little more than the chance
combination of incompatible goods within a private space. Furthermore, these
incompatible goods are set up in random orderings. Households like
buildings undertaken and completed by a single architect are usually more
attractive and better ordered than those which many architects have tried to patch

354

It is worth noting that if each character-type procreates or marries on the basis of its overall conception
of the good then the democratic man may indeed be like the city here and have any kind of hereditary
constitution for a son, since he would seek sexual variety. Sexual variety tends to destroy the family by
eliminating the legitimacy of offspring. Thus, the household may be destroyed by the variety that
determines the democratic man. If, however, he raised the children, then they would be potential tyrants
who, according to Plato, may end as patricides, again destroying the family. I return to this topic below.
355
The household will be detrimental in terms of breeding not only because of the flawed ideas around
which we construct our families, but also because of the enforced monogamy of women. If a good man and
a women produce bad offspring in a traditional family, they would try again with one another and not with
other people. Men had a wide range of sexual options open to them, while women were often and for the
most part cloistered away. See Davidson, 73-136 for an extensive account of Athenian sexual relations.
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up by using old walls that had been built for different purposes (Descartes 1998,
7).356
Only in separated but interdependent class can a city have different goods. Everyone
within what we might call a ‘rearing-unit’ will have the same job, either that of ruler or
that of soldier and the only difference will be in terms of what Aristotle terms paternal
power. The division of labor only works if the classes are raised separately from one
another. Since that is impossible within the household, it must be eliminated.
For better or worse, when there is a traditional household present, each
component (the objects of paternal, marital, and master relations) plays a role and each
organizes its life around a different good. We saw that these together can nevertheless
form a single power, a “small city” (Politics 1252a23-24), which fragments the city. The
first argument for the elimination of the family thus had to do with the injustice it
externalized into the polis due to competing senses of identification. Now we see that the
household likewise introduces strife into the individual before he ever enters the polis, in
terms of both “breeding and rearing.” One’s best intentions can do nothing to prevent the
eventual decay in character as long as there is a household which is less unified than the
individual and more unified than the city. Even if a man is just, when he has a child, if he
does not have a just wife and a just polis, that child will most likely not be just.357 One of
the points that Plato is making is that, without a just city and proper education, it is
impossible for the man to have a just wife. The internal strife introduced by the family is

356

Descartes’ analogy between ‘house’ and ‘consciousness’ permeates the second part of the Discourse. It
is perhaps for this reason that he needs to stress that he doesn’t wish to bring the entire city down, as Plato
wished. Descartes is, of course, speaking of houses as physical structures, rather than households,
nevertheless, the point regarding the tendency of things designed by a single hand to be “usually more
attractive and better ordered” is not affected by this difference.
357
We shall see this in our examination of the timocratic man below.
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one of the main arguments for the equality of women and the elimination of the family
and the equal education of women.
A human being is generated by more than one human (454d-e) and this biological
fact is one of the most potent sources of confusion and stasis in the human psyche.358 If
women help raise and educate children and are uneducated themselves they will instill a
great number of detrimental opinions in the children, “and the opinions they absorb at
that age are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable” (378d5-6). The mothers believe
“such bad stories about the gods wandering at night in the shapes of strangers from
foreign lands” and only thus do they “terrify their children with them” and “make them
more cowardly” (381d7-e3). Because the mother herself believes the tales, she is
possessed of a “true falsehood” (382a5) and will thus have no idea as to what to pass on
to her children as true or to best enable them to see the truth.
Inequality in the education of women will be internalized by the child and will
affect the overall character of the male and female children and thus women should
receive the same education as the men. This is roughly the argument as Annas presents it
(1986, 181-185) and her point is well taken that “Plato’s interest is neither in women’s
rights or their preferences as they see them, but rather with the production of common
good” (1986, 181).359 This is certainly Plato’s intention, for the point of his analysis of
the rearing is that if there is more than one common good among those who rear children
358

Eventually, even when managed as well as possible, the “nuptial number” will produce too many
children possessing qualities that differ considerably from those of their parents. Divorce, in contemporary
society makes this quite clear to the child itself. When the goods of the parents are recognized as
incompatible and they split up on the grounds of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and establish two separate
households, everyone involved sees the strife clearly. Plato wants to say that all households are at least
potentially two. Thus, Plato may tell us that it is not divorce which effects the psyche of the child as much
as the tensions of which the divorce was a manifestation.
359
Justice is ultimately the common good and so to Annas’ account we must also add that, regardless of the
quality of offspring, women must do what they can.
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then the children will be disadvantaged by confusion. Aristotle, like Meno, thinks that
women will do their best, if they stick to their own jobs (1260b18). While Plato thinks
that it is just for each to do his or her part, he also realizes that if part of a woman’s job is
to raise the very young children, then women must be educated in the same way as men.
Thus, the point is that Plato is not interested in the “rights” of any particular group and he
attempts to eliminate all potential factions, limiting such differentiation to the three
classes. So, while Plato is not particularly interested in “women’s rights,” he promotes
what he sees as the well-being of all citizens by eliminating sources of confusion and
faction.360 Thus, women must receive the education of their class in order that the present
and future state of the city may be one of health and justice. Though he is interested in
the whole, Plato also seems to hold that what is good for the whole is best for all
individual members of each group as well and Plato must have thought that such radical
reform would also be both better and more pleasant for individual women.
The lack of education in women was a problem of pedagogy for Plato, but it was
by no means the only problem. In most of the unjust regimes catalogued in VIII, the
father also lacks education and is formed by a mistaken concept of the good. The father
had a much greater ability to affect the son because he was the primary power in a
household.361

360

Of course, any talk of “rights” in an ancient context is problematic, for Plato is concerned with classes
of women, rather than individual women.
361
The father will instill into a child the apparent good for which he should marry (363a1), but the son’s
interpretation of this good will be different from the father’s.

284

The Conflicting Goods Within the Family
The father of the timocrat is a good man who minds his own business in a bad city
(549c). Though the text does not say explicitly why he married, it is likely that he married
for justice. It is part of his job to marry and reproduce.
[H]e’s not very concerned about money (Ùr≈shw µØ sfÒdra per‹ xrÆµata
spoudãzonta) and . .. he doesn’t fight back when he’s insulted, whether in
private or in public in the courts, but is indifferent to everything of that sort. She
also sees him concentrating his mind on his own thoughts, neither honoring nor
dishonoring her too much (•autØn d¢ µÆte pãnu tiµ«nta µÆte
étiµãzonta) (549c-d).
This makes it quite clear, on the other hand, that the wife married for money and honor,
for she is “angered by this” and disparages her husband to their son “over and over again”
(549d4-e1). She is apparently largely confined to the society of women and slaves and
has not received an education. Honor deriving from her husband or son is the highest
good available to her.362 The slaves feel the same way and both contribute to the son’s
discontent. The son is raised in the household composed of these disparate elements and
the household is likewise in a polis composed of disparate elements (it doesn’t matter
which other regime, simply in a badly governed one). He sees that “those in the city who
do their own work are called fools and of little account, while those who meddle in other
people’s affairs are honored and praised” (550a).
This is the level of conflict recognized by Lear, that between the household
influences and the polis influences. But, the conflicting influences within the household
are earlier and more pervasive in the child’s development. The mother was formed by the
362

The timocratic man’s mother is “at a disadvantage among the other women as a result” of her husband’s
absence from the ranks of the rulers (549c6-7).
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views of previous generations which were haphazardly composed of mixed goods
gathered from both the family and the polis. The wife wants honor, and money and the
husband wants justice. The husband is clearly more educated than the wife. He gives her
neither too much nor too little honor, but what is too much or too little for him will be
different than it is for her. In no other stage are the parents in open conflict with one
another. Indeed, this is the only regime where the wife is said to disagree with her
husband and even they are not said to quarrel or to be miserable; she just complains again
and again to the son (449c-d). But, like the timocracy itself, the marriage was a
compromise between two concepts of the good (547b6) and will produce a child who is
psychically compromised in the same way.363
Even if the timocratic son were to choose reason over honor, the grounds of his
choice would have already been determined by his mother’s desire for honor and he
would not be as reasonable or just as his father, except by chance. The very conditions of
his birth make him fragmented and he will most likely pass this fragmentation on and
compound it.364 It is tempting to think that the child might “side” completely with its
father and not compromise or reconcile any different positions. Unfortunately, Plato
seems to hold a more pessimistic position. Since the child is educated before he or she
has a chance to “choose” what we would call “unconscious” grounds for the child’s
decisions have already been made at the mimetic level (378d).
The oligarchic man is not concerned with education (554b4), but because of the
private household, he is the one who educates his son. When the oligarchic man chooses
363

This is one answer to the question of why Pericles and others were unable to make their own children
wise. Not only did most of the politicians not take sufficient care to educate their sons, they also married
for the wrong reasons and created unforeseen consequences by means of their policies and actions. Cf.
Protagoras 319e-320a and 324d-328a. Cf. also chapter 3 above.
364
Cf. 461a-b
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a “blind leader for his chorus” (554b5-6), he is also providing the steps for his son’s
antistrophe and becomes a blind leader himself. Education has little to do with his
acquisition and thus he ignores it. But he has force to back him up and to hold down the
desires produced by acquisition. His son, however, does not have the force that his father
does and succumbs to the desires and spends, rather than makes, the money.
The lack of equality in education and the marital system of classical Athens
would have almost assured that a man would marry a woman worse than he. For
instance, if one chooses a bride for money, like the oligarch, then one will already marry
the daughter of someone who is already an oligarch who has neglected education for
acquisition. Thus marrying according to one’s dominant good (if it is anything but
justice) is in most cases to marry someone unlike oneself, because one makes a choice
based on the qualities of the girl’s father rather than on those that she herself possesses.
She is already a generation removed from the goods valued by her father. This is both a
result and a cause of the decline that Plato outlines in Book VIII.
It is not the negative quality of any single parent that causes the deterioration that
Plato describes, but the difference and multiplicity of influences on a young child’s
psyche. If we return for a moment to the timocrat’s mother we can see the effect that even
the slightest disagreement can have on the entire series of births. The father was just, only
the mother desired money and honor among women (549c-e). This does not seem so bad
and the timocrat is really not a bad man, but the effects of this riff do not stop with the
timocrat. The wife’s good is not only the seed of honor in the youth, but also of wealth,
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which will torture him until it comes to full fruition in his own son.365 This effect
multiplies with every generation so that the simple love of honor, in the less powerful
parent, is enough, Socrates seems to be saying, to produce tyranny eventually. It is not
only in Hades that “we pay the penalty of the crimes committed here, either ourselves or
our children’s children” (366a5-6).

Miasma and Generation Gap
We have seen that the family must be eliminated by the just city in order to be
free of faction and division. It wants to be as static as possible. One of the most important
forms of social movement is generational.
F. Scott Fitzgerald is one of the great observers of generational difference. In an
early story he wrote:
Some generations are close to those that succeed them; between others the gulf is
infinite and unbridgeable. Mrs. Buckner—a woman of character, a member of
society in a large Middle Western city— carrying a pitcher of fruit lemonade
through her own spacious back yard was progressing across a hundred years. Her
own thoughts would have been comprehensible to her great-grandmother; what
was happening in the room above the stable would have been entirely
unintelligible to both. In what had once served as the coachman’s sleeping
apartment, her son and a friend were not behaving in a normal manner, but were
so to speak, experimenting in a void.366
This passage may help us to illuminate Plato’s ‘historicism.’ I would first like to argue
that within each generation there may be “hundred year” stretches during which the
generations are similar and mutually intelligible to one another and thus do not change
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This is not to say that it will necessarily come to fruition in the same family, or in a single generation.
One of the reasons that the decline occurs is that a variety of types exist within a single city and a single
generation.
366
Fitzgerald, F. Scott. “The Scandal Detectives.” Quoted in Cowley 1951, 7
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the household, the constitution or the individual in a great way.367 But, there will
eventually come a point, where the maintenance of these very conditions creates a
different social situation (The First World War, in Fitzgerald’s case) that fosters the
conflicts already present within the individuals of the younger generations.
The conflicting senses of good produce every generation, but, due to the presence
of other types within a city—types like Socrates—it seems possible to ward off decline
temporarily; but only temporarily, unless radical means, such as those described in the
Republic, are adopted. Thus, Plato’s “sociology” is not strictly “historicist.”368 He does
not wish to “predict” what may happen next—this is what the people in the cave do—but
to show that something will happen next and that something will be worse if education is
left up to the family. Thus, he argues, we should attempt to eliminate the difference
between generations and constitutions as much as possible.
Mrs. Buckner did not intentionally produce a son whose goods were unintelligible
to her. If we look at Fitzgerald’s description of the son we can see how it happens. The
son and his friend are enclosed in the privacy of the house and they think they are
“experimenting in a void.” It is precisely the “void” of the private house that allows one
to identify either with one’s family, or with ‘polis influences’ outside the family and thus
produce change. Plato’s point is that we are never in a void and we cannot trust “the most
important thing” to vague experimenting, for our experiments have consequences beyond
what we ourselves can see. I have argued that in the Protagoras, Socrates maintains that
one must look at one’s life as a whole—that is rationally— in order to become virtuous.
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I am not saying that Plato sees generations as a hundred years, but that a hundred years may pass without
any great generational conflict.
368
Cf. Popper (1950).
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If I am right, the Republic suggests that one must look at the city’s life as a whole, many
generations ahead, when thinking about political actions, if one wants a just city.
The inheritance of mutated psychological states does not occur due to ritual
pollution or miasma, but, as we have seen, through the pedagogical pollution of the
psyche. A child is both educationally and biologically circumscribed by previous
generations. Our cultural and biological possibilities exist as an outcome of the
exteriorization of the older generation’s psychic conflicts. The younger generation sees
its parents from another point of view than they saw themselves and in many ways, the
truth of the parent only becomes clear to the child.369 The household begins in the
compromise of marriage and creates a conflicted individual who brings further conflict
into the household and through it back into the city. The elimination of the household and
the communal raising of children by equally educated members of the same class is the
solution Socrates proposes.
The good man, father of the timocrat, never comes to personal ruin, because he
does not base his conception of the good either on the community at large or in the
family. Thus, as far as his personal virtue is concerned, it does not matter what regime he
lives in. Like Socrates, he is concerned with his personal virtue under whatever regime he
happens to live. This is a strong part of the argument for the necessity of politics.
Personal virtue is possible, but it is something of an anomaly and not easily transmitted to
future generations. Though “the just man” may raise his son in a just way, if he raises his
son at all it is in an unjust society. Because of the outside influences of this society and
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Thus, Lear’s mistake—leaving out the importance of the household in the unjust city—not only blurs
his account of the city-soul analogy, but it also makes his account of internalization and externalization less
intelligible. He claims that young mainly internalize and old externalize, but he does not recognizes its
overall importance to the argument.
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the other influences within the family, the son will rebel against the father and replacing
the true good with an apparent good. The danger is that he is formed so early on by a
multiplicity of influences. This means that even if a child has a good model from which
to learn, that model is only one among many. The child is forced to ‘adopt’ models when
he or she does not yet have the capacity to do so.
Like the conflicted timocrat, part of every son wants to “be more of a man than
his father” (550a1). He wants to be better than his father but because he is a product of
conflicting notions of what is good, he will not be able to determine clearly what is
‘better’ and his attempts to improve his lot will be at best “experimenting in the void.” It
seems that in Plato’s view the attempt of the child to be better than the parent will almost
always make the younger generation unwittingly worse. Thus, generational rebellion is
the worst form of domestic strife.370
The rebellious son is the result of the father’s “experiments” or mutations, as his
own children will be. Since these ‘experiments’ are almost exclusively failures, it seems
inevitable that the sons will come into contact with the ruinous consequences of the
pursuit of these. So the son will first “emulate his father” (553a8. Cf also 550a9-b1) but
will soon encounter the ineluctable results of the pursuit of honor or wealth. The timocrat
is merely tempted to be “more of a man” than his father. The oligarch then sees his father
“crashing against the city, spilling out all his possessions, even his life” (553a7-b1). The
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There are of course counter-examples, the most formidable of which would be the generation that would
take the radical measure to found kallipolis. Surely, they recognize the deficiencies of the older
generations—all of whom they expel from the city—and attempt to become better than them. This is a
peculiar case, for it is one that recognizes the its own actions as part of the problem and attempts to
eliminate them, by removing the family. Cases such as contemporary Iran and the later stages of the Soviet
Union are interesting. In both cases, positive change seems to occur because of the young people. In both
cases, the officials see the change as both detrimental and as a result of influences from outside of the
society itself.
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father “was either put to death or exiled or was disenfranchised and had all of his
property confiscated” (553b1-4) and the son “sees all this, suffers from it, loses his
property, and, fearing for his life, immediately drives from his own soul the honor-loving
and spirited part that ruled there. Humbled by poverty, he turns greedily to money
making (xrhµatisµÒn)” (553b-c). The bankruptcy (pen€a) of the first compromised
values will necessarily lead to other compromises and conflicts. The son did not choose
to love money, but was compelled to do so because of the poverty brought about by his
father’s love of honor.
The democrat “who is reared in the miserly and uneducated manner we described,
tastes the honey of the drones” (559c) who were created by his father’s usury (552b-e,
555c) begins to “indulge in every kind of insolence and to adopt their [“sophisticated
men”] ways, because of his hatred of his father’s thrift” (572c-d). He is the first to rebel
consciously and openly. He is not simply forced by different circumstances to adopt a
different good than that of his father, but he despises his father’s miserliness and it is
because of this hatred that he is insolent. He wants to “inflict every kind of punishment
on an unjust father” (378b). It is characteristic of each son that he sees that his father is
not just and wants to be a better man. The tragedy is, of course, that they are all right
except for the just man’s son in whom a false idea of the good was instilled by his mother
and slaves. Thus, from the oligarch down, the sons are accidentally correct in assuming
that their fathers are not just, but they have no grounds for their assumption since they do
not know what justice is. Since the son was educated by that father, the son will most
likely not do better (or not much better), but will probably end up less of a man than his
father, unless he meets with a haphazard polis influence like Socrates. The timocrat is the
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first to be filled with “the greatest falsehood about the most important things” (377e). He
is enacting the stories Hesiod was “telling us about how Uranus behaved, how Cronus
punished him for it, and how he was in turn punished by his own son” (377e-378a).371
Finally the tyrant rebels against all restraint and thus the family itself. He “would
sacrifice his long-loved and irreplaceable mother for a very recently acquired girlfriend”
and “for the sake of a newfound and replaceable boyfriend in the bloom of youth, he’d
strike his aged and irreplaceable father” (574b7-c3). He would enslave them and uses up
all of their possessions (574c). If he needs something from someone he is “willing to
fawn on them and make every gesture of friendship, as if he were dealing with his own
family (pãnta sxÆµata tolµ«ntew poie›n …w oﬁke›oi)” (575e5-576a2). He uses
violence against his father and is a parricide (569b). The savage part of the tyrant
doesn’t shrink from trying to have sex with a mother, as it supposes, or with
anyone else at all, whether man, god, or beast. It will commit any foul murder and
there is no food it refuses to eat (571d1-2).
In the myth of X we find out that a tyrant would even eat his own children
(619b1), thus effectively ending the familial line. But even as the just city maintains those
beneficial elements of the family (463d), the tyrant retains its negative elements within
himself and ends up embodying the conflicted and secretive nature of the household so
that we have “a household instead of a polis, and then an individual instead of a
household” (Politics 1221a18-21). This tyrannical individual still contains the elements
that began the conflict and thus Plato shows that if one does not educate women equally
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Much of the literature excised by Socrates presents either generational rebellion or marital strife. These
stories are the greatest falsehoods when they concern the gods, but they are true of the human community
when it is dominated by the private household and must be censored in order to halt the perpetuation of
such practices among humans.
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with men, if one has a household, eventually, one will produce a tyrant who himself
“lives like a woman, mostly confined to his own house (katadeduk∆w d¢ §n oﬁk€& tå
pollå …w gunØ zª) and envying other citizens” (579b6-c1) in the same way that the
just man’s wife did. Further he will be a “panderer to slaves” (579a2). He will have fully
embodied and come to live the conflicts which first reared their heads several generations
back.372
An unjust person may not become more unjust as time passes, but he or she will
produce a less just person eventually. Timocracy, oligarchy and democracy are not so bad
if we look at them statically. But the point is that they are not static. Plato is here similar
to a contemporary evolutionary biologist, in so far as he looks at dynamic populations,
rather than static constitutions. It is in fact, because of the dynamic nature of populations
that there is only one possible static constitution, that which eliminates the generation gap
as much as possible by eliminating the family. Even then the very nature of time and
birth will eventually cause corruption (546a-e). Other regimes may be able to maintain
the appearance of continuity for some period of time, but the haphazard nature of the
constitution—built either on compromise or conflict—will inevitably deteriorate further
and lead to tyranny.373 We might say that all political roads to do in fact lead to Rome, but
the Rome of Caligula and Nero, because of the way education is conducted in all but the
ideal regime.
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Of course, these changes do not necessarily occur within a single family. Plato’s scheme requires that a
given society contain instantiations of all of the types at any given time (except in kallipolis). In addition,
as I have shown, there may be generations in which no decline or perceptible change will occur at all as in
the case of Fitzgerald’s Mrs. Buckner and her parents and grandparents.
373
Cf. “Nevertheless some particular ones (cities) among them are enduring and are not overturned. Yet
many, from time to time, sink like ships and perish and have perished and will perish in the future due to
the depravity of their steersman and sailor who have acquired the greatest ignorance of the greatest things”
(Statesman 302a).
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Generational Decline and Moral Argument
Aristotle complains of Plato’s succession of regimes. He says:
Again we may ask why the ideal state should turn into a state of the Spartan type.
Constitutions change, as a rule more readily into an opposite than into a cognate
form. The same argument applies to the other changes mentioned by Plato
(Politics 1316a).
Popper claims that Plato presents us with a kind of historicist sociology in which “he
(Plato) will try to understand the laws of historical development. If he succeeds in this, he
will of course be able to predict future developments” (Popper 1950, 11). Julia Annas
puts the same problem in slightly different words when she asks:
But why should there be precisely four kinds of breakdown that are exactly
parallel in city and person? Plato is making a large unwarranted assumption in
taking it that the parallel between the unified city and the unified person will be
followed by precise parallels between four kinds of differently disunified cities
and persons (Annas 1986, 295).
Annas is more explicit than Aristotle and Popper in linking the problems involved in the
“historical progressions one from another” (1982, 295) to the failure of the city/soul
analogy. If this position were correct it would threaten the moral argument of the
Republic. If there is some other possible regime, or if the regimes do not have to move in
this way, then perhaps the just life is not the best. Aristotle, Popper and Annas, are,
however, all mistaken in their assessment of the argument.
An understanding of the role the household plays sheds considerable light on this
problem of why there are “precisely four kinds of breakdown” (Annas 1986, 295) and
why Plato presents them in the order he does. Plato, I take it, is not saying that a
democracy will always and only develop out of an oligarchy. Rather, the point is that, if
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humans are educated poorly, the next generation will most likely be educated in an even
worse manner. That generation will probably educate its children in a worse manner than
that in which it was educated. This structure makes these particular regimes less
important than the nature of decline itself. Plato is not presenting us with history, but
with an account of disruption and the decline of order. It is not any particular generation
that is so bad, but the tyrant they may all become, over the course of time. Plato shows us
this by taking a long view of procreation. Households and cities persist over a number of
generations and this is quite important in the story of decline. Only the just regime, which
starts ‘from scratch’ is fundamentally different from the others. This will save Socrates’
moral argument, but only at the cost of any normal, progressive idea of politics. Any
regime that is not as perfectly static as possible is separated from tyranny only by the
passage of time.374
In all but the just regime successive generations get progressively worse, and all
other regimes are effectively discounted. Any regime in which there are private
households will be plagued by love of money and love of honor. The love of money and
the love of honor both originate largely in the structure of the household and are
dependent upon hereditary relations. If there were a regime that was concerned with a
different good—power for its own sake, for instance—this power would still involve the
conditions of devolution, or conflict. There may be mixtures of these four different types,
but the mixtures will shortly play out into one of the basic character types that Plato
describes. He does not need to catalogue each mixture, because it is not the particular
character type that is important for Plato, but their diachronic relations between them.
374

This suggests the futility of all but perfectionist politics. Both Socrates’ and Plato’s lives seem to
illustrate this. See Apology (31a-e) and Letter VII (326a-b).
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While a democratic man by himself is not so bad—he settles down and finds some kind
of equanimity (561a-b)—he cannot be certain that the next generation, raised after his
way of life will settle down in the same way. This is because the child will be raised
within an entirely different context, the context produced in the polis by the actions of the
father’s generation. This is why Adeimantus agrees that the democracy does seem
pleasant, while it lasts (558a1). Even if decline is held off in some cases (this is how a
democracy can have all types) eventually generations will get worse.375 That means that
anything but the just regime is unjust.376 We speak of the tyrant as the completely unjust.
All other regimes are unjust in some way and thus they are all degrees of tyranny. The
passage of time necessitates justice, or eventually there will be tyranny.
Andrew Lintott explains that “Thucydides does not draw any distinction between
degrees of democracy. Democracy on the Athenian model is his base-line and from this
he calculates grades of oligarchy” (1982, 95). One could similarly say of Plato that he
uses the just city as the base-line from which he characterizes degrees of tyranny.377
When they finally reach the extreme of the completely unjust man or tyrant, we see that
the family has once again been abolished, though this time for the sake of pure injustice.
The tyrant is a parricide, would sleep with his mother and eat his children. All of the
horrors of the extreme case and the generational and pleonexic nature of the household
375

Further, this explains why no progressive politics is possible for Plato. We may be able to salvage a
democratic regime from tyranny temporarily, but as long as we don’t kick out the adults and start fresh with
the children, we will always eventually devolve to tyranny.
376
One may say that no perceptible triangle is precise, so why should we not eliminate all of them. The
answer is that, though a perceptible triangle may change and become corrupted, its corruption is not
successive. Triangles are imperfect, but they do not make mistakes. Geometry is a model because of its
static axiomatic nature. Socrates is trying to make a city as much like a “perfect triangle” as possible.
Mathematical “abstraction” is a kind of eliminating the imperfections of perceptible triangles.
377
The Socrates of the Republic only seems interested in perfect justice as a viable regime. The argument
of VIII suggests that this is indeed the only solution if one takes a long view. Perhaps Statesman 302b-303b
where each regime is doubled is a rethinking of this radical position. Since the perfect regime may in fact
be impossible, Socrates is quite interested in the pathology and decline of the imperfect character and city.
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produce effectively eliminate the viability of all intermediate positions.378 The engine of
decline common to all regimes is the household. The familial arrangement of the tyrant,
which is no more than flattery, eliminates the household in blood, while the familial
arrangement of the just city would eliminate even the dreams that Socrates claims the
best of us have about sleeping with our mothers, the dreams the tyrant makes real.379
We have seen that the household, as more unified than the city and less unified
than the soul, opens the possibility of discord in both the city and in the soul and allows
injustice to pass from one to the other most efficiently. The passage occurs in time and it
functions through generations. The recognition of the generational nature of the
household helps us understand the decline represented in VIII. The Protagoras shows
that in an individual life, a person must look at that life as a whole in order to become
virtuous and in the Republic, Plato shows that one must look at a city over the course of
generations in order to provide justice. The generations will not necessarily always
proceed in the manner described in Book VIII manner, but given enough time a pluralist
society not based on reason will eventually deteriorate and end in tyranny. If a given
society does not, it is only a matter of chance that it was destroyed or conquered before
reaching such a state. Plato sets up four styles of organization where the generational
transactions occur between conflicts internal and external to the household and show that
there is no static relation between the city and the soul as long as there are private
378

We always find ourselves living in an intermediate position and this contributes to the haphazard nature
of our education and ultimate decline.
379
In a society where all women of a certain age were one’s mother, incestuous dreams would not be as
horrific as they are in the case of a nuclear family (thus as Lear suggests, appetites, even the worst of them
are formed by internalization—without the extreme attachment to a single mother, such dreams would not
be horrific. So, though Aristotle criticizes Plato for making each mother only a 1/1000th of a mother (Pol.
II.3), we see that this serves for social unity. Actual incest, however, may turn out to be a statistical
inevitability, even if a rare one, unless intergenerational sexual contact is entirely eliminated. This itself
would be a radical claim for an Athenian.
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households. Thus there is no stable analogy or isomorphism between the city and the soul
as long as the household has not been abolished.
If there is any regime other than the just one described by Socrates, the individual
will be distorted by intra-economic and extra-economic conflicts and will create a greater
distortion in the family which will produce a great distortion in the city, which will
contribute to the detriment of the next generation until it finally devolves in to tyranny.
Thus any intermediate position which looks good in the present is discounted if it holds
within it what will later appear to be the mildest form of conflict between husband and
wife. Thus, once again, we see that an absorption in the present—or a failure to look at
both one’s life and the life of one’s kind as a whole—leads to injustice, unhappiness and
pain. Only by taking as large a temporal view as possible can we hope to see either a
virtuous individual, household, or society.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion

In this dissertation I have shown that the concern with the tendency to forget
ourselves in the flow of time, as it appears in the Protagoras, motivates Plato’s use of
historical characters such as Alcibiades and Critias and that the same concerns extend
throughout the dialogues in which these figures are represented. In the introduction, I
combined the work of Andrea Nightingale, Ruby Blondell and Frances Pownall in order
to establish a framework within which I was able to develop a theory of the intertextual
paradigmatic character, by whose presence Plato is able to open up a diachronic
dimension in the dialogue form in order to show the effects of time on virtue.
In the next four chapters, I laid out the philosophical framework for the rest of the
dissertation by means of an extremely detailed reading of the Protagoras, which focused
particularly on the effects of time on human virtue. In the remainder of the dissertation, I
traced these same concerns through the Alcibiades I, the Symposium, the Timaeus-Critias,
the Charmides and the Republic. In at least part of each of these dialogues, Plato is
primarily concerned with the difficulties presented by time and forgetfulness. In each
chapter, I argue, in some way or another, that the passage of time and our selfforgetfulness in the face of it, explains how it is that no one ever willingly does wrong,
but people, like Alcibiades and Critias, go so tremendously wrong. This also explains
why philosophy, and particularly a constant Socratic questioning, is so necessary: it is a
mnemonic device intended to remind us of ourselves. The constantly changing nature of
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human life in the world of becoming means that one does not come to realize that one
knows nothing of great importance once and for all. Rather, Socrates’ “human wisdom”
is a process of continually reminding himself by means of the elenchus.
Thus, in this dissertation, I have substantially contributed to our understanding of
(1) Plato’s use of historical characters; (2) his understanding of the human experience of
time; and (3) the nature of Socratic intellectualism and its relationship to error. My
concern with these problems is not only an academic one. If one takes the conclusions of
this dissertation seriously, one must take the Socratic claim that no one ever intentionally
errs as a grave warning. Part of my project has been to show that Plato uses characters
like Alcibiades and Critias—and shows them during their youth—in order to remind his
reader that these figures did not intend to turn out in the ways that they did. In this
conclusion, I intend to briefly discuss the more personal lessons I have taken out of this
project.
I undertook this work out of a sense of great fear. I took Socrates seriously when
he said that no one intentionally does wrong. Many scholars and commentators, I believe,
have missed the point in their discussions of akrasia and the topics surrounding it.
Socrates’ point is the same as that which he made in the Apology and so many other
places. He is pointing out that each one of us may, right now, be living in the midst of an
error so deep that it does not recognize itself. In this dissertation I have shown how
forcefully Socrates expresses that the true danger of forgetfulness is that it first and
foremost forgets itself. That is to say, in forgetting ourselves we also forget that we have
forgotten. The only way to remember ourselves is to ask questions constantly, both of
ourselves and others. This is one of the reasons that Socratic philosophy is essentially,
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and not only accidentally, gregarious. One cannot recall oneself to oneself sitting alone
in a room, but rather one must continually test oneself with others.
The lessons from this dissertation shows that the moment we are certain of a
course of action—when Alcibiades sets sail for Syracuse, or Critias kills Theremenes, for
instance—is the moment when we have most thoroughly forgotten ourselves and think
that we know things that we don’t know. Plato’s dialogues show us that we all need to be
our own “gadflies” and try to wake ourselves up. Most often we forget our lives due to a
temporal relativism which identifies with a particular temporal mode and makes
decisions on the basis of that temporal mode. “Waking up” is trying to see one’s life as a
whole. The only way we can see our lives as a whole, the only way that we can escape
temporal relativism, is through reason. Arguments enable us to take an entire life into
account, because the objects of reason are atemporal.
Too often, we read a Platonic dialogue in such a way that we identify with
Socrates. Thus, in a dialogue like the Euthyphro, one is tempted to ridicule Euthyphro for
not wanting to go through the entire discussion again at the end of the dialogue.
Nevertheless, most often, the reader does precisely the same thing when he or she closes
the book and goes about his or her business. I began this dissertation out of the fear that I
may in fact be closer to Alcibiades or Critias than to Socrates. Of course, these two
figures were very talented and ambitious and most of us are more like other more minor
interlocutors in the dialogues, Phaedrus or Eryximachus for instance. But the point is that
if one does not continually examine ones life it is only by chance and a lack of talent that
one is not a Critias. This is why Socrates says that the unexamined life is not worth
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living. One may live a relatively contented life during which historical events do not push
one to become vile or tyrannical, but it seems entirely foolish to bet one’s life on it.
Of course, one must ask, how does philosophy really help us in this case. It is
neither able nor does it want to predict the future so that we can plan ahead for a
particular catastrophic day. Rather, Platonic philosophy, as presented in the dialogues I
have studied here, is a way to deal with the radical contingency of human life in the
world of becoming. When one “thinks one’s life as a whole” one does not imagine every
particular and contingent event that will occur. Philosophy treats universals rather than
particulars and it is the thought of universals—particularly in the realm of excellent
conduct—that help to counter the danger contained in the contingency of particular
events, with which we, most often, solely identify while they are occurring. It is this
identification with a single particular mode (usually the present) as the totality causes us
to make most of our faulty decisions.
People undergo military training so that, when an unexpected situation arises in
the field, they know how to handle it. Often, in the military, it is the physical ability to
accomplish such acts in a time of stress and crisis that is practiced. At least a certain part
of Platonic philosophy seems to be the ethical equivalent. If one constantly thinks and
talks rationally about one’s life as a whole, when the unexpected, critical moment
arises—when as Crito says, “the time for counsel is past” (Crito 46a)— one will be able
to assess the situation correctly. As in the case of military service, the fear of death most
is one of the greatest dangers to self-recollection. But, the figures of Alcibiades and
Critias show us that we may also be lost in our own ambition for the future. Whether we
forget ourselves in memory of the past, ambition for the future or the presence of the
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present, the dangers of self-forgetfulness are great. If we take Socrates seriously, it is this
same self-forgetfulness that produced not only Alcibiades and Critias, but also Hitler and
Stalin. By incorporating the figures of Alcibiades and Critias in his dialogues, however,
and particularly showing them as bright young men, Plato presents a stern warning to us
and assures that the unexamined life is truly not worth living.
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